

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ADVANCING FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS TO FLAG OFFICER RANK

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USAWC CLASS OF 2009

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 30-11-2008		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE International Relations: Advancing Foreign Area Officers to Flag Officer Rank				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Tarek Mekhail				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Dr. Wallace A. Terrill Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The Army leadership currently assigns operational career field general officers (GO) as the United States Senior Defense Official (SDO) in several countries in United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). Although these officers are superb in their career field, this paper will argue that today's Middle East Foreign Area Officer (FAO) is far better qualified to serve as the SDO in these critical operational and strategic level GO positions. It will also argue that expertise and talent demonstrated by FAOs best serves the Army, Department of Defense (DOD) and the United States Government in these International billets. This paper will evaluate this argument by briefly addressing the importance of the Middle East to the United States, FAO selection, special training and qualifications, and the current GO billets in USCENTCOM's AOR. We will then evaluate the benefit of having a FAO general as SDO, the Army cultural change required to allow in country and senior staff FAOs to rise to General Officer/Flag rank and the way ahead to realizing this concept. Finally, we will address other DOD billets that would benefit in having the expertise of a FAO GO.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Middle East, USCENTCOM, Security Assistance, Attaché, Senior Defense Officer					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 22	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Tarek Mekhail

TITLE: International Relations: Advancing Foreign Area Officers to Flag Officer Rank

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 30 November 2008 WORD COUNT: 4,761 PAGES: 22

KEY TERMS: Middle East, USCENTCOM, Security Assistance, Attaché, Senior Defense Officer

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Army leadership currently assigns operational career field general officers (GO) as the United States Senior Defense Official (SDO) in several countries in the United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). Although these officers perform exceptionally well, this paper will argue that today's Middle East Foreign Area Officer (FAO) is better qualified to serve as the SDO in these critical operational and strategic level GO positions. The expertise and talent demonstrated by FAOs best serves the Army, Department of Defense (DOD) and the United States Government in selected International billets. This argument is advanced by briefly addressing the importance of the Middle East to the United States, FAO selection, special training and qualifications, and the current GO billets in USCENTCOM's AOR. The benefit of having an FAO general as SDO is assessed along with the military cultural changes required to allow in country, senior staff FAOs to rise to General Officer/Flag rank. Finally, the DOD billets that would most benefit from having the expertise of a FAO GOs are identified.

ADVANCING FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS TO FLAG OFFICER RANK

When the United States Army War College coined the term VUCA (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous) to explain the type of strategic environment senior leaders are working in, they may well have been thinking of the Middle East. That individuals with the most relevant background, education and understanding of the Middle East be assigned to military billets there is both appropriate and vital. The U.S. Army leadership currently assigns general officers (GO) from the operational career field as the United States Senior Defense Official (SDO) in several countries in United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). The quality of these officers is not in question. Many of them excel further in their career field rising to division command and higher positions. Although, these officers perform superbly in their career field, this paper will argue that today's Middle East Foreign Area Officer (FAO) is far better qualified to serve as the SDO in these critical operational and strategic level GO positions. The argument is predominantly focused on the Middle East and the Central Asian States within the USCENTCOM's AOR because that is where the GO billets already exist. The expertise and talent demonstrated by FAOs best serves the Army, Department of Defense (DOD) and the United States Government in these International billets. In *Strategic Leadership of the Professional Army*, Leonard Wong and Don Snider assert that we are living in a complex world and that future Army leaders need the following characteristics:

The Army's future leaders clearly need to be well versed in interacting with cultures lying outside American borders...This metacompetency includes the ability to understand cultures beyond one's organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical and political boundaries.¹

This paper evaluates their argument by briefly addressing the importance of the Middle East to the United States, FAO selection, special training and qualifications, and the current GO billets in USCENTCOM's AOR. The benefit of having a FAO general as SDO, will be evaluated along with the necessary military cultural changes needed to allow in-country and senior staff FAOs to rise to General Officer/Flag rank. Finally, other DOD billets that would benefit from the expertise of a FAO GO rather than Flag/GOs with limited Middle East experience will be addressed. The purpose is not to advocate for the specialization of the general officer corps, but rather to encourage what has been briefed by the Human Resources Command (HRC) regarding the goal of the Army: "Our efforts are to assign the right person, with the right skills, to the right job at the right time...we do this while recognizing we must meet the Army's Requirement, that we meet Officer Professional Development Needs and that we attempt to meet Officer Preferences...in that order."²

