


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25 March 2011


MEMORANDUM FOR US Army Intelligence and Security Command, ATTN: IACS-SMI-MH (Michael Bigelow), 8825 Beulah Street, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5246

SUBJECT: Declassification Review

1. In accordance with Executive Order 13526 all classified records that are more than twenty five (25) years old and have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, shall be automatically declassified whether or not records have been reviewed. All classified records shall be automatically declassified on 31 December of the year that is 25 years from the date of origin of information. If the date of origin of an individual record cannot be readily determined, the date of original classification shall be used instead.
2. Mandatory Declassification Review of the classified History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, General Staff, which contained 8 parts, dated 1959-1961 has been declassified in its entirety.
3. The Point of contact for this action is Cassius N. Hall, 703-428-4340, cassius.hall@mi.army.mil.



Cassius N. Hall
Classification Management Officer



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HISTORY OF THE
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF

PART SEVEN
(Final Form)

KOREAN CONFLICT
25 June 1950 - 27 July 1953
(Korean Time)

By
BRUCE W. BIDWELL
Colonel, U. S. Army Ret.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
CONTRACT DA-49-083 OSA-2176, dated 27 May 1959, as modified on 1 Octo-
ber 1959 and 22 June 1961

DOCUMENT REVIEWED	
Date	Signature
10-4-75	J. Gillis

e 100-22-64

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PART SEVEN

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PART SEVEN

KOREAN CONFLICT
(25 June 1950 - 27 July 1953)
(Korean Time)

CHAPTER I

COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

Preceded in most cases by a heavy artillery and mortar barrage, North Korean combat elements crossed the 38th Parallel on a broad front to open the invasion of the Republic of Korea between 4 and 5 o'clock Sunday morning, 25 June 1950 (Korean time).^{*} Probably the

* Seoul time is fourteen hours ahead of Eastern Standard Time (EST), so the invasion commenced between 2:00 and 3:00 p. m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), on Saturday, 24 Jun 50, in Washington, D. C. For a detailed account of the early combat operations in Korea, see: Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu in UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR (Washington, 1961), passim.

first American in Seoul to learn of this sudden turn of events was an Army radio operator stationed there with the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (K MAG),^{*} who received a reveal-

* K MAG became an official entity when the American occupation forces were withdrawn from South Korea, effective 1 Jul 49, although

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the formal agreement for it was not actually signed until 26 Jan 50. KMAG originally carried an authorized strength of 495 persons, including 186 officers, 4 WO's, 1 Nurse and 304 EM, but this total was shortly reduced to 472 through the loss of 23 EM spaces. See: Monograph, Capt Robert K. Sawyer, "United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea," Part I & II, pp. 70 and 72-78. Gen Ref Off, OCMH. Hereafter cited as: Sawyer, "KMAG Monograph."

ing message on the subject from the Ongjin Advisory Detachment in the west at approximately 0600 hours. He delivered this message without delay to the KMAG duty officer at Republic of Korea (ROK) Army Headquarters and it soon resulted in the sounding of a general alarm. There was considerable skepticism initially displayed among the KMAG officers concerned that the Ongjin invasion report covered anything more than just the start of another series of border raids which had been going on for some time. This doubt faded fast, though, when subsequent messages described similar attacks along the entire front. Besides, these attacks not only appeared to be well coordinated but also came at points which were easily recognizable as being the most logical avenues of approach for an invasion with main effort directed against Seoul itself.*

* Ibid., Part III, pp. 184-89.

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At the time, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) W. H. S. Wright, the KMAG Chief of Staff, was in temporary command of the Advisory Group, pending the arrival of a replacement for Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts, who had recently finished his tour of duty as Chief, KMAG, and returned to the United States. Colonel Wright himself, though, was already under orders to attend the Army Industrial College at Fort McNair, Washington, D. C., and had just gone over to Japan to bid farewell to his family, with the expectation of following them in the very near future. He learned of the invasion while attending church in Tokyo on Sunday the 25th and was unable to get back to Seoul until about 0400 the next morning. Lt. Col. Carl H. Sturies, was thus in actual charge of KMAG when the invasion started but most of the major decisions prior to Colonel Wright's return were made at KMAG Headquarters by Maj. (later Col.) Walter Greenwood, Jr., the Deputy Chief of Staff.*

* Ibid., pp. 189-90.

As soon as the members of the KMAG staff in Seoul had reached the considered conclusion that the reported attacks really did constitute the opening of a full-scale Communist invasion, they recommended putting the main emergency provisions of a previously prepared South Korean defense plan into effect.* Maj. Gen. Choi Byung Duk, the ROK Army Chief

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* This plan called for evacuating the Ongjin Peninsula, withdrawing certain units to the south bank of the Imjin River and counterattacking with reserve divisions brought up from the south. There was also a companion U. S. plan (CRULLER), providing for the evacuation by sea and air of American nationals in the event of an invasion from North Korea. See: Ibid., Part I and II, pp. 183-84.

of Staff readily agreed to this course of action and commenced to issue the necessary orders at once. Later on during that same day, Mr. John J. Muccio, the American Ambassador, ^{*} met with President Syngman

* An American diplomatic mission to the Republic of Korea had been established, effective 26 Aug 48.

Rhee, who proceeded to express great concern over the need of his fighting forces for more arms and ammunition. KMAG then dispatched an urgent message to Headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM) in Tokyo, requesting the immediate shipment of a ten-day supply of ammunition to the port of Pusan for use by the ROK Army. This message was promptly followed up by another one from Ambassador Muccio, addressed personally to General MacArthur, which repeated the ^{KMAC} same request and gave as his firm opinion that it would be catastrophic for the United States to permit the South Koreans to succumb because of lack of ammunition. *

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* Ibid., Part III, p. 192. These messages were USMILAT to CINCFE, 250425Z, 25 Jun 50 and USMILAT to CINCFE, 250530Z, 25 Jun 50. See also: "Korean Chronology, 25 June 1950-31 December 1951" (S), G-2 314.7, 31 Dec 51 (30 Oct 42), p. 2. ACSI Rec Sec.

The first official word of the North Korean invasion of South Korea to reach the Commander in Chief, Far East Command (CINCFE), came at 0925, 25 June, ^{*} in the form of an information copy of a prior-

* "Korean Chronology," (S), p. 2.

ity radio sent from Seoul to the Department of the Army by the American Military Attache, Republic of Korea. ^{*} It reported that fighting

* Lt Col (later Col) Bob E. Edwards, U.S.A.

of great intensity had started at 0400 on the Ongjin Peninsula, then moved to the east taking in six major points and, by 0900, had overrun the important border city of Kaesong. Additionally, ten tanks had been observed north of Chunchon and twenty boats had landed an approximate strength of one North Korean regiment on the east coast to cut the coastal road running south from Kangnung. There was no evidence

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yet, however, of panic among the South Korean troops. * Headquarters,

* See: Draft Manuscript, Maj (later Lt Col) James F. Schnabel, "The Korean Conflict," ch. IV, p. 12. Gen Ref Off, OCMH. Hereafter cited as "Schnabel MS." A second message from the same MA some ninety minutes later served to confirm this startling news.

Far East Air Forces (FEAF), in Tokyo, likewise began to receive a number of messages from Kimpo Airfield near Seoul to the effect that fighting was going on below the 38th Parallel which seemed to represent more than the usual border incidents. * Furthermore, at 1100, a

* Appleman, op. cit., p. 36. Kimpo Airfield was being operated at that time by the firm of Bourne Associates under an ECA contract but with USAF support, while Northwest Airlines was the only commercial airline then operating flights into and out of the Kimpo airfield. See: Ltr, Paul L. Bencoter, Northwest Airlines, Inc., to Author, 24 Aug 61. Author's File.

broadcast from Radio Pyongyang declared that the North Korean Peoples Army had "repulsed" a South Korean "attack" and threatened "to resort to decisive counter-measures" unless South Korea "suspended its adventurous military actions." * Within a few hours, therefore, FECOM was

* "Korean Chronology," (S), p. 2.

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able to submit an original situation report on the Korean fighting to the Department of the Army, with General MacArthur shortly adding his own personal warning that the enemy effort was not only "serious in strength and strategic intent" but also an "undisguised act of war subject to United Nations censure."

* "Schnabel MS," ch. IV, pp. 12-13.

Numerous and scattered informative reports bearing upon the sudden North Korean invasion commenced to arrive in Washington, D. C., about 8:00 p. m. (EDT), Saturday, 24 June. Ambassador Muccio's first

* These were led by the previously described MA messages from Seoul but also included several special news bulletins from representatives of various foreign press associations located in Korea.

radio on the subject was received in the State Department at 9:26 p. m. that same evening, which corresponded to 10:26 a. m. Sunday, 25 June, at Seoul. His message said, in part: "It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an allout offensive against the Republic of Korea." Secretary

* The Department of State Pub 3922, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Doc. 1, p. 11.

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of State Dean Acheson was duly notified of this critical situation and, before midnight, had relayed the information by telephone to President Truman in Independence, Mo. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, had also heard the news at his Long Island home and taken steps to have the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) in

* See: Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations (New York, 1956), ch. II and III, and Appendix, pp. 217-19.

Seoul forward an official report to him ^{about} ~~regarding~~ the invasion and to schedule a special meeting of the UN Security Council for the next afternoon.*

* Appleman, op. cit., p. 37. See also: United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Docs. 2 and 3, pp. 11-12.

After the receipt of a second telephone report concerning the Korean situation from Secretary Acheson, on Sunday morning, 25 June, President Truman decided to return without delay to Washington, D. C. Accordingly, he instructed the Secretary of State to contact the Service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and work out suitable recommendations with them in the matter for his prompt consideration upon arrival. The UN Security Council then convened at 11:00 that same after-

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noon and adopted a vote of nine to zero, with the U.S.S.R. absent and Jugoslavia abstaining, a resolution declaring the North Korean armed attack upon the Republic of Korea had constituted a "breach of peace." The Council further asked for an immediate cessation of hostilities and requested "all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to re-
*
frain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."

* "Schnabel MS," ch. IV, pp. 14-15; United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Doc. 5, p. 16. The USSR had been boycotting meetings of the UN Security Council ever since 10 Jan 50, over the question of replacing the Chinese representative therein with a representative from Red China.

Meanwhile, the appropriate State and Defense Department officials had been carrying on a series of meetings in compliance with President Truman's previous directive. Early Sunday evening the JCS also held a teletype conference with General MacArthur in order to ascertain the latest combat developments and inform him of tentative plans that were being prepared which would authorize CINCPAC to send supplies and equipment to the ROK Army, extend his command to assume operational

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control of all United States military activities in Korea and utilize his forces (principally Navy and Air) for establishing protective zones around the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area to assure the safe evacuation of American nationals therefrom. His attention was also drawn to the possibility of the Security Council calling upon the UN member nations to take direct action against North Korea. In that case, he might be instructed to employ his forces, including elements of the Seventh Fleet, for stabilizing the combat situation and, if feasible, restoring the 38th Parallel as a boundary. * *Actually, as a matter of*

* Telecon, CINCFE and JCS, TT 3417, 252330Z Jun 50. See also: "Schnabel MS," ch. IV, pp. 16-17.

fact, General MacArthur had already ordered the Eighth Army to load available cargo ships in Yokohama harbor with ammunition for the ROK Army and announced a goal for an initial water shipment of South Korean supplies to reach Pusan not later than 1 July, protected throughout by elements from both FEAF and the U. S. Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE). *

* "Schnabel MS," p. 11. Gen MacArthur ^{had} promptly reported taking this anticipatory action to the D/A, adding that he intended to provide the ROK Army with ammunition and supplies just as long as it could use them.

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When President Truman returned to Washington about 7:45 p. m. (EDT), Sunday, 25 June, he went directly to his temporary residence at the Blair House where a group of thirteen high-ranking State and Defense Department officials awaited him. The ensuing conference

* Included in this group were the Secretaries of State and Defense, all three Service Department Secretaries, and the Chairman and members of the JCS. The Army was represented by Secretary Frank Pace, Jr. and Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins.

with reference to Korea was opened by the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, who presented a detailed report on the rapidly deteriorating military situation in South Korea which he had received from General MacArthur earlier during the day. In view of this report, the President promptly authorized CINCPAC to send a group of carefully selected officer-observers to South Korea, the Seventh Fleet to start moving at once from the Philippines and Okinawa to Japan, and USAF jet aircraft to be flown to areas near Formosa as a matter of urgency. Expressing his deep concern over future Soviet intentions, the President also directed all United States intelligence agencies to recheck their current estimates of Soviet plans and to prepare studies covering the mili-

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tary effort that would be needed to destroy Soviet bases within the Far East if the U.S.S.R. chose to intervene in Korea. He then took occasion to approve the measures for assisting the Republic of Korea which had already been initiated by CINCFE. * Immediately after the

* "Schnabel MS," ch. IV, pp. 20-23.

meeting, therefore, General MacArthur was called into another tele-conference with the JCS and Secretary Pace, ^{and JCS} ~~to be~~ specifically instructed, as follows:

Send a survey party to Korea to determine military requirements.

Supply ammunition and equipment from FEC stocks as requested by US Ambassador Muccio.

Use US Air and Navy forces as necessary to prevent overrunning of the Seoul-Inchon-Kimpo area during the evacuation of US nationals.

Assume operational control of the US Seventh Fleet. *

* "Korean Chronology," (S), p. 3. This telecon was DA TT 3418 (JCS and Secy Pace with CINCFE), 260355Z Jun 50.

Since the military situation was worsening by the hour in South Korea, Ambassador Muccio decided to order the local sea and air emergency evacuation plan for American dependents into effect shortly before midnight on 25 June. This evacuation was accomplished in a hurried but comparatively orderly manner, with the last families clearing

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the Han River bridge between Seoul and Inchon about 0900 the next morning. *

* Appleman, op. cit., p. 39. The main sea evacuation phase of this plan was successfully executed through the use of a Norwegian freighter which had been commandeered in Inchon Harbor, on 25 June 50, by Cmdr John P. Seifert, US Naval Attache to the Republic of Korea. *a similar*
* another sea evacuation of American dependents was also simultaneously carried out from Pusan in the south. See: Prepared from official sources by Capt Walter Karig, USNR, Cmdr Malcolm W. Cagle, USN, and Lt Cmdr Frank A. Manson, USN, Battle Report: The War in Korea (New York, 1951), pp. 25-29.

By now, it had become clearly apparent to all concerned that Seoul itself would soon fall. At 0900 27 June, therefore, having first reported to CINCFE that the Embassy radio station was going to be destroyed, the United States Ambassador and his staff departed for Suwon some 30 miles to the south. Without notifying KMAG, the entire ROK Army Headquarters also commenced to displace to the village of Sihung, halfway between Seoul and Suwon. Learning of this hasty ROK action, Colonel Wright gathered his own staff together and started south in the hope of persuading the Koreans to return to Seoul. Right after the KMAG convoy had crossed the Han River below Seoul, Colonel Wright received a most heartening message from FECOM. Coming over the KMAG command radio set installed in a 2½-ton truck in the column,

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it stated that the JCS had directed General MacArthur to assume operational control of all U. S. military activities in Korea, including KMAG, so he was sending an Advance Command and Liaison Group (ADCOM) from General Headquarters to Korea under Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) John H. Church. In addition, upon reaching Sihung, Colonel Wright was handed a "Personal MacArthur to Wright" message instructing him to repair to his former location and remain of good cheer because momentous decisions were in the offing. Having persuaded General Choi to return the ROK Army Headquarters to Seoul, he then turned his own convoy around and they were both reestablished therein by 1800, 27 June.*

* Sawyer, "KMAG Monograph," Part III, pp. 200-02; Appleman, op. cit., pp. 31 and 40.

GHQ ADCOM, composed of fourteen officers and two enlisted men, landed at Suwon Airfield at 1900 hours on 27 June, to be met there by Ambassador Muccio himself. Setting up a temporary headquarters in the Experimental Agriculture Building within the town of Suwon, General Church was soon able to talk over the telephone to Colonel Wright in Seoul and to communicate with FECOM in Tokyo by radio. He did not succeed that first night in contacting General Choi, however, and the only KMAG personnel actually on hand at Suwon to report to

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him were members of a radio team which was operating with the Ambassa-
dor.*

* Sawyer, "KMAG Monograph," Part III, pp. 215-16; Appleman, op. cit., pp. 42-43. The G-2 member of this GHQ ADCOM, who also acted as Gen Church's CofS, was Col Charles C. Blakeney.

About 0400 the next morning, two KMAG officers, Lt. Col. Robert T. Hazlett and Capt. James W. Hausman, arrived at Suwon from Seoul to notify General Church that the Han River bridges had been destroyed, some North Korean tanks were already in Seoul, and the ROK Army defenses were crumbling fast. They also expressed great fear that a majority of the KMAG personnel were trapped north of the river. When General Choi arrived at ADCOM headquarters several hours later, he confirmed the same dark picture. General Church then informed General Choi that CINCFE had assumed operational control over all American support of the ROK forces and suggested that they form a joint headquarters. With General Choi willingly assenting to this important step, General Church advised him to put the following measures into immediate effect:

Order ROK forces in the vicinity of Seoul to continue street fighting in the city.

Establish straggler points between Seoul and Suwon.

Collect all ROK troops south of the Han River and reorganize them into units.

Defend the Han River line at all costs. *

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* Appleman, op. cit., pp. 31 and 43-44.

President Truman had already called another meeting of the State and Defense officials to confer with him on the Korean situation at 2100 (EDT), 26 June. The reported steady decline in South Korean resistance around Seoul and mounting strength of the North Korean forces in opposition plainly dictated the need for taking more vigorous American military action without further delay. Although this meeting lasted only about one hour, several highly significant decisions were made during it. In a subsequent teleconference held between the JCS and General MacArthur, therefore, CINCFE was informed that:

Restrictions on the use of US Air and Navy elements are removed to permit the fullest support of South Korea in accordance with the UN 25 June decision. The US Seventh Fleet is to be used to prevent any invasion of Formosa by the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) and to prevent any further attacks by Nationalist Chinese Forces on the Chinese mainland. US Air and Navy operations are limited to south of the 38th Parallel in Korea. *

* "Korean Chronology," (S), p. 5. This telecon was TT 3426 (CINCFE and JCS) 270217Z, Jun 50. See also: "Schnabel MS," ch. IV, pp. 32-33.

With the Republic of Korea having formally appealed to the United Nations for assistance, the UN Security Council convened again at

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* United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Doc. 8, p. 17.

1500 (EDT), 27 June. It then had before it reports ^{describing} ~~regarding~~ the seriousness of the Korean situation, received both from the United States and its own UNCOK. ^{*} After considerable argument, the Council

* Ibid., Docs. 10-13, pp. 18-21.

passed a strongly worded resolution, drafted by the American Representative to the UN, Ambassador Warren R. Austin, which recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack ^{*} and to restore international peace and security in the area."

* Ibid., Docs. 15 and 16, pp. 23-24.

Realizing that some dramatic move was now badly needed to prevent the complete collapse of ROK resistance against the North Korean invaders, General MacArthur, on 29 June 1950, decided to visit the scene of battle in person. He hoped that his visit would not only serve to provide symbolic proof to the South Koreans they had neither been abandoned nor forgotten by the United States but also enable him to observe

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the latest combat developments for himself. Landing at Suwon Airfield at 1115, accompanied by seven key members of his staff and four invited press association representatives, he was met there by President Rhee, Ambassador Muccio and General Church. * After ~~first~~ hearing a

* Appleman, op. cit., p. 44. Included in this MacArthur party was the ACoFS G-2, FECOM, Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby. The invited press association representatives were from the UP, INS, Reuters and AP.

notably discouraging resume of the current military situation presented by General Church and ~~then~~ questioning the others about it, General MacArthur expressed a desire to go up to the Han River line opposite Seoul and form his own conclusions in the matter. During this trip he saw thousands of refugees and ROK soldiers still armed with rifles fleeing precipitately from the battle area. Returning to Suwon, he ^{then} told General Church that in his opinion the situation called for the immediate commitment of American ground forces and indicated he would request authority from Washington to do so just as soon as possible. Departing for Japan on this ¹⁸⁰⁰⁻¹¹³¹⁰ encouraging note at 1800 ~~that~~ ^{the} same evening, he reached Haneda Airport near Tokyo at 2215, 29 June. *

* Ibid., p. 45. The initial American combat unit had arrived

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at Suwon from Japan while Gen MacArthur was paying this historic visit. Designated as Detachment X, it consisted of 33 officers and men, and was principally armed with 4 M-55 machine guns from the 507th (Automatic Weapons) Bn, AAA. Its assigned mission was to protect the Suwon Airfield from attack by enemy planes.

General MacArthur prepared a lengthy radio report for the JCS following his return from Korea. In it, he frankly described the ^{unfavorable} unfavorable military situation existing there and declared that the "only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of US Ground Forces." If authorized, therefore, he intended to move a "United States Regimental Combat Team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two-division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counteroffensive." * When he sent his report, he did not know that a new directive

* Rad, CINCFE to JCS, C56942, 30 Jun 50, reproduced in full in "Schnabel MS," ch. IV, pp. 4849.

was already on the way to him from the JCS approved by the President. Arriving the very next day, this directive contained a precautionary statement that its provisions should not be regarded as represent-

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ing a decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces should intervene in Korea but there was full recognition of the risks involved. ^{Besides} ~~In addition to~~ consolidating all of his previous instructions, it ordered CINCPAC to:

Employ U. S. Army service forces in South Korea to maintain communications and other essential services.

Employ Army combat and service troops to ensure the retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan - Chinhae.

Employ naval and air forces against military targets in North Korea but to stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union.

By naval and air action, defend Formosa against invasion by the Chinese Communists and, conversely, prevent Chinese Nationalists from using Formosa as a base of operations against the Chinese mainland.

Send to Korea any supplies and munitions at his disposal and submit estimates for amounts and types of aid required outside his control. *

* Appleman, op. cit., p. 46. This directive stemmed from a hastily assembled meeting of the National Security Council with the President at the White House, ^{which} ~~that was~~ adjourned at 1740, 29 June.

General MacArthur's message about Korea reached Washington just before midnight during the night of 29-30 June. General Collins was immediately notified of its content, and, commencing at 0300 (EDT) 30 June, they proceeded to hold a teleconference with each other on the subject. When General MacArthur protested that merely sending an RCT to the Pusan area would not satisfy the ^{basic} requirements of the

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deteriorating military situation, the Chief of Staff promised to take the matter up at once through channels with the President. He ^{then} ~~then~~ telephoned Mr. Pace, who, in turn, called Mr. Truman. The President approved the commitment of an RCT to the combat zone right away and said that he would render a decision concerning the proposed two-division build-up within a few hours. This new information was, of course, promptly forwarded to CINCFE. * Following a midmorning meet-

* Telecon TT3444 (CINCFE and JCS) 300742A, Jun 50. See also: "Schnabel MS," ch. IV, p. 50.

ing with key State and Defense Department officials, the President did approve sending two American divisions from Japan to Korea and also establishing a naval blockade of North Korea. Shortly thereafter, Ambassador Austin notified the UN Security Council of these United States actions and the President ^{then} ~~then~~ announced his memorable decisions to the world by means of a formal press release. *

* United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Docs. 17 and 18, pp. 24-25. See also: Appleman, op. cit., p. 47.

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Although not supposed to be referred to as such, the United States was now plainly again at war. General MacArthur, therefore, lost no time in taking positive steps to attempt to halt the rapid and practically unopposed Communist advance down through South Korea. Before the day was done, he had not only authorized FEAF and NAVFE to extend their operations into North Korea against military targets but also directed the CG Eighth Army to move the 24th Division by air and water to Pusan, preceded by a small delaying force of two reinforced rifle companies. * The latter unit, commanded by

* "Korean Chronology" (S), pp. 7-8.

Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, and having a total strength of about 440 men, started to land at the Pusan airstrip at 1100, 1 July. * Traveling north, first

* Due to bad flying weather, only 406 of the originally assigned men arrived in Korea on that day.

by rail and then by a combination of truck and marching, it eventually occupied a defensive position near Osan, just south of Suwon, prior to daybreak on 5 July. The previous day it had been joined by an artillery contingent from the 52d Field Artillery Battalion, under the command

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of Lt. Col. Miller O. Perry. This contingent, comprising 108 men and 73 vehicles, was armed with 6 105-mm. howitzers. Attacked and overrun on 5 July 1950, after putting up a most courageous fight against an overwhelming body of North Korean troops led by medium tanks, the so-called Smith Task Force fought the initial American vs. Communist ground engagement of the Korean Conflict.

* Appleman, op. cit., pp. 59-76. This Smith Task Force was actually hit by the 16th and 18th Regiments of the N. K. 4th Division, supported by more than 30 Russian-built T34 tanks.

In the meantime, other major events were transpiring, as follows:

At Lake Success, 29 June - the UN Secretary-General queried each of the member nations relative to what type of assistance they planned to provide South Korea in response to the Security Council resolution of 27 June.

In the Far East, 29 June - Great Britain placed certain elements of the British Far Eastern Fleet under Admiral Sir Patrick Brind at the disposal of CINCFE and they promptly reported to NAVFE for operational control.

In Japan, 30 June - Australian naval elements also reported to NAVFE for operational control and Australia placed its 77th RAAF Fighter Sqdn in Japan at the disposal of CINCFE.

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In Korea, 30 June - General Choi Byung Duk resigned as the ROK Army Chief of Staff and was replaced by General Chung Il Kwun.

In Japan, 1 July - The US Seventh Fleet (TF 77) sailed for Korean waters under Vice Admiral Arthur Struble.

In Washington, 1 July - The U. S. Department of State informed Formosa that General MacArthur's headquarters would consult with it prior to any decision being made on the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea.

In Korea, 3 July - Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, Commanding General of the 24th Division, arrived at Taejon, while ROK pilots completed ferrying the first ten F-51 fighters from Japan to Korea.

In Korea, 4 July - CINCFE established United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), with General Dean in command, and a Pusan Base Command under Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin. FEAF also took over operational control of all aircraft furnished to the Republic of Korea, in order to insure better coordination for their joint air effort.

In Japan, 5 July - CINCFE directed the CG Eighth Army to prepare the 1st Cavalry Division for amphibious operations and to concentrate the 25th Division at Pusan by 12 July as a USAFIK reinforcement.

At Lake Success, 7 July - the UN Security Council passed a resolution which, among other things, recommended the formation of a unified command in Korea and asked the United States to name the commander for it.

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In Washington, 8 July - President Truman designated General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to be the "Commanding General of the military forces placed under the unified command of the United States by UN member nations."

In Korea, 12 July - USAFIK was discontinued, with Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, CG Eighth Army, assuming command of all US ground forces in Korea.

In Korea, 15 July - President Syngman Rhee placed all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea under General MacArthur's command.

* "Korean Chronology," (S), pp. 6-17; Appleman, op. cit., pp. 47-48 and 109-112; United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Docs. 90, 91, 99 and 100, pp. 60-61; Department of State Pub 4263, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, Doc. 2, pp. 10-11.

