

Functional Area 48 (Foreign Area Officer) Review



**Strategic Leadership Division
G-3/5, Strategy, Plans and Policy
Headquarters, Department of the Army
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Executive Summary
Functional Area 48 (Foreign Area Officer) Review – July 2011

“Don’t be held back by conventional thinking...break some glass.”

MG Peter C. Bayer, Jr.,

Director, G-3/5, Strategy, Plans and Policy

1. **Purpose.** Force Modernization Proponents project, define and articulate requirements and develop programs to improve their career fields. In December 2010 the Staff Lead for the Proponent, MG Peter Bayer, Director, G-3/5, directed the Strategic Leadership Division’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Proponent Office, as the office of responsibility, to undertake a comprehensive review of the Foreign Area Officer career field. This report fulfills the Director’s requirement and will show Functional Area 48 (FA 48) as a strong, viable and relevant career field. This Executive Summary comprises the methodology, strengths, major findings and recommendations of the principle components of the review: structure, acquire, distribute, deploy, and develop. The enclosures capture the empirical data, analysis, and all findings and recommendations.

2. **Methodology.** Our goal was to determine, via rigorous research, analysis and debate, if the current program meets Army requirements, and where necessary, make sound recommendations for the future course of our program. Initial questions and subsequent discussions were primarily guided by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3, *The Army Capstone Concept*, and a compilation of writing by the 37th Chief Staff of Army (CSA) – six articles published in *Army* magazine from October 2010 to March 2011. Empirical data was carefully gathered from multifarious sources (surveys, conversations, articles, emails, etc.) and databases. The data and information was then critically analyzed and debated against the relevant FA48 lifecycle management components. The findings and recommendations were grounded by input from civilian and military professionals outside of our community, and a comprehensive, community-wide survey.

3. **Strengths.** Functional Area 48 is a healthy, vibrant career field with sufficient opportunity for assignment, development, promotion and professional growth.

- FAOs are the most regionally, linguistically, and culturally attuned Army Soldiers. They possess unique core competencies, key skills and attributes that will remain in high demand as the Army transitions and continues to operate under conditions of uncertainty and complexity in an era of persistent conflict.

- From our experiences over the last decade, we now have a cohort of FAOs who view the Army through lenses that have been tested by combat and developed by working with partners and allies to address 21st century challenges to the defense and security environment.

4. **General.** Based on our review, the following are general summaries for each component of FA48 lifecycle management:

A. Structure. Structure drives the personnel lifecycle by producing the demand for FAOs through the personnel authorizations on manning documents. FAO structure has grown substantially over the last seven years across both the operating and the generating force. During this time period, we have maintained approximately 75% of our structure in joint billets, and the remaining 25% in the Army. We expect FAO structure to remain stable, even as the Army begins force structure reductions. We make this assumption based on a number of current trends and initiatives: 1) Initial rounds of officer grade plate reductions have had minimal impact on FA48; 2) TF FAO Growth Initiative - 25% growth in FAO billets in targeted FAO Areas of Concentration (Middle East, Africa, Eurasia and Southeast Asia); 3) Steady flow of requests by Combatant and other Commands to recode billets as FA48; and, 4) Strategic and military guidance documents increasingly emphasize security cooperation – key FAO function - as a future, high priority mission.

B. Acquire. Acquisition ensures that the career field recruits and accesses officers with the right mix of education, training and experience to meet FAO structural requirements. The Army's current accession model (Functional Designation) is not adequate to fill the numbers needed to overcome the balance between our initial leader development timelines and the CSA's manning guidance to fill Army and Joint requirements for Majors. The Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP) is now being piloted as the Army's primary means of functional designation for Cohort Year Group (CYG) 2004 and younger to replace the Functional Designation Board. VTIP is a promising new accession strategy which may eliminate some of the quality, quantity and timing issues and increase utilization opportunities for our Majors. In the interim, coordination efforts are on-going between the FAO Proponent and Army G1 for viable workarounds.

C. Distribute/Utilize. Distribution describes how the career field manages the supply of FAOs to meet its structural requirement. While in general FAOs are being distributed and utilized according to policy guidance, there are two issues that deserves comment. First, although Human Resources Command (HRC) has successfully met the CSA's manning guidance in recent years, FAO strength projections indicate that HRC will be unable to meet existing CSA manning guidance in the coming years due to accession shortfalls in Year Groups 1993 – 1999 over the past decade. There are simply not enough FAOs to fill all the requirements. Second, DA Pamphlet 600-3 states that officers should have a breadth of experience prior to the Colonel's Board: "FAOs should ideally complete at least one assignment from three of the following five categories before promotion to Colonel: Overseas U.S. country team, Army operational, Political-Military, Broadening, and Institutional." The execution of this policy guidance has not been possible for all FAOs. Our research verifies that only 60% of FAOs acquire a "breadth of experience" prior to the Colonel's Board. Both issues require additional research in order to fully understand their impact on our mission; and, if necessary, recommend informed solutions.

D. Deploy. Deployment describes how the career field ensures that FAOs deploy worldwide to support operational commanders and other deployment requirements. FAOs are Soldiers first. While the FAO skill set is traditionally employed at the strategic level, commanders at the operational and tactical levels are increasingly requesting FAOs, an indicator that FAOs are proving to be a combat force multiplier for units in combat. Currently, 80 % of all FAOs have deployed in support of our Nation's wars, bringing unique skills to Army Field

Commanders and their staffs. When FAOs deploy, they predominantly fill FAO-coded billets, however this is not always the case. For example, 33 of 55 currently deployed FAOs fill FAO-coded positions. HRC is doing an outstanding job of identifying deployment opportunities, but must continue to push commands to code positions that best utilize FAO skills as “FA48 jobs.”

E. **Develop.** Development describes the education, training and experiential learning of FAOs from accession to retirement. In general, the existing FAO Leader Development Program builds the core competencies, key skills and attributes necessary to successfully meet current Army missions and requirements. However, to remain relevant as the Army transitions, we must revamp our Basic Leader Development Program (BLDP), and create a viable Advance Leader Development Program (ALDP). FAO Proponent must research, develop, fund and make available new education and training opportunities, both resident and on-line, that offer FAOs training and education in basic and advance expertise in cross-cultural competence, interpersonal communication, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational processes, and language proficiency, while sustaining regional and Profession of Arms expertise.

4. **Major Findings/ Recommendations.** The following are the MAJOR findings and recommendations of the review that the Proponent Office will action over the next six to twelve months. The enclosures capture all findings and recommendations.

A. **Core Competencies.** Our leader development policies, strategies and programs must emphasize new qualities required for FAOs to succeed as the Army transitions, while retaining those historical qualities that characterize our foundation. Specifically, in order to develop future FAOs to be operationally adaptive, agile, credible and relevant leaders greater emphasis will be required on cross-cultural competence, interpersonal communication, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational processes, and language proficiency. These core competencies, key skills and attributes, along with the requirements to be grounded in the Profession of Arms and to understand the depth, breath and context of the regions of the world in which our Army will operate, will form the FA48 Core Competencies for building future FAO Basic and Advance Leader Development Programs.

B. **Vision.** In order to inculcate the FA48 Core Competencies, we recommend the following vision as a guide on what we want to become: “Army Foreign Area Officers are Soldiers grounded in the Profession of Arms; who provide leadership and expertise in diverse organizations in joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environments; who advise seniors as regional experts; and who offer unique warfighting competencies – cultural capabilities, interpersonal communications and foreign language skills – that are critical to mission readiness of the Army in today’s dynamic strategic environment.”

C. **Acquire.** Accession of our officers at the seventh year does not meet the needs of the FAO program and has direct negative consequences on developmental assignments and utilization of our Majors. This is true for both primary methods of accession -- Functional Designation Board and Voluntary Transfer Initiative Program – which result in a 40% utilization rate and 60% Training and Holding Status rate at the Major grade plate. The FAO Proponent is closely coordinating with HRC and the Army G1 to modify the Army’s accession model for FAOs to be able to access qualified officers at the fifth and sixth, as well as the seventh, year of service.

D. Develop.

1). The majority of FAOs are unable to maintain language proficiency standards (2-Listening/ 2-Reading/ 1+Speaking) beyond initial training through “rigorous self-study and assignments...” as per the existing policy. Official documents show that only 38% of FAOs within the last year have current Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) scores in their official records. The FAO community must do better on maintaining this critical core competency. Thus, FAO Proponent will research, develop, staff, fund and implement new education and training opportunities to address this shortfall. Additionally, FAO Proponent, in conjunction with HRC and Senior Leader Development Office (SLD), will develop, staff and implement a management system that ensures FAOs at all grades maintain and annually document language proficiency requirements (2-Listening/ 2-Reading/ 2-Speaking).

2). The FAO Orientation Course (to be re-designated Foreign Area Officer Basic Course - FAOBC) is outdated and does not adequately meet education and training requirements needed to prepare the FAO and his/her family for the In Country Training (to be re-designated In Region Training) phase of our Basic Leader Development Program. Additionally, FAO Proponent must incorporate the new FA48 Core Competencies into the revamped course. Thus, FAO Proponent will develop, staff, fund and implement new education and training requirements for FAOBC that address these shortfalls.

3). Guidance found in DA Pamphlet 600-3 is not sufficient to meet new guidance on structured, self-development found in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, which states; “Structured, Self-Development (SSD) is planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual’s knowledge base, self-awareness, and situational awareness. It complements institutional and operational learning. It enhances professional competence and meets personal objectives. It is required learning that continues throughout a Soldier’s career and is closely linked to training and education in the Education System...SSD must deliberately link key leader attributes [FA48 Core Competencies] to a career-long, developmental trace of competency achievement.” Our goal, therefore, is to create a career-long system of development that interdependently links education, experience, training, broadening, self-development and competency achievement in a deliberate, yet flexible, progressive and sequential process.

A). In order to meet new SSD guidance, FAO Proponent, in conjunction with HRC, will research, develop, staff, fund and make available regionally-tailored, SSD opportunities that develop basic knowledge in FA48 Core Competencies, and complement the tenets of our Basic Leader Development Program – Language Proficiency Training, In-Region Training, and Advanced Civil Schooling.

B). Currently, Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels are expected to maintain FA48 Core Competencies via unstructured, self-development and experiences gained from repetitive, career assignments. Thanks to vast improvements in on-line technologies, mid-grade and senior FAOs will be able to take advantage of new and relevant courses that meet our advanced education and training requirements. Thus, FAO Proponent, in conjunction with HRC and SLD, will research, develop, staff, fund and implement a regionally-tailored, SSD Program

that builds and documents advance expertise in FA48 Core Competencies, and complements senior FAO skills and attributes gained from repetitive, career assignments.