Importance of the Middle East to the United States

Without a doubt the Middle East is important to the United States' national, geopolitical, and geographical interests. Because of the vast oil reserves, the Middle East is nationally and geopolitically important to not only the United States, but also to the rest of the world. In *Strategic Insight*, Naji Abi-Aad states, "the present geopolitical and strategic importance of the Middle East is mainly the result of its petroleum resources."³ Approximately 66% of all known oil reserves in the world are in the Middle East.⁴ Another U.S. geopolitical interest involves our commitment to the security of Israel. The State Department's homepage, under U.S.-Israeli Relations, notes: "Commitment to Israel's security and well being has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in

the Middle East since Israel's founding in 1948.”⁵ This statement defines U.S.-Israeli relations by highlighting our political will to support, assist and ultimately protect Israeli security if necessary. Geographically the Middle East is important because it links the Mediterranean and Red Seas via the Suez Canal, a vital transportation channel for international commerce. Finally, the Middle East is significant due to current concerns about nuclear proliferation and Iran in particular.

The Middle East and to a greater extent the Central Asian States within the USCENTCOM AOR are crucial to the U.S. Military's fight in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Much of the recruiting and financing for radical Islamic organizations and their activities stems from this part of the world. With the exception of Syria and Iran, most terrorist support and activities are from non-state sponsored actors. They are individuals or groups dissatisfied with current regimes' in power. They are also frustrated with the poverty and the lack of future for individuals within those societies.⁶ Arguably the ideology for radical Islamic thought began in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt continues to be a fertile recruiting ground for members and leaders of various terrorist organizations both internal to Egypt and internationally; including Al-Qaeda. Much of the financing for many terrorist organizations and activities come from the gulf countries on the Arabian Peninsula. The Pakistani western frontier serves as a safe haven for terrorist organizations, in particular Al-Qaeda, because of the tribal nature, terrain and general lawlessness. Consequently, it is vital that we continue to develop and improve our military to military relationship with countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan because of their importance in GWOT.

Unique Qualifications of a Foreign Area Officer (FAO)

An FAO is a highly trained Army officer; an experienced expert prepared to serve in a specific region of the world. Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3-48 defines the FAO as follows: "Foreign Area Officers serve where expert Army officers are needed to match their professional military skills and knowledge with their regional expertise, language skills, and knowledge of US and foreign political-military relationships."⁷ Selection to serve as a FAO is extremely competitive. In an average year, approximately 1000 captains go before a career field designation board, to request FAO branch designation and compete for 250 billets.

Once selected, a FAO enters a three to four year training program consisting of language training, in-country training, and a master's degree program. The FAO trainee first receives language training. The duration of this training period is 6-18 months depending on the difficulty in the language.⁸ Following language training, FAO either conducts "in-country" training or enters into a master's degree program, although the order is not particularly important.⁹ In-country training is a unique opportunity where a trainee is immersed into the country and regional environment in which he is likely to serve. The in-country training program has several goals and benefits:

- Utilize and continue improving language skills; this includes learning the dialect of the host country
- Learn how an embassy functions
- Regional travel to other countries in that specific AOR
- Attend a host nation military school and, if possible, serve with a host nation military unit for 2-4 months

Finally, a FAO is provided an opportunity to acquire a master's degree in their region of expertise at a prestigious U.S. university which offers a specialization in that area of

study. The purpose of the degree program is to enhance the FAO's knowledge of the history, politics and economics of the region. Upon training completion, FAOs normally serve the rest of their careers as regional experts at the operational and strategic levels both in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas (OCONUS). DA Pam 600-3-48 identifies; "Foreign Area Officers, [as being] best described as the Army's 'Soldier Statesmen' . . . " [who strengthen]:

- The Defense Attaché System.
- Key positions in Security Assistance Organizations.
- The Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- The Department of State.
- The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- The Defense Intelligence Agency.
- Combined and Joint Commands.
- The Department of the Army Staff.
- Army Major Commands and Service Schools"¹⁰

GO Billets in USCENTCOM's AOR

Two general officer billets are currently coded for Army FAOs. Neither of these billets, however, is in the USCENTCOM AOR; they are the Senior Defense Representatives in China and Russia. The continuing importance of the Middle East region to U.S. national objectives warrants having the skill set of a FAO GO in the volatile and complex environment of the Middle East region, although such an appointment has not yet occurred. Excluding Operational HQ in Iraq and Afghanistan, several GO billets are filled by officers from the operational career field in the USCENTCOM AOR.¹¹ They include:

- Major General (MG), Chief of Office of Military Cooperation, Cairo, Egypt (OMC-C)¹²
- MG, Chief of the United States Military Training Mission, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (USMTM)
- Brigadier General (BG), Chief of Office Program Management Saudi Arabian National Guard, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (OPM-SANG)¹³
- BG, Chief of the Office of Defense Representation, Islamabad, Pakistan (ODRP)¹⁴
- BG, Chief of the OMC-K, Kuwait City, Kuwait

These billets are in countries that are vital to U.S. national interests and pursuit of the global war on terrorism. The billets are predominantly oriented toward security assistance, consisting of foreign military sales (FMS), joint military training and exercises, and International Military Education and Training programs with the host nation. This past year DOD re-designated the senior GO billets as the SDO within the host Nation. This means that the in-country GO serves not only as the chief of the security assistance program but also as the defense attaché (“dual-hatted”); thus having overall responsibility for both military missions as the SDO. In short, a difficult job is compounded with this additional responsibility, and this tasking is especially challenging for a GO who has minimal experience with either duty set.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have given the current generation of operational officers a much keener understanding of the Islamic culture, and one could argue the necessary skills to fulfill the SDO function. That claim would be naïve, however. Many of the lessons learned in a combat zone dealing with the local population are not applicable when dealing with the host government and could lead to friction if appropriate adjustments were not made. Conducting a meeting with a local

Iraqi official while dressed in body armor, carrying an M4 machine gun and arriving in armored HMMWVs accompanied by a personal security detachment (PSD) does not constitute useful preparation for serving in a U.S. Embassy and working with the host nation's senior leaders. Serving in a friendly host nation entails a very different environment. Diplomatic skills acquired from years of experience in the region and from a full understanding of the character of the sovereign country and its national interests are essential. Operational officers seldom have the breath of regional, cultural, political, language, economical, historical and attaché or security assistance experience of a fully qualified FAO.

Benefits of a FAO General in Host Nation for the Army and DOD

The essential question is: what does an FAO general bring that is currently missing? The answer is exceptional knowledge and specialized experience within the field. The FAO spends much of his/her career at the operational and strategic level. Typically, the senior FAO has served in the three FAO communities both overseas (OCONUS) and in the continental United States (CONUS). FAOs serve in three DOD communities: the intelligence community, either in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Washington D.C. or as an Attaché overseas; the security assistance community, either OCONUS as an in-country program manager or CONUS as a program manager on a combatant or unified command staff; and finally in a variety of politico-military advisory billets on Pentagon based staffs¹⁵ or a similar billet on a deployed combat zone war fighting staff.

One might, however, ask the "So what?" question. How does the Army and DOD benefit by having a FAO general serving in these positions? Just as an operational

general is ready to command a division due to battalion and brigade command experience, the same is equally true for an FAO general. When an FAO general becomes the SDO, getting acclimated to the host nation and environment is simply not an issue. Cultural subtleties are known and cross cultural mistakes seldom occur.