The appointment of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, U.S.A., as the United Nations Commander to lead a large-scale military effort aimed at driving the North Korean invaders out of South Korea served to conclude the introductory phase of the Korean Conflict period. In slightly less than three weeks, most of the basic decisions had been made and the matter stood ready to be resolved mainly through combat action within an operational theater. Still remaining at hand, though,

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was the critical question of whether either Russia or Red China or both might choose to enter openly into the conflict and what, if any, steps should be taken to limit their available excuses to do so. The full implications of this difficult question were already painfully evident to the Army intelligence authorities in Washington, along with the more private problem of transforming the current military intelligence system without delay from a Cold War organization badly starved by defense economy to one that could function properly in support of actual war. It now becomes necessary, therefore, to understand the general military intelligence situation existing at the time of the sudden Korean outbreak, which will be described in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER II
INTELLIGENCE SITUATION

It has often been said that, from the military intelligence standpoint, the Communist invasion of South Korea was another Pearl Harbor because the nation's top leaders were taken so completely by surprise when it happened. Actually, though, the intelligence circumstances surrounding the two events were entirely different and there can be little valid comparison made between them. At the time of Korea, for example, the American intelligence system was still undergoing a thorough overhaul under the terms of a National Security Act passed in July 1947, which not only had created a considerably altered defense establishment but also added several new agencies to the previous intelligence system. Furthermore, unlike the period of guided expansion that preceded Pearl Harbor, the United States was then in the midst of conducting a so-called Cold War against the combined threat of an aggressively led and powerful U.S.S.R. assisted by a large scale international Communist conspiracy operating on a global basis. While never fully accepted as such by all concerned, this Cold War was in reality an intelligence war. It thus becomes necessary to examine briefly into the military intelligence situation which existed early in 1950, in order to determine whether or not there was any failure on the part of the departmental intelligence agency to execute its assigned mission properly during the critical months prior to Korea.

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The main point to remember in regard to the military intelligence situation existing shortly before the outbreak of the Korean Conflict is that, although Korea obviously did present a potential trouble spot in the worldwide picture, it was neither the only trouble spot nor even the most seriously disturbed area in the Far East at that particular time. * The intelligence demands of the Amer-

* See: Ltr (S), Irwin to Willoughby, G-2 350.09, 9 June 50 (24 Sep 47). ACSI Rec Sec.

ican occupation in Japan and Germany, of course, were still receiving first priority during early 1950 but such significant developments as a series of crushing defeats suffered by French troops at the hands of Viet Minh rebels in Indo-China, mounting Huk depredations on Luzon in the Philippines and the recently ordered evacuation of Hainan Island by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek could all properly claim close military intelligence attention. There was also the difficult task of promptly organizing an appropriate intelligence coverage for Red China and Formosa because of portentous changes that had just occurred within those two governments, while the bitter Netherlands-Republic of Indonesia dispute over the ultimate status of Dutch New Guinea was serving to keep the strategic East Indies in a constant turmoil. These numerous problems, plus the unfavorable intelligence implications of the abrupt American troop withdrawal from

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South Korea in June 1949, had quite naturally served to prevent any exclusive collection concentration on the Korean Peninsula as representing a most probable scene of armed conflict between opposite ideological forces in the immediate future.

Another important factor tending to turn ^{the attention} the Army intelligence agency away from Korea early in 1950, was that its organization had been deliberately designed after World War II to center a main attention upon the direct military threat posed to the United States by the U.S.S.R., rather than on any global coverage of activities of the international Communist conspiracy. This emphasis stemmed from a set of approved recommendations which were submitted to the Chief of Staff by an authoritative War Department Policies and Programs (Haislip) Board during August 1947. Having been accepted without a notable show of protest by the departmental intelligence officials themselves and duly incorporated in their Essential Elements of Information (EEI's), these policy recommendations were then utilized to guide all subsequent Army intelligence operations in the field. They were also promptly adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense when the latter body came into being. It was already a fixed thesis early in 1950, therefore, that the departmental military intelligence agency should concentrate on following Russian Army developments and rely chiefly upon ^{such} other sources, as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or State Department, to furnish it with

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its required "political intelligence." The fact that political and military intelligence, as well as economic intelligence, were now practically indistinguishable from each other was apparently not yet truly appreciated by the national authorities concerned.

Pointing the Army intelligence effort principally at ~~the~~ U.S.S.R. military capabilities likewise served strongly to divert ~~it~~ from the Far East because it was in western Europe that the bulk of ^{the} Russian and Satellite armies stood poised and ready to fill the post-World War II *void* there whenever any good opportunity came to be presented. Although the NATO Nations, led by the United States, were striving hard to remedy this dangerous situation just as soon as possible, the recently thwarted but almost successful Communist attempt to secure sole control of Berlin still warned of its ever-present danger. Increased Red pressures on Greece, Iran and Turkey also indicated further Soviet moves within the European theater in the very near future. The American military intelligence authorities thus soon decided to take definite steps to improve their collection coverage for Russia and the Satellite countries by building up intelligence personnel strength in the European Command (EUCOM) and the Military Attache Offices behind the Iron Curtain. Since this planned augmentation program ran counter to a defense economy drive ^{which} ~~that~~ was being currently pressed by Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, the personnel spaces needed to sustain it had to be secured from other field intelligence offices, including those located in the Far East.

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Secretary Johnson's ill-timed defense economy drive against the military intelligence effort was crippling in many important respects and especially so for the three Service Attache systems. He not only seemed personally dedicated to imposing severe strength and fund reductions on those systems but also refused to allow the departmental intelligence officials to exercise any independent flexibility at all in operating them. This, despite the fact that the monetary savings obtainable from that particular economy source were merely a drop in the bucket compared to the over-all defense budget. At the same time, the conclusive point that the new conditions of Cold War really called for an expansion rather than a reduction in the amount of military intelligence activities continued to remain studiously ignored.

The total authorized strength of the Office of the ACoFS G-2, GSUSA, under Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Stafford LeRoy Irwin, on 1 June 1950, was 601 persons. This total was made up of 202 officers, 2 warrant officers, 16 enlisted men and 381 civilians. * Included in *it were*

* See: Memo, 1 Jun 50, File G-2 300.6 (16 Jan 50). ACSI Rec Sec. Three of ^{*these*} the officers and two of the civilians were actually charged against a Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) personnel allotment.

~~it were~~

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the staff and faculty of the Strategic Intelligence School (SIS) but not the members of the Army Attache system, which was ^{still} also commanded by the ACoS G-2, GSUSA. During the months of April, May and June 1950, the Army Attache system had carried an average strength of 524 persons, with a typical breakdown being some 119 officers, 37 warrant officers, 101 noncommissioned officers, 75 American civilians and 192 local civilians. That total, though, represented a sizeable reduction from the 730 persons who had been authorized for the system in ^{during} the corresponding period during the previous year. *

* Memo (S), ACoS G-2 for Army Liaison to Department of Defense Management Committee, 1 Sep 50, sub: Economies Effected in Intelligence Activities, G-2 020.G-2, undated (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec. See also: File, G-2 350.09, 12 Oct 50 (31 Dec 48) and T/D 400-12-1326, 17 Jul 50. G-2 320.2 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG.

The basic mission applicable to the ACoS G-2, Intelligence, Department of the Army, on 25 June 1950, had been assigned in April 1950 and read, as follows:

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, under the supervision of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and, within his scope of responsibility, of the Comptroller of the Army, plans, coordinates, and supervises the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence information pertaining to the war potential, topography, military forces, and military activities of foreign countries, and the strategic vulnerability of the United States

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and its possessions. In addition thereto, he advises on counterintelligence matters; supervises counterintelligence activities; supervises military mapping; and performs the Army cryptologic functions, utilizing the Army Security Agency for this purpose, and provides the official channel of liaison between the Army and foreign military personnel. *

* D/A SR 10-5-1, 11 Apr 50, par. 37.

This particular functional assignment for the ACoS G-2, D/A, had resulted from a sweeping Army reorganization announced on 11 April 1950, which, among other things, replaced the existing five General Staff Directors with four Assistant Chiefs of Staff. It also placed the ACoS G-2, D/A, under the supervision of two newly designated Deputy Chiefs of Staff and, in certain administrative matters, a ~~Comptroller~~^{Comptroller} of the Army with greatly increased powers. The most important change in it for the departmental military intelligence agency, however, was a failure to give the ACoS G-2, D/A, any responsibility whatsoever in connection with Army intelligence training. Immediately after its publication, the G-2 officials started to prepare ^a the required special regulation covering the organization and functions of their Office under the new mission but, because of time-consuming coordination difficulties and the exigencies of the sudden Korean outbreak, this task could not be completed until 10 October 1951. By that date, unfavorable developments within the Army intelligence training field had already forced the reassignment

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of an intelligence training function to the ACoS G-2, D/A. The major functions ^{then given} given to his Office to perform ~~at that same time~~ were, as follows:

Intelligence - Collects and evaluates information, produces intelligence, and disseminates finished intelligence to meet the requirements and responsibilities of the Army. Supervises and coordinates the performance of intelligence research and the production of military intelligence by the various continental Army and oversea commanders and heads of administrative and technical services.

Counterintelligence - Formulates counterintelligence plans and policies, and executes counterintelligence measures. Operates the Counter Intelligence Corps Center and School.

Army representative - Represents the Army on intelligence and counterintelligence matters in its relations with other Government agencies and with foreign governments.

Training - Prepares plans for military intelligence and counterintelligence training in accordance with over-all training policies established by the Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

Reserve components - Exercises supervision over personnel of the Military Intelligence Reserve and Army Security Reserve, recommending the proper utilization of such personnel to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

Security of military information - Supervises the Army's security of information program.

Army Attache System - Operates the Army Attache System.

Foreign liaison - Provides the official channel of liaison between the Army and foreign military representatives on duty, visiting, or training in the United States.

Communications intelligence and communications security - Accomplishes the Army communications intelligence and security missions and supports the Air Force Security Agency in accordance with appropriate Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, utilizing, where applicable, the Army Security Agency for these purposes. *

* D/A SR 10-120-1, 10 Oct 51, Sec. III.

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Being a firm believer in organizational simplicity, General Irwin had devised an organization for the departmental intelligence agency, which, at the time of the Korean outbreak, demonstrated a marked centralization of functions. Except for the usual Secretariat and a small Planning and Coordination Office operating directly under the Division Executive, all OACofS G-2, D/A, functions were thus concentrated within three large subordinate groups, as follows:

Administrative and Liaison Group

Branches: Fiscal
Foreign Liaison
Message Center
Personnel
Service
Special Procurement

Intelligence Group

Branches: World Wide
Eurasian
Eastern
Western
Technical
Collection/Dissemination

Security and Training Group

Branches: Map and Photo
Operations
Security of Military Information
Training *

* Org Chart, D/A Int Div, Gen Staff, 24 Jan 50, f/w O20 G-2 (11 Jun '46). ACSI Rec Sec. The Deputy Director of Intelligence, D/A, was also designated to act as the Commandant of the Strategic Intelligence School.

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While organizational simplicity did represent a very desirable goal to pursue, this particular organization was faulty in several noteworthy respects. Execution of the Army foreign liaison mission, for instance, was much more than merely an administrative matter and often involved policy determinations at the highest military level. Moreover, the G-2 security and training functions were so completely different from each other that they did not provide any common ground for an effective ^{operational} supervision of ~~operations~~ under one single head. Many of the key intelligence officials were also convinced that it had been a serious mistake to join the intelligence and dissemination functions together within the production organization, although this was still a controversial question. No major organizational changes *along SVC* appeared to be in the ^{offing,} ~~office,~~ though, as long as General Irwin continued to remain at the agency helm.

In addition to this agency proper, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, commanded a number of small field detachments which were intended to perform special intelligence functions either in the continental United States or overseas. The advantages of forming these separate detachments not only lay in reducing the total size of the departmental intelligence agency itself but also in gaining a favorable amount of outside administrative support and military security for the functions involved. Normally designated by letters of the alphabet, the detachments varied considerably in size, composition and scope, but all of

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them were called upon to accomplish some very important intelligence tasks. Nine such detachments were in actual being at the time of the Korean outbreak, ^{to serve} for the following purposes:

(S) Det. "A" - to provide liaison with CIA field offices in the United States and assist in the collection of foreign intelligence from domestic sources.

(U) Det. "C" - to provide officer escorts for foreign military personnel paying official visits to the United States.

(U) Det. "F" - to provide specialized teams to certain governmental agencies within the United States for performing intelligence missions of a highly sensitive type.

(U) Det. "M" - to provide specialized teams to all major overseas commands for performing intelligence missions of a highly sensitive type.

(S) Det. "O" - to provide personnel to the Canadian Army Intelligence Staff and British Land Forces in the Middle East for collecting intelligence information.

(S) Det. "Q" - to provide intelligence officers for integration into the British Army intelligence system.

(U) Det. "R" - to provide the final two years for the Russian course of the Army Language and Area Program.

(U) Det. "S" - to provide the final two years for the Japanese course of the Army Language and Area Program.

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Det. "Pipeline" - to provide the final two years for language and area training courses worldwide, with the students concerned being attached to whatever Army Attache Offices were appropriate.
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* See: "Problems of Army Intelligence" (T.S.), 27 Sep 50, Tab "Special Elements," O20. G-2 (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

Besides the Strategic Intelligence School, which was still an integral part of the departmental military intelligence agency in June 1950, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, continued to retain a direct control over the CIC School and Center at Ft. Holabird, Md., through the Chief, CIC, and the ASA School at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., through the Chief, ASA. * *His mission* ~~The task~~ of supervising the Army Language School (ALS)

* On 24 Jun 50, the Chief, CIC, was Maj Gen John K. Rice and the Chief, ASA, Col (later Brig Gen) John C. Arrowsmith.

at the Presidio of Monterey, Calif., however, had recently been approved for transfer to the Sixth Army, effective 1 July 1950. Additional intelligence specialist training was also being accomplished within the Army General School (AGS) at

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Fort Riley, Kans. Although ^This was an Army Field Forces (AFF) facility, ^{but} its Intelligence Division was currently offering regular courses for both officers and enlisted men in the following subjects:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Intelligence, general | Interpreter |
| Photo Interpretation | Censorship |
| Order of Battle | Strategic Intelligence |
| Prisoner of War Interrogation | Equipment Identification * |
| Translator | |

* See: "Problems of Army Intelligence" (T.S.), 27 Sep 50, Tab "Special Elements," O20. G-2 (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

With the problem of achieving a satisfactory coordination of effort for intelligence operations becoming steadily more and more difficult to solve, the departmental intelligence agency of the Army was *being* constantly called upon during the pre-Korea period to provide suitable representation on a striking array of different committees, boards and panels. Illustrating this distinct trend toward greater complexity, some of the more permanent of these groups at that particular time were, as follows:

- State-Defense Military Information Control Committee.
- United States-United Kingdom-Canadian Military Coordinating Committee.
- National Censorship Readiness Measures Coordinating Committee.
- Advisory Committee for the London Scientific Mission.
- Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the JCS.
- Armed Forces Security Agency Council.

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Joint Signal and Evaluation Analysis Sub-Panel, reporting to the Counter-Measures Panel of the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee.
Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency Liaison Group.
Committee on Coordination of Army-Navy-Air Force Attache Systems.
Joint Intelligence Indications Committee (formerly the Intelligence Indications File Committee).
Joint Intelligence Summary Executive Committee.
Committee on Geophysics and Geography.
Acquisition and Dissemination Special Committee on Technical Information.
Panel on Geographic Research Techniques.
Panel on Cartography and Geodesy.
Panel on Requisition and Dissemination, Special Committee on Technical Information.
Man-Power Panel.
United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).
United States Evaluation Board (USEB).
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC).
Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC).
Interdepartmental Jigsaw Committee.
Inter-Agency Defector Committee.
NSCID 7 Committee on Domestic Collection.
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Committee.
Scientific Intelligence Committee.
Politburo Committee on USSR.
Politburo Committee on USSR Satellites.
Psychological Intelligence Committee.
Soviet Material Committee.
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee.
Joint Chemical Warfare Intelligence Committee.
Joint Electronics Intelligence Committee.
Joint Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee.
Joint Bacteriological Warfare Intelligence Committee.
Joint Medical Sciences Intelligence Committee.
Joint Anti-Aircraft Artillery Committee.
NIS Chapter Coordinator and Subcommittees.
IAC Watch Committee. *

* Ibid., Tab "Committees."

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In June

~~ix~~ September 1950, the OACofS G-2, D/A, was not only accomplish-
ing a full schedule of regular and special oral briefings on a wide
variety of intelligence matters but also disseminating an enormous
amount of basic intelligence to the Army by means of handbooks, train-
ing guides, terrain and topographic studies, foreign language manuals,
and other informative pamphlets. Current intelligence was likewise
being disseminated through the following periodic publications:

Daily Intelligence Briefing - A daily resume of the sig-
nificant cables received within the Department of the Army
during the previous 24 hours, with appropriate comments there-
on. Distribution restricted to a very few agencies at the
seat of government.

Weekly Intelligence Report - A more comprehensive digest
of major intelligence events. Distribution made to major seg-
ments of the Army, in the United States and overseas, as well
as to other services and agencies in Washington.

Monthly Intelligence Report - A monthly publication deal-
ing primarily with events and trends in foreign military estab-
lishments. Distribution: Similar to Weekly Intelligence Report.

Order of Battle Summary - A bi-monthly publication restricted
to the order of battle of foreign military establishments. Dis-
tribution: Similar to Weekly Intelligence Report. *

* Ibid., Tab "Dissemination."

Of important interest with reference to the military intelli-
gence situation existing just before Korea, is the fact that, during
April 1950, the ACofS G-2, D/A, had arranged for the publication of
a new Department of the Army Special Regulation on collection proced-

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ures to replace the Basic Intelligence Directive (BID), which had always been issued in the past simply as an intelligence document signed by the head of the departmental military intelligence agency himself. The idea was not only to give the directive a greater official status but also to ^{establish} ~~fix~~ more firmly the collection responsibilities for all Army field commanders and attaches under the new conditions of Cold War. For the Far East, it contained the following specific instructions:

(c)

AREAS OF COLLECTION RESPONSIBILITY

1. General. - a. Within assigned areas each commander and/or attache is responsible for collection of military intelligence information from all available and pertinent sources. These sources will be many and varied, and not confined to persons living within the country or area of responsibility.

b. In certain instances, assigned areas overlap. Usually this is because adequate coverage of an important area cannot be effected from one office, or because adequate coverage of a less important area can be accomplished ^{by offices} in surrounding areas.

2. Commanders. - a. The Commander in Chief, Far East, is responsible primarily in Japan, the Japanese Mandated Islands, and all other areas of the Far East Command except the Philippine Islands; and secondarily in all areas of strategic interest to his command, including specifically Korea and the Philippine Islands.

3. Army Attaches. ... - e. Areas of responsibility are as follows:

Attaches ac-credited to -	Additional areas of primary responsibility -	Areas of additional responsibility -	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1. Korea	-----	2. China	-----
1. Taiwan	2. China	4. Hong Kong	5. Outer Mongolia
	3. Manchuria	4. Macao	5. Sinkiang
			5. Tibet *

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* D/A SR 380-305-5, 28 Apr 50, Military Security, Army Intelligence Instructions (S), superseding ID, GSUSA, BID (S), dated 1 Sep 48. The numerals shown in front of the geographic areas listed for the Army Attaches ^{simply} represent relative priorities ^{in collection} in collection responsibility.

(c) ^{Regarding} ~~In regard to~~ the practical application of this basic directive, it must be realized that its assignment of areas of responsibility was not intended to give any true indication of the actual capabilities of the field offices concerned to collect military intelligence information therein. During early 1950, for example, due to a recently ordered personnel cut, the total authorized strength of the Army Attache Office within the Republic of Korea was only 1 officer, 1 warrant officer and 4 enlisted men. ^{*} As a result, the Chief of the In-

* See: JCS 2028/9, 8 Dec 49, f/w MID 320.2, 8 Dec 49 (31 Dec 48). Similarly, the authorized strength of the Navy Attache Office, Korea, had been reduced to 1 officer, 4 enlisted men, 1 American civilian and 2 alien civilians, and the Air Force Attache Office, Korea, entirely abolished.

telligence Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, on 24 April 1950, had found it necessary to warn General Irwin that the Army Attache in Seoul did not

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have enough time available "to travel to critical areas to obtain first hand information, neither does he have time for research and evaluation of the information collected." * With the Army Attache Office in Taipei,

* See: OM (T.S.), Chief Int Div to G-2, G-2 320.2, 24 Apr 50 (24 Aug 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Formosa, also in the process of undergoing an exhaustive reorganization following its hasty move there from Nanking, China, * and the collection

* Authorized strength of the Army Attache Office, Formosa, on 1 Apr 50, was 4 officers, 1 warrant officer, 3 enlisted men, 2 American civilians and 13 alien civilians. These totals, though, were about to be reduced by 1 warrant officer, 1 enlisted man, 2 American civilians and 7 alien civilians. See: Report, ID-SD-2, 1 Apr 50 and Memo, ACofS G-2 to Barringer, OSD, 21 Jun 50; G-2 320.2 (24 Aug 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

activities of all the Army Attaches having been limited strictly to overt means and methods, the capabilities of these two key Far Eastern offices for covering their respective areas in any effective manner were manifestly very slight. Besides, ^{as mentioned before,} although the G-2 Section of Headquarters FECOM in Tokyo was

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both large and well established, its collection effort was designed primarily to satisfy the demands of the American military occupation in Japan.

(S) Under the terms of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) had granted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) a virtual monopoly in conducting clandestine intelligence operations within the foreign field but it was still more or less generally accepted that the overseas theater commanders enjoyed an inherent right to engage in such operations for protecting the safety of their own commands. No formal agreement had been reached on this vital question by June 1950, however, and the departmental military intelligence authorities continued to remain seriously disturbed over the lack of reliable information they were receiving from covert sources. * This failure probably stemmed ^{in a large measure} ~~mostly~~ from the fact

* See: Memo (S), Chief Int Div to ACoFS G-2, 26 May 51, sub: Clandestine Collection of Intelligence, G-2 350.066, 26 May 51 (14 Jun 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

that CIA had only been in existence approximately three years and needed a greater length of time to increase its collection capabilities, especially those behind the Iron Curtain. The CIA officials, though, did

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feel strongly that the real mission of their new agency was to seek out the "big picture," whereas the Army's mission should be confined solely to military (Army) intelligence matters.

(S) Since Korea was obviously an area of strategic interest to the Far East Command, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, the ACofS G-2, FECOM, had arranged to keep a small military intelligence detachment operating at Seoul when the American troops were withdrawn from Korea in June 1949. Known as the Korea Liaison Office (KLO), this detachment actually formed a part of the Joint Special Operations Branch (JSOB), Civil Intelligence Section, Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan. On 24 February 1950, Col. Arthur T. Lacey, the JSOB Chief, had been moved up to become ^{both the} Chief of the Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP, and Director, Counter Intelligence Division, GHQ, FECOM, which in the higher echelons were practically indistinguishable from each other. He was then replaced shortly afterwards as the Chief of JSOB by Col. Charles C. Blakeney, former ACofS G-2, IX Corps. * At the time of the Korean outbreak, the KLO was under

* Col Lacey and Col Blakeney had both served full tours of duty in MID (ID) during the post-World War II period.

the command of Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Leonard J. Abbott and carried an authorized

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strength of 2 officers, 1 warrant officer and 2 enlisted men. *

* See: Notes on Interview with Col Charles C. Blakeney, USA Ret., 11 Aug 60. Author's File. The other KLO officer ^{then} ~~at that time~~ was 1st Lt (later Maj) Charles A. Lynch.

(4) On or about 14 June 1950, as a normal indoctrination procedure for his new assignment, Colonel Blakeney was sent to Korea in order to ascertain what steps might be taken to improve the FECOM collection effort there. After talking personally to all the key intelligence personnel stationed in Seoul, including those from the KLO, ROK Army, American Embassy, Service Attache Offices, CIA, KMAG and Office of Special Investigations (OSI) of the Far East Force (FEAF), he came to the considered conclusion that their multifarious operations were inadequately coordinated for obtaining maximum results. Furthermore, the South Koreans themselves were not only failing to furnish much information of value about the Far Eastern situation but also demonstrating a decided lack of cooperation in helping the JSOB-sponsored and other American agents to get through the lines upon their return from intelligence trips to the north. Colonel Blakeney then flew back to Japan during the night of 24-25 June 1950, arriving in Tokyo just before the sudden opening of the North Korean invasion. *

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* Ibid. It was during this same period that John Foster Dulles, acting in the capacity of a Consultant to the Secretary of State, paid his well-publicized visit to Korea. Col Blakeney accompanied the Dulles party when it went up north to observe from the "38th Parallel" and chiefly recalls that there did not seem to be as many South Korean troops within the border area as there should have been because a large number of ROK 2d Div personnel had gone home on furlough to assist in the spring planting.

Bearing this general picture of the current intelligence situation in mind, therefore, it now becomes advisable to inquire into the specific performance of the departmental intelligence agency of the Army during the pre-Korea period, to determine whether or not it actually did provide any effective warning of the impending North Korean attack. Such an examination should not only cover the more indicative reports which were forwarded to the agency at that time from the field but also the evaluation and dissemination of the intelligence derived therefrom, as the latter two steps likewise form essential parts of the total military intelligence process.

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CHAPTER III

PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE

Visits by American officials to Korea north of the 38th Parallel during the immediate post-World War II period were few and far between. A most interesting one, though, was made there from 29 May to 3 June 1946 by Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, while he was acting as President Truman's personal representative for reparations matters. Mr. Pauley found himself in a position to interview several top officials of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Northern Korea and they even chose to escort him on an inspection trip of all the local industrial plants. Shortly afterwards, he was thus able to address a noteworthy letter to the President, which not only listed in detail a number of compelling reasons why the Soviets had no immediate intention of withdrawing from Korea but also prophetically declared that:

Frankly I am greatly concerned with our position in Korea and believe it is not receiving the attention and consideration it should. While Korea is a small country, and in terms of our military strength is a small responsibility, it is an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend. It is here where a test will be made of whether a democratic competitive system can be adapted to meet the challenge of a defeated feudalism, or whether some other system, i. e. Communism will become stronger. *

* Ltr, Pauley to Truman, 22 Jun 46, reproduced in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, vol. II, "Years of Trial and Hope" (New York, 1956), pp. 320-22.

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Ambassador Pauley's pointed comments ^{on} concerning the unfavorable situation developing for us in North Korea went generally unheeded because at that time the so-called "spirit of Yalta" was still an all-pervading theme throughout American ^{governmental} government circles. With President Roosevelt and Stalin, as late as 8 February 1945, having discussed a joint trusteeship for Korea and apparently reached an amicable agreement, ^{*} questioning Soviet motives in the Far East was just not the ^{COMMON} thing.

* See: State Department, The Conference at Malta and Yalta: 1945, p. 770.

to do. Nevertheless, a few realistic voices did continue to be raised in the matter. Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) John R. Hodge, Commander of the United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), for example, submitted a series of reports to the departmental military intelligence agency in Washington to explain that the Soviets were forming a large North Korean Army and training and equipping it for the "liberation" of Korea. He ^{further} likewise expressed a firm opinion that "upon the termination of the Korean occupation, this Soviet-trained and indoctrinated force will be prepared to move into the southern zone and consolidate control of all Korea, delivering another satellite into the Soviet orbit" and ^{He even} ventured ^{to make} the pessimistic prediction that Korea "promises to be a trouble

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area for some time to come with a potential for even greater trouble
*
than we have seen thus far."

* See: Ltr (S), ACoFS G-2 to Supt U S Mil Academy, 7 Apr 47, MID 350.001 USMA. ACSI Rec Sec. Gen Hodge also reported along these same lines, on 24 Feb 47, to President Truman at the White House. Truman, op. cit., pp. 322-23.

Another important military figure to report authoritatively about Korea during this preliminary period was Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Albert C. Wedemeyer. As a former Commander-in-Chief of the China Theater and an acknowledged Far Eastern expert, he was directed by President Truman, in July 1947, to visit that ~~troubled~~ ^{strategic} area and undertake a thorough appraisal of the political, economic, psychological and military situations existing therein. In his report, therefore, with particular reference to Korea, General Wedemeyer called attention to well-supported intelligence estimates that the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean Army was already of approximately 125,000 strength and vastly superior to the United States-organized Constabulary of 16,000 South Koreans which was only equipped with Japanese small arms. He ^{also} strongly believed that there was a definite possibility the Soviets would soon withdraw their occupation forces in order to induce a corresponding withdrawal by the United States and specifically recommended the organ-

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ization of a South Korean Scout Force, similar to the previous Philippine Scouts, to preclude the forcible establishment of a Communist government in Korea.*

* General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports (New York, 1958), Appendix V and VI.