4). Nearly 80 percent of the Army's senior leader assignments require talent in more than just the operational art. Despite this, the Army's tradition bound paths to enterprise leadership heavily transit operational assignments and draw almost exclusively upon "maneuver, fires, and effects" officers (primarily combat arms). According to DODI 1315.20, the Army is required to "provide for a career path and develop officers who have opportunities for promotion into G/FO ranks..." Promotion results over the last six years indicate that there is no clear pattern for promotion for FAO's to the G/FO ranks (rates for 2006-2011: 0%, 1.6%, 0%, 0%, 0.7%, 0%). To date, the Army has only promoted three FAOs to the rank of Brigadier General.

A). FAO Proponent should determine whether senior FAOs are being selected to GO at a rate commensurate with Colonels from the operational support and operational functional areas; and if necessary, gain Army G3/ CSA support for appropriate instructions to future promotion boards.

B). FAO Proponent should work with the GOMO to identify and recode, if possible, billets that would benefit from the FAO skill set which in turn would drive Army requirements to regularly select more FAOs into the G/FO ranks.

C). Keeping FAOs oriented on their particular regions is critical to their success, but there is an equally and admittedly conflicting requirement to keep FAOs well-grounded in the Army's operational ethos and sensibilities. Any advance leader development program for senior FAOs must - at some frequency - "re-green" these Soldiers. FAO Proponent must identify and seek opportunities in key developmental assignments in senior Army positions requiring FAO-related skills.

4. **Way Forward.** This review process will become a biennial staff exercise tied to the cyclic requirement to review and revise DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Chapter 28, Foreign Area Office, Functional Area 48*. Additionally, FAO Proponent will use this report to provide feedback to the FAO population on the health of their career field. This review is the beginning, not the end, of what will be the development of an FA48 Campaign Plan that sustains the program's exiting strengths and capitalizes on the findings and recommendations, ensuring that our future development strategies, training methodologies and personnel system all complement and contribute to the on-going evolution of the Army, as it too transitions as a Profession of Arms.

Enclosures:

Tab A - Structure

Tab B - Acquire

Tab C - Distribute

Tab D - Deploy

Tab E - Develop

Tab F - Vision

Tab G - Community Survey

Tab H - Senior Leaders Survey

Tab I - DA PAM 600-3, Chapter 28, Foreign Area Officer Functional Area (FA 48)

Tab A – Structure

A. **Introduction.** Unlike almost any other branch or functional area in the Army, the FAO possesses unique skills and attributes that are demanded throughout the Department of Defense, not just the Army. In fact, due to our focus at the strategic level, FAOs are more likely to support joint organizations for the majority of their career rather than the Army: Roughly, 75% of our structure is joint, and the remaining 25% of billets are in the Army. This simultaneously poses unique challenges and opportunities for the Army FAO program:

- Issue 1: What does FAO structure look like? What organizations are FAOs supporting?
- Issue 2: Do our FAOs provide expert Pol-Mil advice to the right senior leaders in the right places with the sufficient quantities of FAOs?
- Issue 3: Are we supporting the Army where we should be so that the Army gets its return on its investment in this corps of officers? And what about the future?
- Issue 4: Does this structure provide opportunity for career progression for our officers?

The overarching core question was, “Are we (the FAO Program) postured to be able to support the Army and Joint Force in 2020 and beyond”. The above questions were sub-components of this main question. The key word to note is “postured,” as we admit that we cannot fully predict where all of our positions will be in the future. However, by reviewing current Army and Joint mission projections,¹ we can speculate on the Army’s future structure to determine if we are correctly postured to influence the development of that future.

The ability to be able to place FAOs in the right places to influence that future is key. Structure is dynamic: We have added almost 200 billets in the last seven years, for example, and we anticipate additional changes in our structure in the future. Our FAO population can have a large and positive impact on whether that structure evolves in a positive way for the program.

Summary of Findings: FAO structure has grown substantially over the last seven years across both the operational and the generating force. During this time period, we have maintained approximately 75% of our structure in joint billets, with only 25% in Army billets. We can expect FAO structure will continue to grow, albeit not as rapidly as the Army reduces its end strength. There are no MAJOR findings in “structure,” and of the findings or issues indicated, none demand immediate attention.

B. **Regulation/Policy Guidance.** *Nothing significant was noted in DA Pam 600-3 with respect to the lifecycle; and as such, this review found nothing to change in this section of DA PAM 600-3. It simply states:*

¹ Some of the following documents were used in developing the vision of where the FAO program would fit in the future of Army Operations: Tradoc Pam 525-3-0 Army Capstone Concept; Tradoc Pam 525-3-1 Army Operating Concept; Army Leader Development Strategy; Capstone Concept for Joint Operations; Joint Operating Environment 2010. It is from this vision that we were able to develop the overarching questions that guided our investigation.

*“Structure. The FAOs serve at all echelons worldwide. The FAO positions exist on the Army Staff, in ASCCs, Combatant Commands, Joint Commands, Defense Agencies, National Agencies, and the institutional Army. The Active Army life-cycle development model for FAOs is shown at figure 28–1. It depicts FA qualification requirements and key developmental assignments.”*²

C. Issues/Findings/Recommendations.

1) **Issue 1:** What does our current structure look like?³ This section will give background information that will form a basis for much of the other research not only in the structure analysis, but for the entire FAO review.

A) **Finding 1.1:** Overall observations on FAO structure (see figures A1-4).

There are a total 924 billets across all AOCs. This is an increase of 30 billets (total 894) for FY10. Over the last seven years (FY05), FAO structure has grown from 737 to 924 billets or 187 billets. While we have no evidence to say why this has occurred, we can infer that this is due to the growing recognition of the service FAOs provide to the Joint and Army forces.

Overall 75% of the FAO force is outside of the Army indicating great opportunity for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multi-national (JIIM) experiences. The percentage of Army billets to JIIM positions increases with grade -- from 63% (MAJ) to 85% (COL). With 53% of all billets being in OSD, Attaché, Security Cooperation and COCOMS, there are many opportunities to cover the **Joint, Interagency and Multinational** elements of the **JIIM** experiences. However, opportunities for Intergovernmental experiences are limited, with less than 10 billets specifically in Intergovernmental organizations. While structure may not reflect it, many FAO billets offer both exposure and experience in the Intergovernmental environment.

Analysis of structure by grade seems to indicate a good experiential progression of position opportunities from MAJ to COL. With increasing grade there are greater opportunities for overseas and senior leader advisor positions. Greater fidelity of Army billet locations in conjunction with increase of 162nd Bde caused increase in the Operational Force from 9.4% to 13.8% of the structure.

Strategic and military guidance documents increasingly emphasize security cooperation – a key FAO function - as a future, high priority mission. This fact, coupled with increased demand across all commands that employ FAOs lead us to assume that while the rest of the Army will be reducing, FAO structure is likely to remain stable or even possibly grow in the future.

² DA PAM 600-3, Chapter 28-5(a), p. 261

³ For the purposes of this study, the Personnel Manning and Authorization Document (PMAD) 1102, FY12 data was used.

Recommendation 1.1: More research needs to be done on which billets give FAOs experience in Intergovernmental environments prior to developmental changes are made to the program focused on this element.




Figure A1





Figure A2

Figure A3




Figure A4

B) **Finding 1.2:** Observations taking into consideration Areas of Concentrations (AOC).

48B, 48D, 48H, 48I and 48J are the AOCs with the most consistent growth. AOCs in red are targeted growth areas (FAO Growth Initiative). 48G is the most notable as there has been a loss of billets in FY09, although a current trend shows an increase between FY10 to FY12 (see figure below). This was most likely due to AFRICOM's stand up and the transition of billets from EUCOM and CENTCOM to AFRICOM. Growth in 'areas of persistent conflict' has not been consistent and certainly not dramatic (See figure A5)




Figure A5

48X has had the most dramatic increase since FY09, growing from 10 to 36 billets with most of the billet growth in Army Service Component Commands and other Army commands.

Recommendation 1.2: FAO Proponent needs to continue to work with all commands employing 48D, 48G, 48I, and 48J to ensure their continued growth. This should include working with those same commands to review their structure to find possible billets that should be recoded into one of those four AOCs. In addition, special attention should be paid to these four AOCs during the Grade Plate Reduction initiative to ensure they are not eliminated as part of that program.

2) **Issue 2:** Considering our vision of being the Army's and DoD's premier Political-Military advisors, are we where we need to be and in sufficient quantities and qualities (AOCs)?⁴

A) **Finding 2.1:** Certain AOCs have no representation at the COL level on either OSD or JCS. At the COL level, we have only three JCS billets (48B, 48F, 48G) and nine billets in OSD (48B, 48E, 2x48G, 4x48J, 48X). The result of this structure is that we have no 48C, 48D, 48H or 48I COLs on either of these Defense Department level policy making bodies. If we expand our analysis to include LTCs, all AOCs have representatives on both JCS and OSD.

Recommendation 2.1: A review done in conjunction with both JCS and OSD should be completed to ensure full coverage of regions worldwide by Army regional specialists.

B) **Finding 2.2:** In the COCOMs, certain AOCs have no presence at the COL and LTC level. The following AOCs have no COLs in their COCOM; 48D, 48E, 48F, 48H, 48I. In addition, 48Ds have no LTCs present in a COCOM.

NORTHCOM and AFRICOM have no recorded downrange billets, yet on the ground, both have FAOs in countries in their AORs. In addition, AFRICOM still shows 48Cs in their structure – legacy from transition from EUCOM.

1] **Recommendation 2.2a:** A review done in conjunction with COCOMs to ensure that COCOMs are adequately manned by senior FAOs to meet their needs.

2] **Recommendation 2.2b:** FAO Proponent should work with NORTHCOM and AFRICOM to properly recode their billets to reflect correct geographical locations.

⁴ While there certainly can be a lively discussion as to what organizations we should have considered, this review considered the following: (1) OSD, JCS and COCOMS for advising directly to our senior leaders in DoD; (2) FAO impact for the Army by looking at the ASCC's and other operational units; (3) Review of our opportunities outside of CONUS; and, (4) how we may be influencing the Army through our PME institutions.

C) **Finding 2.3:** FAOs are having a minimal impact on Army operational units as many AOCs have no (zero) billets in any major Army command or staff.⁵ The Army staff has only three COL billets (48D, 2x48E) and even when considering all ranks, there are no 48F or 48J on the G-3's staff. While the ASCCs are the lowest echelon command for the Army to be regionally focused with FAOs, there are some AOCs that have NO representation in any ASCC. There are a total of 74 billets across all AOCs and ASCCs. There are no 48C, 48D, 48E, 48F, 48H COLs on ANY theater Army staff. When we expand the analysis to include LTCs, 48Cs still have no representation in ASCCs. We do find two 48X COLs in USAREUR and USARPAC.

1] **Recommendation 2.3a:** FAO Proponent should work with USAREUR and USARPAC to ensure that their billets are coded to get the best balance of FAO for their needs rather than maintaining 48X.