An FAO general already understands the nuances of the culture, including ways to avoid inadvertently offending the host nation's leaders. He/she speaks the language and does not have to rely consistently on a translator. Given that a majority of host nations prefer to rely on the services of their own translators, U.S. generals without adept language skills are easily placed at a disadvantage. Moreover, however, there is a good chance the FAO general would have previously served in that country, thus creating a potential advantage through prior knowledge of and familiarity with the host nation's leadership. Non-FAO generals experience an exceptionally short executive training program before entering the billet. The FAO general will already know the security assistance and attaché business. Clearly, the U.S. Army and DOD will gain a huge advantage in assigning an FAO general to critical Middle East positions.

This analysis can be taken one step further, however, by exploring the other end of the spectrum. In what way(s) is the U.S. disadvantaged when the SDO is not a FAO? The following scenario is, unfortunately, an all too common one easily observed in the Middle East. Assume the USCENTCOM Commander or an equivalent DOD officer is visiting the host nation. On most occasions the principal will meet with the most senior host nation leadership, typically the host country's Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the Minister of Defense and the head of state. The host nation sets the framework for the office call, the time, venue and number U.S. personnel allowed in the meeting. This

framework is strictly adhered to and controlled by the host nation especially at the presidential/king level. In most cases the only individuals allowed into these meeting are the principal, the U.S. ambassador and the U.S. SDO to the host nation. Unless all of the host nation attendees speak English fluently, which is very rarely the case; a host nation translator will translate the meeting into Arabic. And this places the United States at a severe disadvantage.

In such a scenario, U.S. attendees seldom possess an adequate, let alone strong, comprehension of the host nation's language. This situation often leads to second and third order effects that derive from the meeting. One very serious second order effect might be that the U.S. delegation is seated at a negotiation table where critical decisions are discussed and decided by the host nation. This potential problem is less about the accuracy of what is being translated, and more about the nuances in the cross talk between the host nation's senior leaders in their native tongue. This scenario has the potential to lead to a third order effect. If the outcome of the meeting is not what the U.S. delegation might desire, no one from the U.S. delegation in actual attendance at the meeting will be able to explain why. If the FAO general were in the meeting he/she would understand the host nation cross talk and very likely be able to provide insight on the cross talk dynamics to both the principal and the ambassador, and thereby impact the meeting's outcome. This issue is not something the U.S. leadership should take lightly. The benefit of having an FAO present at such meetings is impressive. The outcome is often completely different if situational awareness is maximized and the FAO has the opportunity and ability to provide clarification and critical interjections at the right time in accord with U.S. national interests

Realizing this Concept

GO FAOs serving in overseas billets in USCENTCOM's AOR would clearly be beneficial to the Army and DOD. There is strong evidence that FAOs are needed in greater quantity for longer service throughout the Army. The Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct a study that "outline[s] alternatives to up-or-out that could be tested via demonstration projects, to suggest methods to evaluate these alternatives, and to work with the military services to identify possible communities in which to conduct the demonstrations."¹⁶ The RAND study basically looked at DOD career fields and noted those that would best serve the interests of the country by extending the Mandatory Retirement Dates to allow for continued service. The FAO career field was among those highlighted in the RAND study. They found:

The FAO community is an ideal test case for an up-or-stay demonstration project for several reasons. First, it has high mid-career training costs, which means longer careers provide a greater return on investment. Second, FAO expertise is hard to replace because it comes from people skills, tacit knowledge, and personal networks developed over time. Finally, extending the length of employment would give the FAO community the opportunity to explore different ways of managing officers' careers.¹⁷

Furthermore, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Directive, Number 1315.17 dated 28 April 2005, identified policies and responsibilities for FAO program administration DOD wide. This directive discusses the FAO program in general and specifically discusses establishing promotion opportunity for FAOs to the rank of General:

3.4. Officers (FAOs) with potential for service on political-military staffs and for effective military diplomacy shall be competitively selected within the Military Departments and be able to represent the U.S. Department of Defense to foreign governments and military establishments. They shall be educated, trained, and have their careers managed to ensure they are retained for such assignments. Procedures to ensure competitive career

advancement for such officers shall be incorporated in personnel management programs, to include opportunities for service at General/Flag Officer ranks.¹⁸

OSD clearly realizes a definitive and growing need for the talents of FAOs within DOD.