In September 1947, the JCS forwarded a formal memorandum to the Secretary of State announcing that "from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea."* The American military govern-

* Truman, op. cit., pp. 325-26. The JCS members at this time were Admiral of the Fleet William D. Leahy, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz and General Carl Spaatz.

ment in South Korea was ^{thus} then closed out and an independent Republic of Korea proclaimed, effective 15 August 1948, less than one year later. The Russians, however, countered these twin actions by establishing a "Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea" in North Korea and advising the United States that all Soviet forces would be removed therefrom prior to the end of 1948. This promised Russian troop withdrawal

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was then duly accomplished and, except for KMAG, our own was completed
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in turn by 26 June 1949.

* Ibid., pp. 328-29.

The planned U. S. troop withdrawal from South Korea had presented a number of difficult problems for the American military intelligence officials to solve. There was not only the matter of filling the gap in field collection coverage which would result from Headquarters, USAFIK, being abolished but also the withdrawal might well provoke a decisive Soviet attempt to bring about an immediate collapse of the new Republic of Korea and take over control of the entire peninsula. In regard to this latter contingency, the view of the departmental intelligence agency of the Army was summarized for the Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates, CIA, on 25 February 1949, as follows:

2. The Intelligence Division believes that an invasion of South Korea by the North Korean People's Army is a possibility at present, and recognizes that the likelihood of such an invasion will increase somewhat, following the departure of United States troops. However, the Intelligence Division considers that an invasion is a possibility, rather than a probability, for the following reasons:

a. Action short of invasion might bring about the result desired by North Korean and, presumably, Soviet authorities, without incurring the risks involved in a military operation. Such action could include the instigation of Communist led disturbances in South Korea, the infiltration into the south of armed and trained agents and guerrillas, and continuation of border incidents on the 38th parallel.

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b. The People's Army still is a relatively small, although well trained and efficient, military force. At present it does not have, of itself, the preponderance of strength over South Korean military forces which would be required to insure victory in an armed struggle. The People's Army, as a force in being, may well be considered by North Korean authorities to have greater value as a constant threat than if it were committed to a military adventure which conceivably could result in its defeat or in expenditure of its strength without proportionate returns. *

* Memo (S), DI to Asst Director, Reports and Estimates, CIA, 25 Feb 49, sub: Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949, CSGID 319.25, 25 Feb 49 (5 Jan 49). ACSI Rec Sec.

It should be ^{realized} ~~carefully~~ noted that the American military intelligence officials were aptly aware by this time just how completely responsive the N. K. Peoples Army was to Soviet direction. They knew, for instance, that a sizeable number of Red Army general and field grade officers had been attached to the North Korean Defense Ministry right from the start, who plainly possessed full authority to review any important decisions made therein. High ranking Soviet officers were also ^{already} serving at the two North Korean military academies to supervise the conduct of the school training and, in certain special cases, actually to act as instructors. The real heart of the Communist control program, though, lay in the assignment of Soviet military advisers to the North Korean combat divisions. According to reliable

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reports, there were some twenty of these advisers within each combat division in 1949, all wearing Red Army uniforms and holding the rank of major or above. One such adviser was supposed to render "assistance" to the division commander on military matters and another on political affairs, while the rest of them were spotted in key positions throughout the division proper. By offering timely "suggestions," which in reality had the force of orders, they were thus together able to regulate practically every phase of the unit's daily existence.

* See: Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study of a Soviet Satellite (C), Office of Intelligence Report No. 5600, 20 May 51, pp. 116-117.

The American military intelligence officials were likewise prompt in realizing that some sort of a profound struggle was going on at this same time between the Russian and Chinese Communists over principal control of North Korea. While Russian territory did carry down into the northeast corner of the Korean Peninsula, parts of Red Chinese Manchuria also bordered along its entire northern and northwestern flank. As a matter of fact, both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese regimes had nurtured exile Korean governments within their respective ranks during World War II and had served positive notice to all con-

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cerned of an intention to reassert their former influence in Korea immediately following the defeat of Japan. The Russians, therefore, could hardly elect to ignore the close interests of the Red Chinese in North Korea, even though from the moment ^{that} the first Russian soldier stepped on Korean soil about 9 August 1945, North Korea was to all intents and purposes a Soviet domain with outside influences appearing only at Soviet sufferance.*

* Ibid., pp. 117-21.

Not long after the Korean outbreak, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) A. R. Bolling, the ACoS G-2, D/A, ordered the initiation of an exhaustive study within the departmental military intelligence agency for the specific purpose of reviewing and analyzing the "reports received by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, from all sources during the period 1 October 1949 to 25 June 1950, to determine the extent to which the intentions and capabilities of the North Korean regime to invade Korea were revealed." This study then went on for several months, as additional reports from various sources were uncovered, and finally reached the following general conclusion:

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, ascertained in November 1949, that expansion of the North Korean Army under Soviet guidance was underway; in March 1950 that the North Korean Communist regime intended to extend its control over all Korea and, with Soviet aid, had the military capability to do so; and in May 1950 that the outbreak of hostilities in Korea could occur at any time. *

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* See: Folder (TS), "North Korean Intentions and Capabilities as Reported to Assistant Chief of Staff - G-2," p. 1 (S), SD 40438, G-2 381. Korea, Undated 50 (29 June 50). ACSI Rec Sec. The study was admittedly prompted by repeated claims and rumors circulating in Washington that several reports had been forwarded to the OACofS G-2, D/A, from the Far East, as early as 10 Mar 50, which predicted the North Korean invasion of South Korea. See: Ibid., p. 33 (S).

A careful examination of the numerous and varied reports that were gathered together by the departmental intelligence officials of the Army during the fall of 1950 in support of this quoted general conclusion does serve to validate it beyond any serious question. On the other hand, the conclusion manifestly tends to beg the direct query which was posed by the ACofS G-2, D/A, regarding the intentions and capabilities of the North Koreans to invade South Korea. The reports on the whole ^{further} also appear to follow a set pattern from which several other worthwhile conclusions can be drawn. With the latter purpose particularly in mind, therefore, some of the more indicative reports have been selected from the study for illustration and are listed chronologically, in brief, as follows:

4 Oct 49 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - The long-standing threat of a N. K. Army invasion of South Korea is not borne out by the best information available at this time on its troop dispositions, strength and movements.

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- 11 Oct 49 (CIA Intelligence Digest) - The probabilities of offensive action by either North or South Korea are still remote, with October being the last practicable month in 1949 for taking such action.
- 12 Oct 49 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - Former officials of the defunct leftist "League of Koreans Residing in Japan" have reportedly stated that North Koreans will attack South Koreans on 15 Oct 49. Comment: This information may well have been fabricated by the source for an ulterior reason.
- 15 Oct 49 (KMAG Periodic Estimate of the Situation) - Present troop dispositions and border activities indicate that North Korea will adopt ^{its} recognized capability of defending in ~~its~~ present positions and harassing the Republic of Korea by continual guerrilla operations within the interior, while, at the same time, mounting company or battalion-size attacks along the 38th Parallel.
- 21 Oct 49 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - North Korea and Moscow radio-casts have recently been belaboring UNCOK. Comment: North Korean threats to unify the country are in consonance with Soviet desires to dominate the entire Korean peninsula but the imminent execution of these threats through armed invasion is not evidenced by the reported military situation.
- 25 Oct 49 (USAF Significant Intelligence Cables in Brief) - Pres Rhee has emphasized the danger of current conditions in Korea and declared that three different sources have informed him North Korea is "getting ready to come South."

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5 Nov 49 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - The prevalence of rumors about a North Korean invasion of South Korea during August, September and October was to justify Communist economic burdens being placed on the public, encourage guerrillas and instigate civil war in the south. Comment: While reports do seem to indicate that N. K. units are merely consolidating their positions near the 38th Parallel, the presence of tanks at the Parallel and planned construction of a nearby airfield also provide overtones of intended offensive action.

10 Nov 49 (CIA Intelligence Digest) - There are no indications that decisive military developments will occur in Korea during November.

29 Dec 49 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - The Deputy Prime Minister of North Korea has forwarded recommendations to the UN on the unification of Korea which include an ultimatum that South Korea will be invaded if the Rhee Government refuses to comply with them. This is one of the few invasion references that have been received here during recent months and may mark the start of another N. K. war of nerves propaganda campaign for the coming winter.

30 Dec 49 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - N. K. Government has set March-April 1950 as the time to invade South Korea. Comment: After a period of comparative quiet, N. K. invasion threats are again being constantly reported. Although troop movements to the south do appear significant in terms of possible military action during

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the spring of 1950, time alone can show the influence of such strong ^{restraining} ~~detering~~ factors as the ROK Government's ^{inability} ~~ability~~ to contain guerrilla activities ^{of} and develop its own military resources. Equally important and much more difficult to predict is the political factor. The Soviets undoubtedly still remain ^{strongly} ~~firmly~~ determined to unify Korea but that does not necessarily mean they intend to calendar the event by starting a civil war in the spring of 1950, especially if this action would be to the detriment of World Communism.

31 Dec 49 (KMAC Semi-Annual Report) - N. K. Security Forces are capable of (a) Holding their present positions along the 38th Parallel, while harassing the Republic of Korea with continued guerrilla attacks in the interior and mounting company or battalion size attacks along the Parallel or (b) Within a seven-day concentration period, opening a three division assault through the WONSAN-SEOUL corridor supported by air and armor.

12 Jan 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - In connection with its forthcoming invasion of South Korea, the N. K. Government has designated the months of June and July as the propaganda months, September the month for attack on nerves and November the month for stirring the people's minds. Present plan is to attack during the months of March and April 1950. Date of information: 16 Nov 49. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-6 (Reliability and truth cannot be judged).

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14 Jan 50 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - N. K. Government has reinforced its troops along 38th Parallel in order to forestall ROK Army attacks. Comment: While this report does reflect FECOM's *defensive* interpretation of current N. K. troop movements within the forward areas, their possible offensive nature should also be borne in mind.

1 Feb 50 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - N. K. Peoples Army now totals 65,470, including 3 Divisions of 10,970 each; an independent mixed brigade of 9,000; an air force of 800 and an armored unit of 1,220. There are also ex-Chinese Force (CCF) concentrations of 11,000 in the Sinuiji area and of 5,000 in the Nanam area. A N. K. Peoples Army expansion program involving both men and equipment is already plainly underway. It is believed that North Korea will not instigate civil war during the present winter months, although the N. K. Peoples Army will be capable of launching such an invasion during the climatically favorable summer or fall months of 1950. The determining factor in that decision will be the political aspects of the situation.

10 Feb 50 (CIA Intelligence Digest) - No significant developments in relations between northern and southern Korea are expected during February.

19 Feb 50 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - N. K. Peoples Army has announced it will attack South Korea by March 50. Another re-

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port states ^{that} South Korea will be invaded during February 50 and a Communist Government established in Seoul by 15 August 50.

Evaluation: F-6.

28 Feb 50 (USAF Significant Intelligence Cables in Brief) - Information extracted from recent OSI reports shows that increased civil unrest and present political situation in Korea are leading towards Civil War.

7 Mar 50 (CIA Weekly Intelligence Highlights) - UNCOK has called for sending UN Military observers to Korea and these observers should act as a deterrent against open aggressive moves by either North or South Korean armed forces.

10 Mar 50 (FECOM Joint WEEKA) - Report received that N. K. Peoples Army will invade South Korea during June 50. Comment: Soviet intentions in Korea are believed closely related to the ^{over-all} Communist program in Southeast Asia. It seems likely, therefore, that overt military measures in Korea will be held up pending the results of other Communist activities in such countries as Indo-China, Burma and Thailand.

13 Mar 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - In preparing for the invasion of South Korea, the N. K. Peoples Army, now 100,000 strong, is strengthening its "guarding forces" along the 38th Parallel. This invasion will take place during November 1949. Dates of information: 6 Nov 49. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-6.

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17 Mar 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - The invasion of South Korea by the N. K. Peoples Army will take place during Feb 50 in the province of Kangwon DO. Date of information: Jan 50. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-6. Comment: Reports are being continually received that an invasion of South Korea is going to take place. While it does appear inevitable that war will occur, the time element ~~is a factor~~ which still remains unknown.

24-25 Mar 50 (FECOM Intelligence Summaries) - Current reports of armed force expansion and major troop movements indicate that ^{the} N. K. Peoples Army will be prepared to invade South Korea by fall and possibly by the spring of this year. It is concluded, though, that the most probable course of action for North Korea during the spring and summer of 1950 will be to further an attempt to overthrow the ROK Government by creating chaotic conditions in South Korea through guerrilla activities and psychological warfare.

29 Mar 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - N. K. Government has organized "South Invading Troops" in Hungnam for use in the forthcoming invasion of South Korea. Date of information: Feb 50. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-3 (Reliability cannot be judged but possibly true).

10 Apr 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - ^{The} Central Standing Committee of Supreme Peoples Committee, N.K. Government, has

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resolved to accomplish the unification of Korea on or about May 1950. Date of information: Jan 50. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-6.

10 Apr 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - Kangson Steel Works have been converted into an ammunition factory in preparation for the invasion of South Korea during the spring of 1950. Date of information: Jan 50. South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-6.

18 Apr 50 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - N. K. civilians between the ages of 16 and 30 began taking their military training on 5 Jan 50. Comment: Although the amount of information received on this subject during the past few months suggests that many N. K. civilians are now receiving such military training, there is insufficient evidence to warrant believing the program will become a major military factor in North Korea.

21 Apr 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - N. K. Peoples Army has installed loud speakers along the 38th Parallel, warning South Koreans to evacuate the area as an invasion is planned for the very near future. Date of information: 21 Feb 50. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-3.

25 Apr 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - USSR has ordered the N. K. Puppet Government to attack South Korea this spring and further declared that if the attack is not made the

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Chinese Communist Government will go into action. Date of information: 20 Feb 50. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-6.

25 Apr 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - N. K. Armed Forces are making plans for the future invasion of South Korea and the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) are preparing to assist them. Date of Information: 28 Dec 49. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-6. Comment: The truth of this report cannot be judged but it may possibly be true because previous reports have definitely indicated that CCF units are present in North Korea.

1 May 50 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - N. K. Government issued orders in March 50 for the evacuation of areas approximately two miles north of the 38th Parallel. Evaluation: A-2 (Completely reliable and probably true). Comment: This order could have stemmed from such factors as a need for troop billets, institution of counterintelligence measures or clashes between troops at the Parallel. It is not believed to mean that armed conflict will soon be precipitated in Korea.

11 May 50 (CIA Intelligence Digest) - Despite growing northern Korean military capabilities, there is still no indication of an anticipated early attempt at an invasion of southern Korea.

12 May 50 (ARMY ATTACHE, Seoul, WEEKA) - N. K. forces were supposed to invade South Korea 7-9 May but only small fire fights took

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place on those dates. Comment: Invasion not anticipated in the near future and it is believed that N. K. propaganda agencies are beginning their annual war of nerves.

17 May 50 (USAF Significant Cables in Brief) - From USUN (Austin), Korean Foreign Minister has reported to UNCOK that the situation along the 38th Parallel is getting serious and N. K. border forces are being strengthened. While there are no indications of an imminent invasion, the Korean Government is plainly worried.

24 May 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Information Report) - N. K. Puppet Government has stationed approximately six CCF divisions in certain designated areas of North Korea for the South Korean invasion. Date of information: 23 Mar 50. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-6. Comment: Figure of six CCF divisions is felt to be highly exaggerated. This agency only accepts some 30-35,000 CCF personnel as now being in Korea, which is equivalent to about three divisions.

2 Jun 50 (ARMY ATTACHE, Seoul, WEEKA) - Considerable movement of trucks from N. K. Security Force rear echelon areas up to 38th Parallel during past two weeks. Comment: Possible movement of troops to strengthen North Korean lines along the 38th Parallel.

9 Jun 50 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - Two "divisions" of Korean Volunteer Army (formerly part of Chinese Communist Forces) entered North Korea in Aug 49 and three more during Dec 49. Reports now

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indicate that there is a new (7th) Peoples Army Div, in addition to the 4th, 5th and 6th Divs previously reported but not fully accepted. Although it is evident an expansion program to include personnel drawn from both CCF and N. K. sources has been going on, the belief is that a trained and equipped N. K. Peoples Army of thirteen divisions cannot be put in the field by Sep 50. The tank elements of a Peoples Army mechanized detachment were located in Pyongyang, on 15 May, armed with 28 Soviet manufactured tanks. Comment: An armored unit has existed in North Korea for some time and recent reports indicate that it is actually a tank brigade.

19 Jun 50 (CIA Current Capabilities Estimate) - In pursuit of its major aim to extend control over southern Korea, the North Korean regime is capable of continuing and even increasing support of the current program of propaganda, infiltration, sabotage, subversion and guerrilla operations. At the same time, it is further developing both its short and long term capabilities for overt military operations. While the northern and southern armed forces are nearly equal in combat effectiveness, training and leadership, the North Koreans possess a marked superiority in armor, heavy artillery and aircraft. Hence, the northern Korea armed forces, even as presently constituted, possess a capability for attaining limited ob-

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jectives in short-term military operations against South Korea, including the capture of Seoul.

19 Jun 50 (FECOM Intelligence Summary) - The Presidium of the Supreme Peoples Assembly of the N. K. Government today proposed that the legislative organs of the North and South Korean Governments should unite to form an all-Korean legislature. Comment: The N. K. Soviet advisers apparently believe it is an opportune time to attempt to subjugate South Korea by political means, especially as their guerrilla campaign in South Korea has been recently meeting with serious reversals.

23 Jun 50 (ARMY ATTACHE, Seoul, WEEKA) - In broadcasting the text of the recent Presidium resolution, Radio Pyongyang continues to stress 15 Aug 50 as a target date for Korean unification. Considerable movement of N. K. Security Force units, tanks, trucks, landing craft and equipment to 38th Parallel¹⁵ also being reported. Comment: Significance of these movements cannot be judged at this time. They may mean preparation for maneuvers and training projects similar to those which were carried out in spring of 1947 and 1948. ROK intelligence agencies are taking immediate special steps to determine their real significance.

23 Jun 50 (USAF Air Intelligence Report) - In preparation for the invasion of South Korea, N. K. Government is mobilizing large groups of so-called Mixed Troops of the N. K. Peoples Army, consisting of Russian and Chinese Communists. Date of information: 23 Apr 50. Source: South Korean National Police. Evaluation: F-6.

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One of the most significant conclusions deducible from this list of selected reports bearing upon the Korean situation, as received in ID (OACofS G-2), D/A, from 4 October 1949 to 23 June 1950, seems to be that the departmental intelligence officials of the Army were having to rely heavily on pertinent extracts from the daily FECOM Intelligence Summary for their chief guidance in the matter. This was especially true until mid-May 1950, when the newly established Army Attache Office, Republic of Korea, commenced to obtain better supporting coverage for the periodic summary (WEEKKA) it was required to dispatch each week to Washington. Unfortunately, after the withdrawal of the American occupation forces from South Korea, effective 1 July 1949, FECOM had rightly come to regard that area in the light of a secondary sphere of collection interest, so its military intelligence effort therein was organized ^{only} on an extremely limited scale.

CIA, of course, was also concurrently engaged in collecting information with reference to the Korean situation both from overt and covert sources. In this connection, though, it must be recognized that its Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), which published an Intelligence Digest forecasting probable monthly developments in major trouble spots all over the world, naturally gave a great deal of weight to the opinions it received from the OACofS G-2, D/A, relative to the strength and capabilities of foreign armies. As a matter of fact, the mentioned CIA "Current Capabilities Estimate for North Korea," dated 19 June 1950,

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actually contained a word-for-word reproduction of an ID estimate on the same subject which had recently been forwarded to ORE for that particular purpose.

A most promising source of information about North Korea during the pre-invasion period was provided by the South Korean National Police, whose intelligence personnel were constantly interviewing refugees, repatriates, military deserters, defectors and other knowledgeable personnel coming down from the North. This source was being exploited for the United States by a small group of Air Force personnel operating in the Seoul area as part of OSI District #8, FEAF, and under the command of Warrant Officer (later Maj.) Donald Nichols, USAF. The main difficulty with it was that the information gained from these South Korean National Police activities could seldom be evaluated any higher than F-6 and the lag between the time the actual observation was made and when the report eventually reached Washington was often so great as to render the information of little practical value.

Nevertheless, in many important respects, the picture derived from even these few selected reports should have been remarkably clear to all concerned. The Communist dominated Peoples Government in North Korea was patently making definite preparations to undertake some sort of a military invasion of South Korea if its expanded guerrilla and subversive offensive continued to go unrewarded. Furthermore, its military capabilities for such an invasion had become materially improved late in 1949 and early 1950, by stepping up con-

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scription procedures, transferring a large number of battle-hardened Korean veterans from Communist China to Korea and equipping the N. K. Peoples Army with Russian tanks. While both the American and South Korean intelligence agencies had managed to maintain a fairly complete and accurate order of battle on the North Korean armed forces, the

* For a detailed discussion of the actual comparative strengths and equipment of the North and South Korean armed forces in June 1950, see: Appleman, op. cit., ch. II.

big question still remained essentially unanswered for them. This was whether or not the invasion would actually be ordered to start and, if so, by whom and when.

A feature article of the ID Intelligence Review, published in November 1949, was devoted to "The North Korean Peoples Army" and included the following unequivocal statements: "The North Korean People's Army is currently being expanded and developed. The USSR is participating in the equipping and training of this force. In the event of overt hostilities between North and South Korea, such participation can be expected to continue and might include active direction of the People's Army."

* See: Folder (TS) "North Korean Intentions and Capabilities as Reported to Assistant Chief of Staff - G-2," Tab "E" (S), SD 40438, G-2 381. Korea, Undated 50 (29 Jun 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

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Early in 1950, the agency also disseminated a timely "Estimate of Military Potential of North Korea." This estimate proceeded to emphasize the fact that North Korean foreign policy was Soviet-directed and apparently "aimed at cementing relations with other Communist states, particularly Communist China, and bringing all of Korea under its control." In a subsequent discussion of North Korean military capabilities, it further took note that successful aggressive action by North Korea against South Korea "would be carefully planned and prepared for and would be carried out only at Soviet instigation." Commencing with the 1 March 1950 issue and continuing right on through the 1 June 1950 issue, the ID monthly "Summary of Intelligence Reference Data" ^{then} ~~thus~~ carried a standard paragraph which declared that the "North Korean Army is capable of maintaining internal security and successfully resisting aggression from South Korea, but not from the U.S.S.R. or Communist China. Given continued Soviet aid, it has the offensive capability of overrunning South Korea."

* Ibid.

There was, though, a strong feeling still persisting within the departmental intelligence agency of the Army in March 1950, that the Soviets would much prefer to weaken the Republic of Korea through po-

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litical and economic pressures rather than resort to increased North Korean military activity for accomplishing the same end. This feeling becomes readily ^{revealed} ~~apparent~~ from an ID study of Far Eastern intelligence requirements, which was prepared at that time for CIA and, in the case of Korea, presented the following ^{general} ~~considered~~ conclusions:

4. Korea

a. Soviet and Soviet-sponsored courses of action against South Korea in their order of probability are likely to be:

- (1) Political and economic pressure to weaken the Republic of Korea; and
- (2) Increased military activity by North Korea to bring the South Korean Government under Soviet control.

b. Specific intelligence requirements in the case of (1) above are indications of plans or activities designed to result in:

- (1) Removal of Rhee (President of Republic of Korea) by any clique willing to deal with North Korea;
- (2) Complete loss of value of South Korean currency;
- (3) Serious rice shortage resulting from natural or other causes;
- (4) Marked increase in popular support of guerrillas and/or anti-Government feeling;
- (5) Marked increase in intensity and scope of guerrilla attacks;
- (6) Sharp drop in Korean Army morale.

c. Specific intelligence requirements in the case of para. a.(2) above are activities or plans aimed at accomplishing:

- (1) Ill-advised offensive action by the Korean Army (this implies loss of control by KMAG);
- (2) A further substantial influx into North Korea of former Chinese Communist forces;
- (3) Southward movement of Chinese Communist Forces now in North Korea;
- (4) Increase and acceleration of Soviet logistic aid, particularly ammunition, artillery, tanks, and planes;
- (5) Concentrations of present tank strength in the Uijongbu corridor;
- (6) Intensification of 38th Parallel incidents in the Ongjin Peninsula, and in areas from Haeju to the east;
- (7) Further southward movement of the 2d Division and the Independent Mixed Brigade located in North Korea. *

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* See: Project 5418 (S), 2 Mar 50, G-2 350.09 Far East. ACSI Rec Sec. This study was delivered directly to CIA and received no other distribution. In addition to listing these detailed intelligence requirements for Korea, it also contained similar sections devoted to Tibet, Thailand and Burma.

By early May 1950, with events in French Indo-China ^{plainly} ~~having~~ ^{threatening} ~~threatened~~ to erupt soon into an unfavorable climax, the departmental military intelligence officials found it necessary to pay much closer attention to the Far East than before. A special evaluation was thus made for the entire area, which specifically cautioned that "the movement of North Korean forces steadily southward toward the 38th Parallel during the current period could indicate preparation for offensive action." Likewise, on 23 May 1950, "A Brief Estimate of Soviet Intentions to go to War" ^{included} ~~contained~~ the following pertinent statement:

The Soviets, directly or through the Chinese Communists, are augmenting military assistance to the Viet Minh and North Korea. The outbreak of hostilities may occur at any time in Korea and the fall of Indo-China to the Communists is possible this year. *

* See: Folder (TS) "North Korean Intentions and Capabilities as Reported to Assistant Chief of Staff - G-2," Tab "E" (S), SD 40438, G-2 381. Korea, Undated 50 (29 June 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

Finally, on 8 June 1950, just two weeks before the actual opening of the Korean invasion, ID forwarded an important military intelligence

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estimate to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans covering "Probable Developments in the Far East in 1950." This estimate purposely sought "to determine Soviet intentions and capabilities in the Far East, either in the event of a war in 1950 or in the event of a continuation of the Cold War." Regarding the first eventuality, it held that "Soviet military operations in the Far East will be a supplementary part of the over-all offensive operations in a global war, and on a scale which will not prejudice the principal campaigns in Europe and the Near and Middle East. " If, however, only the Cold War was continued, the Soviet aim would then be "to utilize the post-war situation to maximize conflicts arising from nationalist and other movements" and thereby reduce Western prestige and influence throughout the Far East. Furthermore, since one of the most obvious Soviet objectives in the Far East was "to extend its control over all Korea, either by subversive means or by military invasion," probable developments within that particular area would be, as follows:

According to current reports from the field, the North Korean Army will be prepared to invade South Korea by fall, or possibly even by summer, if the current expansion of the northern armed forces and troop movements to critical 38th parallel areas continue. But, on the other hand, since Soviet intentions in Korea are believed closely related to the expansionist program in Southeast Asia, it seems possible that overt military measures will be held in abeyance in Korea, at least until further developments in the Soviet program for Southeast Asia. If the Soviets are convinced they are winning the struggle in Southeast Asia, they probably will be content to wait a while longer and let South Korea ripen for future harvest. If checked or defeated in their operations in Southeast Asia, they may divert a portion of their effort to Korea, which could result in the People's Army of North Korea invading South Korea. *

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* See: Project 5695 (S), 6 Jun 50, #926620. ACSI Int Doc Lib.