2] **Recommendation 2.3b:** FAO Proponent should work with USAREUR to ensure they have the 48Cs they require in their structure.

D) **Finding 2.4:** Seven of nine AOCs have fair opportunities to serve overseas in both Attaché and security cooperation billets with increasing opportunity as grade increases.

Recommendation 2.4: FAO Proponent and HRC need to consider why 48F and 48J AOCs have limited opportunities for OCONUS security cooperation opportunities and should avoid developing assignment policies that may adversely affect them.

E) **Finding 2.5:** When we consider all schoolhouse institutions, FAOs have a total of 65 billets with seven of nine AOCs having representation. No significant issues.

3) **Issue 3:** Does our structure allow for career progression?⁶

A) **Finding 3.1:** Overall structure across all grades poses no issues or concerns, and should allow for a fair amount of accessions to be able to competently grow LTCs and COLs.

B) **Finding 3.2:** Our analysis of AOCs, indicates that certain AOCs have smaller MAJ structure than LTC structure potentially causing growth of a limited pool of officers for promotions to higher grades. Specifically, the AOCs of concern are: 48C, 48E, 48H, 48J.

The nature of FAO training and development facilitates growth at the LTC and COL level rather than the MAJ grade. When commands add a FAO, they want to add an experienced FAO rather than a less-experienced FAO. Our current accession process (see Tab

⁵ On a related and interesting note, in preparing for our senior leader survey to accompany this study, we were able to identify ONLY 31 Army General Officers (LTG, MG, BG) to survey – an incredibly small but telling number. In addition, no all of even those 31 directly supervise FAOs.

⁶ Analysis for this section considered the job/structure pyramid for the entire FAO structure and also for each AOC, measured against an Army optimal pyramid.

B) exacerbates this issue by effectively eliminating one developmental FAO assignment for MAJs as most officers do not complete training until they are already mid-grade MAJs.

Recommendation 3.2: Special attention needs to be paid to specified AOCs during growth or reduction time periods of our Army and branch to ensure that targeted AOCs show more growth at the MAJ-grade than LTC- or COL-grade. Of the targeted AOCs, 48E has the most extreme issue (see Figures A6, A7 and A8) due to the large difference between the number of LTCs (68) and COLs (12), or over 5 LTCs for every COL.




Figure A6




Figure A7



Figure A8

4) **Issue 4:** Where are FAOs postured to help the Army of the future and is it where it needs to be?⁷

A) **Finding 4.1:** FAO structure has grown dramatically in the last two years in areas that would be considered “non-traditional” FAO billets, specifically in the 162nd Bde, the Army’s Asymmetrical Warfare Group (AWG) and SOCOM. 162nd Bde has grown from 0 to 21 billets in one FY and includes all FAO AOCs. This brigade forms part of the Army’s way ahead in security cooperation/building partnership capacity and FAOs are at the center of the effort that will directly support COCOMs engagement in their regions. AWG has 22 relatively new billets

⁷ Analysis for this section considered current and future doctrine and capstone concepts to analyze whether we are postured to be able to support future focus or postured to be able to influence the development of future concepts so that the Army can take advantage of FAOs unique skills. This analysis looked across all jobs FAOs currently fill and are scheduled to fill in the future, with a special focus on ‘non-traditional’ FAO billets.

with a large amount coded for 48B, with no coding for 48E, 48H and 48I. Discussions with serving FAOs seem to indicate a lack of understanding on how to best utilize FAOs in this unit. SOCOM has grown dramatically with nine new FAO billets. While FAO Proponent has been in discussion with SOCOM about various growth initiatives, more growth is uncertain at this time.

1] **Recommendation 4.1a:** HRC needs to assign high performing and/or experienced FAOs to the 162nd especially during this initial time period of development of the unit.

2] **Recommendation 4.1b:** FAO Proponent should coordinate further with both AWG and SOCOM about future growth and utilization of FAOs in those organizations ensuring that FAOs are providing what these units require and that these units are structured to get the right balance of FAOs (i.e. 10x48Bs in AWG).

B) **Finding 4.2:** FAO structure may be insufficient to support the formation of “Regionally Aligned Brigades” as mentioned in the Army’s Capstone Concept. There is no FAO structure below Corps level (and very few Corps billets), and ASCC structure is already being stretched by current and emerging demands on those commands. Draft doctrine (FM 3-93) that governs Theater Army operations has edited out the emerging concept of FAO “fly-away” teams (to support general purpose forces planning for or operating in the AOR) that would have permitted growth in structure and resources to allow ASCCs to develop and train these teams.

Recommendations 4.2: FAO Proponent must remain in coordination with the doctrine writers of FM3-93 and all other doctrine that addresses security cooperation to ensure that FAOs are properly structured and resourced to support the Army’s growing security **cooperation** effort in the future. In addition, FAO Proponent must remain in coordination with Army plans for the development of the regionally aligned units.

Tab B – Acquire

A. **Introduction.** The Foreign Area Officer program has built a reputation for developing high quality officers that provide sound advice to the Army's and DoD's senior leadership. High quality starts with who we bring into the program. In our accession analysis (or acquire in the personnel lifecycle), we researched and attempted to answer the main question: "How do we recruit and access the right talent at the right time to meet Army needs now and for future requirements?" To that end, we utilized the following sub-questions/issues:

- Issue 1: What is the current accession process and does it work? How do we ensure quality accession numbers?
- Issue 2: How do we determine the right numbers of FAOs to access into the program?
- Issue 3: What are the eligibility requirements and are they still relevant (DA PAM 600-3 requirements)?

Summary of findings: The Army's current accession model is not adequate to fill the numbers needed to overcome the balance between our initial leader development timelines and our ability to fill Army and Joint requirements for Majors. The Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP) has recently been piloted as the Army's primary means of functional designation for Cohort Year Group (CYG) 2004 and younger. VTIP is a promising new accession strategy which may eliminate some of the quality, quantity and timing issues and increase utilization opportunities for our Majors. In the interim, coordination efforts are on-going between the FAO Proponent and Army G1 for viable workarounds.

B. **Regulations/Policy Guidance.** *Eligibility requirements for accessions into the FAO program as found in DA Pam 600-3 are:*

"b. Acquire. Officers are accessed into the FAO program as part of their cohort year group's (YG) 7-year FDB. The FAO proponent establishes the minimum criteria the DA-level FDB will use in selecting officers for FA 48. Minimum criteria for FA 48 are —

(1) Demonstrated aptitude for learning foreign languages by attaining an acceptable score on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). The minimum DLAB score for designation as a FAO is 95. The minimum scores for officers designated to study in different categories (CAT) of language are as follows: CAT I languages (Spanish, French, Italian, Portuguese) - 95, CAT II languages (German, Indonesian)- 100, CAT III languages (Dari, Pashto, Persian, Farsi, Russian, Uzbek, Hindi, Urdu, Hebrew, Thai, Serbian, Croatian, Tagalog, Turkish, Sorani, Kurmanji) -105, and CAT IV languages (Arabic-MSA, Chinese Mandarin, Korean, Japanese)- 110. These requirements may be waived by the FAO proponent for officers who have a current (less than one year old) Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of 2/2 or higher.

(2) Officers must have a time in service (TIS) of less than 17 years AFCS by the start of ACS in accordance with AR 621-1.

(3) No officer is selected for FAO training without having first successfully completed company grade leader development and having obtained quality experience in basic branch assignments. Officers at risk for promotion will not be considered.

(4) All officers must be eligible for a Top Secret security clearance based upon an SBI under AR 380-67.

(5) If the officer's spouse and other dependent Family members are not U.S. citizens, they must begin the naturalization process when the officer begins the FAO accessions process. If this is not completed in a timely manner, it may limit an officers' assignment potential.

(6) The officer's spouse and other dependent Family members must be free of serious or chronic medical problems that would preclude worldwide assignment. If a Family member is enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Program with a condition that prevents them from living overseas, the officer must be prepared to serve unaccompanied overseas tours.

(7) Given the nature of FAO assignments, joint domicile needs are extremely difficult to accommodate. Officers with military spouses should carefully consider the potential personal costs in terms of Family hardship prior to choosing a FAO career. ”⁸

C. Issues/Findings/Recommendations.

1) **Issue 1:** What is the current accession process and does it work? How do we ensure quality accession numbers?

A) Finding 1.1: The FAO Program uses four methods for accessions, two primary and two secondary methods. The two primary methods are the Functional Designation (FD) board and the Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP). The secondary methods are the Call to Active Duty (CAD) and Inter Service Transfers (IST).

B) **MAJOR Finding 1.2:** Accession of our officers at the seventh year does not meet the needs of the FAO program and has direct negative impacts on developmental assignments and Army utilization for our Majors. This is true for both primary methods of accession – Functional Designation Board (FD) and Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP). Nearly 100% of our accessions take place at the seventh year of an officer's career.

Due to basic branch and other Army requirements, newly accessed officers take an average of 22 months before starting FAO training. This creates a number of issues: (1) Officers generally do not start training until they are promotable Captains or Majors resulting in a loss of one critical developmental assignment. This effectively eliminates the possibility of having an 'experienced' Major as a FAO (See Figure B1); (2) Training and Holding Status (THS) accounts at the Major grade level are at an extremely high rate (~60%) while utilization rates for the Army are extremely low (~40%). The issue is compounded by the fact that the Army Campaign Support Plan requires the Army to provide FAOs at the Major level who have FAO job experience (i.e. 162nd Infantry Bde) which, given current accession practices, HRC is generally unable to produce.

1] **Recommendation 1.2a:** FAO Proponent coordinates with HRC and G1 to modify FAO accession model to be able to access at the 5th and 6th year, vice only the 7th year.

⁸ DA PAM 600-3, Chapter 28-5(b), p. 261. Review of these requirements is found later in this Enclosure.

2] **Recommendation 1.2b:** FAO proponent develop alternatives to the current training timeline that have the effect of shortening the training timeline overall (See Tab E – Develop for further discussion of this recommendation).




Figure B1

B) **MAJOR Finding 1.3:** The FD board creates quality and timing issues. Due to the board being administered as a DA Policy board, the FAO Proponent is not permitted to provide the board with information that may aid in proper selection of FAO candidates. Previous boards have selected a number of officers who did not meet minimum eligibility requirements for FAO. For example, in the 2010 FD board, 30% of the officers selected did NOT meet minimum requirements as outline in DA PAM 600-3. In addition, FD boards will typically access the minimum quantity of officers necessary within the band of potential accessions (access 60 with a possibility of 70 accessions per year). The timing of the FD board also exacerbates the release of officers to FA 48 as the board typically meets during the summer of the officer’s 7th year, with results being released at end of the of the officer’s 7th year, or beginning of the 8th year. This precludes the possibility of assignment moves in support of the FD board during an officer’s 7th year

Recommendation 1.3: FAO Proponent work the FAO accessions model with G1 and HRC to permits accession early in the FY to gain a timeline advantage permitting officers to move in the same year as accession.⁹

⁹ VTIP starts to address this issue, but does not address the low numbers for accessions. If the issue of low accessions does not change, FAO Proponent will NOT be able to fully take advantage of timeline gains offered by VTIP.