They provided specific guidance on a vision for the future of the FAO program. The real change, however, needs to come from within the Services if these goals are to be realized.

Needed Cultural Change within the Army Leadership

The Army officer management system has changed multiple times in the past twenty years. In 1996 General Reimer, Army Chief of Staff, commissioned task force OPMS XXI to examine Army and Joint requirements for the 21st century. He assigned Major General David Ohle to head this task force charged with investigating numerous aspects of the officer management systems, including the officer evaluation report (OER) and officer promotions. MG Ohle commented as follows when describing the task force mission:

. . . every officer in the Army is trying to assist the Chief of Staff of the Army in taking the Army forward into the 21st century. There are different roles for all the officers. What we really need to do is to build a broad bench of experts who can, in their own area, take the Army forward. Right now the focus is to build the bench in the warfighting area, and we have the best warfighters we've ever had. To a certain extent, we've done that at the expense of building experts across the spectrum that we need to have to take us into the 21st century. As we develop this new system with the hallmark of providing multiple avenues of approach to success, so that everybody doesn't have to be a warfighter, we can have experts across the whole spectrum who not only take us into the 21st century but really help us in the Department of Defense and in the Joint Staff, and with all the commanders in chief in DoD. I think that really is what we have to do.¹⁹

OPMS XXI accomplished this task and gave rise to a new OER system where senior raters are accountable for and held to a limited number/percentage of above center of

mass ratings and a new promotion system where all officers compete equally within their general career fields. This has enabled FAOs, as well as others in vital career fields, to compete equitably to the rank of Colonel.

Given the volatility of the Middle East and the demonstrated critical nature of the FAO, we need ask: Why hasn't the Army selected FAOs for General Officer rank and assignment to the region? The answer, at least in part, is that the current Army senior leader culture and the selection process for Brigadier General (BG) is biased against FAOs as well as other non-operational career fields. Command experience is heavily weighted, perhaps excessively so, in selection to General Officer/Flag rank. The BG selection board is comprised of senior general officers with vast battalion or brigade command experience. Consequently, it would be unusual, if not simply unnatural, for these senior general officers to select an FAO for advancement. An FAO's career path is very different from their experience. Second, there is a well acknowledge element of parochial bias between the branches within the Army. For an FAO to be selected to BG, another branch will have to relinquish a BG billet and this sort of realignment will not happen without intervention by very senior Army leadership. Finally, there is some evidence, albeit anecdotal, that those sitting on the BG selection board are authorized to discuss officer files openly.²⁰ Such a selection process necessarily leads to parochial bias. In most cases the FAO community would not have a GO sitting on the board with personal knowledge of or commitment to supporting the FAO community. Consequently, unless the Army initiates a requirement for the BG selection board to select an FAO, the board members will not be inclined to seriously consider an FAO for

advancement even though he/she may be the best qualified individual for the particular billets previously discussed.

The question then becomes: how do we go about changing the leadership culture in today's Army? To change the culture two facts need to be clearly articulated to the Army leadership and the selection boards. First, success moves through multiple avenues within the Army. Success in battalion or brigade command does not necessarily equate to qualification to be a SDO in a critical region where important Army, DOD, and U.S. national interests are at stake. Second, the best and most qualified officers must be aligned with and then selected to billet, not the one who generally finds favor with the board members.

General Officers Serving in DOD Billet in the field of International Relations and Affairs

A reoccurring DOD theme seems to be that in international relations and multicultural affairs almost any flag officer is knowledgeable and capable. Many of these billets are divided among the services.²¹ There are several GO billets throughout DOD where regional and technical expertise would greatly benefit a command and staff. It is in the best interest of the DOD to generate a group of GO FAOs, preferably from all services that have the ability, knowledge and experience to work in the international affairs arena. Fortunately, several identifiable Flag Officer billets well suited for an experienced FAO already exist.

One wants to believe that senior strategic leaders want the best possible advice from the most knowledgeable individuals on their staffs. The most appropriate billet where FAO type experience, knowledge and capability are extremely valuable assets at the GO level is the Deputy J5 billet on a geographical combatant command staff.