Neither the OACofS G-2, D/A, nor any of its subordinate reporting agencies ever disseminated suitable intelligence before 24 June 1950, which attempted to set a definite date for the commencement of an invasion of South Korea by the N. K. Peoples Army. As a matter of fact, a prediction of that precise nature would seldom, if ever, be feasible because it would ^{ordinarily} plainly fall within the realm of trying to read the enemy commander's mind. He, of course, can always abruptly change his mind for a wide variety of different reasons and in that manner delay, alter or even cancel the course of action he has previously adopted. The most ID could thus normally be expected to accomplish in the direction of giving some sort of an invasion warning was to notify the proper authorities that there were a number of strong indications at hand pointing directly towards its imminence. These indications were clearly available for all to see during early 1950 in Korea and duly reported from the field. Time after time, however, their full impact was discounted by a ruinous combination of faulty evaluation and wishful thinking on the part of the military intelligence reviewers directly concerned. The comments which they placed on many of the more indicative reports undeniably showed a stubborn refusal to believe that the Soviets really intended to order the invasion to start when it actually did.

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Regardless of this faulty evaluation, though, it does seem almost inconceivable that the invasion should have caught so many top American officials, both civilian and military, by admitted surprise. There was certainly sufficient information disseminated regarding the powerful offensive capabilities of the N. K. Peoples Army to convince even the most skeptical that such an eventuality might well occur ^{some time} during the climatically favorable summer months of 1950 in Korea. While several other trouble spots may have appeared then to pose a greater immediate danger to United States interests in the Far East than Korea, this conclusion was based largely upon logic from our own national standpoint and not necessarily from ^{*} that of the Soviets. The unvarnished truth is ~~that~~ the Communists

* For a perfect example of this type of specious reasoning, see: ID GSUSA, D/A, "Intelligence Review," #167, April 1950 (S), p. 5. ACSI Int Doc Lib.

not only enjoyed the strategic initiative on a world-wide basis but also were clever enough to make excellent use of it by deliberately diverting the major attention of our intelligence agencies away from the area ^{that} they had already selected for their projected military operations.

The Communist counterintelligence and deception effort which was utilized in North Korea to cover the intended invasion remains very

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impressive. By establishing a centralized military security system throughout the North Korean armed forces and exercising a strict information control in Pyongyang, the Soviets managed to conceal their plans for aggressive action even from the bulk of the Peoples Army officers and Labor Party officials intimately involved. They were

* Department of State, "North Korea: A Case Study of a Soviet Satellite (C)", op. cit., pp. 116-17.

also able to keep the southern border so closely guarded that it soon became almost impossible for the ROK and other intelligence agents to collect any truly revealing information about the military situation existing in North Korea. One of the most effective of the many deceptive measures that they ^{apparently} ~~previously~~ adopted was to introduce a series of conflicting dates for the scheduled start of the invasion into their regular intelligence channels. This caused a wide variety of different dates on the subject to show up in American intelligence reports from numerous sources and undoubtedly did help to foster a "cry wolf" attitude among our intelligence officials which may have been natural but was ^{also} ~~most~~ assuredly fatal. *

* See: Harold Joyce Noble, "The Reds Made Suckers of Us All," The Saturday Evening Post, vol. 225-6 (9 Aug 1952), pp. 30 and 76.

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Mr. Noble was a First Secretary at the American Embassy in Seoul and acted as intelligence coordinator there for the Ambassador during the pre-Korea period.

The departmental intelligence agency of the Army, therefore, along with the other intelligence agencies of the United States Government, entered the Korean Conflict in the wake of a violent wave of criticism that they had failed to provide any appropriate warning of the sudden invasion of South Korea by the N. K. Peoples Army. Although a good deal of such criticism was plainly justified, especially that bearing upon the faulty evaluation of certain reports received, some of it manifestly was not. In this connection, it should be recalled that during the latter part of the preceding period, the OACofS G-2, D/A, had been forced to contend with the crippling handicaps of an ill-judged economy drive personally pushed by a Secretary of Defense who neither understood nor appreciated the crucial importance of the military intelligence effort to national security called for by the new conditions of Cold War. The major changes which were promptly demanded in that unsatisfactory situation as a result of the Communist invasion thus become the subject for detailed examination in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

FAVORABLE PROGRESS

While
Although some of the other beneficial results for Army intelligence were not so immediately forthcoming, the outbreak of hostilities in Korea naturally did put an abrupt end to the defense economy drive that Secretary of Defense Johnson had been vigorously pushing over the preceding year. As a matter of fact, Mr. Johnson resigned his office, effective 19 September 1950, and was replaced two days later by General of the Army George C. Marshall. * With all the top

* Facts on File, 1950, p. 291J. President Truman accepted Mr. Johnson's resignation "with regret."

governmental authorities having suddenly developed an avid interest in the Korean situation, there was soon a greatly increased demand for special briefings and studies covering a wide variety of different intelligence subjects, *pertaining thereto.* The OACofS G-2, D/A, officials also became promptly involved in guiding the preparation of the intelligence portions of an Army expansion program which would necessitate a large supplemental Army appropriation from Congress. * Even though

* The regular Army Appropriation Act for FY 1951 (PL 759, 81st Cong., 2d sess.) was not passed until 6 Sep 50. It was then followed

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three weeks later by a 1st Supplemental Appropriation Act (PL 843, 81st Cong., 2d sess.) totalling \$3,166,403,000. See: Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1951, pp. 119-21.

most of the funds intended for intelligence use therein were purposely scattered among the Technical Service budgets, the departmental military intelligence personnel still had to assist first in estimating each of the required items and then shepherding them on up through the numerous budgetary review agencies in order to reach a hoped for satisfactory conclusion. *

* See: Memo (S), Col George S. Smith for ACofS G-2, 21 Aug 50, Tab "G-2 Since June 1950," pp. 3-4, G-2 350.09, Undated (21 Aug 50). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

Supplementary appropriations were needed by the departmental military intelligence agency most of all to permit the procurement of additional personnel. The agency was not only confronted with a large number of new and urgent production responsibilities but also *instant* ~~abrupt~~ demands for resuming the conduct of several combat intelligence functions that had been badly neglected during the preceding Cold War period. In this connection, it should be recalled that General Irwin, as late as 22 May 1950, had addressed a strong letter of

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protest to higher authority describing the grave harm to the field collection effort stemming from recent reductions in the strength of the Army Attache system. That particular protest, though, was not even allowed to get beyond the Chief of Staff's Office because there seemed to be no prospect of it ever receiving any sympathetic consideration by the Secretary of Defense.*

* SS (S), G-2 to C/S and S/A, 22 May 50, G-2 320.2, 22 May 50 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

Although the adverse personnel situation for the Army Attache system failed to change right away following the Korean outbreak, some encouraging signs soon did commence to appear on the horizon. On 27 June 1950, for example, the system was actually granted an increase of 3 officers, 6 enlisted men and 7 civilians, with the contemplated plan being to charge a majority of these spaces against a newly established MDAP quota instead of the OACofS G-2, D/A. That plan could not be fully carried out, however, as the Department of Defense shortly ~~re-~~ *transferred* ~~planned to transfer~~ part of this new Army MDAP quota to the Navy. Nevertheless, based upon some subsequent discussions along similar lines, the Army Attache system eventually gained additional spaces for 1 officer (India), 1 officer (Indo-China), 1 enlisted man (Belgium) and 2 enlisted

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
men (Netherlands).^{*} Furthermore, in mid-July 1950, after Army Secre-

* See: Memos dated 27 and 30 June 50, File G-2 320.2 (24 Aug 43).
WW II Rec Div, GSA. The three additional enlisted men were code clerks
called for by the fact that the ^{U.S.} Army Attaches in Belgium and the Neth-
erlands had ^{just} been given the task of executing the entire crypto-communi-
cations function for their companion MDAP offices.

tary Frank Pace, Jr. ^{had} requested authority from the Secretary of Defense
to reassign several spaces recently rendered surplus through forced
strength reductions within the Satellite nations to Army Attache Offices
in Turkey, China, Switzerland, Finland, Indonesia and Syria, Secretary
Johnson reversed his previous stand in the matter completely by reply-
ing: "In view of the urgent need for continuous intelligence collection
from areas peripheral to the Soviet Union, I approve your recommenda-
tions and direct their immediate implementation in order that these key
intelligence posts may be staffed without delay."^{*}

* Ltrs (S), S/A to S/D, 12 Jul 50, and S/D to S/A, 24 Jul 50;
G-2 320.2, 12 and 24 Jul 50 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

These early actions with reference to obtaining personnel increases
for the Army Attache system still fell far short of satisfying the ex-



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immediate ^{needs} demands of the ~~critical~~ intelligence collection situation. The JCS, however, had already started to consider specific recommendations for major strength increases throughout the Service (Army, Navy and Air) Attache Offices, which were finally agreed upon and submitted to the new Secretary of Defense on 26 September 1950. When Secretary Marshall approved them on 11 October 1950, ^{*} the Army Attache system

* See: IF (S), ACoFS G-2 to ACoFS G-1, G-2 320.2, 24 Oct 50, (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

received its first sizeable strength increase since World War II, amounting to 29 officers, 5 warrant officers, 21 enlisted men, 19 U. S. civilians and 33 alien civilians. This increase then served to bring the authorized strength of the system up to 150 officers, 42 warrant officers, 141 enlisted men, 91 U. S. civilians and 229 ^{*} alien civilians.

* Memo, G-2 to Sec Gen Staff, 20 Oct 50, G-2 016/2-T, 20 Oct 50 (1 Aug 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

The OACoFS G-2, D/A, proper likewise secured its own personnel increases generally in this same manner. On 26 July 1950, it forwarded a hastily prepared staff study to the Joint Intelligence Committee

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(JIC), asking for a strength augmentation without further delay of 137 officers, 5 warrant officers, 42 enlisted men and 196 civilians. The proposed plan for accomplishing that augmentation was to recall 66 reserve officers of junior grade with G-2 mobilization designations to active duty and forward regular assignment requests to the OACofS G-1, D/A, for the rest of the officers. As many warrant officers as possible were then to be procured through the Career Management Division, AGO, and all required enlisted men obtained by transfer from the Department of the Army Administrative Area (DAAA). The

* IOM (S), Chief A & L Div to G-2 Exec, 26 Jul 50, G-2 320.2, 26 Jul 50 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

total requested civilian increase was duly granted, effective 15 August 1950, and 106 additional officer spaces were authorized one week

* Memo, Chief Civ Pers Br, Staff Adm Off, to Chief, Staff Adm Off, OCS, 29 Sep 50, G-2 320.2, 29 Sep 50 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

*
later but

* G-2 Memo, signed by Chief A & L Div, 22 Aug 50, in special "Space Authorization File, G-2," G-2 320.2, Undated 52 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

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both only on a temporary basis. There were no warrant officers currently available for reassignment, though, and, under the existing personnel policies, the ACoFS G-1, D/A, balked at giving the departmental military intelligence agency any more enlisted men. Civilian job descriptions were thus promptly prepared to cover the 42 enlisted men positions and a second augmentation program was submitted to the Office of the Chief of Staff, not only for them but also 7 officers and 11 civilian spaces ~~that were~~ needed to support the speedy preparation of air target folders in collaboration with the USAF. *

* DF, ACoFS G-2 to Staff Adm Off OCS, G-2 320.2, 22 Aug 50 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

Although this second G-2 augmentation program was approved in October 1950, by then the matter had become more or less academic because the bulk of the new personnel, especially the ^{key} civilians, were simply not procurable. Between 1 July 1950 and 31 August 1950, G-2 civilian personnel authorizations for all purposes had risen from 381 to 609 but, on 22 September 1950, the actual strength in that particular category was only 406. During the same general period, there were also 29 civilian resignations in ID and a careful screening of 977 applicants for employment in intelligence positions was able to produce just 35 ^{new} hirings. ^{* According to} ~~Moreover,~~ on 20 November 1950, a total of 140 G-2 augmentation

* Memo, Chief Civ Pers Br, Staff Adm Off, to Chief, Staff Adm OCS,

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29 Sep 50, G-2 320.2, 29 Sep 50 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

spaces remained unfilled and some 40 CIC enlisted men were still being utilized in various capacities within the agency in an attempt to get the essential work done.*

* OM, Chief A & L Div to G-2 Exec, 20 Nov 50, in special "Space Authorization File G-2," G-2 320.2, Undated 52 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

It seemed to be almost a foregone conclusion that the rapid functional expansion occasioned by the Korean Conflict would soon result in another major reorganization for the departmental intelligence agency of the Army, especially after General Irwin's relief as the ACofS G-2, D/A, on (EDCMR) 29 Aug 50.* The over-simplified organiza-

* D/A SO 137, 17 Jul 50. This same order assigned Gen Irwin to Headquarters, U. S. Forces in Austria, with station at Salzburg and he received his promotion to Lt Gen (temporary) upon assuming command of those forces, on 13 Oct 50. See: Dept of Def, Press Br, Lieutenant General Stafford LeRoy Irwin, USA, up to date as of 7 Jun 51.

tion which he had prescribed for the agency, with the security and training functions and the administrative and foreign liaison functions respectively

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merged together under single heads, had never worked out in a satisfactory manner. General Bolling, his successor, though, had already served both as the Deputy and Acting ACoFS G-2, GSUSA, and was inti-

* Gen Bolling, who had been Deputy DI (ACoFS G-2) ever since Nov 47, received his appointment to be the ACoFS G-2, D/A, effective 23 Aug 50. See: G-2 Memo No. 33, 23 Aug 50, G-2 300.6 (6 Jan 50).
ACSI Rec Sec.

mately familiar with it. Since there were so many other more compelling problems immediately at hand, the matter of reorganization was deliberately set aside for the time being. Pressures for such action became so great in January 1951, however, that changes in organization were finally announced for the Office, ACoFS G-2, Intelligence, effective 1 February 1951, along the following lines:

a. The Administrative and Liaison Division is redesignated the Administrative Division. The Administrative Division will retain all personnel and functions except those presently assigned to the Foreign Liaison Branch.

b. The Foreign Liaison Branch, A&L Division, is redesignated the Foreign Liaison Office. The Foreign Liaison Office will retain all personnel and functions presently assigned.

c. The Security and Training Division will be abolished.

d. The Training Division will be established with the following branches assigned:

Training Branch
Plans and Organization Branch
Reserve Components Branch
Map and Photo Branch

The Allocations Section, presently assigned to Training Branch, will be transferred to the Plans and Organization Branch.

e. The Security Division will be established with the following branches assigned:

[REDACTED]

Operations Branch
Security of Military Information Branch
Censorship Branch

f. The Office of the Assistant Executive for Plans and Coordination will be abolished and the Planning and Coordinating Office will be established.

g. The Control Office will be established. *

* Memo, "Reorganization of OAC/S, G-2, Intelligence," 25 Jan 51, G-2 300.6, 25 Jan 51 (12 Jan 51). ACSI Rec Sec. ^{Personnel} Key appointments also made at this same time, were: Col (former Brig Gen) John W. Middleton to be Chief of the Training Div; Col Paul G. Cramer, Chief of the Security Div and Col Charles H. Ott, Chief of the Administrative Div.

The only new element introduced into the departmental military intelligence agency by this 1 February 1951 reorganization was a small Control Office designed to operate directly under the G-2 Executive. It had recently become quite the fashion in American governmental circles to emphasize the so-called management function through forming separate control offices for that purpose. The avowed goal was to improve administrative practices and to devise more efficient work methods within the agency concerned. The G-2 Control Office was thus initially allocated a total of four military spaces, plus necessary civilian clerical help, and called upon "to plan, formulate, initiate, coordinate and review policies, procedures, and programs in management for the Office of the ACofS G-2, Intelligence." The first Chief of the G-2 Control

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Office was Lt. Col. (later Col.) Herbert L. Nelson and its key civilian member soon came to be Mr. Henry J. Ritterbush. Listed on the Department of the Army organization charts as an "IBM Special Govt Representative,"^{*} the latter official was charged with surveying the

* See: D/A Org Chart, "Office ACoFS G-2, Intelligence, Chiefs and Key Personnel," 2 Apr 51. ACSI Rec Sec.

agency's intelligence activities in order to determine their adaptability to machine recording procedures. It was under Colonel Nelson's personal direction and Mr. Ritterbush's technical supervision, therefore, that the highly praised G-2 Central Records Facility (CRF) utilizing such procedures was formally established at Fort Holabird, Md., on 17 August 1951.^{*}

* Ltr, AGAP-A (2 Aug 51) G-1, copy in: G-2. 020 G-2 Central Records Facility, 17 Aug 51 (8 Jul 51). ACSI Rec Sec. Mr. Ritterbush held an Army Reserve (AGC) commission as a Lt Col and, on 22 Mar 51, had volunteered to come on active duty to assist in setting up this CRF. When ~~the IBM Co,~~ his employer, ^{the IBM Co,} agreed to grant him one year's leave with full pay for accomplishing that task, however, he chose to remain a civilian. File G-2 201, Ritterbush, Henry J. ACSI Rec Sec. See also: Ltrs, Col Howard Michelet, U.S.A., 14 Aug 61, and Col Herbert L. Nelson, U.S.A. Ret, 28 Aug 61; to Col Bruce W. Bidwell, D/A. Author's File.

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While the 1 February 1951 reorganization did succeed in straightening out several of the more important functional problems that had been plaguing the departmental military intelligence agency of the Army for ~~some~~^{a long} time, it failed noticeably to resolve all of them. Still at hand, for instance, was the controversial question of whether the fundamental collection and dissemination functions ought to be performed separately or decentralized among the various branches engaged in intelligence production. The previous organization had represented a distinct compromise in this matter, by forming a combined Collection and Dissemination Branch as a regular part of the large Intelligence (Production) Division, OACofS G-2, D/A. Coincident with the 1 February 1951 reorganization, though, these two functions were split up and given to separate Dissemination and Requirements Branches but kept under that same Division. A "Requirements" designation was considered more appropriate for the latter branch than the traditional "Collection" designation, because of the broad nature of the additional requirements that the Korean outbreak had presented to the agency, which were then felt to be.

to:

a. Implement an accelerated collection program for the Department of Army; coordinate such activity with the Central Intelligence Agency and supplement that Agency's program in the collection of military information.

b. Establish policies and procedures in the conduct and handling of covert collection activities on a world-wide basis and coordination of such matters with the Central Intelligence Agency.

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c. Effect the production and dissemination of foreign and domestic intelligence pertaining to the covert capabilities of Soviet, Satellite, and Communist elements to accomplish espionage, sabotage, and subversion that would adversely affect the Korean War.

d. Reestablish the Army's evasion and escape program.

e. Increase the inter-exchange of intelligence documents to meet the demands of units embarking for Korea. *

* "Major Activities of Requirements Branch Relating to Korean Conflict During Period 25 June 1950 - 8 September 1951" (S), G-2 314.7, 16 Oct 51 (30 Oct 42), pp. 1-2. ACSI Rec Sec.

The greatest need of the Army intelligence effort during the early part of the Korean Conflict period obviously was to expand its collection capabilities, both in Washington and the field. Hence, the new Requirements Branch of the Intelligence (Production) Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, was given the ^{important} specific mission of "accelerating the Department of the Army's collection program and providing a control point for the collection and evaluation of all intelligence information." It ^{originally} sought to accomplish this intricate task by forming a Collection and Evaluation Section around the nucleus of experienced military and civilian personnel who had been in the old World-Wide Branch of the Intelligence Group, OACofS G-2, D/A, when the invasion started. *

* Ibid., pp. 2-3.

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Shortly thereafter,

~~At the same time,~~ the G-2 Control Office, in connection with an assigned major project "to study and prepare recommendations for re-grouping the components of the Office of the ACoS G-2," reached a considered conclusion that the collection and dissemination functions should be performed independently of intelligence production. Effective 16 July 1951, therefore, the existing Intelligence (Production) Division was abolished and two new divisions, with certain specified branches, were created in place of it, as follows:

Production Division
Eastern Branch
Eurasian Branch
Western Branch
Estimates Branch
Technical Branch
Special Research Branch
Collection and Dissemination (C & D) Division
G-2 Document Library Branch
Publications Branch
Special Procurement Branch
Requirements Branch *

* G-2 Memo No. 17, 18 Jul 51, G-2 300.6, 18 Jul 51 (5 Jan 51).

ACSI Rec Sec.

Although a functional separation of that particular nature had long been advocated by many intelligence authorities, the results did not turn out to be entirely favorable in all cases. It tended, for example, to multiply the coordination problems surrounding the con-

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duct of the daily intelligence teleconference between the ACoS G-2, D/A, and Headquarters, FECOM, that was designed to receive timely information on developments occurring throughout the Far East. The Eastern Branch of the Intelligence (Production) Division had been given the mission of supervising this informative teleconference, in which representatives of other intelligence agencies at the seat of the government participated regularly, and was also held responsible for performing the following closely related functions:

- a. Preparation of the daily agenda.
- b. Maintenance of the daily teleconference situation map.
- c. Preparation of special briefings of teleconference information to various General Staff Agencies. *

* "Summary of Major Activities of ACoS G-2, 25 June 1950 through 8 September 1951" (C), p. 3, Call No. 20-2.2 AA 1950-51. Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

After the G-2 reorganization of 1 February 1951, the Eastern Branch continued to remain the action unit for the FECOM teleconference and the new Requirements Branch was charged with "coordinating and executing administrative details concerning telecons." This system of divided control could be made to operate in a fairly satisfactory manner while these two branches were an integral part of the Intelligence (Production) Division but it failed to work out smoothly following the functional separation between production and collection-

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dissemination which became effective 16 July 1951. A special effort was then made during the next month to settle these difficulties by naming the Requirements Branch as the action unit for the FECOM tele-conference. ^{Nevertheless,} Because the Eastern Branch still held sole authority for handling all items concerned with intelligence production ^{brought up} ~~mentioned~~ therein, ^{*} though, the new system was not very successful either.

* Ibid., pp. 2-3.

Although the authorized procurement of former enemy scientists and technicians for United States exploitation through PAPERCLIP procedures had ended during September 1947, the Army continued to be directly involved in the conduct of similar cases on an individual basis under a different legal authority. Shortly before the Korean outbreak, the mission of supervising this and several other sensitive departmental intelligence activities, such as defector operations and the development of a program aimed at denying certain persons to Communist exploitation, was assigned to the Intelligence (Production) Division, OACofS G-2, D/A. Since these varied operations seldom had anything at all to do with the production of military intelligence, Brig. Gen. John Weckerling, Chief of the Intelligence (Production) Division, soon recommended their concentration

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within the Administrative and Liaison (A&L) Division. This action
*
was actually taken, in October 1950, by re-forming an earlier Spec-

* G-2 Memo No. 37, 13 Oct 50, G-2 300.6, 13 Oct 50, (6 Jan 50).
ACSI Rec Sec.

ial Procurement Branch of the A&L Division. When the new Collection
and Dissemination Division was organized effective 16 July 1951, how-
ever, the Special Procurement Branch was made a part of it. That par-
ticular branch had also recently been charged with the twin tasks of
selecting a site for and supervising the construction of physical fac-
ilities ^{for} at an Armed Services Personnel Interrogation Center (ASPIC)
and an Armed Services Document Intelligence Center (ASDIC), in con-
pliance with a directive issued to the ACoFS G-2, D/A, by the JCS.*

* JCS 950/25, App B, Par 1, p. 413, based upon JIC 456/40 and
approved by the Secretary of Defense (JCS 950/29), on 24 Mar 51. Rec-
ords of the JCS.

These two closely related agencies were then later* joined together and,
on 1 October 1951, announced to the Army as comprising The Army Security
Center, Washington, D. C.*

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* GO 86, 1 Oct 51.

(S) Despite the lessons of World War II, plans for immediately expanding the Army technical intelligence effort in the event of an emergency had been seriously neglected during the Cold War period. To make matters worse, the Technical Intelligence Section of G-2, FECOM, had also been inactivated in 1949 as an economy measure and its functions distributed among the various FECOM technical services. The net result was a marked lack of effective general staff supervision over the collection and examination of enemy equipment captured by the United Nations forces during the early stages of the Korean Conflict. While the OACofS G-2, D/A, was prompt in recognizing that fully representative technical intelligence teams from Washington were needed in the combat theater without delay and even took the lead in arranging to have them quickly organized and instructed, the personnel of these initial teams were naturally inclined to operate more as agents for their own technical services than to satisfy the needs of the departmental military intelligence agency itself. It thus became necessary in November 1950, to send Lt. Col. (later Col.) George Artman, Chief of the Weapons and Equipment Section, Technical Branch, OACofS G-2, D/A, to FECOM for three months to help set up a satisfactory reporting system for technical ^{Intelligence} information and to coordinate the classification and shipment of captured material from the field. Meanwhile, the OACofS G-2, D/A, officials had proceeded to establish

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an appropriate project for training Technical Intelligence Coordination Detachments at the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, and those units commenced to arrive in Korea by the spring of 1951.

* "Summary of Major Activities of ACOFS G-2, 25 June 1950 - 8 September 1951," op. cit., pp. 3-5. In Sep 50, Col Collin S. Myers was appointed to act as ^{the} ~~A~~ Technical Intelligence Coordinator for FECOM.

Another unfortunate result of this failure to anticipate the need for a proper technical intelligence program in case of an emergency was that it delayed the start of collecting and exploiting enemy nameplate data from the intelligence standpoint in Korea. A successful project of that type had constituted one of the outstanding military intelligence achievements against Japan during World War II but it now had to be redeveloped all over again completely from scratch. Realizing that the Korean Conflict offered a most promising opportunity for analyzing nameplate data obtained from captured enemy equipment, the Technical Branch, OACofS G-2, D/A, first communicated with FECOM to express a departmental interest in the matter and then issued general instructions to cover the collection of such markings throughout the Far Eastern Theater. When the announced plan showed few signs of any real progress, though, Maj. Johan O. Romningen of the Munitions Production Subsection

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of that branch was sent to the Far East in November 1950, to render advice and assistance to G-2, FECOM, for preparing a suitable handbook on these markings. This handbook was finally issued during March 1951, with a Signal supplement added to it several months later. By June 1951, the OACofS G-2, D/A, had also managed to publish an official directive defining its specific requirements within this productive intelligence field but that was a whole year after the sudden

* Ibid., p. 5.

opening of the Korean invasion.

The departmental military intelligence agency had likewise pioneered in the favorable development during World War II of an Escape and Evasion (E&E) instructional program, known as MIS-X, for use by military personnel who suddenly found themselves isolated within enemy or other forbidding territory. Early in 1949, due mainly to economy considerations, primary general staff responsibility for that program had been transferred from the Intelligence Division to the Plans and Operations (P&O) Division, D/A, where it remained completely neglected. In March 1949, though, the Director of P&O was prevailed upon to determine the desirability and feasibility of such training and what it should consist of under the current conditions. Unfortunately, with no sense of urgency apparently being felt throughout the General Staff on the subject,

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nothing ever came of this ^{progressive} anticipatory recommendation.*

* See: DF, D/P&O to D/O&T and D/I, 8 Mar 49, f/w File (TS) G-2 253.6 (10 Oct 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

The Korean outbreak naturally aroused a renewed interest in E&E training, especially among the air elements of the UN Forces, but it was not until October 1950 that the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division (JSPD) of the JCS scheduled a formal meeting to discuss the matter. During this meeting, which was attended by representatives from A-2, ONI, Navy-Air, Marine-Air, Navy-Ops, Army (G-2 and G-3) and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) of CIA, it was agreed that the Army E&E function should rest primarily with the G-3 staff sections. Nevertheless, the corresponding G-2 staff sections should also stand ready at all times to furnish required assistance in preparing E&E training literature and establishing interrogation or debriefing centers for the program.* On 26 December 1950, however, when the JSPD decided

* See: MR (C), R. W. Guenther, 10 Oct 50, and DF ACofS G-3 to ACofS G-2, 17 Oct 50: File (TS) G-2 253.6 (10 Oct 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

to appoint an ad hoc Escape

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and Evasion Committee, the original G-2 member thereof, Col. Frank N. Leakey, became its Chairman by seniority and this same policy was then continued after he had been replaced by Lt. Col. (later Col.) M. J. Hagood, Chief of the Returnee Section, Requirements Branch, ID, OACofS G-2, D/A.