C) **MAJOR Finding 1.4:** VTIP provides opportunity to correct some of the problems presented by FD board, but still will not allow FAO Proponent to access most officers at the 5th and 6th year.

VTIP allows much greater proponent and FAO Branch/HRC input into the selection process with potential for 100% of accessed officers to be volunteers and fully eligible. VTIP allows for full use of FAO questionnaire ensuring that candidates chosen are not only fully qualified, but will allow for the selection of officers with pre-existing skills and experiences valuable to the FAO program. In addition, VTIP permits the panel to consider and utilize the FAO Proponent’s quality analysis matrix. Thus, the selection of qualified officers can be maintained with this process unlike in the FD board. Additionally, with three-four VTIPs per FY, the possibility of starting training sooner with newly accessed officers is much greater. G1 model for numbers to access still hasn’t been modified to allow FAO to access primarily at 5th or 6th year of service.

Recommendation 1.4: FAO Proponent work with HRC and G1 to develop a ‘glide path’ of additional accessions that would allow FAO Proponent to focus accessions at the 5th year of service (see Figure B2).¹⁰




Figure B2

D) **Finding 1.5:** At the time of the review, the FAO Proponent had no recruiting program in place. There was no concerted effort made prior to FD board or VTIP to target specific year groups or officers with skill sets desirable to FAO to recruit them to the program. There was no planned strategic communication or information campaign to inform junior

¹⁰ This coordination has already started as of early 2011 and is still in process.

officers or cadets of the program. There was no strategic communication to permit cadets/officers the possibility of developing FAO skills prior to entering active duty.

1] **Recommendation 1.5a:** FAO Proponent should develop a refined strategic communications plan to coincide with VTIP and FD boards to ensure that officers not only know about the program, but that we attract officers with skills and experiences desirable to the FAO program.

2] **Recommendation 1.5b:** FAO proponent should investigate strategies to ‘get the word out’ about the program to pre-commissioning sources to take advantage of those cadets opportunities to develop FAO skills prior to entering active duty.

E) **Finding 1.6:** Secondary accessions methods, Call to Active Duty (CAD) and Inter Service Transfer (IST) have no formal process to include the FAO Proponent in the selection process resulting in the past in lower quality accessions. HRC owns these methods and processes and does not have a systematic way of including FAO Proponent in the decision making. Quality standards of the previous year’s accessions were not maintained resulting in a fairly large number of officers accessed who were not fully qualified¹¹. Potential for long term reduced quality perception is possible. As FAO proponent was not involved in the process including AOC designation, AOC strengths per YG were not considered potentially skewing AOC sizes.

Recommendation 1.6: FAO Proponent and HRC must develop a formal Memorandum of Agreement or standard operating procedure to formalize the accession process and standardize quality in all accessions¹².

F) **Finding 1.7:** Secondary accessions methods, Call to Active Duty (CAD) and Inter Service Transfer (IST) offer very limited means to increase accessions. Very few officers from other services qualify due to restrictive eligibility requirements.¹³ CAD and IST officers must be fully qualified in all aspects of training prior to approval for accession. Otherwise, they begin their first FAO job unprepared.¹⁴

FAO Proponent and HRC have no formal process to recruit from reserve FAO program to bring qualified officers onto active duty.

1] **Recommendation 1.7a:** FAO Proponent and HRC should not waive requirements and access officers into the program solely to fill current demand. Quality should be maintained and CAD or IST should only be utilized when the candidate is exceptionally qualified and prepared to begin an immediate position as a FAO.

¹¹ This comes from anecdotal evidence from the field as we have received feedback from the field about officers who were CAD arriving not prepared to do FAO jobs.

¹² This in fact has been happening through a verbal agreement between HRC and Proponent since the fall 2010.

¹³ The requirement to have completed Captains Career Course and a CPT level KD job is the most difficult hurdle for IST officers and usually precludes them from being considered.

¹⁴ This too comes from feedback from the field.

2] **Recommendation 1.7b:** CAD and IST should be principally used to target and augment specific year groups and AOCs. FAO Proponent should work with RC FAO Proponent in development of qualified RC FAO officers.

3] Recommendation 1.7c: FAO Proponent should include new members of the branch including accessions from CAD and IST in the Foreign Area Officer Basic Course to ensure all new members start service as a FAO with a basic understanding of what a FAO does. See Tab E for further discussion of this course.

G) **Finding 1.8:** Inconsistent accessions over last decade with abnormally high accessions in the late 1980s - 1990s year groups have caused lower accessions in mid-1990s year groups. This ‘bulge’ in older year groups now has the potential to be a demographic crisis as a large portion of these officers are now retirement eligible (See Figure B3). Currently, the excess LTC population is covering for the shortage of MAJs. However, as these LTCs separate from service, FAO will experience an even greater shortage of personnel and will find its overall utilization rates drop as well.

Recommendation 1.8: FAO Proponent must inform the field of this problem and to anticipate potential greater shortages in the future. Utilize VTIP, CAD and IST when possible to augment shortage AOCs and YGs.




Figure B3

H) **Finding 1.9:** Between FAO Proponent and FAO Branch, we do not have a standardized formal process for AOC designation creating a potential situation for ad hoc results. AOC Designation is normally accomplished by FAO Proponent shortly after designation results of the FD or VTIP processes utilizing current year group numbers by AOC, officer preference and skills and experience. FAO Proponent is not involved in the AOC designation process for CAD and IST (see Finding 1.5) due to the entire process being internal to HRC. FAO Proponent holds an informal panel to make the decision, with the decision authority resting with the Chief, DAMO-SSF.

Recommendation 1.8: A formalized process should be codified into a standard operating procedure and should include HRC in the review process.¹⁵

2) **Issue 2:** How do we determine the right numbers of FAOs to access into the program?

A) **Finding 2.1:** FAO Proponent manages accessions numbers by year groups and AOC (based on MAJ authorizations) which is different from how G1 manages accessions - by grade. The difference in systems often creates a difference in number requirements (G1 numbers take precedence). At times, the rapid growth of FAO requirements has not been supported by the Army's accession process, principally due to the lag caused by the length of the FAO training timeline.

Recommendation 2.1: FAO Proponent work closely with G1 to ensure nuances of FAO management are considered as G1 develops accession numbers.

B) **Finding 2.2:** FAO Growth initiative requires FAO Proponent to grow four specific AOCs (in the "Arc of Instability") without gaining additional accession numbers. If the billet structure in these four AOCs does not grow commensurate with the growth of personnel, then we may be artificially creating large AOCs than cannot be properly supported over the officer's career (i.e. Promotions).

Recommendation 2.2: FAO Growth Initiative must be very closely managed between the accessions process and the growth of structure.

3) **Issue 3:** What are the eligibility requirements and are they still relevant?¹⁶

A) **Finding 3.1:** Informal field survey indicates eligibility requirements are generally fine as written.

B) **Finding 3.2:** Formal survey (ARI) indicates either agreement or strong agreement with over 80% of our population that company command or company level KD be retained as part of eligibility requirements.

¹⁵ This has already started to take place as of Jan 2011. However, a formalized process or SOP still should be developed.

¹⁶ Eligibility requirements are spelled out in DA Pam 600-3, chapter 28 and are created by Army G-3/5/7, DAMO-SSF, FAO Proponent Office. All eligibility requirements can be found in paragraph B. DA PAM 600-3 in this tab.

Recommendation 3.2: Ensure that KD completion remains part of the eligibility requirements.

C) **Finding 3.3:** Regarding paragraph 1 of the eligibility requirements:

*“Demonstrated aptitude for learning foreign languages by attaining an acceptable score on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). The minimum DLAB score for designation as a FAO is 95.... These requirements may be waived by the FAO proponent for officers **who have a current (less than one year old) Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of 2/2 or higher.**”* Study showed that some minor adjustment in language for eligibility requirements may result in an increase of the quality of the officer assessed.

1] **Recommendation 3.3a:** Research the viability and legality of requiring non-native English speakers to be required to take an English DLPT in verbal and writing ability to be considered in eligibility determination.

2] **Recommendation 3.3b:** Recommend adjusting waiver language to remove the qualifying statement *“who have a current (less than one year old) Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of 2/2 or higher...”* and be replaced with: *“on a case by case basis...”* in order to provide flexibility to FAO Proponent office to require DLAB from officers who have a current DLPT score of 2/2 in a native language only.

D) **Finding 3.4:** Regarding paragraph 6 of the eligibility requirements, *“The Officer’s spouse and other dependent family members must be free of serious or chronic medical problems that would preclude worldwide assignment”*, study indicates that many officers are unaware of family EFMP considerations during the FAO application process causing some potential family hardships during the first accompanied overseas assignment (typically ICT).

Recommendation 3.4: FAO proponent should consider rewording both the FAO Questionnaire and DA Pam 600-3 so that an officer elects to do an EFMP screening during the application process so that the officer can make an informed decision regarding entry into FAO or not.

Tab C – Distribute and Utilization

A. **Introduction.** Distribution is defined in AR 600-3, while Utilization is defined in DA PAM 600-3. Not only does this analysis consider how the FAOs are assigned (distributed) throughout the Army and Joint Force structure, but it also considers how FAOs are employed (utilized).

B. Regulations/Policy Guidance.

1) AR 600-3. According to AR 600-3, Distribution is described as: "...the function of distributing available personnel to units based on the Army requirements and in accordance with HQDA priorities. It includes the distribution of newly trained Soldiers and the redistribution of Soldiers who are ready for a new assignment. A major focus of the distribution function is to maximize personnel readiness within the Army's combat units and to support the development of Soldiers."

2) DA PAM 600-3. Utilization in DA PAM 600-3 is described as: "FAO majors and lieutenant colonels focus mainly on their technical competencies through breadth and depth of FAO assignments. These skills are refined as the officer moves into the senior leader level at the rank of colonel. Sequencing of the type and location of assignments is not critical. The FAOs should avoid "homesteading," and alternate between overseas and CONUS tours as much as possible. Confining oneself to any one type of work or in any one location typically reduces an officer's utility as a FAO."

C. Issues/Findings/Recommendations.

1) **Issue 1:** Are we filling current structure?

Finding 1.1: Yes, but some commands are filled at lower rates either intentionally (CSA Guidance) or due to a lack of available/qualified officers. Additionally, there is a looming shortfall of officers due to an under-acquisition of certain cohort year groups (YG) over the past decade (see Figure F1 and Tab B Acquire, Finding 1.8). Cause: Over the last decade, The Army under-acquired new officers, which resulted in a dip of cohort YG strength. Effect: The low YG gap will become very apparent as HRC tries to meet the future demands of various commands.