Traditionally, the Deputy CCJ5, Strategic Plans and Policy, billet at USCENTCOM has been filled by a Naval or Marine Corps flag officer. Again, these are invariably fine officers who performed exceptionally well in their basic career field, but, generally, they have little to no experience in international relations or affairs and often have little experience in the USCENTCOM AOR. The value of having a FAO GO on the USCENTCOM staff as a principal advisor to the commander is tremendous. The USCENTCOM Mission Statement states:

US Central Command, working with national and international partners, promotes development and cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and transnational aggression in order to establish regional security and stability.²²

What career field offers vast experience in the AOR and is most qualified to shape strategic policy within the USCENTCOM mission? At present, the most knowledgeable individual and probably the only one who has worked in every facet reflected in the USCENTCOM Mission is the FAO colonel assigned in the CCJ5 Directorate as the Chief of Theater Engagement Branch. Having an FAO General Officer serving as a senior decision maker on the USCENTCOM staff constitutes an impressive and powerful force multiplier.

There are two GO billets in the Army where selecting an FAO would bring more to the table than would the selection of officers from the operational career field. They are the Commander of United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Army International Affairs Directorate on the Army G35 Staff.²³

The Mission Statement for USASAC is:

On behalf of the Army Executive Agent (AMC), USASAC manages Army security assistance:

Provides total program management, including planning, delivery, and life cycle support of equipment, services, and training to, and coproduction with, U.S. allies and international partners.

Negotiates and implements coproduction agreements

Serves as proponent for Army security assistance information management and financial policy

Provides logistics procedural guidance to the Army security assistance community

Supports U.S. Government emergency assistance, humanitarian relief and Operations Other Than War.”²⁴

The past four USASAC Commanders have all come from the operational career field.

All these officers have had remarkably modest security assistance or acquisition corps experience. Only one of the commanders had security assistance experience, and he did not gain this experience until he was selected for promotion to brigadier general and as the Chief of the Office of the Program Manager Saudi Arabian National Guard, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Another interesting point is these same commanders all retired from this billet or soon thereafter. The evidence is suggestive if not clear: Army leadership is using the USASAC GO billet as a reward for successful past performance in jobs outside security assistance rather than selecting true expertise with enduring potential. That an FAO will eventually become the USASAC Commander only makes sense as almost a third to half of the FAOs career is spent working in security assistance. The terminology, language, U.S. law and international agreements associated with security assistance require the knowledge of a well-rounded FAO.

As for the Deputy Director billet on the Army G35 Staff, the argument is similar to that for the CCJ5 billet on a geographical combatant command staff. The function of the G35 Army International Affairs Directorate is as follows:

The Army International Affairs (AIA) personnel in Army G-35 serve as the political-military staff for the Chief of Staff of the Army...The AIA organization produces regional assessments and develops policy for the conduct of Army international activities worldwide and with foreign representatives. It develops and recommends regional and transregional priorities for Army international activities and integrates regional goals into the Army Security Cooperation Strategy (ASCS). It provides consultative support and expert assistance for any theater combatant command or Service in the development and conduct of international civil-military emergency planning.²⁵

Again, this Army directorate is almost exclusively focused on international affairs and how the army can leverage international relations or how international activities impact the Army. On rare occasions when a Russian or China FAO GO has concluded his SDO job from theater he is assigned to this billet, but if one is not available the Army fills it with an operational GO. It seems only sensible and logical that the Army senior leadership and staff would want to have a GO expert on international relations and affairs on staff.

Within DOD there are several GO billets that call for the unique talents of a regional expert or, at a minimum, an officer with substantial international background. These billets are the Deputy in the OSD office of Near-East Southeast Asia Policy, Deputy J5 on the Joint Staff, and the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Officers from other services are currently holding all these billets. But, as previously argued the background and experience of a foreign area skilled officer from one of the Services will bring much needed expertise to these agencies.