* "Major Activities of Requirements Branch Relating to Korean Conflict During Period 25 June 1950 - 8 September 1951" (S), op. cit., pp. 3-4.

Despite the obvious need of a revitalized E&E program ~~to be~~ used in the Far East, the Service members of the ad hoc Escape and Evasion Committee could neither agree among themselves nor with the CIA members concerning agency responsibility for directing it. On 28 February 1951, though, the Chief of Staff did approve the recommendations of an Army study to the effect that primary general staff supervision of the entire E&E program should be returned to the ACofS G-2, D/A. When the military Services also accepted full CIA control over the associated function of devising a covert correspondence system with U. S. prisoners of war, the E&E program then proceeded to make rapid strides in development, as follows:

March 1951 - The ACofS G-2, D/A, took positive steps to establish and maintain a close liaison with the newly formed Psychological War-

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fare Special Staff Division, D/A, not only in regard to the E&E program but also for all forms of unconventional warfare.

April 1951 - The X Corps started an experimental E&E course of instruction in Korea, which was shortly adopted by the other two (I and IX) Corps of the Eighth Army.

July 1951 - The ACofS G-2, D/A, forwarded an official letter to the CG, Army Field Forces, directing the installation of E&E training as a regular part of the basic Army training *schedule*.

July 1951 - A four-officer staff group was formed in Tokyo, under the sponsorship of G-2, FECOM, to draw up a theater E&E training plan and a set of standard operating procedures for promptly interviewing E&E returnees in the hope of improving such training.

August 1951 - Two trained officers from the OACofS G-2, D/A, were attached to Headquarters, Sixth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., in order to present a 50-minute E&E lecture to all personnel being processed through West Coast ports of embarkation for Far Eastern duty.

October 1951 - D/A Pamphlet No. 21-46, entitled "Behind Enemy Lines," was published for the express purpose of disseminating E&E information throughout the United States Army.

April 1952 - The ACofS G-2, D/A, nominated 1st Lt. Addison R. Bragg as the first of six officers to be trained by CIA in all aspects of activities pertaining to covert correspondence with U. S. prisoners of war.

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July 1952 - CG, AFF, delegated his responsibility for conducting both the basic training and port of embarkation phases of the E&E program within the Zone of Interior to the six Continental Armies.

November 1952 - The ACoFS G-2, D/A, approved a recommendation from the CG, AFF, that the E&E lecture should be given at an earlier date in the basic training program and then followed by field exercises, designated as "Survival Training," thus to comprise a more normal part of the training cycle.

November 1952 - The E&E Briefing Officer at the East Coast Port of Embarkation, Camp Kilmer, N. J., reported that he had already given 158 briefings, which were attended by a total of 93,862 persons. *

* Ibid., pp. 3-8. See also: File (TS), Mar 51-Nov 52, G-2 253.6 (10 Oct 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

As previously mentioned, the sudden arrival of the Korean Conflict had brought about a tremendous increase in demands for intelligence dissemination, especially briefings on the military situation. One of the very first acts of the Intelligence (Production) Division, OACoFS G-2, D/A, therefore, was to organize an operations team within the G-2 War Room, composed of Far Eastern experts from G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Air Force and Navy, for performing that emergency briefing function.

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This hastily assembled team was then able to present almost continuous Korean situation briefings for the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, and other appropriate individuals and agencies, including the press. As soon as it became practicable to establish such briefings on a more formal basis, however, responsibility for executing them was transferred from the Eastern Branch to the Dissemination Branch, ID, and all outside representation, except from G-3, was discontinued. For the next several months, the new G-2 Briefing Unit averaged approximately 55 briefings of various types each week and, by October 1951, although a considerable number of unscheduled briefings still kept coming up, the regular briefing schedule was generally fixed along the following lines:

Daily Briefings

Office of Secretary of Defense - Current Korea Sit & Ops
Department of the Army Briefing- Current Korea Sit & Ops
(Joint G-2/G-3 Briefing)

Semi-Weekly Briefings

Secretary of the Army - Monday: Current Korea Sit & Ops
Thursday: Current Korea Sit & Ops
UN Ambassadors (New State Bldg)- Tuesday: Current Korea Sit & Ops
Friday: Current Korea Sit & Ops

Weekly Briefings

Army General Council - Wednesday: Current Korea Sit & Ops
Current World Roundup
G-2 MIC - Thursday: Current Korea Sit & Ops
G-2 Briefing for G-3 - Friday: Current Korea Sit & Ops
Press Briefing (Off-Record) - Friday: Current Korea Sit & Ops
Office of Secretary of Defense - Friday: Current World Roundup
Foreign Attaches - Wednesday: Current Korea Sit & Ops
Strategic Intelligence School - Monday (When Requested) Current
Korea Sit & Ops

Bi-Weekly Briefings

Armed Forces Medical Policy Council - Monday: Current World Roundup

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Note: On Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays, a written briefing of Korea Sit & Ops is prepared covering previous 24-hour period (from Telecon) and is posted on the G-2 Situation Map in the War Room. *

* "Summary of Major Activities of ACoFS G-2, 25 June 1950 through 8 September 1951" (C), op. cit., pp. 10-12 and Tab C.

There was also an urgent need indicated for written reports on the Korean situation, to be distributed periodically to certain designated American military and other officials all over the world. This major requirement was promptly satisfied by the publication of two new intelligence reports, as follows:

a. A daily situation report (SITREP) on Korea. The Current Section of the World-Wide Branch (later Estimates Branch), ID, was made responsible for the production of this report which was disseminated within the Department of Defense and transmitted electrically to overseas commands, military attaches and military missions. Participation by G-3, Air and Navy was obtained. In April 1951, this function was transferred to the War Room.

b. World Intelligence Notes Digest (WIND). This report was initiated on 6 July 1950 in order to satisfy a request from CINCFE that he be informed of major current intelligence developments throughout the world. The WIND is dispatched to CINCFE daily, Monday through Friday, based on the most important items published in the Daily Intelligence Briefing. *

* Ibid., p. 12.

The big problem, though, confronting the departmental intelli-

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gence agency of the Army immediately after the Korean outbreak was, as usual, one of how to procure sufficient and qualified military personnel for sustaining its rapid expansion. There had been a large number of promising pronouncements made by higher authorities during the post-World War II period on the subject of improving intelligence personnel policies but they had all come to naught when these same authorities failed to follow them up vigorously in the face of an ensuing defense economy drive. As a matter of fact, the sudden opening of the Korean invasion had found the ACofS G-1 and ACofS G-2, D/A, still in the midst of a protracted argument over the details of forming an Intelligence Career Management Branch under the Career Management Division, AGO, to implement a plan for intelligence personnel specialization which had been outlined by the latter authority on 8 June 1950. It was not until 22 September 1950, that the ACofS G-1, D/A, finally did approve "in principle" the establishment of this Intelligence Career Management Branch and then more than seven months

* See: Report of Actions Completed, G-2 to Sec GS, 27 Sep 50, G-2 016/2-T, 27 Sep 50 (1 Aug 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

later before a new regulation could be completed so as to provide for voluntary career specialization by officers within the following selected intelligence fields:

- 
- (1) Strategic intelligence, to include the General Staff, joint intelligence agencies, and the Army attache system.
(2) Intelligence staffs of major commands and field armies and higher headquarters.
(3) Army Security Agency.
(4) Counter Intelligence Corps.
(5) Specialized intelligence units. *

* SR 605-150-30, 10 May 51, par. 1.

Meanwhile, the military intelligence officials had found a solid friend in Mr. Frank Pace, Jr., who became the Secretary of the Army, effective 30 March 1950. In January 1951, for example, he personally expressed a strong ^{personal} interest in the Army Attache system to General Bolling and stated that he considered it the most important intelligence collection means available to the Department of the Army. He also wanted arrangements made for all the Army Attaches to be presented to him upon their return from foreign station and a letter prepared for his own signature requesting the Secretary of State to notify the American Ambassadors and Ministers that Army Attaches "are not aides nor attached to them for the purpose of planning social affairs." * Further-

* See: Ltr (S), Bolling to Army Attaches (Graling, Canada), 10 Jan 51, G-2 350.09, 10 Jan 51 (25 Nov 46). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

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more, when General Bolling informed him of the fact that the departmental military intelligence agency had experienced great difficulty in filling a number of critical Army Attache posts with suitable officers under the existing volunteer system, Secretary Pace promptly approved filling these posts by detail from among officers of the "highest caliber and qualifications." He did not fail to ^{PURSU} follow up _{press} on these favorable declarations either, as General Bolling was soon in receipt of a direct communication from Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson, reiterating the Secretary's personal interest in the Army Attache system and asking what specific action could be taken to meet its immediate personnel requirements. * This query event-

* SS (S), G-2 to C/S and Asst S/A, 12 Jan 51, G-2 O41.221-T, 12 Jan 51 (27 Dec 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

ually resulted in the ACoFS G-1, D/A, nominating 18 Artillerymen, 24 Infantrymen and 9 Armor officers from the "upper 10% of the Army" to fill by detail several vacant Army Attache posts. *

* See: DF, G-2 to G-1, 8 Jan 51, G-2 O41.221-T, 8 Jan 51, 12 Jan 51 (27 Dec 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA. Sec Pace had another even more pointed letter ready for dispatch to the Sec of State in regard to the social phases of Army Attache duties but apparently dropped the idea when he discussed it with the Sec of Def, on 19 Jan 51, and found Gen Marshall unsympathetic in the matter.

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On 1 July 1949, in line with his determined campaign to unify the Service Attache Offices, Secretary of Defense Johnson had ordered the designation at each foreign station of a "Senior Military Attache" to represent the National Military Establishment within the host country. This imposed system was never popular among the three Services, and, in the case of intelligence activities, it often did tend to encourage some non-responsive reporting and collection from the field. The claim was also advanced that under the new merger system the Service Attache Offices were fast becoming too complicated and unwieldy from an administrative standpoint. That particular allegation, though, ^{seemed} ~~was~~ open to serious question. Nevertheless, actions were initiated during February 1951, which finally led to the applicable Department of Defense order being rescinded and, effective 26 July 1951, the Army Attaches were once more permitted to reassume their own Service designation.

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* See: File, G-2, 350.09, Feb-Jul 51 (31 Dec 48), ACSI Rec Sec.

The fact that Secretary Pace continued to remain greatly interested in the military intelligence function became clearly evident on 12 October 1951, when he addressed a note to the Vice Chief of Staff describing his grave concern over the vital role it would have to play in connection with the planned tactical use of atomic weapons. He felt

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that more emphasis should be given to assisting the Army intelligence effort and suggested such emphasis might "come from added appropriations, better selection of personnel, and, possibly, promotion of personnel." * One result of his note was a directive from ~~higher authority~~ *the Chief of Staff*

* Memo (S), Sec Gen Staff to G-2, 15 Oct 51, G-2 350.096 (15 Oct 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

for the Training Branch, OACofS G-2, D/A, to make a full scale study of the subject. Upon completion, this study presented a principal conclusion that the current Army intelligence methods and procedures were "adequate to permit efficient tactical use of atomic weapons" but further work would be needed to fulfil future requirements for qualified intelligence specialists and to develop a satisfactory training program for insuring intelligence success within this untried field. * Three days

* SS (S), G-2 to C/S and S/A, 26 Nov 51, G-2 350.096, 26 Nov 51 (15 Oct 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

later, General Bolling also forwarded a list directly to Secretary Pace spelling out the positive steps that he had recently taken to improve the adverse Army intelligence situation, as follows:

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a. All G2 personnel have been directed to stress the improvement of intelligence operations in lectures to Service School students.

b. A recommendation to the Chief of Staff has been prepared that a Military Intelligence Reserve Officers Training Corps Unit be established. This study was forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 for coordination.

c. A staff study is under preparation recommending the reestablishment of a Military Intelligence Training Center in an effort to meet the expanded requirements for intelligence specialists.

d. A study was requested of the Army War College on the advisability of establishing an Armed Forces Intelligence College. A study is being prepared in the Office of G2 reviewing intelligence training in the Army School System, including the Strategic Intelligence School and the advisability of establishing an Armed Forces Intelligence College.

e. Based upon Korean experiences, Branch Schools are emphasizing combat intelligence training in their curriculum.

f. A study which recommends expansion of the intelligence specialist training program was implemented by a directive from the Chief of Staff entitled "Procurement of Intelligence Specialist Personnel" and is now in committee. G1, G2, G3, and TAG are participating in this study.

g. A recommendation is being forwarded by G2 to the Chief of Staff that the Intelligence Section, Special Assignments Branch, Career Management Division, TAG, be transferred to G2. The present status of this recommendation is that it is being processed through General Staff coordination and is waiting for a formal reply from G1.

h. A memorandum has been forwarded to the Chief of Staff from G2 requesting that G2 be given a modified Schedule "A" authority to insure an intelligence career plan for civilians.

i. G2 has recommended that a percentage of the graduates from the U. S. Military Academy and senior ROTC units should be encouraged to apply for intelligence specialization. A proposed letter to this effect has been forwarded from G2 for the consideration of G1.

j. In accordance with letter from the Secretary of the Army to the Chief of Staff, dated 7 November 1951, subject: "Research and Development Organization" and the instructions of the Chief of Staff to the Comptroller of the Army, a Research and Development Section is being organized in the Office of the G2." *

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* Memo (C), G-2 to S/A, 29 Nov 51, G-2 350.09, 29 Nov 51 (6 Nov 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA. Mr. Pace wrote on this memo that it seemed "like a splendid program."

Early in March 1952, the Department of Defense finally issued a new regulation which had the main effect of making each Service again individually responsible for the entire conduct of its own attache system. While certain joint communications and fiscal operations were still authorized, especially for the Army and Air Force, they could now only be established on the basis of an approved mutual agreement. Voluntary inter-Service coordination measures were also strongly encouraged for the express purpose of providing closer cooperation and preventing duplication of intelligence collection effort both in Washington and the field. By 1 October 1952, the Army Attache system thus came to include a total of 67 foreign stations and consisted of 169 officers, 43 warrant officers, 173 enlisted men, 104 American civilians and 257 alien civilians. At the same time, the intelligence production officials concerned remained in general agreement that approximately 75% of the useful intelligence information for the Department of the Army currently stemmed from the activities of this extensive attache system.

* "The Army Attache System," 1 Oct 52, G-2, O41.221, 1 Oct 52 (27 Dec 43), p. 2. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

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It becomes plainly apparent, therefore, that the departmental intelligence agency of the Army was far from ready at the start of the Korean Conflict period to function effectively in support of major combat. Its operations had been severely handicapped during the preceding period by a rigorous defense economy drive and there was insufficient time available to readjust the national intelligence effort properly following the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Steps were immediately taken to improve the agency performance in all categories of activity but, as usual, it was practically impossible to procure qualified personnel to carry out any satisfactory expansion program without considerable delay. Although favorable progress could be promptly reported in many instances, some badly needed improvements continued to remain essentially unfulfilled even two years after the sudden opening of hostilities.

Meanwhile, with most of these post-invasion intelligence changes just beginning to get under way within the OACofS G-2, D/A, military events had been moving at an extremely rapid rate throughout the combat zone. First there was the brilliantly successful amphibious landing executed behind the enemy forward lines during mid-September at Inchon and then the abrupt Red Chinese military intervention which occurred late in October 1950 and served to alter the entire character of the Korean Conflict. Because this latter event not only held some very important intelligence implications of its own but also stirred

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up a new wave of criticism against the Army intelligence effort, it now becomes desirable to analyze separately a number of its more significant features from the standpoint of the operations of the departmental military intelligence agency.

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CHAPTER V

CCF INTERVENTION

In analyzing the Army intelligence performance relative to properly anticipating the entry of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) into the Korean Conflict during mid-October 1950, it first seems appropriate to point out that the departmental military intelligence officials had never been under any illusions as to the true nature of the ultimate Red Chinese aims within Asia. This becomes clearly apparent from the conclusions that were reached in a major study of the Chinese Communist movement which was completed by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the Military Intelligence Division (MID), WDGS, in July 1945, just prior to VJ Day. These conclusions showed beyond any question that the MIS (MID) officials were even then fully aware the Chinese Communist movement formed an integral part of the international Communist conspiracy under guidance from Moscow. The Red Chinese leaders, therefore, were much more than just agrarian reformers and the so-called "democracy" they were trying to establish in China did not differ materially from its Soviet counterpart in Russia.*

* See: Hearings, "Military Situation in the Far East (MacArthur)," before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 1st sess., Part 3, pp. 2268-75. Hereafter

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cited as: MacArthur Hearings. The document actually introduced at these hearings was not the complete MIS study (See: Project 1199A, vol. I & II. WW II Rec Div, GSA.) but only a brief summarization of it that had been previously submitted to Congressman Walter A. Judd by Brig Gen Paul E. Peabody, Chief of MIS, under whose personal direction the original study was made. There is, however, no essential difference in the thoughts or conclusions expressed by the two documents.

During the Cold War period between VJ Day and Korea, the Army intelligence officials had found no reason to alter their realistic appraisal that the Red Chinese were pursuing a fixed policy of seeking in every possible way to extend Communist control throughout Asia. With particular reference to Korea, they knew that elements of the Korean Volunteer Corps of the CCF had been returned to North Korea from Yanan in November 1945 and the Communist Chinese officials had then promptly started to enlist Koreans residing within the border provinces of Manchuria into a Volunteer Corps for the future "liberation" of Korea. The nearly 50,000 Koreans who eventually did join this Korean Volunteer Corps not only played an important role in the subsequent Red Chinese conquest of Manchuria but also, because of their lengthy combat experience, soon came to represent a very capable and well-armed ground force available for further Communist duty in the Far East whenever needed.*

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* See: Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study of a Soviet Satellite (C), op. cit., pp. 117-20.

In July 1949, the Chinese Communists delivered two divisions of the Korean Volunteer Corps, currently called the 164th and 166th Divisions of the CCF, to staging areas in North Korea just across the Yalu River from southwest Manchuria. These divisions were shortly redesignated as the N. K. 5th and 6th Divisions, given Russian in place of U. S. Army equipment, and assigned a full complement of Korean commanders, ^{along their} with Soviet advisers. This initial shipment of Korean troops from Red China was then followed by another one in April 1950, so that by early June 1950 there were at least 40,000 members of the former Korean Volunteer Corps in North Korea standing ready to comprise approximately one-third of the assault troops needed for the N. K. Peoples Army to launch its sudden invasion of South Korea, on 25 June 1950 (Korean time). *

* Ibid., p. 120.

Despite the comparatively accurate knowledge held by the departmental military intelligence agency in Washington regarding the CCF elements ^{that} ~~which~~ were already integrated into the N. K. Peoples Army, there was an admitted lack of similar Order of Battle information at

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invasion time about the CCF units still remaining located across the border to the north. Both the OACofS G-2, D/A, and G-2 FECOM officials were fully aware of the dire necessity for obtaining such information without further delay but the invasion itself unfortunately served to render this task much more difficult of accomplishment. The early enemy advances not only destroyed all the existing FECOM intelligence nets in Korea but also the formal directive issued to CINCFE, on 29 June 1950, contained an added precaution for him "to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the Manchurian and Soviet borders." * With practically no ground

* MacArthur Hearings, Part 5, p. 3192. See also: Truman, op. cit., p. 341.

nets functioning and this MacArthur command restriction preventing any effective air or naval reconnaissance across the Yalu, the Army intelligence officials were forced to rely almost entirely upon outside sources for their needed information concerning changes in strength and disposition of the CCF.

On 3 July 1950, as part of its daily Intelligence Summary, G-2 FECOM presented an "Order of Battle of Chinese Communist Regular Ground Forces in Manchuria" which covered the following major units:

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1st Cavalry Division
2d Cavalry Division
38th Army
39th Army
56th Army
70th Army

Tsitsihar Area
Wangyehmiao Area
Changchun Area
Mukden Area
Chinh sien Area
Chengte Area *

* Special File (S), "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korean War," Part I, Tab A, p. 7. AGSI Rec Sec. Hereafter cited as: "Chinese Intervention File" (S). The strength of these CCF Armies was usually regarded as being about 30,000 but they could vary considerably both above and below that round figure on an individual basis. Likewise, although most of them were composed of three infantry divisions, some had only two and a few of ~~them~~ actually had four such divisions.

The very next day, another FECOM Intelligence Summary included a most interesting report on ~~this~~ ^{the} same subject, ^{that had been} recently received from the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of National Defense through a source in Tokyo who "should be considered with reserve pending further information." It read, as follows:

a. Former CCF Koreans Returned to North Korea: Of the 145,000 North Korean troops, formerly a part of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) 50,000 have been returned to North Korea since 1948. These troops consisted mostly of artillery and armored force personnel. During the past month, the Chinese Communists have sent 200,000 CCF troops, mostly Koreans, via Manchuria to North Korea. An additional 50,000 Koreans, formerly under the command of General LIN Piao, have been moved from South China to Manchuria.

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b. Additional Troops in Manchuria: Chinese Nationalist sources also report that in addition to the Communist forces carried in Manchuria in Intelligence Summary 2854, there is a self-contained artillery corps along the Manchuria-North Korea border, and that General LIN Piao's 55th and 57th Armies are in Manchuria. Also reported in Manchuria are 374,000 militia personnel which are reportedly being sent to the USSR to be reequipped and regrouped. *

* Ibid.

This early indication that General (later Marshal and Red Chinese Defense Minister) Lin Piao and elements of his crack CCF Fourth Field Army were already in the process of moving into Manchuria from South China was promptly followed by a large number of other reports, *but* often conflicting and of low evaluation, along similar lines. As a matter of fact, CIA had recently informed G-2 FECOM of a report from Tientsin stating that the Soviets had ordered the Chinese Communists to dispatch 200,000 troops to North Korea and it was even considered possible the 38th and 39th Armies of the Fourth Field Army, currently being carried by FECOM within the Changchun and Mukden areas respectively, were *actually* en route to Korea. Both G-2 D/A and G-2 FECOM also kept receiving reports from a wide variety of sources that the Red Chinese leaders had held a conference in Peiping during the latter part of July for the express purpose of discussing future military strategy in eastern Asia. At this conference, which was presided over by Mao Tse-tung himself and attended by Premier Chou En-lai, Commander-in-Chief of the Peoples Lib-

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eration Army Chu Teh, Commander of the Third Field Army General Chen Yi and General Lin Piao, it had ~~been~~ ^{apparently been} presumably settled that the CCF should "resist U. S. invasion of Korea, support the North Korean war effort and concentrate Chinese Communist forces on the North Korean border in order to deal with any emergency."^{*}

* "Chinese Intervention File" (S), Part III, pp. 3-4. A later report placed Molotov in Peiping at the time of this high level conference.

Throughout July and August 1950, the departmental intelligence agency of the Army continued to receive a mass of second and third hand reports from many different sources to the effect that additional CCF elements were being moved into Manchuria from South China. The evidence in support of this large-scale troop concentration finally became so convincing that toward the end of August G-2 FECOM commenced to list the 40th, 66th and 67th Armies, along with six other CCF Armies, within its "Order of Battle of Chinese Communist Regular Ground Forces in Manchuria."^{*} It was then estimated that the total

* Ibid.

CCF ground strength in Manchuria had reached 246,000 and the expanded force was

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Organized, as follows:

38 A (4FA)(a)	Changchun Area
66th Army	Yenchi-Tunghua Area
39th A (4FA)(a)	Mukden Area
83 Armored Div(b)	Mukden Area
87 Armored Div(b)	Mukden Area
161 Field Artillery Div	Mukden Area
6th Artillery Div	Mukden Area
40th Army (15 AG)(c)	Antung Area
56th Army	Antung Area
57th Army	Antung Area
70th Army	Chengte Area
1st Cav Div(e)	Unlocated
2nd Cav Div(e)	Unlocated
55th Army (d)	Unlocated
67th Army	Unlocated

- (a) Elements of these Armies have been reported still in Kwangsi Province moving toward Canton.
- (b) Strength unknown. Identification tentative; these units may possibly be the armored or artillery corps previously reported.
- (c) Tentative location.
- (d) Possibly Antung Area.
- (e) Reported as being along the Korean border. *

* Ibid., Part I, p. 33. ^{listed CCF} The 9_A Armies were believed to contain about 31 Infantry Divisions.

(S) Even though the Order of Battle ~~being~~ carried by the OACofS G-2, D/A, relative to CCF ground troop dispositions in Manchuria was ^{being} steadily revised upward during this same period, it continued to remain far more conservative and much less definite than its counterpart in G-2 FECOM. On 15 September 1950, for example, just prior to the scheduled Inchon landing, the ID Weekly Intelligence Report presented the following notably uncertain estimate:

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The estimated Chinese Communist Field Force disposition has been changed to include three armies and one miscellaneous unit in Manchuria, with a fourth army carried in that region with a query.

The change is predicated on the following: (a) Acceptance of the existence in Manchuria of the Fifty-fifth, Fifty-sixth, and Fifty-seventh Armies, believed to have been formed from Manchurian Military District troops already in the region; (b) the transfer, last April, of a miscellaneous cavalry unit, with an estimated strength of 3,000, to Manchuria from Central China; and (c) the reported movement of elements of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army to Manchuria from South China. The units and actual strength involved in the last-mentioned movement are unknown, but may have included the Fortieth Army.

The strength of the 3 recently accepted armies is estimated at 20,000 each. Consequently, the over-all Field Force strength has been increased by 60,000, and a corresponding reduction has been made in the Manchurian and over-all Military District troop strength estimate. The 60,000 troops of these 3 Armies, plus 22,000 troops of the Fortieth Army (?) and the 3,000 troops of the miscellaneous cavalry unit, account for the indicated 85,000 Field Force troops in Manchuria. *

* Ibid., Part II, pp. 414-15.

Regardless of ~~these~~^{the} discrepancies, ~~between~~^{existing} ~~the~~^{the} G-2 D/A and G-2 FECOM Order of Battle on CCF units in Manchuria during September 1950, however, it was now clearly evident to all concerned that the Red Chinese were perfectly capable of intervening in the Korean Conflict with a powerful ground force whenever they chose to do so. Furthermore, since the forward elements of this ground force were already favorably disposed along the Yalu River in the Antung, Yenchi and Tunghua areas, that intervention could be accomplished within a few hours after the ap-

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appropriate orders had been issued to start it. The principal problem confronting the American military intelligence authorities following the successful Inchon landing, therefore, was not so much to determine the CCF capabilities for intervention but to be able to give suitable advance warning that the Communist Chinese leaders had decided to adopt such a course of action utilizing the capabilities they admittedly ~~already~~ possessed. This was an entirely different matter from pursuing the chimera of trying to deduce specific Red Chinese intentions or to read the enemy commander's mind but it was still a most difficult task to perform because the CCF units involved enjoyed an unwonted immunity from air observation just across the Yalu River while they stood poised and ready for almost immediate commitment as desired.

There were two principal methods of approach available to the American intelligence officials in seeking to collect timely information on any Red Chinese decision to intervene in Korea but neither of them gave much promise of being especially rewarding under the existing circumstances. The first of these methods called for exploiting every possible friendly source throughout the world in the hope of receiving some authoritative or truly reliable report that such a decision had been reached by the Communist leaders themselves. One trouble with this method was that the Communists undoubtedly would, as usual, introduce a continual stream of conflicting reports on the subject into their regular intelligence channels for the deliberate purpose of concealing the real decision if and when it might happen to be made.