Issue: Growing Demographic problem within FA48 will exacerbate MAJ utilization issue in near future.
 Insufficient accessions may ensure problem continues into the future




Figure C1

Recommendation 1.1: Move the Functional Designation (FD) Board or Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program (VTIP) panel to the 5-year mark and start training new FAOs at their 7th year. This would result in MAJs reaching their first jobs. See TAB A, Accessions, for further analysis.

2) **Issue 2:** Is FAO Branch meeting the Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) manning guidance?

A) **Finding 2.1:** Yes, but there are some disparities at grade and command. Cause: Although HRC currently meets most of the manning guidance provided by the CSA, some units are filled at less than the proposed guidance. In most cases, though, this is due to a low number of authorizations. For example, if a Tier 2 unit (required 80% fill rate) is authorized only 3 FAOs and HRC can only fill 2 of the positions, the result is a 66% fill rate. Effect: Some units, due to low authorizations, will occasionally be reported below the CSA manning guidance.

B) **Finding 2.2:** The looming crisis as reported in Finding 1.1 will also have a major impact on manning as the Army progresses through the next few years. Cause: Over the last decade, FAO under-accessed new officers, which resulted in a dip of cohort YG strength (see Figure F1). Effect: As the officers in retirement-eligible YGs depart military service, the looming gap in some units will have to be filled with officers more junior in grade.

Recommendation 2.1: FAO Proponent and HRC continue to coordinate to meet CSA guidance with available and qualified officers. Additionally, FAO Proponent continues to educate all major commands on the possibility that FAO billets may fall below CSA guidance in the coming years as the FAO Corps progresses through a short-fall of officers.

3) **Issue 3:** To what extent are the FAOs mal-assigned? For the issue of mal-assigned FAOs, the analysis considered three definitions: FAOs serving in O1A/O2A positions; FAOs serving outside of FAO authorizations; and FAOs serving not in their own AOC, but another AOC.

A) **Finding 3.1:** For FAOs serving in O1A/O2A positions, there is no issue. Only 59 officers out of over 1,280 were serving in these type of positions. Additionally, FAO manning guidance ensures that FAOs are assigned to these positions on a very limited basis. Effect: Currently, HRC is filling its directed share of O1A/O2A positions. There is no negative impact at the current time of FAOs serving in a minimum number of O1A/O2A positions.

Recommendation 3.1: HRC continues to monitor and reduce number of officers serving in O1/O2A.

B) **Finding 3.2:** There is no issue for FAOs serving outside of authorized FAO billets (billets other than O1A/O2A positions). Less than 2% of the assigned FAOs currently serve outside of either an authorized FAO billet or O1A/O2A billet. Additionally, FAO manning guidance ensures that FAOs are assigned to these positions on a very limited basis. Effect: There is no impact on the FAO Corps of officers serving outside of authorized FAO billets.

Recommendation 3.2: HRC continues to monitor out of AOC assignments for the professional development of the officers and the AOC.

C) **Finding 3.3:** There is some cross-AOC assigning of FAOs within the FAO community, especially at the O6 level. Cause: Most occurrences were at attaché positions within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Also, most of these assignments were in geographically close regions (see Figure F2).

Currently, DIA has a total of 23 48C billets at the O6 level. Of these 23, 5 are filled by Eurasian, 48E, FAOs. Some, but not all, of these 5 DIA positions are located in Central Europe, where one can argue that given the region's political-military history in the last century, Eurasian-trained FAOs may be just as well suited to work as European FAOs. Additionally, some AOCs are grossly over-strength at the O6 level (e.g., Eurasian and Latin American FAOs). The result is HRC will fill a requirement with an available, trained FAO from another AOC rather than wait on a FAO from within that AOC. Effect: There is minimal impact of officers serving outside of their AOC.

AOC	48B (37)	48C (31)	48D (7)	48E (12)	48F (6)	48G (25)	48H (10)	48I (12)	48J (15)	TOTAL
48B	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	1
48C		--	2	4						6
48D			--					2		4
48E		7		--	1	1				9
48F					--			2	1	3
48G		2	1			--			1	4
48H			1		1	1	--	2		5
48I					1			--	2	3
48J	1					2			--	3
Total	1	9	4	4	3	4		7	4	

Figure F2

1] **Recommendation 3.3a:** HRC and SLD continue to monitor cross-AOC assignments. The Proponent, through the attaché nomination process, continues to scrutinize all attaché nominations.

2] **Recommendation 3.3b:** For future study, Proponent identifies the commands, which experience habitual cross-AOC assignments. Once identified, Proponent works with HRC and the command to determine if it is satisfied with the current processes or if some re-coding of billets may be required.

3] **Recommendation 3.3c:** FAO Proponent in conjunction with HRC research the impact of cross-AOC assignments at the O6 level to determine if they have a negative impact on the quality of work performed.

4) **Issue 4:** How effectively are we currently assigning according to DA PAM 600-3? According to DA PAM 600-3, "FAOs should avoid "homesteading," and alternate between overseas and CONUS tours as much as possible. Confining oneself to any one type of work or in any one location typically reduces an officer's utility as a FAO. Therefore, FAOs should ideally complete at least one assignment from three of the following five categories

before promotion to colonel: Overseas Country Team, Army Operational, Political-Military, Broadening, and Institutional.

Finding 4.1: Using cohort YG 1990 for analysis¹⁷, only 60% of the officers have met the guidance of serving in three of five jobs as listed in DA PAM 600-3 (see Figure F3). Officers in lower density AOCs and lower density cohort YGs tended to be assigned to repetitive higher tier units. For example, many 48J (Sub-Saharan African) FAOs had multiple in-country attaché assignments to the detriment possibly gapping other 48J requirements. In these cases, the officers then may receive a depth, but not a breadth of experience. There is no empirical evidence that not meeting the guidelines as outlined in DA PAM 600-3 affects FAO promotions or assignments.

AOC	Met guidance	Total # of officers	% who met guidance
48B	17	20	85%
48C	12	17	71%
48D	1	2	50%
48E	10	17	59%
48F	1	4	25%
48G	2	5	40%
48H	3	9	33%
48I	1	4	25%
48J	4	7	57%
TOTAL	51	85	60%

Figure F3

Recommendation 4.1: HRC analyze past promotion boards to see if breadth or depth played a more important role in officer promotions. If there is no clear indication, recommend Proponent consider removing this language from DA PAM 600-3.

¹⁷ The YG's O6 board is scheduled to convene in August 2011 which will permit a study started on effects of officers who have an assignment history in line with DA PAM 600-3 and if there is any effect on their promotion. This study can be continued over a few years to determine any negative or positive effects of this policy guidance on promotions

Tab D - Deploy

A. **Introduction.** FAOs have unique skills invaluable in today's era of persistent conflict. While the FAO skill set is traditionally employed at the strategic level of operations, individual deployments of FAOs to combat zones is proving to be a combat force multiplier for units in combat and resulting in increased demand for FAOs in the theater of operations. In this analysis, we researched whether FAOs are contributing to current combat operations? And if so, how?

For purposes of the study, HRC provided a snapshot in time of data covering deployed FAOs in March 2011 under the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS).

B. **Regulation/Policy Guidance.** DA Pam 600-3, Chapter 28-5(d) states:

d. Deploy. The FAOs are Soldiers who must remain prepared to deploy worldwide at any time to support operational commanders and in support of other requirements. All FAOs must be deployable to accomplish missions across the full spectrum of operations. The FAOs may deploy with their units or as individuals as the mission demands. FAOs must prepare themselves and their Families for this reality.

C. Issues/Findings/Recommendations

1) Issue 1: Are FAOs deploying in support of combat operations? How do FAOs maintain an Operational link?

Findings 1.1: Many FAOs are deploying in support of the Nation's wars, though some are not performing FAO missions in theater. FAOs get combat experience principally from WIAS or AF-PK Hands assignments. Currently there are 55 FAOs in theater conducting combat operations. In conjunction with these deployment opportunities, FAOs maintain an operational link to the combat forces via a variety of assignments including positions at the ASCC, Corps HQs, Army Staff, 162nd Infantry Brigade, AWG, WIAS, and APH. Currently, 35% of the FAO population fills operational billets.

Recommendation 1.1: Explore with G1 and HRC additional opportunities to involve FAO participation and contribution to combat operations where the supported units and organizations can best capitalize on the FAO skill set.




Figure D1

2) Issue 2: Are FAOs doing FAO jobs on deployments and utilizing their skills or are they doing branch immaterial jobs (01A/02A)?

Findings 2.1: FAOs are deploying in support of the nation's wars predominantly to perform FAO missions (Figure D1). 33 of 55 deployed FAOs were in FAO-coded positions. 17 of the remaining 22 positions were "FAO-like" jobs or benefitted greatly from FAO skills (i.e., mentoring/training foreign security forces). HRC is doing an outstanding job of identifying deployment opportunities and having the commands code these positions 48 or identifying jobs that best use FAO skills. No change is necessary to current practice.

Recommendation 2.1: Continue to work with HRC and G3 at AHRC to ensure that FAOs go into FAO jobs as much as possible.

Recommendation 2.2: Work through senior leadership to explain the skills FAOs bring to the fight and continue the trend that branch immaterial jobs become the exception to the rule.

Deployment Job/Skill Required

■ 48 ■ FAO-like ■ Immaterial





Figure D2

3) Issue 3: Are the ASCCs and Army Staff serving as “Deployment Platforms?” Are FAO deployments unfairly burdening certain units, commands or staffs?

Findings 3.1: The individual augmentation jobs such as WIAS taskers are sourced fairly evenly. FAOs are deployed out of joint assignments more frequently than Army assignments. Of the 23 organizations that have FAOs deployed, only 3 (Army Staff, DIA, and CENTCOM) have more than 2 FAOs deployed due to WIAS taskers. HRC is “spreading the pain” evenly and managing the taskers so that no one organization is unfairly burdened (See Figure D2).

Recommendation 3.1: Continue HRC’s direct engagement of the Commands to garner support for their contributions to the war effort by allowing FAOs to deploy from joint organizations.



Count of SKILL	Column Labels															
Row Labels	01A	02A	18A	21A	31A	42A	48C	48D	48E	48G	48J	48X	01A	(blank)	Grand Total	
Army Africa		1													1	
Army Europe		1											1		2	
Army Japan													1		1	
Army South		1													1	
Army Staff	1												3		4	
Bragg											1				1	
CAC													1	1	2	
Carson						1									1	
Centcom		1								1			8		10	
CSL/Student Detachment													1		1	
DIA	1	3						1	1	1	1		5		13	
DLI								2							2	
DTRA	1														1	
EUCOM	1														1	
OSD			1										1		2	
SETAF											1				1	
Southcom				1											1	
State Department								1	1						2	
Student Detachment		1													1	
USARPAC		2													2	
USFK		1													1	
USMA					1								1		2	
War College		2													2	
(blank)																
Grand Total	4	13	1	1	1	1	1	3	2	4	1	22	1		55	

Figure D3

4) **Issue 4:** Where are FAOs deploying? What locations or missions count as a deployment?