Conclusion

FAOs are highly trained and talented regional experts who serve most of their careers at the operational and strategic level. The VUCA environment of the Middle East requires the Army and DOD to acknowledge the importance of having regional GO

experts in SDO billets in nations vital to United States National Interests, on the geographical combatant command staffs and in Army/DOD billets where international expertise will benefit higher headquarters staffs. For FAO GOs to become a reality, change is required in the BG selection process so that the most qualified and talented officer is selected for these critical international relations and affairs billets. Finally, advancing established and highly skilled FAO GOs to serve DOD wide as “Soldier-Statesmen” will be absolutely beneficial to U.S. national interests as a whole.

Endnotes

¹ Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, “Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (McGraw-Hill Custom Publishing, 2005), 614.

² Ev Torres, “US Army Human Resources Command Officer Personnel Management Directorate Army War College October 2008,” lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 29, 2008, cited with permission of Mrs. Torres.

³ Naji Abi-Aad, “The Middle East: Petroleum Supply Security or Political Stability?,” *Strategic Insights*, Volume VII, Issue 1, February 2008, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2008/Feb/aadFeb08.asp> (accessed Oct 13, 2008).

⁴ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, *The Future of Oil*, <http://www.iags.org/futureofoil.html> (accessed Oct 13, 2008).

⁵ US Department of State Homepage, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.htm> (accessed Oct 13, 2008).

⁶ There is evidence that Iran and Syria are two countries with USCENTCOM's AOR that are considered states that sponsor terrorism within Iraq, and to terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.

⁷ DA Pamphlet 600-3-48, 5, http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/p600_3_48.pdf (accessed Oct 13, 2008).

⁸ DOD classifies languages into four categories. The category IV languages are Arabic, Farsi, Chinese, Japanese and Korean which all are 18 month teaching programs at the Defense language Institute in Monterey, California.

⁹ Army FAO Proponent makes the determination if a FAO trainee goes to their in-country training depend on the availability of FAO trainee billets in the AORs.

¹⁰ DA Pamphlet 600-3-48, 5.

¹¹ Except for the OPM-SANG billet, it is worth mentioning that the remaining billets are all joint billets that can be field by any service flag officer. It is also noteworthy to mention that the Air Force and the Navy have weak or no FAO like program in there service.

¹² Currently an Air Force GO is assigned in this billet, but traditionally Army has filled this billet over the past 15-20 year.

¹³ Although, in the past the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) heavily procured U.S. military equipment through the FMS program, in the past few years the OPM-SANG mission has changed primarily focusing on training of the SANG forces. Thus a GO Chief from the operational career field would make sense for this billet.

¹⁴ Currently a Navy Rear Admiral is assigned in this billet, but in the past an Army GO has filled the billet.

¹⁵ There are FAO billets in the Pentagon on the Army, Joint, or OSD staffs.

¹⁶ RAND National Defense Research Institute, "Creating New Career Options for Officers in the U.S. Military," http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7569/index1.html (accessed Oct 13, 2008).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Department of Defense Directive, NUMBER 1315.17 April 28, 2005, "Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs," 2, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/131517p.pdf> (accessed Oct 13, 2008).

¹⁹ Maj. Gen. David H. Ohle, "OPMS XXI--an integrated strategy Army," interview by Mary Blake French, *BNET Business Network*, Feb 1997, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_/ai_n8738957 (accessed Oct 13, 2008).

²⁰ In 2004 I was selected to sit on an Army selection board. The discussion of files between members on the board was not authorized.

²¹ This information was acquired during casual discussions with Marine Corps FAOs.

²² *United States Central Command Homepage*, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom/our-mission> (accessed Oct 13, 2008).

²³ I would argue that both these billets should be filled by GO FAO. Although, it does not matter what region of the world these GO FAOs come from as long as they have security assistance, politico-military and attaché experience.

²⁴ *United States Army Security Assistance Command Homepage*, <http://www.usasac.army.mil/About/mission.htm> (accessed Oct 27, 2007).

²⁵ *HQDA Army International Affairs, Army G35 Homepage*, <http://international.army.mil/AboutAIA/AIAOrgn.htm> (accessed Nov 4, 2007).