The second method of providing an effective warning of large scale

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Chinese Communist intervention in Korea was to establish a close watch ^{over} of the critical Manchurian area across the Yalu River for the purpose of noting troop, supply, or other movements which might ^{tend to} indicate that the decision had been made and was actually in the process of being implemented. Based primarily upon air-photo reconnaissance but supplemented by undercover ground observation wherever possible, this would ordinarily be the most dependable of the two available methods from the military intelligence standpoint. As previously described, however, CINCFE was not permitted to authorize any air flights near either Red Chinese or U.S.S.R. territory and his ground intelligence nets were still suffering from the ravages of the initial North Korean attack. To make matters worse, on 27 September 1950, after the Inchon landing, he received a new directive from the JCS cautioning that "his forces would not cross the Soviet or Manchurian borders under any circumstances, that only Korean ground force units would be used in the northeast province bordering the Soviet Union and the area along the Manchurian border, and that support of U. S. operations north or south of the 38th parallel would not include air or naval action against Manchurian or Soviet territory." ^{*} The chances of G-2 FECOM obtaining any promptly revealing in-

* MacArthur Hearings, Part 5, p. 3193. Quoted from a letter sent to Chairman Russell by Sec/Def Marshall, on 23 May 51, which had ^{slightly} been paraphrased for security. The actual message was ^{to} CINCFE from JCS (TS) CM 92801, 272240Z.

formation on CCF troop movements beyond the Yalu River thus became even more severely limited than ^{ever} before.

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Starting practically from scratch because of the disintegration resulting from the early progress of the Communist invasion, General Willoughby had taken immediate steps to reestablish a productive military intelligence effort in support of ^{the} contemplated UN counteroffensive moves in South Korea. The obstacles facing him in this vital endeavor, though, were formidable to say the least. It was not just simply a matter of dispatching a group of friendly Koreans behind the enemy lines with instructions for them to report back whatever they might happen to see but, in contrast, each prospective agent had first to be most carefully screened and then intensively trained in his or her specialized intelligence task. This training effort soon ran into serious language and educational difficulties, especially when it sought to cover radio communications and the use of codes. Even the act of getting the agents safely installed within their respective observation posts proved to be an exceedingly involved and time consuming process, as it called for furnishing them all with proper identification papers which could satisfy the strict demands of the North Korean personnel security system. The Far East Command Liaison Group (FECIG) in Tokyo, therefore, successor to the ^{earlier} ~~previously~~ described JSOB, was unable to organize a really substantial covert intelligence net until the combat lines had commenced to stabilize following the CCF intervention. Nevertheless, several outstanding individual feats of a military intelligence nature were achieved prior to that time, with Maj. (later Col.) Stephen A. B. Norberg, AUS, and Lt. Eugene F. Clark, USNR, both accomplishing invaluable reconnaissance missions into enemy-

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held territory just before and right after the Inchon landing. *

* For detailed accounts of Maj Norberg's and Lt Clark's remarkable exploits, see: File AG 201 (C), Stephen A. B. Norberg, WW II Rec Div, GSA, and Capt Karig, Cmdr Cagle and Lt Cmdr Manson, op. cit., pp. 347-52.

A Joint Intelligence Indications Committee (JIIC) had been formed in Washington, effective 8 August 1950, to function under the JIC of the JCS. * Directly representing the departmental intelligence agencies

* DF (S), G-2 to TAG, G-2 334, 16 Oct 50 (21 Jun 49). WW II Rec Div, GSA. This committee was accepted by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), on 7 Dec 50, as being the only "Watch Committee" for the U. S. Government. Shortly thereafter, it was also given formal terms of reference in order to guide its assigned warning activities.

of the Army, Navy, and Air Force but also participated in regularly by CIA, the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) of the State Department, and several other intelligence elements of the United States Government, the mission assigned to this key warning committee was "to analyze and report indications of Soviet Communist intentions of hostile action."

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At the end of August 1950, it could thus officially sum up the current status of the CCF intervention question in a periodic Joint Intelligence Summary (JINTSUM) by declaring that: "There are indications of air and ground buildup by Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria but no indication as to whether for offensive or defensive purpose." *

* "Chinese Intervention File" (S), Part III, p. 6.

The successful landing at Inchon during mid-September 1950, naturally served to focus the principal attention of all American intelligence agencies on attempting to determine whether or not the Red Chinese would now choose to intervene openly in the Korean Conflict. With the speeches of the Communist leaders growing daily more and more belligerent in tone, the U. S. State Department concluded arrangements for India's Ambassador in Peiping, Dr. Sardar M. Pannikar, to contact Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and try to find an authoritative answer to this crucial question. * Accordingly, on 25 Septem-

* Possessing no direct means of diplomatic communication with Red China, the U. S. Government had been utilizing the Indian Government as a go-between for that purpose both in Peiping and New Delhi. Amb Pannikar, being a pronounced Red sympathizer himself and apparently

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enjoying Chou En-lai's full confidence, was considered to be the most likely person to obtain reliable information in this ^{sensitive} particular matter.

ber 1950, the ACoS G-2, D/A, reported to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans that Ambassador Pannikar, after his conversations, felt "in the circumstances, direct participation of China in the Korean fighting seems beyond the range of possibility, unless a world war starts as the result of UN Forces passing beyond the 38th Parallel and the Soviet Union deciding to intervene directly." He had ~~even~~ ^{then} gone so far as to conclude personally that "Communist China by herself will not intervene in the conflict and attempt to pull others' chestnuts out of the fire." * The State Department, though, because of security reasons,

* Memo (S), G-2 to DC/S Plans, G-2 000.244 China, 25 Sep 50.
ACSI Rec Sec.

refused to release the full text of the first Pannikar interviews with Chou En-lai to the JIIC or ^{even} allow a cable report about them to be sent to CINCFE. *

* "Chinese Intervention File" (S), Part III, p. 10.

On or about 27 September, just when the JCS was in the process of authorizing General MacArthur to engage in military operations north

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of the 38th Parallel "provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter air operations militarily in North Korea," Ambassador Pannikar held another conversation with Chou En-lai which convinced him that Red Chinese intervention in Korea "had become much more probable." Because of this and several very menacing speeches attributed directly to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai themselves, it was finally agreed at the highest level that the Chinese Communist intervention threat was now an extremely dangerous one. The State Department, therefore, on 3 October 1950, forwarded a carefully worded message to the Department of the Army advising that Chou En-lai had informed Ambassador Pannikar if UN forces, other than South Korean, crossed the 38th Parallel, his country would send troops across the frontier to participate in the defense of North Korea. This report was then promptly relayed to CINCPAC and its substance appeared in the FECOM Intelligence Summary the next day.*

* Ibid., pp. 8-9. Units of the ROK Capitol and 2d Divisions actually crossed the 38th Parallel near the east coast on 1 Oct 50 (Korean time). See: "Korean Chronology" (S), op. cit., p. 60.

The OACofS G-2, D/A, weekly Intelligence Summary, on 29 September 1950, had featured a recent report received from the U. S. Consul Gen-

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eral, Hong Kong, which claimed strong evidence "that the Communists may not invade Formosa this year and aid to North Korea will be limited to token support in the form of food and medical supplies." The same report, though, took further note that "sufficient Communist troop strength already is located in the adjacent areas of Manchuria and Southwest China, respectively, to augment the North Korean People's Army and the Viet Minh forces without the discernible movement of additional troops into these regions." * Concurrently, G-2 D/A issued a

* "Chinese Intervention File" (S), Part II, pp. 415-16.

formal estimate of probable Soviet courses of action ^{for North} ~~with reference to~~ Korea in the immediate future, if the UN forces either secured all of Korea south of the 38th Parallel or undertook ground operations north of the 38th Parallel. In the latter case, this estimate presented the following ^{noticeably} extremely devious set of conclusions:

a. Assuming that the Soviets are not yet willing to run the risk of a global war, the U.S.S.R. would probably not move troops into North Korea in the face of advancing U. S. forces. As in Iran and Greece, they would probably retire, ostensibly, from a venture which had not been participated in directly by Soviet forces. They would make every effort to secure a cessation of hostilities through the U. N. in order to restore the status quo prevailing in Korea upon the Japanese surrender in 1945.

b. Since the Korean campaign is causing the Soviets neither loss in Soviet manpower nor redistribution of their forces, they can be expected to continue hostilities as long as it will force further economic drains on the U. S. in an unremunerative area in the Far East.

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c. To continue the hostilities, the Soviet would accelerate support of the North Korean forces to prolong the involvement of the United States in a costly guerrilla struggle in a primitive country with inferior communications and extremely cold winter weather.

d. Intensified and continuous guerrilla action with Soviet support could be expected even though the North Koreans were defeated and U. S. forces occupy all or most of North Korea.

e. From the Soviet point of view it is obviously desirable for the Chinese Communists to become embroiled in North Korea, and they would exert the utmost pressure to force and/or to persuade them to intervene. There is no information available to forecast with certainty that the Soviets could succeed in winning complete Chinese Communist assistance and/or intervention in Korea. This course of action is considered less probable than those given above. The quid pro quo offered by the Soviets would undoubtedly be in the form of economic assistance to the Chinese Communists which they badly require. *

* Ibid., pp. 493-94.

Although the Washington intelligence officials still remained stubbornly reluctant to recognize that any firm indications of Chinese Communist preparations to intervene in the Korean Conflict had yet appeared, ^{*} the critical period for finding a positive answer to

* See: Ibid., p. 267.

this all-important question was quite obviously ^{now!} close at hand. The cabled JINTSUM, dated 5 October 1950, thus included a specific warning from the JIIC

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that "Chinese Communist capabilities for overt military intervention in Korea have materially increased with deployment of experienced combat forces to Manchuria." This forthright warning was tempered considerably, however, by a qualifying statement that "Communist threats to intervene if any UN forces other than South Korean cross the 38th Parallel do not clearly point to such intention as statements may be designed primarily to deter UN action north of Parallel." On the other hand, the FECOM Intelligence Summary published the very same day, in discussing an "enemy capability of reinforcement by the Chinese Communists," not only called special attention to the fact that the potential massing of CCF troops under Lin Piao at Manchurian crossings in Korea was now "conclusive" but also informed that ~~the~~ *his force* could comprise "a possible 9/18 Divisions organized into 3/6 Armies of the total strength of 38 Divisions and 9 Armies carried in all of Manchuria."^{*}

* Ibid., Part III, pp. 9-13.

On 9 October 1950, just one week before the memorable meeting of President Truman and General MacArthur on Wake Island, the JCS forwarded the following amplification of previous instructions to CINCFE "in light of the possible intervention of Chinese Communist forces in North Korea:"

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Hereafter in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory. *

* Ibid., p. 14. See also: Truman, op. cit., p. 362.

(u) CINCPAC, of course, did not receive this important message from the JCS until 10 October 1950 (Korean time). By then the die was already clearly cast, with General MacArthur having issued his second surrender ultimatum to the "Premier, North Korean Government" and ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to cross the 38th Parallel north of Kaesong at 1000 the previous day. * Since the chances of CCF ^{intervention} ~~inter-~~

* "Korean Chronology" (S), op. cit., pp. 62-63. Gen. MacArthur's initial surrender ultimatum was addressed to the "Commander-in-Chief, North Korean Forces" and issued from Seoul on 1 Oct 50 (Korean time). In connection with the second ultimatum, elements of the 1st Cav Div deliberately beat the gun by about four hours and crossed the 38th Parallel at dawn. Having been first in Manila and first in Tokyo during World War II, ^{also} ~~the personnel of~~ that Div. wanted to be first in Pyongyang which lay some 80 miles to the north.

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were thus greatly enhanced, the JIIC held an emergency meeting in Washington, on 11 October 1950, and reported that it was still "impossible to determine conclusively whether the Chinese Communists will exercise their substantial capabilities to intervene in Korea, although the movement of veteran combat troops to Manchuria and reiterated threats of intervention continue to indicate the possibility of such action." Also, there seemed to be "every indication North Koreans intend to continue the struggle, and it is possible the Soviet and Chinese Communist decision on intervention hinges on future military developments." The following day, CIA prepared a formal estimate for the President on the "Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," which ~~had been~~ concurred in by the Department of State, Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence agencies, ^{which} It declared that:

While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950. During this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans. *

* "Chinese Intervention File" (S), Part III, p. 15. A copy of this estimate was sent to CINCFE.

(S) G-2 D/A received another pointed report bearing upon the CCF intervention question in mid-October, although the best local evaluation that could be given to it at the time of its submission was F-3 (reliability cannot be judged - possibly true). On 18 October 1950,

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the U. S. Military Liaison Officer in Hong Kong cabled certain information which had been relayed to him from a Mr. C. L. Chen, defected President of the Chinese Central Air Transport Corporation, that the Red Chinese Government had unexpectedly called an urgent air operations conference in Peking. His (Chen's) representative during this conference was able to learn reliably that the Communists had decided to undertake military action in North Korea and had moved 400,000 troops to the border area. These troops were alerted to cross the Yalu the night of either the 18th or 20th of October. ^{With} ~~Since~~ prisoner of war interrogations later ^{revealing} ~~revealed~~ that the border crossing actually commenced as early as the night of 13-14 October 1950 and was in full swing by 18-19 October, this Hong Kong report was really not very far off the true mark. * Of further interest, is the fact that the CCF intervention was

* Ibid., Part II, p. 322 and Part III, p. 16. It is possible that some CCF troops crossed the Yalu even before the night of 13-14 Oct 50. See: Appleman, op. cit., p. 766.

already ^{actual} in progress when President Truman and General MacArthur were discussing future Korean strategy together at Wake Island, on 15 October 1950.

U\ G-2 FECOM's reaction to this disturbing report from Hong Kong was mainly to point out that recent public statements by Chou En-lai and

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other Red Chinese leaders had "intimated the possibility of Communist China intervening in the Korean War." The FECOM Intelligence Summary of 20 October 1950, though, announced that the CCF deployment along the border was now an accomplished fact while the matter of finding out whether the Red Chinese would decide to cross the border did not come under the purview of theater intelligence but depended more upon the "readiness of the Kremlin to go to war." Nevertheless, the UN Command had started to take additional precautionary measures by conducting daily air reconnaissance flights over all avenues of approach to the south from the river. No positive movements, however, "except intermittent though large-scale truck convoys" had so far been picked up through these flights.*

* Ibid., Part III, pp. 16-17.

While contact between the UN and CCF forces may well have occurred prior to 26 October 1950 (Korean time), it was on that particular date that the first Red Chinese POW was actually captured by the ROK I Corps south of the Chosin Reservoir. Shortly afterwards, the ROK 1st Division near Unsan and the ROK 6th Division near Unjong, both operating in the Eighth Army zone, also reported capturing POW's from the CCF. The FECOM Intelligence Summary of 1 November 1950, therefore, when the total number of confirmed CCF POW's had reached eleven,* tentatively accepted the 124th CCF Division as being opposite

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* "Korean Chronology" (S), op. cit., pp. 68-70.

the U. S. X Corps in the east and noted that two other CCF Divisions were "most likely" operating within the Eighth Army Area." Finally, in another FECOM Intelligence Summary issued just two days later, it was acknowledged that: "Although there is no concrete evidence of plans for large-scale employment of CCF forces in the Korean War, this possibility must be considered as an active capability." *

* "Chinese Intervention File (S), Part III, p. 17.

Whether or not the Chinese Communists might choose to intervene in the Korean Conflict was now no longer a debatable question and the military intelligence problem had plainly become one of determining the full extent of such intervention. While there was still a marked tendency both in Washington and the field to discount the probability of any ^{major} large-scale CCF commitment across the Yalu, the capability of Red Chinese leaders to do so without any preliminary warning had been readily recognized for some time. In view of this, on 6 November 1950, CIA presented a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to the NSC, formally concurred in by the intelligence agencies of the Departments of

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State, Army, Navy and Air Force, covering "the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea and Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions." It proceeded to point out that the Red Chinese leaders not only possessed complete freedom of action for reinforcing their troops in Korea but also they appeared strongly determined to:

- (a) Avert the psychological and political consequences of a disastrous outcome of the Korean venture.
- (b) Keep UN forces away from the actual frontiers of China and the USSR.
- (c) Retain an area in Korea as a base of Communist military and guerrilla operations.
- (d) Prolong indefinitely the containment of UN, especially US, forces in Korea.
- (e) Control the distribution of hydro-electric power generated in North Korea and retain other economic benefits.
- (f) Create the possibility of a favorable political situation in Korea, despite the military defeat of the North Koreans. *

* NIE Number 2 (S), 6 Nov 50. Int Doc Library, ACSI.

Looking back, it does seem to be almost unbelievable that the compelling nature of these easily ^{derived} ~~derivable~~ basic Red Chinese objectives in North Korea was ever in serious doubt. Since the Communist leaders patently held the military capability of intervening therein with an overwhelming force, at least numerically, even before the UN troops crossed the 38th Parallel during early October 1950, the fact that they would decide to meet this new threat with a powerful counteroffensive cer-

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tainly should have occasioned very little surprise. It was not until 16 November 1950, though, that the JIIC announced "The increase in Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria and Northeast China, the widespread Chinese defensive measures, and the nature of Chinese Communist propaganda indicate the definite possibility of major Chinese Communist intervention in Korea." * By this time, G-2 FECOM had raised

* "Chinese Intervention File" (S), Part III, p. 26.

its current estimate of total regular CCF troops in Manchuria to 415,000 and could report that elements of all twelve recognized divisions of the 38th, 39th, 40th and 42d CCF Armies were present in Korea. Moreover, a considerable number of hints and rumors were being received that CCF Third Field Army units had already started to arrive in Manchuria for Korean commitment. *

* Ibid., pp. 23-24 and 27.

The question of CCF intervention in Korea was conclusively settled during the week ending 28 November 1950. Communist penetrations were then not only actually threatening the Eighth Army's forward positions but also had succeeded in opening a gap of some 30 miles between its

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right flank and the left boundary of the U.S. X Corps which was operating independently to the east. * *These assuredly* there were ~~these~~ firm indications

* Ibid., Part I, pp. 167-70 and Part II, pp. 436-37.

that the CCF had been committed in full force in North Korea, so CINCFE officially notified Washington that his UN forces were now on the de-
* **** fensive and confronted with "an entirely new War."

* "Korean Chronology" (S), p. 80.

** MacArthur Hearings, Appendix PP, p. 3364.

From the military intelligence standpoint, therefore, the CCF intervention question was really divided into two different phases. The original problem had been to find out whether or not the Red Chinese leaders would decide to intervene openly in Korea at all and then, if the answer to that question was in the affirmative, to determine the true extent of such intervention. With reference to the first matter, *an* analysis of the actual performance of the OACofS G-2, D/A, appears to support the following specific conclusions:

1. The agency was aptly aware right from the start of the aggressive Red Chinese aim to assist in every way possible the spread of Communist control throughout Asia.

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2. Despite the virtually complete destruction of its existing ground intelligence nets by the sudden North Korean invasion and the fact that the UN forces were not permitted to make any reconnaissance flights over Manchurian or Soviet territory, the agency did manage to keep reasonably well informed about the rapid preliminary CCF buildup and deployment across the Yalu River, which included major elements of General Lin Piao's battle-tested Fourth Field Army.

3. At the time of the successful UN landing at Inchon during mid-September, the departmental military intelligence agency was able to join FECOM in flatly declaring that the Red Chinese were capable of intervening in the Korean Conflict within a few hours with a powerful ground force whenever they chose to do so.

4. Since it was not enough to warn against this recognized CCF capability, the agency promptly sought to obtain additional information which might ^{tend to} indicate that the Red Chinese leaders had decided to order their threatened intervention in Korea into actual effect.

5. While several revealing reports were received by the agency before 9 October 1950 (Korean time), the date when General MacArthur issued his second surrender ultimatum to the North Korean Government, that the Communist Chinese would intervene in Korea if any UN Forces other than Korean crossed the 38th Parallel, these reports were not then considered sufficiently convincing to warrant a definite conclusion of such nature.

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6. Even in the face of ever-increasing evidence that the CCF was already in Korea in force, the agency continued to display a stubborn reluctance to believe the intervention had really taken place.

7. Finally, on 6 November 1950, the OACofS G-2, D/A, did participate and concur in the presentation of an important NIE, which served to notify the NSC members that the CCF was now definitely committed to full-scale intervention in North Korea.

The departmental intelligence agency of the Army was thus plainly slow in realizing the true extent of the CCF commitment even after the Red Chinese intervention in Korea had become initially accepted. The distinct possibility still existed then, of course, that this intervention would turn out to be only on a limited scale rather than in full force because of the grave risk it might induce another world war. Finding the answer to that particular question, though, was essentially an Order of Battle problem for solution by theater intelligence means. Unfortunately, since G-2 FECOM was never allowed to utilize all of his normally available collection means during the Korean Conflict, the theater intelligence performance in this respect could not be markedly productive. It becomes most difficult to quarrel in any significant degree, therefore, with CINCPAC's general resume of the theater intelligence situation at that time, which he forwarded to Washington on 26 December and read, in part, as follows:

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Meanwhile, every effort was made to assess enemy strength and intentions in light of this new reinforcement repeatedly and publicly declared by Chinese Communist authorities to be only on an individual volunteer basis. Political intelligence failed to penetrate the iron curtain and provided no substantial information of intent. Field intelligence was handicapped by the severest limitations. Aerial reconnaissance beyond the border, which was the normal source of field intelligence, was forbidden. Avenues of advance from border sanctuary to battle area, only a night's march, provided maximum natural concealment. No intelligence service in the world could have surmounted such handicaps to determine to any substantial degree enemy strength, movements and intentions. *

* Ibid., Part IV, Annex A, p. 3.

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CHAPTER VI
DETAILED PRODUCTION

Despite the understandable emphasis that was being placed upon direct support of the combat operations in Korea after 25 June 1950, the departmental intelligence agency of the Army could not afford to neglect in any important manner its normal coverage of all actual or potential trouble spots developing throughout the world. At the same time, the sudden Korean outbreak had created an immediate and overriding demand for a large number of handbooks, terrain studies, identification guides and instructional pamphlets of many different types to be issued to troops ^{located} in the Far East. Since this sort of basic intelligence production required the use of extremely scarce and highly specialized research personnel, some other similar program would obviously have to suffer. Early in July 1950, therefore, the ACoS G-2, D/A, notified the Army Technical Services that the preparation of "studies and/or handbooks on areas of the world where military operations are likely to occur, such as Manchuria, the Hong Kong area, French Indo-China, Singapore, Iran, Turkey and Thailand will take precedence over National Intelligence Survey (NIS) production." *

* DF (C), G-2 to Tech Services (Medical), G-2 319.25-T, 3 Jul 50.
WW II Rec Div, GSA.

With this and other expedient moves promising to assist materially

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in an intensified production effort, the Intelligence Division (ID), OACofS G-2, D/A, promptly undertook to make a hasty review and revision of the World War II "Soldiers Handbook for Korea." Extracting pertinent data from the Korean NIS and combining it with whatever more recent information happened to be available, an initial revision of this earlier publication was actually finished in time for issue to the 2d Division just before the scheduled departure of that division from the United States for the Far East during the latter part of July 1950. A regular "Korean Handbook," though, appropriately covering the geography, economics, politics, sociology, communications and armed forces of Korea, both North and South, could not be completed until September 1950. Also accomplished largely on a crash basis, were the following special production projects:

1. Since the bulk of the N. K. Peoples Army equipment was of Soviet origin, the Technical Branch, ID, rushed to prepare an intelligence pamphlet describing it in precise detail for troop use. Two hundred copies of this badly needed publication were air-shipped to Headquarters, FECOM, on 14 July 1950, with the original pamphlet being later twice revised, first in September and then again in December, 1950.

2. As soon as it had become apparent that the military command formed to oppose the North Korean invaders would represent the United Nations, the Western Branch, ID, started to produce a series of studies and articles bearing upon the

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ability of various foreign nations to contribute to such a command and the probable military effectiveness of their respective combat elements. This effort eventually led to the issuance of an informative periodic report, entitled "United Nations Action in Korea," commencing on 7 August 1950.

3. In September 1950, the Area Analysis Section of the Technical Branch, ID, completed a "Strategic Engineer Study" covering the entire projected combat area, for use by military staffs in the field. This publication was derived mainly from the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study (JANIS), Korea, which had been finished during the early Cold War period right after World War II.^{*}

* See: "History of the Department of the Army Activities Relating to Korean Conflict, 25 June 50 - 8 Sep 51," (C), op. cit., pp. 6-8.

Although readily conceding that the curtailment of NIS production in order to meet the emergency demands of Korea had been truly necessary, Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoeter, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), felt its continuance for any considerable length of time would constitute a very dangerous procedure. Late in August 1950, therefore, he addressed a letter of protest in the matter to the

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Secretary of Defense, which subsequently served to open up an exchange of correspondence on the same subject between his successor, Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Walter B. Smith, and General Marshall, the new Secretary of Defense. * Meanwhile, the Department of the Army intel-

* See: Incl (S) to Memo, Sec Def to Secs Army, Navy and Air Force, 14 Dec 50, JCS 334 CIA. Records of the JCS.

ligence officials had already taken it upon themselves to ~~try to~~^{help} obtain a personnel augmentation for the Technical Services that were engaged in NIS production, totalling 143 persons with combined salaries of \$694,778 per annum. * As usual, though, the problems inci-

* DF (S), G-2 to G-4, 1 Sep 50, G-2 319.25-T, 1 Sep 50 (13 Jun 47).
WW II Rec Div, GSA.

dent to actually procuring these personnel and then training them in their individual intelligence duties turned out to be so difficult the Secretary of Defense, in December 1950, had to notify the DCI that, even though the importance of the NIS was fully recognized, there were simply not enough qualified persons on hand to achieve the currently assigned NIS production goals. The Services, therefore, intended to reduce their planned NIS completions for FY 1951 from 15 to 8. *

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* Ltr (S), Sec Def to DCI, 14 Dec 50, JCS 334 CIA. Records of the JCS.

Personnel problems along these ^{same} lines continued to plague the Army NIS performance during the rest of the Korean Conflict period. While most of the personnel augmentation requests made by the OACofS G-2, D/A, to assist ⁱⁿ NIS production were eventually approved, including the allocation of 9 additional spaces for FY 1952 to ID itself, the Technical Services could seldom fill their authorized personnel quotas and the caliber of NIS work gradually became noticeably poorer. *

* DF (S), G-2 to Offices, Chief TC, Sig and Engr, 4-8 Oct 51, G-2 319.25-T, 4-8 Oct 51 (13 Jun 47). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

To illustrate this discouraging personnel procurement situation, ID, in March 1951, prepared a most revealing table on the subject, as follows:

Tech Serv	Authorized	Employed 8 Feb 51	Employed to date	Estimate of need to produce 15 NIS per year
Engr	92	51	80	140
Trans	18	18	18	25
Sig	15*	0	1	7
Chem	6	0	2	5
QM	2	0	2	2
Med	5	0	0	10
Ord	5	0	2	5
	<u>143</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>194</u>

* Sig original authorization of 15 was cut to 10 by their Manpower Board. *

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* "Status of Augmentation as of 14 March 1951," G-2 319.25-T, 14 Mar 51 (13 Jun 47). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

The sudden outbreak of hostilities in Korea also brought another fundamental intelligence problem promptly to the fore. Military intelligence production within the principal overseas theaters (EUCOM, FECOM, USFA and TRUST) had been severely handicapped for some time by the fact that there was no satisfactory delimitation agreement in existence between the various theater intelligence agencies and CIA over the conduct of covert activities, ^{herein} needed to insure the security of a military command. The original NSC directive in this matter (NSCID #5) had contained an "agreed activities" clause that, in effect, told the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) to get together and reach a detailed agreement on the subject but they were unable to do so. With the outbreak of the Korean Conflict posing an immediate question of exactly what intelligence support CIA should give to the commander in a theater of operations, NSCID #5 was slightly revised and reissued on 28 August 1951. It still included the same "agreed activities" clause, however, which continued to remain conspicuously unfulfilled. Hence, when Secretary Pace journeyed

* See: Incl (S) to Ltr, ACoFS G-2 to DI EUCOM, 7 Feb 52, G-2 350.09 Europe, 7 Feb 52 (8 Dec 51). ACSI Rec Sec.