Findings 4.1: FAOs deploy predominantly to Afghanistan (44%), Pakistan (9%) and Iraq (29%) (See figure D3). FAOs also get credit for deploying to some countries on unaccompanied tours whether through the normal assignment process or while assigned to DIA or a COCOM to fill critical attaché or security assistance billets. The Army uses “dwell time” to track deployment history and only assignments that reset dwell time count as a deployment. FAOs do not get deployment credit for participation in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, counter-narcotics, peace-keeping or other missions unless they go on TCS or deployment orders and get their dwell time reset on their ORB.

Recommendation 4.1: Explore with G1 and HRC to get dwell time reset for participation in other “real world” operations such as Japan Disaster Relief, Anti-Drug Task Force, and other 3 – 6 – 12 month missions.

Where do FAOs deploy?

■ Afghanistan ■ Iraq ■ Pakistan ■ Other




Figure D4

Tab E – Develop

A. **Introduction.** Among the most regionally, linguistically, and culturally attuned of all U.S. Army personnel, FAOs possess unique skills and distinctive attributes to contribute effectively to a wide range of Army missions. Because these skills and attributes must not only be learned, but also maintained over time, FAOs possess unique educational and professional development needs throughout their careers. Our goal, therefore, would be to create a career-long system of development that interdependently links education, experience, training, broadening, self-development and competency achievement in a deliberate, yet flexible, progressive and sequential process.

The analysis of this component focused on the following issues:

1) **Issue 1:** Do we have enough structure to support FAO development from MAJ to COL? (See Tab A – *Structure*).

2) **Issue 2:** What general FAO core competencies, key skills and attributes are required at each level from MAJ to COL? How are they acquired?

3) **Issue 3:** Does FAO Leader Development Program offer the right mix of training, education and experience to establish and maintain a foundation of core competencies, key skills and attributes?

4) **Issue 4:** How do FAOs develop advanced expertise in the grades of LTC and COL? Is there a need for a Proponent directed, self-development program for FA48 Core Competencies?

5) **Issue 5:** How do FAOs maintain proficiency in the Profession of Arms? How do they maintain an operational link? (See Tab D – *Deploy Analysis*).

6) **Issue 6:** Does FAO Leader Development Program offer the right balance of training, education and experience to permit competitive promotion to General Officer? What are the General Officer billets that best utilize FAO core competencies, key skills and attributes?

B. Regulations/Policy Guidance: Initial questions and subsequent discussions were primarily guided by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3, *The Army Capstone Concept*, and a compilation of writing by the 37th Chief Staff of Army (CSA) – six articles published in *Army* magazine from October 2010 to March 2011. Empirical data was carefully gathered from multifarious sources (surveys, conversations, articles, emails, etc.) and databases. The data and information was then critically analyzed and debated against the relevant FA48 lifecycle management components. The findings and recommendations were grounded by input from civilian and military professionals outside of our community, and a comprehensive, community-wide survey.

DA Pamphlet 600-3, dated 1 February 2010: *“Throughout the professional career of a FAO, officers will have the opportunity for training and further professional development.*

This starts with a FAOs initial training, followed by continued development through assignments and required courses and lastly by the officer's self-development efforts [Figure E1].”




Figure E1

1) “Initial Training: All FAOs will generally conduct the three phases of training: Language Proficiency; In-Country Training; and Advance Civil Schooling.”

2) “Continued Development: Officers may receive further education through training required for positions they may fill. Some examples include advance language training, JPME II, DISAM, INTAC, etc... In addition, officers will be assigned to positions that will further their professional development.”

3) “Self-Development: All FAOs will carry the burden of self-development as they serve in positions of increased responsibility. This includes the fact that a FAO is expected to remain a resident expert not only regarding basic branch specific subjects, but also regarding US Army, joint, interagency, and multi-national topics of relevance.”

E. Issues/Findings/Recommendations.

1) **Issue 1:** Do we have enough structure to support FAO development from MAJ to COL? (See Tab A – Structure).

2) **Issue 2:** What general FAO core competencies, key skills and attributes are required at each level from MAJ to COL? How are they acquired?




Figure E2




Figure E3

Issue 2: What general KSA are required at each level from MAJ to COL? How are they acquired?			
	MAJ	LTC	COL
Grounded in the profession of Arms	Education: BOLC Training: CCC/ILE Common/Warrior/ Survival Skills Experience: Tactical jobs (Co/ Bn/Bde/Div Staff) Exercises/Operations/ Combat	Education: Self / OPD Training: None Experience: Operational/ Strategic jobs (Corps/HQDA/ASCC Staff/ Army Institutions) Exercises/Operations/ Combat	Education: SSC Training: None Experience: Strategic jobs (ASCC/ HQDA/ Army Institutions) Exercises/Operations/ Combat
Understands the depth, breadth, and context of a specific region.	Education: ACS - MA Training: ICT Experience: Operational/ Strategic Jobs/ Exercises/ Operations/ Combat	Education: Self/ OPD Training: Seminars/ Conferences Experience: Operational/ Strategic jobs (OSD/ JS/GCC/ASCC)	Education: Self / OPD Training: Seminars/ Conferences Experience: Strategic jobs (OSD/ JS/ GCC/ ASCC)
Understands Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment	Education: ACS- MA Training: JMAS/ DISAM Experience: Operational/ Strategic jobs/ Exercises/Operations/ Combat	Education: Self / OPD Training: JMAS/ DISAM Experience: Strategic jobs (OSD/JS/GCC/Embassy)/ Exercises/Operations/ Combat	Education: Self/ OPD Training: JMAS/DISAM Experience: Strategic jobs (OSD/JS/GCC/ Embassy)/ Exercises/Operations/ Combat
Credentialed in advanced intercultural, interpersonal, and foreign language expertise	Education: ACS-MA Training: DLI – 2/2 Experience: ICT/ Operational/ Strategic jobs/ Exercises/ Operations/ Combat	Education: Self / OPD Training: Refresher/ Self (Lang) Experience: Strategic jobs (OSD/JS/GCC/Embassy)	Education: Self / OPD Training: Refresher/ Self (Lang) Experience: Strategic jobs (OSD/JS/GCC/Embassy)

Figure E4

A) **Finding 2.1:** In general, FAO Leader Development Program builds the core competencies, key skills and attributes necessary to successfully meet current Army missions and requirements for FAOs (Figure E2). However, to remain relevant as the Army transitions, we must revamp our Basic Leader Development Program (BLDP), and create a viable Advance Leader Development Program (ALDP). We now have a cohort of FAOs who view the Army through lenses that have been tested by combat and developed by working with partners and allies to address 21st century challenges to the defense and security environment. We must capture what they have learned about the importance of remaining grounded in the Profession of Arms, as a complement to our undisputed role as the Army’s regional experts. At the same time, our development policies, strategies and programs must emphasize new attributes required for FAOs to succeed as the Army transitions, while retaining those attributes that form our foundation (Figure E4). Specifically, in order to develop future FAOs to be adaptive, credible and relevant leaders in an era of persistent conflict greater emphasis will be required on cross-cultural competence, interpersonal communication, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational processes, and foreign language proficiency. These core competencies, key skills and attributes, along with the requirements to be grounded in the Profession of Arms and to understand the depth, breadth and context of the regions of the world in which the Army will operate, will form the FA48 Vision and Core Competencies for future FAO Basic and Advance Leader Development Programs (Figures E3 and E5).

1] **Recommendation 2.1a:** FAO Proponent codify/re-write DA Pamphlet 600-3 to reflect the new FA48 Vision (See Tab F – *Vision*) and Core Competencies.

2] **Recommendation 2.1b:** FAO Proponent incorporate the new FA48 Vision and Core Competencies into its Basic and Advance Leader Development Programs.

B) **Finding 2.2:** FAOs gain valuable developmental experience via a wide variety of repetitive FAO assignments: Overseas U.S. Country Team, Army Operational, Political-Military, Broadening, and Institutional. However, only 35% of all FAOs have served

operational billets, and less than 50% of all mid-grade and senior FAO have served in combat assignments.

1] **Recommendation 2.2a:** FAO Proponent, in conjunction with HRC and SLD, seek more Army operational and broadening assignments requiring FAO skills that keep them relevant with the rest of the force and grounded in the Profession of Arms.

2] **Recommendation 2.2b:** FAO Proponent, in conjunction with HRC and SLD, continue to fill requirements in combat billets that require FA48 Core Competencies.

3) **Issue 3.** Does FAO Basic Leader Development Program (BLDP) offer the right mix of training, education and experience to establish a foundation of FAO core competencies, key skills and attributes?

Does FAO Basic Leader Development Program offer the right mix of Training, Education and Experience to establish a base foundation of FAO Core Competencies?

TENET COMPETENCY	DLI	FAOBC	IRT	ACS	ILE	Other Training IC/ JIIM / IP			
Grounded in the Profession of Arms	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Understands the depth, breadth, and context of a specific region.	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Understands Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes/No	No	No	Yes	No	No
	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Credentialed in advanced intercultural, interpersonal, and foreign language expertise	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No

We must develop Leader Development programs that produce FAOs who are inquisitive, creative and adaptable.

Figure E5




Figure E6

A) **Finding 3.1:** Right Mix of Core Competencies: See paragraph E. 2. A).
above.

B) **Finding 3.2:** Training Sequence: The FAO Basic Leadership Development Program timeline uses a standard, sequential order of basic language proficiency training (which includes FAO Basic Officer Orientation Course), In-Country Training, Advance Civil Schooling, and ILE Common Core Course (Figure E6). However, Proponent, working with FAO Training Officers at located at HRC, will maintain the flexibility to move the order of training (Figures E10 and E11).

C) **MAJOR Finding 3.3:** The FAO Orientation Course (to be re-designated Foreign Area Officer Basic Course - FAOBC) is outdated and does not adequately meet education and training requirements needed to prepare the FAO and his/her family for the In-Country Training (to be re-designated In-Region Training) phase of our Basic Leader Development Program. Additionally, FAO Proponent will incorporate the new FA48 Core Competencies into the revamped course. Thus, FAO Proponent will develop, staff, fund and implement new education and training requirements for FAOBC that address these shortfalls.

1] **Recommendation 3.3a:** The following objectives are recommended for the FAOBC: 1) Impart a keen understanding of who FAOs are and what FAOs do; 2) Explain all phases of FAO Basic Leader Development Program, and the respective standards; 3) Explain FA48 Core Competencies; 4) Provide the framework and tools that enable development of cross-cultural competence and interpersonal communication; and, 5) Lay the foundation for operations in the JIIM environment. Proponent will coordinate with Defense Language Institute and HRC to implement these objectives into the 2012 training cycle, or as soon after as possible.