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to Europe in November 1951 and requested CINCEUR to report to him about "measures to assist the EUCOM intelligence effort," Gen. Thomas T. Handy mentioned several policy problems but the "CIA problem" headed his list. * Since neither the Service members of IAC nor

* See: SS (S), G-2 to Sec Army and CofS, 29 Dec 51, G-2 350.09 Europe, 29 Dec 51 (8 Dec 51). ACSI Rec Sec.

the DCI were willing to compromise in the least on such a basic matter as responsibility for covert intelligence operations within overseas territories involving the security of a military command, no agreement was reached, despite almost day to day discussions, with reference to the "agreed activities" clause of NSCID #5 before the cessation of combat operations in Korea. *

* See: File (TS), G-2 350.066 (14 Jun 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

The sudden Korean outbreak also found the ACofS G-2, D/A, in the midst of a heated argument with the Army munitions procurement authorities about stockpiling certain strategic minerals that were considered to be in short supply within the United States. Even though it usually did require an evaluation of economic rather than purely military factors, the departmental intelligence agency officials had always insisted that they

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should produce intelligence pertaining to the "Strategic Vulnerability of the United States." Accordingly, early in June 1950, during a special strategic vulnerability briefing for the Secretary of the Army, they emphasized an immediate need to stockpile additional beryl, graphite, manganese, mica, talc and tin because the current source of supply for those particular items was being threatened by conditions developing in Southeast Asia. * This indication, which was personally

* See: SS (C), ACoFS G-2 for CoFS and Sec Army, 13 Jun 50, G-2 401.1, 13 Jun 50. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

followed up by Mr. Pace himself, served to upset the existing departmental munitions procurement plans considerably as its recommended action called for a substantial increase in stockpile expenditures over and above the "balanced program" that had already been adopted to cover such purchases. * By 3 August 1950, however, Mr. Archibald S.

* See: Memo (C), Office Under Sec Army to ACoFS G-4, 26 Jun 50, G-2 401.1, 26 Jun 50 (13 Jun 50). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

Alexander, the Under Secretary of the Army and Army representative on the national Munitions Board, was able to report to Secretary Pace that the strategic vulnerability problems recently presented were now under

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active discussion in the Munitions Board and the military factors described by the intelligence staff studies would assuredly receive ^{most} ~~here~~ careful attention in the future. *

* Memo (C), Under Sec Army, 3 Aug 50, G-2 401.1, 3 Aug 50 (13 Jun 50). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

One result of this stockpiling dispute was to foster a growing awareness among the higher authorities concerned that the production of economic intelligence for national defense purposes stood greatly in need of more effective inter-agency coordination. The IAC, though, failed to take any positive steps in that direction until 17 May 1951, when it did agree upon terms of reference for an Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) to consist of "designated representatives of those agencies charged with primary responsibility for foreign national security intelligence, i. e., the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Intelligence Agency." Duly approved by the NSC, the new EIC was then formally directed to:

- a. Arrange concerted economic intelligence support, on selected major issues, for studies of interagency interest requested by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.
- b. Arrange for the mobilization of data and analyses available, relevant to appropriate operating problems of any member agency requesting assistance, or of any other agency dealing with economic security problems, which may request assistance.
- c. Examine continuing programs of fundamental economic research relating to the national security throughout the United States Government and recommend to the IAC for appropriate action allocation of responsibility for specific fields of inquiry where such allocation appears appropriate.

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d. Review and report to the IAC from time to time, on the pertinence, extent, and quality of the data and analyses available, bearing on the issues analyzed.

e. Recommend to the IAC for appropriate action priorities and allocation of responsibilities for the collection and analysis to fill specific gaps in the economic intelligence needed for national security.

f. Maintain a continuing review of the foreign economic intelligence activities of the United States Government as they relate to the national security.

g. Make such special reviews of economic intelligence distribution and processing procedures as may appear useful and make recommendations for improvement to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, which shall have responsibility for instituting such action as it may judge appropriate.

h. Prepare coordinated reports which present the best available foreign economic intelligence. *

* Ltr (S), DCI to G-2, G-2 334 Economic Intelligence Committee, 29 Jun 51. WW II Rec Div, GSA. The initial Army representative on this EIC was Mr. John F. Kullgren from the OACofS G-2, D/A.

On 28 September 1950, the IAC furnished further important guidance to the Army production effort, by announcing a set of "critical national intelligence objectives with respect to the U.S.S.R.," in the hope that the highest priority would be "given to the collection of information and to the production of intelligence concerning Soviet capabilities and intentions for:

1. taking direct military action against the Continental United States;
2. taking direct military action, employing USSR Armed Forces, against vital U. S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Union, and Western Europe;
3. interfering with U. S. strategic air attack;
4. interfering with U. S. movement of men and material by water transport;

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5. production and stockpiling, including location of installations and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical weapons and equipment, and critical transportation equipment;

6. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to U. S. national security, short of commitment of Soviet Armed Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage objectives;

7. interfering with U. S. political, psychological, and economic courses of action for the achievement of critical U. S. aims and objectives. *

* DCI 4/2 (S), 28 Sep 50, copy in: G-2 350.09, 28 Sep 50, f/w (27 Nov 50). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

With these national intelligence objectives thus having been clearly spelled out, at least for the U.S.S.R., the next logical step was to devise a set of standard operating procedures within the Department of the Army production organization to evaluate submitted critical information at once and, if it was considered authentic, arrange for its required dissemination by the most expeditious means available. In this connection, ID had already defined an "intelligence indication" as being "evaluated information which points to a possible course of action by a foreign power." Moreover,

* Memo, ID Exec for Intelligence for Branch Chiefs, 8 Sep 50, G-2 312.7, 8 Sep 50. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

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during December 1950, an approved plan for instituting such standard operating procedures in the OACofS G-2, D/A, was given appropriate distribution throughout the Army establishment. It not only defined "critical information" as "information bearing on the initiation of hostilities between the United States and a foreign power" but also directed the recipients to prepare their own subordinate plans for handling that particular class of information without further delay. *

* See: File (C), G-2, G-2 350.09, 19 Dec 50 - 10 Jan 51 (19 Dec 47). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

The North Korean aggression had naturally brought about a marked increase in all forms of psychological warfare and other kindred activities dealing with foreign information matters. This development, in turn, soon caused the creation of a new Special Staff Division within the Department of the Army, effective 15 January 1951, which was designated as the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare. * Despite

* DA GO #1, 17 Jan 51, Sec III.

the fact that the departmental military intelligence agency had always in the past become deeply involved in psychological warfare operations, it was able for some time to avoid any direct participation in this latest effort along those lines. * On 31 October 1952, though, Brig. Gen. Brig. Gen. *Brig. Gen.*

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* See: "Informal Minutes of Special Meeting of Director and Consultants, Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization" (S), 30 Mar 51, G-2 385. Psychological, 30 Mar 51. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

(later Maj. Gen.) John M. Willems, the Deputy ACofS G-2, D/A, announced at a regular Division Chiefs meeting that there had been a definite change in policy and "G-2 would now engage in psychological warfare." * Shortly thereafter, Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Robert

* "Summary of Div Chiefs Meetings" (S), 31 Oct 52, G-2 337 G-2 Conference, 31 Oct 52 (1 Jul 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

A. McClure, the newly appointed Chief of Psychological Warfare, addressed the assembled key OACofS G-2, D/A, personnel on the subject of "Intelligence Support of Psychological Warfare Activities" and chose to stress the following principal points:

1. Psychological warfare plans and operations can be no better than the intelligence base upon which they are founded.
2. The great bulk of psychological warfare intelligence requirements express a need for hard, factual information.

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3. Special Force activities behind enemy lines can only be mounted successfully if they have had adequate intelligence support both in their planning and operational phases.*

* "Presentation by Chief of Psychological Warfare to G-2 Personnel on Intelligence Support of Psychological Warfare Activities" (S), G-2 385. Psychological-T, 5 Dec 52 (23 Oct 52), pp. 15-16 and 31. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

One of the most significant production developments that took place during the entire Korean Conflict period was the signing of a joint agreement, on 16 May 1952, by Maj. Gen. A. R. Bolling, ACofS G-2, D/A; Rear Adm. F. L. Johnson, Director of ONI, and Maj. Gen. John A. Samford, D/I, USAF, to formalize G-2 and ONI participation in the activities of the Air Intelligence Production Division (AIPD), Directorate of Intelligence, USAF.* The Army's interest in this *betated*

* File, "Army Participation in Air Force Target Intelligence," G-2 320.2, 18 Jun 52 (4 Apr 51), Tab A. WW II Rec Div, GSA. This AIPD later came to be known as the Air Force Office of Intelligence (AFOIN).

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in Air Force target intelligence production was fixed at 7 officers
and 11 civilians,^{*} although when the formal agreement was subsequently

* See: Ltr, Cabell to Bolling, 15 Dec 50, G-2 320.2, 15 Dec 50
f/w (4 Apr 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

reached, on 16 May 1952, the actual strength of the so-called Army
component of AIPD (AFOIN) was 11 officers and 5 civilians.^{*} The Navy

* File, "Army Participation in Air Force Target Intelligence,"
G-2 320.2, 18 Jun 52 (4 Apr 51), Tab C. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

in contrast, having effected a separate arrangement with the Air
Force during March 1950 in order to satisfy the requirements of its
own air arm, had 91 officers, 104 professional civilians and 56 cler-
ical enlisted men or civilians, totalling 251 persons, currently in-
tegrated within the Air Force production organization for that ~~parti-~~
^{same}
~~cular~~ purpose.^{*}

* Ibid., Tab F.

The mere signing of a joint agreement in this matter by General
Bolling, did not, of course, solve the problem of obtaining the nec-

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essary personnel space authorizations for an expanded "Army Component - AFOIN." Col. Woodson F. Hocker, G-2 head of the existing group, *

* Col Hocker's actual title then was "Army Deputy to Assistant for Production, D/I USAF."

had recommended an absolute minimum of 83 spaces (including the 19 already assigned) to accomplish the required work but that figure was subject to a series of special surveys by teams from the Staff Administrative Office, OCS, to determine suitable personnel allocations for the group in point of grades, MOS and civilian job titles. Even though these management surveys reduced its total authorized strength to 78 persons, the group still comprised 37 officers, 21 professional civilians, 13 enlisted men and 7 clerical civilians. * In the meantime, with

* SS, Staff Admin Office to CofS, 13 Aug 52, G-2 320.2, 13 Aug 52 (4 Apr 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

the component having been officially established effective 15 July 1952, it was given the following mission to perform:

1. To represent the Army views regarding the accomplishment of missions by the Strategic Air Command.
2. To insure that target intelligence is so developed as to support current War Plans.
3. To insure that adequate tactical target materials exist to enable the Air Force, Navy, and/or Allied Air Forces to support ground schemes of maneuver.

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4. To represent the Army in the formulation of studies, plans, and estimates and in the review of such papers prepared by other agencies.
5. To contribute to the production of target materials.
6. To provide technical advice and assistance in matters peculiar to the Army, such as AAA, airborne, etc.
7. To provide direct working level liaison with Army agencies in securing source materials and in developing requirements.
8. To monitor Army programs and requirements.
9. To assist in the formulation of studies to be used in generation of target systems, target selection, and for production of target material, all of which may be used in employing guided missiles and atomic artillery.*

* File "Army Participation in Air Force Target Intelligence,"

G-2 320.2, 18 Jun 52 (4 Apr 51), Tab B. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

As mentioned earlier, the pre-Korea Intelligence Division (ID), which was not only required to execute the entire production function for the OACofS G-2, D/A, but also to supervise the bulk of the agency's collection and dissemination activities, remained in being until 16 July 1951. On that date, it was split up into a separate Production Division and a new Collection and Dissemination Division, with the first-named division ~~then~~ called upon to accomplish the following specific tasks:

- a. Insures that the Department of the Army has timely notification of any event or condition immediately affecting the security of the United States or its armed forces.
- b. Produces current, staff, and basic intelligence on foreign powers and areas to meet Army requirements.
- c. Coordinates the performance of intelligence research and the production of military intelligence by other Army agencies in their fields of responsibility. As directed, participates in production of intelligence jointly with other governmental agencies.

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- d. Produces studies of those aspects of the strategic vulnerability of the United States required for Army planning.
- e. Collates intelligence information required for the timely production of operational intelligence in case of war. *

* "Production Division Memorandum No. 1," 23 Jul 51, G-2 020.
G-2 Production Div (23 Jul 51), p. 1. ACSI Rec Sec.

Although the new Production Division was fully intended to comprise the "intelligence producing division" for the departmental intelligence agency of the Army, it did not at first hold any responsibility regarding the production of "intelligence on the subversive activities of the Communist Party in countries outside the Iron Curtain." This responsibility was initially assigned to the Survey Section of the Requirements Branch, Collection and Dissemination Division. Organized with a separate Watch Section and Review Section operating directly under the Division Chief, the Production Division then included three geographic and three functional branches, as follows:

Eurasian Branch
Special Functions Section
USSR Section
Eastern Europe Section

Eastern Branch
China Section
SE Asia Section
Japan/Korea Section
South-Central Asia Section

Western Branch
Atlantic Pact Section
Western Europe Section
Latin-American Section
Near/Middle East Section

Estimates Branch
Estimates Section
Targeting Section

Technical Branch
Weapons and Equipment Section
Area Analysis Section
Strategic Vulnerability Section

Special Research Branch

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* Ibid., p. 1 and Annex "A".

Except for a separation of the Strategic Vulnerability function from Weapons and Equipment intelligence production, through forming a new Area Resources Branch on 15 July 1952, this Production Division organization continued to remain essentially unchanged for the rest of the Korean Conflict period. The following tabulation, therefore, serves to show, in brief, the main events and accomplishments that were reported for historical purposes by each of its major elements during both FY 1952 and FY 1953:

Watch Section - Actually representing a Secretariat for the IAC Watch Committee, this small section of the Production Division performed mainly administrative duties for that joint Committee. Brig. Gen. John Weckerling, Deputy ACofS G-2, D/A, presided over the IAC Watch Committee from 28 December 1950, the date of its original inception, until 14 August 1952. He was then succeeded, effective 12 September 1952, by Brig. Gen. John M. Willems, his replacement, with Col. Harvey H. Smith, Chief of the Production Division, filling in during the interim as ^{an} Acting Chairman. Regular meetings of the IAC Watch Committee were held weekly but special meetings could, of course, be called at any time. Two such special meetings were held during the Korean Conflict period, one on 26 December 1951 and the other on 28 November 1952.

Review Section - Consisting of a carefully selected group of experienced researchers, plus individually designated Current Intelligence and Basic Intelligence Officers, this separate section performed necessary duties for the Chief, Production Division, along the following lines:

- a. Review Staff - Examined all important material produced by the geographic or functional branches to insure that it met established Production Division standards, especially in respect to soundness of conclusions, logical presentation and adequacy of content. Being acknowledged experts ^{relative to} within the intelligence production field, personnel of the Review Staff often assisted in resolving divergent inter-branch and inter-agency viewpoints concerned therewith, and also furnished valuable technical guidance to the branch or other unit chiefs as needed.
- b. Current Intelligence Officer - Surveyed all incoming cables for the purpose of determining which might be of interest to the Chief, Production Division. Consulted with the ^{appropriate} appropriate production representatives to select items for inclusion in current intelligence publications and then proceeded to coordinate the detailed preparation of these same items within the appropriate branches. The

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four principal current intelligence publications at this time were the Daily Intelligence Briefing (DIB), Weekly Intelligence Report (WIR), World Intelligence Notes Digest (WIND) for FECOM and Daily Intelligence Briefing Summary for SHAPE.

- c. Basic Intelligence Officer - Supervised the Army's participation in the NIS program, issued necessary instructions for revising such continuing production projects as the Order of Battle Summary and ^{the} Person-
alities File, and transmitted certain intelligence materials or documents prepared by the Production Division to the Alternate Headquarters, D/A.

Eurasian Branch - Held responsible for intelligence bearing upon the U.S.S.R., Soviet Satellite countries of Europe, Yugoslavia, Finland (transferred to the Western Branch during the latter part of FY 1953), and the Free Territory of Trieste, this key branch concentrated its main effort on military intelligence production but also often found it necessary to perform a limited amount of political research in order to interpret properly the military decisions being made by the Communist leaders. Derived from an existing substantial compilation of basic intelligence data on this important area, the Eurasian Branch was able to contribute a great many ^{useful} ~~individual~~

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items and feature articles to the Intelligence Review (IR), DIB and WIR, and to complete a total of thirteen NIS sections during the Korean Conflict period. It also produced a large number of special studies for such prime intelligence users as the OACofS G-3, Weapons System Evaluation Group of OSD, JIC, ONI, DI USAF, and Chief of Psychological Warfare, ~~DIA~~^{etc.}, and presented a weekly analysis of indications of hostile Soviet intentions before the IAC Watch Committee. For illustration, some of the more noteworthy intelligence production projects it accomplished from 9 September 1951 to 30 June 1953, covered the following timely and salient subjects:

Logistical Guide to Soviet Army Units (revised).

Five-Year Summary of Soviet and Satellite Capabilities.

Annual Briefing on Russian Armed Forces for students at the Army War College.

Military Situation of the Yugoslav Army.

Tactical Air Support of Soviet Army Units.

Current Status of Czechoslovakian Frontier Guards.

Soviet Ground Forces Personnel in North Korea.

Organization and Disposition of Soviet Border Troops.

Bulgaria's Militarized Security Forces.

Organization, Equipment and Techniques of Soviet and Satellite Air Defense.

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World-Wide Pattern of Communist Guerrilla Activities.

Combat Operations of Soviet Infantry.

Current Situation in Albania.

Satellite Order of Battle.

Remilitarization of East Germany.

Military Schools of the U.S.S.R. Ground Forces.

Soviet Ground Force Aviation.

Enemy Vulnerabilities to Psychological Warfare.

Soviet Capabilities for Waging War in ^{the} Arctic and sub-
Arctic Regions.

Soviet Reactions to NATO Buildup.

Possible Solution to the Trieste Problem.

Soviet Airborne Capabilities.

Resistance Potential Behind the Iron Curtain.

Comparative Fire Power of U. S. and Soviet Divisions.

Revision of TM 30-544 "Russian-English Military Dictionary"
(under contract with Georgetown University).

Development of handbooks on Soviet and Satellite Armies
for use by the "Aggressor Force," U. S. Army.

Eastern Branch - This Branch naturally played a most significant role in military intelligence production during FY 1952 and FY 1953 because its assigned area of responsibility for all of Asia not only included Japan, China and Korea but also such dangerous trouble

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spots as Kashmir, Malaya, Indo-China, Burma, Indonesia, Formosa, and the Pescadores, and the Philippine Islands. Due to continued heavy interest in these ^{disturbed} particular areas, the Eastern Branch was constantly required to give numerous routine and special intelligence briefings on the situation existing within them to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff, members of Congress, outgoing Service Attache, MAAG and diplomatic personnel, distinguished foreign visitors, and a multitude of other persons. The branch was likewise regularly called upon to present lectures covering a wide variety of Far Eastern subjects to students at the National War College, Army War College, Armed Forces Staff College and Strategic Intelligence School. One of its major production projects during the early part of the Korean Conflict period was to prepare basic intelligence handbooks describing the Chinese Communist Forces and CCF Order of Battle for use by military staffs in the field. It also contributed periodically to the IR and other intelligence publications, and completed all of its assigned NIS sections. Of special interest is the fact that early in FY 1953 it was designated by the ACoS G-2, D/A, to be the action agency for ^{both} the preparatory development and subsequent operations of a "Tripartite Intelligence Conference" composed of appropriate representatives from the United States, United Kingdom and France. This new intelligence coordinating group, which was soon expanded to include Australia and New Zealand, then held meetings

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in different localities twice a year with personnel from the Eastern Branch always attending.

Western Branch - Charged with intelligence production for all areas of the world except Asia, the U.S.S.R. plus its European Satellites, and Yugoslavia, this branch ^{plainly} had to remain extremely flexible. Its specific production accomplishments during FY 1952 and FY 1953, therefore, were strongly characterized by diversity both in point of subject matter and area covered, as follows:

- a. Staff Intelligence - Made almost daily contributions to the DIB and WIR on such varied subjects as: "Revolutionary Plotting in Latin America," "Recurring French Cabinet Crises," "French Difficulties in North Africa," "Egyptian Government Changes," "Iranian Internal Problems," "Arab-Israel Border Incidents," etc.
- b. Periodic Projects - Produced numerous articles for inclusion in the IR and provided a large amount of material for the OB Summary, ^{that} which was seeking to list the current dispositions of all major military units throughout the world.
- c. Basic Intelligence - Completed its assigned NIS sections and also produced companion handbooks on the United Kingdom, Israel, West Germany, Argentina, Brazil and Guatemala.

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- d. Miscellaneous Projects - Prepared required intelligence data in support of all emergency war plans, the Friendly Forces Annex to the Army Capabilities Plan and a considerable portion of the Psychological Warfare Annex for that same plan.

Estimates Branch - This branch was given the very important mission of joining with corresponding groups from the Navy, Air Force, State Department, CIA and other pertinent agencies, ~~of the U. S. Government,~~ in the production of National and Special Intelligence Estimates for use by the NSC and certain designated high-level policy or planning bodies, ^{of the U.S. Government.} It also participated actively in the production of all military intelligence estimates for the JIC of the JCS. Being organized on a worldwide basis, the Estimates Branch was continually asked to give special G-2 briefings and lectures from the global standpoint. Noteworthy examples of this latter type of activity during FY 1952 and FY 1953 were, as follows:

Briefing members of the Army Long Range Estimates

Committee on "Soviet Capabilities, Present to 1960."

Briefing the Secretary of the Army and ACoFS G-3, D/A,

on "The United Kingdom Estimate of the Importance that the USSR Places on the Far East."

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Briefing personnel of the Office of the ACoS G-3, D/A
on ^{the} "Peripheral Deployment of NATO Forces."

Presenting a lecture to the staff, faculty and students
of the Army War College on "Communist Capabilities
and Probable Courses of Action in the Event of a War
with the Western Powers."

Presenting a lecture to the staff, faculty and students
of the Army War College on "The Strategic Vulnera-
bility of the United States."

Briefing President-elect Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense-
designate Charles E. Wilson and members of the JCS on
"Communist Ground Force Capabilities in Korea."

Preparing a special study for the Chief of Staff to deter-
mine Soviet capabilities for "maintaining and/or build-
ing up their forces in case they are halted on the
Rhine/Ijssel line by U. S. atomic attacks."

Briefing members of the Department of Defense Ad Hoc Study
Group on Continental Defense, on "Some of the Factors
in the Strategic Vulnerability of the United States."

Presenting a lecture to the faculty and students of the
Regular Course, Command and General Staff College, on
"A Strategic Evaluation of the U.S.S.R."

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Technical Branch - Until 15 July 1952, this branch was not only charged with the production of technical and scientific intelligence on all foreign weapons and equipment but also the development of such varied intelligence programs as Strategic Vulnerability, Markings Analysis, and Topographic (Military Geographic) Specialist Teams. Effective that date, however, these special tasks were removed from the Technical Branch and grouped together under a new Area Resources Branch. Production requirements for the Technical Branch proper then became largely centered upon supervising the preparation by the appropriate Army Technical Service of Foreign Military Weapons and Equipment Handbooks. Important accomplishments ~~and events~~ connected with the ^{Army} technical intelligence effort during FY 1952 and FY 1953, therefore, were as follows:

- a. The Technical Branch completed the preparation of a classified FM 30-16 "Technical Intelligence," which was first written in draft form during March 1952 and then sent to Headquarters, Army Field Forces (AFF), for review and editing. Returned to the branch for further refinement shortly thereafter, this manual was intended to govern the establishment of technical intelligence detachments within combat theaters and to serve as a basic guide for the production of more detailed

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technical intelligence manuals by the Technical Services themselves. It was finally approved for publication late in June 1953. Five new Foreign Military Weapons and Equipment Handbooks were ^{likewise} ~~then~~ published prior to the end of FY 1953, covering Soviet armored vehicles, artillery, engineer equipment, infantry weapons and signal equipment. Similar handbooks on Soviet ammunition (in color), Soviet quartermaster equipment, Satellite engineer equipment and Satellite signal equipment, were also ^{actual} ~~actually~~ in the process of publication by that same date.

- b. The Technical Branch furnished regular G-2 membership on the Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee (JTIS) of the JIC, as well as on an important Scientific Estimates Committee ^{which} that was created by DCI directive during August 1952 for the express purpose of integrating and coordinating scientific intelligence production at the national level.
- c. In March 1953, when the ACoS G-2, D/A, sponsored the formation of an ad hoc Technical Services Committee within the Department of the Army, the Chief of the Technical Branch, Production Division, was named to be its Chairman. This committee, which consisted of appropriate repre-

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representatives from G-2, G-4, AFF, and the seven Technical Services, was ^{then} ~~July~~ assigned the mission of delineating "all aspects of intelligence responsibility among the various contributors" to a greatly expanded Army technical intelligence effort.

- d. During the last quarter of FY 1953, the Technical Branch initiated the preparation of a monthly liaison letter designed to implement an agreement between the United States and Canada for the mutual exchange of useful technical intelligence information ^{by them} ~~that they held~~ on other countries.

Area Resources Branch - Although not established as a separate branch until 15 July 1952, the research specialists of this economic intelligence element had been making substantial contributions to the IR, DIB, WIR, Army chapters of the NIS and many important NIE's, for some time. In May 1952, its Current Economic Unit had even prepared a summary of munitions production capabilities of all the major foreign powers for inclusion in the Chief of Staff's so-called "Black Book" containing basic military data. During FY 1953, an acknowledged expert from the Area Resources Branch was also called upon to brief the Secretary of the Army on the subject of "Soviet Petroleum Supply and Demand, Peace and War," while selected branch personnel gave lectures to the Armed Forces Industrial College on the "Strategic Vul-

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nerability of the U. S. and Canada", and to the Air Command and Staff School at Maxwell Field, Alabama, on the "Strategic Vulnerability of the U.S.S.R." Special projects assigned directly to the Area Resources Branch during the same general period were, as follows:

- a. Strategic Vulnerability of Western Europe - This continuing major study, although based mainly upon OACofS G-2 research, was often supplemented by material obtained from the Army Technical Services, Navy, Air Force and Graduate School of Georgetown University. It sought to show the extent of economic assistance that the United States might be required to furnish Western Europe, especially the NATO nations, in the event of war with the U.S.S.R. The study covered nineteen different countries, namely, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, United Kingdom, Ireland, Western Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, and the economic subjects that it considered in relation to its given strategic area fell under the following categories:

World Trade Pattern

World Areas Essential to Industry

Population

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Transportation
Pipelines
Telecommunications
Agriculture
Forest Products
Minerals and Chief Mining Areas
Iron and Steel Industry
Copper, Lead and Zinc Industries
Aluminum Industry
Commercial Chemicals Industry
Electric Power Grids
Aircraft Industry
Automotive Industry
Antifriction Bearings Industry
Electrical Equipment Industry
Electronic Industry
Mining Equipment Industry
Railroad Equipment Industry
Shipbuilding
Textile Industry
Munitions Industry
Rubber Industry
Petroleum and Petroleum Products
Communist Party in Western Europe

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- b. Markings and Nameplate Analysis Program - This notably productive program, reinstated in ~~accordance~~^{line} with World War II experience not long after the Korean outbreak, was aimed at deriving as much information as possible from numbers, plates or symbols fastened, stamped or molded on enemy military equipment, and thereby disclosing for intelligence purposes:
- (a) the name and location of the maker (often coded)
 - (b) the date of manufacture
 - (c) a production serial number, and
 - (d) miscellaneous markings such as trademarks, mold numbers, casting numbers, etc.
- c. Topographic (Military Geographic) Specialist Teams - The need for assigning technically qualified specialists within the Army Attache system in order to satisfy the military geography demands of the NIS had become clearly apparent even before the Korean outbreak. The DI, GSUSA, in 1947, therefore, with invaluable assistance from the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, and Commanding Officer, Army Map Service, had²⁵ been promptly able to inaugurate a successful project of that nature, which authorized a post-graduate training course for selected Regular Army officers at civilian institutions and their subsequent assignment to Topographic Specialist Teams in the field. Following the graduation of the first group of officers under this program

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during the fall of 1948, arrangements were made to station such teams in Iraq (December 1948), Iran (January 1949) and Spain - Portugal (August 1950). The severe officer shortage occasioned by the Korean Conflict naturally forced the suspension of all post-graduate training for officers but, as soon as the topographic specialist program could be restored, Military Geographic Specialist Teams were organized again and dispatched to Italy (May 1952), Norway (August 1952), Benelux (August 1952) France (September 1952) and Turkey (December 1952). Plans were then also laid to continue the program on the basis of graduating at least three officers each year from civilian institutions and utilizing a total of seven officer spaces within the Army Attache system ^{for} as topographic specialists.