2] **Recommendation 3.3b:** Proponent codify/re-write DA Pamphlet 600-3 to reflect the new objectives for FAOBC.




Figure E7




Figure E8




Figure E9

D) Finding 3.4: In-Country Training (ICT): The basic components of the ICT Program (to be re-designated In-Region Training - IRT) will remain intact: Regional travel, language immersion, and host-nation schooling (*Figure E7*). However, ICT does not fulfill training requirements specifically in the area of security cooperation¹⁸ and requires better ties to the Army Service Component Commands, where the primary planning and execution of security cooperation campaigns is accomplished. Additionally, three of the nine FAO areas of concentration (Latin America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia) have requirements for officers to attend host nation staff school longer than six months in duration, thus measurably reducing opportunities for regional travel and internships in Defense Attaché Offices (DAO), Defense

¹⁸ Feedback came to us from the field that our new officers are not familiar with Security Cooperation planning and activities. In addition, FAO Proponent analysis of current Army thinking on future operations indicates that an increase in the importance of security cooperation activities will require structure changes on how we conduct IRT in the future.

Cooperation/Security Assistance Offices (ODC) and Army Service Component Commands (ASCC).

1] **Recommendation 3.4a:** IRT will remain the cornerstone of the FAO Basic Leader Development Program, but IRT priorities will be “language proficiency” and “directed internships” to include a rotation, where possible, with an ASCC (*Figure E8*). Directed internships will include, as a minimum, rotations (two to three month in length) with the DAO, the ODC, and the respective ASCC. FAOs can dedicate a portion of their IRT to host nation schooling (ILE equivalent) and regional travel under the direct mentorship of the senior Army FAO of the host nation IRT site. Regional travel should also be accomplished during the internships, whenever possible.

2] **Recommendation 3.4b:** Proponent will eliminate attendance by FAOs in host-nation schools that are longer than three months in duration. Proponent will review case-by-case exceptions to this policy when requested by an IRT supervisor in writing. (*Figure E9*).

3] **Recommendation 3.4c:** Proponent will revise the ICT Supervisor's Guide and the ICT Handbook to reflect the IRT policy changes. Changes may include revision of rating schemes and a directed mentorship program.




Figure E10

Average Length of FAO Basic Development Training							
Area of Concentration	Language Training	ICT	ILE	ACS	Other Training		
					JMAS	DISAM	DTRA
AOC 48B	7 Months	12/15 Months	4 Months	18Months	4 Months	1Month	N/A
AOC 48C	9 Months	12 Months	4 Months	18 Months	4 Months	1 Month	N/A
AOC 48D	12 Months	14 Months	4 Months	18 Months	4 Months	1 Month	N/A
AOC 48E	12 Months	12 Months	4 Months	18 Months	4 Months	1 Months	N/A
AOC 48F	16 Months	12 Months	4 Months	18 Months	4 Months	1 Month	N/A
AOC 48G	15 Months	12 Months	4 Months	18 Months	4 Months	1 Month	N/A
AOC 48H	14 Months	14 Months	4 Months	18 Months	4 Months	1Month	N/A
AOC 48I	11 Months	15 Months	4 Months	18 Months	4 Months	1Month	N/A
AOC 48J	7 Months	12 Months	4 Months	18 Months	4 Months	1 Month	N/A

Figure E11

E) **Finding 3.5:** Advance Civil Schooling. Advance Civil Schooling (ACS) ranges from 12 to 24 months. There is ample research that supports a strategy to maintain our policy of permitting our FAOs to attend a wide variety of graduate schools with diverse graduate programs that meet the criteria found in DA Pamphlet 600-3. However, there is little to no empirical data that suggests that FAOs are at a disadvantage if they attend 12-month graduate programs versus longer programs. In fact, most of the graduate programs offered by our nation’s best universities are only 12 months in length.

1] **Recommendation 3.5a:** Proponent will develop policy which directs 12-month ACS graduate programs as the standard, but will retain the flexibility to waive longer periods of ACS on a case-by-case basis.

2] **Recommendation 3.5b:** Proponent will review all 12-month graduate programs to ensure that the curricula and electives support the new FA48 Core Competencies, specifically: cross-cultural competence, interpersonal communication, and Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational processes.

4) **Issue 4:** How do FAOs develop advanced expertise in the grades of LTC and COL? Is there a need for a Proponent directed, self-development program?




Figure E12

A) **Finding 4.1:** There is no FAO Advance Leader Development Program. Currently, Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels are expected to maintain FA48 Core Competencies via unstructured, self-development and experiences gained from repetitive, career assignments. Thanks to vast improvements in on-line technologies, mid-grade and senior FAOs will be able to take advantage of new and relevant courses that meet our advanced education and training requirements. While there are education and training opportunities available, these opportunities are directly linked to assignments with specific requirements. This development strategy has inconsistent results for the overall FAO Corps, particularly for sustaining language proficiency standards.

Current DLPTs Proficiency Levels

AOC	1/1 or below (%)	At least 2/2 (%)	At least 3/3 (%)
48B (212)	5%	33%	62%
48C (171)	9%	37%	54%
48D (40)	53%	40%	7%
48E (173)	5%	68%	27%
48F (47)	15%	64%	21%
48G (132)	24%	46%	30%
48H (72)	17%	36%	47%
48I (63)	13%	59%	28%
48J (101)	8%	57%	35%
TOTAL (1011)	12%	47%	41%

Figure E13

Current DLPTs

AOC (total w/DLPTs)	Current DLPT/Total COL= %	Current DLPT/Total LTC= %	Current DLPT/Total MAJ= %	Total
48B	23/43=53%	25/78=32%	40/91=44%	88/212=42%
48C	12/28=43%	17/51=33%	21/40=53%	50/119=42%
48D	0/6=0%	1/7=14%	7/13=54%	8/26=31%
48E	12/34=35%	27/76=36%	29/63=46%	68/173=39%
48F	3/6=50%	9/22=41%	9/19=47%	21/47=45%
48G	5/25=20%	9/52=17%	23/53=43%	37/130=28%
48H	5/13=38%	10/30=33%	18/29=62%	33/72=46%
48I	4/13=31%	7/18=39%	14/32=44%	25/63=40%
48J	3/18=17%	7/40=18%	22/43=51%	32/101=32%
TOTAL	67/186=36%	112/374=30%	183/383=48%	362/943=38%

Figure E14

B) MAJOR Finding 4.2: The exiting policy to “sustain language skills through rigorous self-study and assignments” is not sufficient to maintain FAO language proficiency standards (2-Listening/ 2-Reading/ 1+Speaking) beyond initial training for the majority of the FAO population. Official documents show that only 38% of FAOs within the last year have current Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) scores in their official records (Figures E13 and E14). The FAO community must do better on maintaining this critical core competency.

Recommendation 4.2: FAO Proponent, in conjunction with HRC and Senior Leader Development Office (SLD), will research, develop, staff and implement a management system that ensures FAOs at all grades maintain and annually document revised language proficiency requirements (2-Listening/ 2-Reading/ 2-Speaking).

C) MAJOR Finding 4.3: Guidance found in DA Pamphlet 600-3 is not sufficient to meet new guidance on structured, self-development found in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, which states; “Structured, Self-Development (SSD) is planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual’s knowledge base, self-awareness, and situational awareness. It complements institutional and operational learning. It enhances professional competence and meets personal objectives. It is required learning that continues throughout a Soldier’s career and is closely linked to training and education in the Education System...SSD must deliberately link key leader attributes [FA48 Core Competencies] to a career-long, developmental trace of competency achievement.” Our goal, therefore, is to create a career-long system of development that interdependently links education, experience, training, broadening, self-development and competency achievement in a deliberate, yet flexible, progressive and sequential process. See Figure E12.

1] **Recommendation 4.3a:** In order to meet new SSD guidance, FAO Proponent, in conjunction with HRC, will research, develop, staff, fund and make available regionally-tailored, SSD opportunities that develop basic knowledge in FA48 Core

Competencies, and complement the tenets of our Basic Leader Development Program – Language Proficiency Training, In-Region Training, and Advanced Civil Schooling.

2] **Recommendation 4.3b:** Currently, Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels are expected to maintain FA48 Core Competencies via unstructured, self-development and experiences gained from repetitive, career assignments. Thanks to vast improvements in on-line technologies, mid-grade and senior FAOs will be able to take advantage of new and relevant courses that meet our advanced education and training requirements. Thus, Proponent, in conjunction with HRC and SLD, will research, develop, staff and implement a regionally-tailored, SSD Program that builds and documents advance expertise in FA48 Core Competencies, and complements senior FAO skills and attributes gained from repetitive, career assignments.

3] **Recommendation 4.3c:** SSD Program guidelines should maximize existing and emerging on-line technologies. In this era of constantly changing communication technologies, FAOs gather and process information differently today than they did even five years ago. With advancements in the web and the invention of collaborative sites like Facebook and Twitter, our FAOs are able to glean information instantaneously via computer screens and cell phones. Understanding the way our upcoming FAOs learn is critical to our success as a Branch.




Figure E15

5) **Issue 5.** How do FAOs maintain proficiency in the Profession of Arms? How do they maintain an Operational link? (See *Figure E15 and Tab D – Deploy*).

6) **Issue 6.** Does FAO Career offer the right balance of training, education and experience to permit competitive promotion to General Officer? What are the General Officer billets that best utilize FAO core competencies, skills and attributes?

A). **MAJOR Finding 6.1:** The Army is not in compliance with DODI 1315.20, September 2007, Management of DOD Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs which states: "Ensure Service FAO programs provide for a career path and develop officers who have the opportunities for promotion into the General Officer ranks." Essentially, FAOs have no historical rate or pattern of promotion to general officer (See figures below). The Army accesses high quality officers into FA48, and invests substantial funds and time in their training and development, only to retire senior FAOs at their peak.

Six Year Promotion rates of officer with FA48:

FY06: 0/125 = 0%

FY07: 2/128 = 1.6 %

FY08: 0/136 = 0%

FY09: 0/134 = 0%

FY10: 1/138 = 0.7%

FY11: 0/ = 0%

A). Proponent should determine whether senior FAOs are being selected to GO at a rate commensurate with Colonels from the operational support and operational functional areas; and if necessary, gain Army G3/ CSA support for appropriate instructions to future promotion boards.

B). The FAO Proponent should work with the GOMO to identify and recode, if possible, billets that would benefit from the FAO skill set which in turn would then drive Army requirements to regularly select more FAOs into the G/FO ranks.

C). Nearly 80 percent of the Army's senior leader assignments require talent in more than just the operational art. Despite this, the Army's relatively narrow, tradition bound paths to enterprise leadership heavily transit operational assignments and draw almost exclusively upon "maneuver, fires, and effects" officers (primarily combat arms). Keeping FAOs oriented on their particular regions is critical to their success, but there is an equally and admittedly conflicting requirement to keep FAOs well-grounded in the Army's operational ethos and sensibilities. Any advance leader development program for senior FAOs must - at some frequency - "re-green" these Soldiers. FAO Proponent must identify and seek opportunities in key developmental assignments in Army positions requiring FAO-related skills.

Tab F – Vision

A. **Introduction.** Any thorough review of a program must start with the vision of where that organization or program is headed – it’s vision. Businessdictionary.com defines a vision as:

*“An aspirational description of what an organization would like to achieve or accomplish in the mid-term or long-term future. It is intended to serves as a clear guide for choosing current and future courses of action.”*¹⁹

Another way to look at it comes from Burt Nanus, a well-known expert on the subject. Nanus defines a vision as a **realistic, credible, attractive future for [an] organization.**²⁰

- **Realistic:** A vision must be based in reality to be meaningful for an organization.
- **Credible:** A vision must be believable to be relevant. If the members of the organization do not find the vision credible, it will not be meaningful or serve a useful purpose. One of the purposes of a vision is to inspire those in the organization to achieve a level of excellence, and to provide purpose and direction for the work of those employees.
- **Attractive:** If a vision is going to inspire and motivate those in the organization, it must be attractive. People must want to be part of this future that's envisioned for the organization.
- **Future:** A vision is not in the present, it is in the future. A vision is not where you are now; it's where you want to be in the future.

B. **Regulations/Policy Guidance.** To determine where the FAO program needed to go, we first needed to analyze where the Army was going in the future and then determine what part the FAO program would play in that future. We were principally guided by TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, *The Army Capstone Concept*. However, we also reviewed a number of other key strategic documents such as the TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The Army Operating Concept*, the *Army Leader Development Strategy*, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* and a compilation of writing by the 37th CSA– six articles published in *Army* magazine from October 2010 to March 2011, among other documents.

From these key thought documents, we extracted the principal competencies that the Army required from its members and from that list, we determined the core competencies that FAO could best contribute to the Army to achieve its vision for the force in 2025. Using those competencies, we analyzed then changed the current vision to a working model. That working model was constantly ‘poked and prodded’ ensuring that it was realistic, credible, attractive and focused on the future over the entire timeframe of the study until it reached its current state.

¹⁹ Retrieved from: <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/vision-statement.html>

²⁰ From NDU article titled “*Strategic Leadership and Decision-Making*“, retrieved from: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/strat-ldr-dm/pt4ch18.html>

C. Issues/Findings/Recommendations.

1) Previous FAO vision: “Army Foreign Area Officers are Soldiers who are regionally focused experts in political-military operations with advanced foreign language skills and cultural competence who advise senior decision-makers throughout all phases of military operations.”

2) Proposed FAO Vision: “Army Foreign Area Officers are Soldiers grounded in the Profession of Arms; who provide leadership and expertise in diverse organizations in joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environments; who advise seniors as regional experts; and who offer unique warfighting competencies – cultural capabilities, interpersonal communications and foreign language skills – that are critical to mission readiness of the Army in today’s dynamic strategic environment.”

Recommendation: The Chief, Foreign Area Officer Proponent approves the use of the proposed vision to guide the way ahead for the FAO Program.

3) Core Competencies: From our study for the FAO vision, we can derive key aspects that will focus our efforts in developing our Foreign Area Officers of now and the future.

Our leader development policies, strategies and programs must emphasize new qualities required for FAOs to succeed as the Army transitions, while retaining those historical qualities that characterize our foundation. Specifically, in order to develop future FAOs to be operationally adaptive, agile, credible and relevant leaders greater emphasis will be required on cross-cultural competence, interpersonal communication, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational processes, and language proficiency. These core competencies, key skills and attributes, along with the requirements to be grounded in the Profession of Arms and to understand the depth, breadth and context of the regions of the world in which our Army will operate, will form the FA48 Core Competencies for building future FAO Basic and Advance Leader Development Programs.

Thus, the six Core Competencies that will guide the FAO program into the future are:

1. Grounded in the profession of arms
2. Understand and provide expertise in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational environments
3. Understand the depth, breadth and context of their Region
4. Cross-Cultural Expertise
5. Interpersonal Communication skills
6. Foreign language skills

Executive Summary
Functional Area 48 (Foreign Area Officer) Survey

A. Introduction. The goals of this project were to assess FAO perceptions of their training and professional development and identify opportunities to improve FAO accessions, training, and education.

Bottom Line Up Front. Most FAOs feel that:

- Accessions: The timing of accessions is appropriate
- Training and professional development:
- The training area with the strongest need for improvement was language training.
- Respondents reported deficiencies both in their initial and sustainment language training.
- Opportunities for continuing contact with the operational Army are needed.
- Expanding FAOC and improving ICT would be beneficial.

Role-specific training and professional development:

- Preparation for attaché role is good overall; needs improvement for security cooperation roles.
- Some “cross-training” is needed due to relationship between attaché and security cooperation functions.
- The FAOC is deemed irrelevant or unimportant

Methodology: The Army Research Institute conducted an online survey by contacting the 1283 serving FAOs via email. 726 out 1283 FAOs responded – one of the best response rates of any survey that the institute has seen. Not every respondent answered every question, but all totaled, FAOs included over 2000 anecdotal and written responses – 35 pages worth. FAO Proponent and ARI did review these, but will not include examples of them in this summary.

B. Regulations/Policy Guidance. N/A

C. Issues/Findings/Recommendations.

1) The Survey Sample/Population:

All current FAOs were invited to participate.
726 respondents (See Figures 1-3).

Sample	N
95% male, 5% female	
CPT	107
MAJ	249
LTC	246
COL	124

Figure 1

Accessions Source	N
Career Field Designation Board	593
Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program	93
Call to Active Duty	25

Figure 2

AOC	N
48B – Latin America	121
48E – Eurasia	125
48G - Middle East	98
48C – Europe	124
48J - Sub-Saharan Africa	72
48H - Northeast Asia	54
48I - Southeast Asia	55
48D - South Asia	24
48F – China	43
48X - FAO Immaterial	7

Figure 3

2) **Accessions.** In Accessions, most FAOs believe that we are accessing FAOs at the right time in their career and that we are spending the correct amount of time in our basic branches before becoming FAOs. 80% of respondents “Strongly Agree” that company command experience is critical to performance as a FAO (See Figures 4-6).

Amount of time in basic branch	
Too short	3.8
Right amount	86.5
Too long	9.7

Figure 4

Timing of accessions	
Earlier than necessary	2.6%
Right time	84.0
Later than necessary	13.4

Figure 5

Item	% Strongly agree/ Agree	% Strongly disagree/ Disagree	% Neither Agree nor disagree
My experience as a company commander provided a critical and unique contribution to my performance as a FAO.	80.3	7.5	12.3
Inter-service transfers can be effective as Army FAOs.	43.7	20.1	36.2
Call to Active Duty officers can be effective as Army FAOs.	36.6	19.2	44.2
Reserve Component officers should be directly accessed into the FAO Corps.	18.5	39.4	40.2
FAOs should successfully complete a tour in an O1A position before becoming a FAO.	21.4	34.1	34.5

Figure 6

3) Overall Preparation and Sustainment

FAOs surveyed generally felt that initial training is meeting our needs. However, there is a fairly even difference of opinion about sustainment training (See Figure 7).

Item	% Strongly agree/ Agree	% Strongly disagree/ Disagree	% Neither Agree nor disagree
My initial FAO training met the needs of the Army.	72.2	10.0	17.9
My FAO sustainment training met the needs of the Army	26.5	28.1	45.4

Figure 7

In initial training, other than language, FAOs generally feel that they either receive or already have many of the skills necessary to be effective. The only area that they believe needs sustainment is “Regional Expertise.” Scores on this chart reflect “5” for Strongly Agree, “1” for Strongly Disagree. Scores near “3” indicate either an even split or ambiguity and thus, no statistical significance (See Figure 8).




Figure 8

4) Role-Specific Preparation:

In their most recent assignment, more than two-thirds of FAOs reported they used Regional Expertise (69%) and Intercultural Competence (70%) daily or routinely; almost 50% used Foreign Language at least routinely (See Figure 9).

Item	Daily	Routinely	Occasionally	Rarely	Not at all
Used foreign language proficiency	33.2%	15.4	15.4	14.0	14.3
Used regional expertise	43.9	25.5	9.9	3.9	5.8
Used intercultural competence	46.2	24.2	11.4	4.1	3.3

Figure 9

FAOs rated language training highest in importance in preparing for roles as attachés or security assistance officers. Both populations reported anecdotally the need to regionally focus JMAS and DISAM. ACS ranked third for both attaché and security assistance, but first for staff positions. The FAOs rated the FAOC as unimportant for any of the three roles.

One hundred ninety-nine FAOs who have served or are serving as Attachés responded. They reported that language training was most important in their preparation for their role (4.48/5.00). JMAS (4.36/5.00) and ACS (4.24/5.00) were important. Anecdotally, they reported JMAS is important, but is too general and out of date. This is the first exposure many have had to intelligence operations and functions (See Figure 10).




Figure 10

Two hundred forty-six FAOs who have served or are serving in Security Assistance roles responded. They also saw language as the most important part of their role (4.12/5.00). ICT was considered more important than DISAM. In fact, anecdotally, DISAM was reported as insufficient, irrelevant or generic (See Figure 11).




Figure 11

Five hundred sixty-six officers who have served or are serving in staff positions responded. They reported ACS as the most important part of FAO training in preparation for their duties (3.86/5.00) followed by ICT (3.74/5.00). Anecdotally, FAOs reported ILE and JPME were helpful and that regional expertise of culture and history was important (See Figure 12).




Figure 12

5) Joint FAO Skill Sustainment Pilot Program.

- 23 respondents had attended JFSSPP.
- 78.3% viewed JFSSPP as a good approach to sustainment training.
- 78.2% agreed that the Army should establish minimum standards for participation in JSSPP.
 - Completion of 1-2 assignments in the region
 - O5 rank
 - 2/2 language proficiency
 - Make mandatory as part of PCS between assignments

6) Senior FAO perspectives (See figure 13).

Item	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
My mentors provide me with appropriate guidance to seek a variety of assignments.	14.7%	32.8	24.1	17.1	11.2
Senior FAOs should be prepared to serve as generalists.	36.1	39.5	10.9	10.1	3.4
I feel qualified to serve in any AOC as a FAO Colonel.	41.2	26.9	13.4	13.4	5.0
I find appropriate functional/job-specific training for service in Colonel-level assignments available.	16.1	36.4	26.3	15.3	5.9

Figure 13

TAB H: SENIOR LEADER SURVEY

Senior Leaders Survey
Expected Publication
30 Sep 11

TAB I: DA PAM 600-3, CHAPTER 28



Tab I - DAPam 600-3
Chap 28.pdf