- d. Strategic Intelligence Reserve Affiliation Units - Based upon an Army reserve affiliation program originally authorized in 1947, the Area Resources Branch adopted a firm policy of assigning specific long range research projects to each Strategic Intelligence Research and Analysis (SIRA) unit that could be effectively monitored by the branch personnel having a primary interest in the particular subject assigned. The OACofS G-2, D/A, was thus not only provided with an additional means of obtaining current strategic intelligence

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research but also a relatively well-trained reserve auxiliary capable of being quickly mobilized during an emergency and given ^{active} strategic intelligence duty either in ^{*} Washington or the field.

* See: Summary of Major Events and Problems (Reports Control Symbol CSHIS-6), FY 1953, "G-2 314.7, 31 Aug 53 (6 Jan 53), Production Div, and "History of Army Activities, 9 September 1951 through 31 December 1952" (S), G-2 314.7, 9 Sep 53 (6 Jan 53), Tab "Prod Div." ACSI Rec Sec. Activities of the Special Research Branch, Production Division, which were mainly concerned with communications intelligence matters, are not covered in this discussion because of ^{an} established national policy.

At the end of the Korean Conflict period in July 1953, the Production Division continued to remain organized generally along these same lines and was by far the largest single element of the departmental intelligence agency of the Army. Moreover, although the agency itself had recently undergone a severe reduction in authorized strength, the ACoS G-2, D/A, was personally attempting to minimize the worst effects of that cut for this key division. Because of the ever-growing personnel shortages, however, it soon became necessary to suspend publication of the WIR until further notice, restrict cur-

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rent coverage of the purely military aspects of economic and psychological factors in Latin America, and even to delay the production of basic technical intelligence which was ~~needed~~ ^{needed} so badly by the Army and other governmental planning groups. Finally, effec-

* Memo (S), ACofS G-2 to CofS, 20 Apr 53, G-2 350.04, 20 Apr 53 (8 Apr 53). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

tive 11 May 1953, the Production Division was given a total strength of 363 persons, who were then distributed among its various subordinate units, as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Civilians</u>
Production Division Headquarters	7	14
Area Resources Branch	13	27
Army Component, AFOIN	24	18
Eastern Branch	20	26
Estimates Branch	11	3
Eurasian Branch	28	44
Special Research Branch	21	32
Technical Branch	11	16
Western Branch	19	29
Total -	<u>154</u>	<u>209</u> *

* Production Division Memo #8, G-2 020. G-2 Prod Div, 4 May 53 (30 Apr 53). ACSI Rec Sec.

In summation, therefore, the two most important points to observe with reference to the G-2 production effort during the Korean Conflict

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period would appear to be, first, that a great deal of it was hastily devised after the invasion had actually started and, second, even though the effort was called upon to provide direct support for the UN combat forces in the Far East, it could not afford to neglect detailed intelligence consideration of the rest of the world in the slightest. On the other hand, it must be readily admitted that once the effort did get underway in light of the altered conditions, it was not only fitting and thorough but also remarkably well designed to accomplish the assigned mission.

While this foreign intelligence production effort was going on during the Korean Conflict period, the ACoS G-2, D/A, ^{also} likewise had to take proper steps to develop suitable Army policies and procedures within the military security field and, in some cases, even to conduct actual operations for the purpose of maintaining them. The many difficult problems that he constantly encountered in connection with carrying out these fundamental counterintelligence responsibilities will thus be described in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER VII

MILITARY SECURITY

The sudden Korean outbreak found the military security (counter-intelligence) effort of the OACofS G-2, D/A, in a noticeably unsatisfactory state. Although the new conditions of Cold War had served to increase all phases of this effort to a marked degree, the Army had not only been prevented by higher authority from carrying out the domestic intelligence operations it needed to support prior planning for the possible use of federal troops in local emergencies but also denied any direct control over the establishment of policies and procedures aimed at uncovering subversion or sabotage within its own ranks. Moreover, due mainly to defense economy considerations, the total authorized strength of the two security branches that formed part of the earlier merged Security and Training Division, was reduced to 36 officers and 41 civilian employees just when the demands of the security clearance program for personnel requiring access to classified information of the Government had reached a new peak in intensity. On 25 June 1950, under the terms of a special regulation dated 14 September 1949, which was still in force, these branches were being called upon to perform the following functions:

Operations Branch - Formulates, promulgates, and supervises counterintelligence programs pertaining to the Army; establishes counter-measures against efforts to gain unauthorized access to classified information pertaining to plans, operations, and capabilities of the Army; and initiates, controls, reviews, and recommends final action on certain types of security investigations of military and civilian personnel connected with the Army.

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Security of Military Information Branch - Formulates, promulgates, and exercises supervision over measures for censorship and for safeguarding classified military information; and promulgates and interprets policy on the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and their nationals, the United States Government, nongovernmental agencies, and individuals. *

* SR 10-120-1, Organization and Functions, Department of the Army, 14 Sep 49.

The most pressing counterintelligence problem right after the opening of the Korean Conflict had to do with the ^{successful} establishment of military censorship, especially armed forces and public ^{information} media censorship. This was the case despite the fact that anticipatory planning both for national and military censorship in the event of an emergency had been favorably accomplished during the previous Cold War period. ^{Furthermore,} ~~likewise,~~ on 7 February 1950, the Secretary of Defense had formally directed the Secretary of the Army to assume primary responsibility for:

(a) coordinating all aspects of censorship planning, as it concerns the Department of Defense, with a view to developing censorship programs which are soundly conceived and integrated with those of the Federal Agency having primary responsibility for censorship;

(b) providing consultation and coordination with the National Security Resources Board through a working group comprising appropriate representation from each military department and such representation as the NSRB may desire;

(c) informing the Secretary of Defense from time to time of programs and developments in the field of censorship planning. *

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* Memo (C), Sec Def to Secs Army, Navy, Air Force, 9 Feb 50, G-2 000.73, 9 Feb 50 (3 Nov 48). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

One result of this timely directive from the Secretary of Defense was the prompt creation of a working group on censorship planning, which soon came to be known as the National Censorship Readiness Measures Coordination Committee (NCRMCC). Enjoying appropriate NSRB, OSD, Army, Navy and Air Force representation, the NCRMCC started without delay to prepare an emergency plan for armed forces participation in the implementation of national censorship if it was ever ordered into effect. * Even though the letter of instructions to the field regard-

* See: Memo (C), ACoFS G-2, signed by Col John W. Middleton, Chief Security and Training Division, ^{to} Brig Gen Eugene L. Harrison, Deputy Chief of Information, 24 Aug 50, G-2 000.73, 24 Aug 50 (3 Nov 48). WW II Rec Div, GSA. Col Egon R. Tausch, Chief of the Training Branch, Security and Training Division, OACoFS G-2, D/A, was initially designated to be the Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense on this NCRMCC, ^{and} while its original Army member was Maj Thompson M. Colquitt from the SMI Branch of that same division.

ing that particular plan could not be actually issued until 29 August 1950, * it was already in the process of Army-Air Force staff coordina-

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* Ltr (S), AGAO-S 000.73 (28 Aug 50) G-2 M, to CG's Alaska, Caribbean, Pacific and Continental Army Commands, copy in: G-2 000.73, 29 Aug 50 (3 Nov 48). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

tion at the time of ^{the Korean outbreak,} Korea, so its chief provisions were generally understood and accepted by all concerned.

This anticipatory planning effort had been founded on the thesis that national censorship would be immediately imposed by the Chief Executive following some kind of a declaration of war. The Korean Conflict, however, was then being officially regarded as a United Nations police action led by the United States, which presented an entirely new concept in the matter. Besides, neither the Air Force nor the Navy seemed to feel in July 1950 there was any compelling need for the establishment of censorship and the National Censorship Adviser to the NSRB had already expressed an opinion that "in view of the diplomatic and political implications, the President would not give his approval to the imposition of national censorship."^{*}

* "Summary of Major Activities of ACofS G-2, 25 June 1950 through 8 September 1951" (C), op. cit., pp. 19-20. The National Censorship Adviser to the NSRB at this time was Mr. (former Col) Gilbert C. Jacobus, who had been the senior Censorship Officer in G-2, SHAEF, during WW II.

Nevertheless, the problem of affording a suitable military security

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for troop movements, combat operations and the introduction of new weapons into the Korean Conflict, soon became both real and acute. Since there were at first almost no curbs at all on reporting about those matters, serious security breaches repeatedly occurred during the early weeks of the fighting. These security breaches thoroughly alarmed the operating personnel within the OACofS G-3, D/A, and prompted the G-2 security officials to undertake a comprehensive study of the entire censorship situation. Upon completion, this study reached the rather indefinite conclusion that only total national censorship embracing the armed forces, civil mail and public information media could possibly hope to solve the problem effectively but under the existing conditions such a course of action was plainly out of the question. The three major press services in the United States, though, were shortly persuaded to agree not "to compile or publish state or national round-ups of National Guard or Reserve units being called to active duty." Additionally, on 9 August 1950, when the Secretary of Defense cabled CINCFE to express his grave concern over the recurring breaches of security displayed in dispatches emanating from Korea, General MacArthur stated that he preferred a code of voluntary press control to one calling for an imposed censorship and also noted, as follows:

In Tokyo previous directives from Washington forbade such direct procedure but something of the same general effect has been accomplished by constantly calling attention of correspondents to published dispatches which jeopardized security. The results are progressively encouraging. The practical difficulties involved with nearly 300 correspondents representing 19 foreign countries of varying attitudes and with the constant

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demands for more rapid transmission of copy to their home offices renders the problem of arbitrarily checking dispatches almost insurmountable. Of course, whatever system is applied here will not prevent violations through stateside or other foreign outlets and unless something of the same sort is applied there articles violating security can rapidly be transmitted by airmail delivery or even faster methods of communication. To attempt a complete censorship in Japan would require the employment of thousands of persons to check the various communications systems involved. This is completely beyond the resources of this command. In addition it would involve international complications which would be practically insurmountable. If any change in the present system is to be made I suggest that for general coordination and understanding it be formulated and announced by the government from Washington after due consultation with other nations involved. *

* Ibid., pp. 20-22.

Military security problems bearing upon the establishment of armed forces and public ^{information} media censorship then continued to plague the Army authorities both in Washington and the Far East. They were soon made even more difficult when a heated dispute broke out in the Department of the Army over whether the press censorship function should be performed within a theater of operations by Theater G-2 or Public Information Office personnel. This particular dispute was presumably settled on 30 January 1951, at least for the Department of the Army, with general staff responsibility for supervising press censorship being definitely assigned to the ACofS G-2, D/A, but the Chief of Information (CINFO) also designated as a "proponent agent" for such matters. * In the meantime, General Bolling had ^{submitted} proceeded to submit a

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* Ibid., pp. 23-24. See also: MR attached to Memo for Brig Gen J. H. Phillips, Deputy ACoFS G-2, from Brig Gen Frank Dorn, Deputy Chief of Information, 25 Feb 52, G-2 000.73, 25 Feb 52 (3 Nov 48).
WW II Rec Div, GSA.

recommendation through channels to the Chief of Staff that military censorship, including press censorship, should be ordered into effect without further delay in Korea.*

* "Summary of Major Activities of ACoFS G-2, 25 Jun 50 through 8 Sep 51" (C), pp. 23-25.

The Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, disagreed with the G-2 proposal for establishing an armed forces censorship in Korea but did feel that press censorship ought to be imposed there just as soon as possible and he promptly forwarded a recommendation along those lines to the JCS. On 8 September 1950, the JCS informed CINCFE they considered his voluntary press censorship system ineffective and intended to notify the Secretary of Defense that a more positive censorship of all public information media in FECOM was now necessary. General MacArthur then sharply reminded them he had no personnel trained or available to perform detailed censorship work and reiter-

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ated an earlier belief that the implementation of censorship should be a United Nations activity. On the basis of his reply and numerous ^{other} indicated problems concerned with personnel requirements, shipping space and day to day regulation of some 60 non-English speaking war correspondents, the JCS finally decided to forego any ^{further} additional ^{moves} effort toward imposing censorship on public information media in the Far East. CINCFE was carefully cautioned, however, to continue "positive pressure in support of the principles of voluntary censorship at all levels in order to provide maximum security of force deployment." *

* Ibid., pp. 25-29.

Another major counterintelligence problem which confronted the departmental intelligence agency of the Army during the early part of the Korean Conflict period was connected with developing more effective removal procedures for personnel, both civilian and military, who were found to be either serious security risks or disloyal. In January 1950, the Secretary of the Army had asked the Personnel Policy Board, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to make a study of the procedures currently in use for that purpose by the three Service Departments, so more uniform policies could be established regarding the dismissal of such employees. The Army,

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for example, was still utilizing the summary authority contained in PL 808 to process both its security risk and disloyalty cases but the Navy and Air Force were now using that particular authority only for security risk cases and EO 9835 procedures, through the Civil Service Commission, for handling their disloyalty cases. One result of this study, therefore, was to have the Secretary of the Army, on 12 May 1950, notify the Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board that in the future the Army would conform to the Navy and Air Force removed system ^{for} in all removal cases.

* See: SS (S), ACofS G-2 for CofS, 29 Jun 50, sub: Proposed Loyalty-Security Regulations, G-2 000.24, 29 Jun 50 (16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

Meanwhile, at an Armed Forces Policy Council meeting held on 10 May 1950, the Secretary of Defense himself had requested the Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board "to undertake a general review of the present policies and procedures for determining the loyalty and security of Department of Defense civilian personnel." The Korean outbreak thus found the OACofS G-2, D/A, in the midst of preparing several informative memorandums dealing with this complicated subject for the guidance of Army representatives participating in two major personnel security reviews. * Less than two weeks later and before either

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* Memos, ACoFS G-2 for Adm Asst to Sec Army, 16 and 27 Jun 50, G-2 000.24, 16 and 27 Jun 50 (16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec. John W. Martyn, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, ^{has already} named Arthur H. Onthank, Director of Civilian Personnel, and John Connell, Personnel Manager, Office of the Secretary of the Army, to represent the Army in the security policy review ^{being conducted} for the Secretary of Defense.

review could be actually concluded, though, Mr. Johnson ordered the Service Secretaries to take immediate steps to accomplish pre-employment investigations for all civilian employees being assigned to sensitive positions, which were specifically defined as those positions requiring access to Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential material in their respective departments. * These early actions were then strongly

* Memo, ACoFS G-2 for Adm Asst to Sec Army, 27 Jun 50, G-2 000.24, 27 Jun 50, (16 Dec 46), Tab C w/Attachment. ACSI Rec Sec.

influenced by other closely related developments within the personnel security field, as follows:

1. Passage of Public Law 733, 81st Congress, on 26 August 1950, not only repealing the initial suspension section of PL 808 but also providing for the establishment of Loyalty-Security Hearing Boards to re-

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ceive testimony from civilian employees who were answering charges for their removal on loyalty-security grounds.

2. Passage by Congress, on 20 September 1950, over President Truman's veto, of a new Internal Security Act (PL 831, 81st Congress, commonly known as the McCarran Act), which was ^{intended} designed to furnish an effective legal basis for prosecuting members of the Communist Party seeking to subvert the United States Government.

3. Issuance of an Army-wide directive by The Adjutant General, dated 20 September 1950, covering the establishment of Loyalty-Security Hearing Boards in compliance with PL 733 and ^{also} giving official notice that the existing Special Regulation 620-220-1, Civilian Personnel, Loyalty-Security Adjudications, was being rewritten to conform to this new law.

4. Approval by Secretary of Defense Marshall, on 2 October 1950, of a recommended list from the Personnel Policy Board of "Criteria for Determining Eligibility for Employment for Sensitive and Non-Sensitive Duties in the Department of Defense". Among other things, this list indicated the need for a special regulation to assist the appropriate ^{commanders} ~~authorities~~ in determining security qualifications and requirements for the employment or assignment of personnel to sensitive positions throughout the United States Army.

* See: File G-2 000.24, 7 Sep-28 Dec 50 (16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

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Since these measures were all aimed primarily at establishing effective procedures for handling civilian loyalty and security risk cases, they did not alter in any significant degree the currently prescribed methods for disposing of disloyal, disaffected or subversive military personnel. To serve that ^{latter} ~~essential~~ purpose, the Army had already devised a workable program based upon the provisions of a Special Regulation 600-220-1, originally issued on 10 November 1948 and then slightly revised in January 1950, supplemented by additional instructions contained in a Special Regulation 600-220-2 (Secret) dated 9 June 1949. This program normally involved one or more of the following administrative actions:

1. Each Army inductee or enlistee was initially called upon to fill out and sign a standard Loyalty Certificate (NME Form 98). If that certificate failed to mention membership in any organization designated by the Attorney General as being inimical to the United States Government, no further action was taken. When it did so indicate, however, then further security checks were accomplished and a decision was eventually made by proper authority on the enlistment or continued induction of the person in light of them.

2. Similar procedures were utilized to eliminate disloyal or subversive Regular Army personnel and Army Reserve personnel either on active duty or in an inactive duty status, under the terms of AR 615-370, Enlisted Personnel, Discharge, Disloyal or Subversive.


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3. Army Reserve personnel on whom fragmentary disloyal or subversive information was already known were deliberately not recalled to active duty until such time as a suitable investigation could be conducted to determine whether or not they should be eliminated through AR 615-370 procedures.

4. Under the provisions of SR 600-220-2 (Secret), the duty assignments of suspected military and civilian personnel were fittingly restricted pending the completion of a full scale investigation to determine whether or not they should be eliminated through AR 615-370 procedures.*

* See: DF (S), Col Middleton, S & T, to Col Howze, P & C, 14 Aug 50, G-2 000.24, 14 Aug 50 (16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

While the departmental military security officials were not entirely satisfied with the powers they possessed under this adopted program for eliminating known or suspected subversives from the Army, they had generally come to accept the situation in that respect by the time the Korean Conflict started. As a matter of fact, during its total period of operation from 10 November 1948 to early August 1950, the program did succeed in producing some very interesting statistics, as follows:



<u>Action under SR 600-220-1:</u>	
Cases received	170
Cases pending (discharge recommended)	15
Personnel discharged	55
Cases returned for further investigative action	100
<u>Action under Reserve Recall Program:</u>	
Total cases	1147
a. Derogatory cases (will not be recalled until investigations can be conducted or may be discharged under SR 600-220-1).	480
b. Derogatory cases (may be recalled but will be placed under surveillance)	420
c. Derogatory cases not identified to persons of Army service	68
d. Pending classification to a or b above	179
<u>Action under SR 600-220-2 (Regular Army Personnel):</u>	
Class "A" Restrictees -	21
Class "B" Restrictees -	45 *

* Ibid., Tab F.

The advent of the Korean Conflict made it vitally imperative, of course, to eliminate all disloyal or subversive persons from the NME just as soon as possible. At a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council held on 8 August 1950, therefore, Secretary of Defense Johnson not only requested the three Services to review their security files and separate any personnel with Communist leanings but also announced ~~that~~ he intended to advise the White House when this action had been completed. Because the Army felt ^{that} its existing program was well suited for such purpose, no important changes were recommended in it. Nevertheless, all four of the basic special regulations supporting the program were promptly revised in order to render them more applicable and



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they were then reissued before the end of the year, as follows:

SR 600-220-2 (S), Personnel, Disposition of Subversive and Disaffected Personnel, 6 September 1950.

SR 620-220-1, Civilian Personnel, Loyalty-Security Adjudications, 13 November 1950.

SR 600-220-1, Personnel, Disloyal and Subversive Military Personnel, 6 December 1950.

SR 380-160-2, Military Security, Determining Eligibility for Employment on Sensitive Duties, 28 December 1950. *

* See: File G-2 000.24, 6 Sep-28 Dec 50 (16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

Other events bearing upon the military security field that occurred during the early Korean Conflict period and appear to warrant special mention were, as follows:

1. The IIC, on 8 June 1950, had approved a change in the current Delimitations Agreement on security activities by governmental agencies, which was designed to transfer responsibility for performing certain counterintelligence investigations aboard Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) ships from the Army to the Navy. This change then necessitated a corresponding revision of the latest SR 380-320-2, "Military Security, Counterin-

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telligence Investigative Agencies, Supplementary Agreements" that
was duly accomplished, effective 16 August 1950. *

* See: DF, G-2 to AG, 16 Aug 50, G-2 310.11, 16 Aug 50 (5 Aug 41).
WW II Rec Div.

2. Congress, on 16 June 1950, had passed a law (PL 555, 81st Congress) amending the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, in order to permit the entrance into the United States of 500 additional DP's as "national interest cases" provided they were recommended by both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. Investigating the DP applicants for such entrance from the security viewpoint, however, presented some almost insuperable problems for all concerned. With the Army CIC representing the only possible means of performing satisfactory overseas investigations for that purpose, the Secretary of Defense chose to delegate his own assigned responsibility in the matter to the Secretary of the Army. Col. William H. Brunke, Chief of the Exploitation Branch, ID, OACofS G-2, D/A, was then selected to organize this new Army effort. Representative committees were also soon formed to develop and coordinate workable procedures for clearing the DP applicants, so that, late in November 1950, detailed instructions could be sent out to the various occupation commanders covering the entire conduct of screening operations in the field. * Shortly thereafter, arrangements were

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* See: File, G-2 383.7, 20 Sep-22 Nov 50 (24 Feb 50), WW II Rec Div, GSA. Col Brunke's assistant and officially designated alternate for this Army effort was Lt Col Edward M. Jones, also from the Exploitation Branch, ID, OACofS G-2, D/A.

likewise concluded to speed up the local DP processing by establishing joint Army-State clearance committees in Frankfort, Germany, and Salzburg, Austria.

3. The Informant and Observer system which had been in force during World War II was abolished, effective 20 August 1945, and not replaced. While the need for a similar system without some of the more objectionable features of this earlier organization had become clearly apparent during the subsequent Cold War period, no attempt was made to introduce another one into the Army until after the Korean outbreak. On 20 October 1950, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration did approve, but for planning purposes only, the distribution of a G-2 sponsored "Countersubversive Plan" to be instituted in all units of the Army Field Establishment upon specific direction by the Secretary of the Army. Regardless of the fact that this new system had been most carefully designed to operate through the regular chain of command and was plainly "non-punitive, non-investigative and non-mandatory if other coverage existed," it was never put into actual effect. *

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* See: File (S), G-2 383.4 CS, 6 Jul-31 Oct 50, f/w (16 Aug 50).
ACSI Rec Sec.

4. Having been beset by many serious personnel problems throughout the entire preceding Cold War period, the CIC was finally able to get a new AR 600-148, "Personnel, Assignment to Counter Intelligence Corps" published in August 1950, which served to tighten up several of the mandatory qualification requirements governing the selection of personnel for CIC assignment. Notwithstanding, the sudden Korean emergency had found the CIC with a shortage in TO/E strength of 15 Lieutenant Colonels and 55 Majors, and needing 5 Lieutenant Colonels and 50 Majors for immediate duty in the Far East. The desired raising of CIC personnel standards, therefore, especially for field grade officers, ^{had to be} ~~was~~ in most cases again, ^{*} postponed.

* See: DF (C) Chief, CIC to G-1 thru G-2, 14 Jul 50, G-2 322.999, 14 Jul 50 (15 May 44). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

5. Under the current SR 10-5-1, "Organization and Functions, Department of the Army," dated 11 April 1950, the OACofS G-2, D/A, had been charged with "planning, coordinating and supervising the collection, evaluation

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and dissemination of intelligence information concerning the strategic vulnerability of the United States and its possessions." Because the term "strategic vulnerability" was so broad and elastic, though, the other three general staff divisions continued to remain deeply involved in activities impinging directly upon that function. During December 1950, for example, the ACofS G-3, D/A, addressed a letter to the six Continental Army Commanders on the subject of "Department of the Army Responsibility for Industrial Security" and instructed them to accomplish a "Facility Security Survey" for the industrial plants located within their respective areas that were being carried as "Key Facilities" by the national Munitions Board. Since these surveys might well produce some valuable information both from the strategic vulnerability and military security (sabotage) standpoint, the ACofS G-2, D/A, not only arranged to receive a copy^{of} each for use in the departmental military intelligence agency but also advised the ACofS G-2's of the Continental Armies to make similar arrangements at their own headquarters.

* See: DF (C), G-2 to G-1, G-3 and G-4, 17 Nov 50, and Ltr (C), G-2 to Continental Army Commanders, 26 Dec 50; G-2 O61.2, 17 Nov 50 and 26 Dec 50 (17 Jan 47). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

6. A law (PL 679, 81st Congress), was passed on 9 August 1950, *that authorized* ~~which permitted~~ the President to prescribe

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regulations for safeguarding American ports and waterfront facilities. President Truman then issued an Executive Order (EO 10173), dated 18 October 1950, establishing a limited port security program to be implemented by the United States Coast Guard of the Treasury Department. In accordance with a written request from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of the Army, therefore, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, in January 1951, was called upon to take necessary steps to insure that all the Army Commanders and Attaches would urgently report any information which might give:

(a) Warning of the actual or suspected departure for the US or approach to the US of any vessel known or suspected of carrying materials for attack.

(b) Warning of the actual or suspected departure for the US of vessels owned, controlled or in the service of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, Eastern Germany, or Eastern Austria.

(c) Any other information of value to the Coast Guard in carrying out its task. *

* See: Ltr (S) Sec Treas to Sec Army, 4 Jan 51, G-2 350.09

(24 Sep 46), WW II Rec Div, GSA, and G-2 Memo, 26 Feb 51, G-2 300.6

(12 Jan 51). ACSI Rec Sec. The Sec Treas also requested ~~this same~~ ^{similar} the same assistance from the Navy, Air Force, State Dept, CIA and FBI.

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7. Early in January 1951, the Director of Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense, proposed the formation of a joint Service agency to develop needed equipment for physical or investigative security use. The Army did not favor the formation of such an agency because the JIC had already taken action in the same matter which included the CIA. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense ^{ignored} ~~proceeded to ignore~~ ^{this} ~~that~~ obvious duplication and announced the establishment of a Physical Security Equipment Agency (PSEA), effective 7 February 1951. Under management direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, ^{the} ~~this~~ PSEA was then held responsible to provide for the "development of physical security and related investigative equipment as a common service for all agencies of the Department of Defense." Army participation in the new agency was subsequently covered by the publication of SR 380-410-1, dated 23 February 1951.*

* See: File, G-2 334 Physical Security Equipment Agency, 25 Jan-23 Feb 51. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

The establishment of the G-2 Central Records Facility (CRF) at Fort Holabird, Md., on 17 August 1951, was a most progressive step in the direction of improving the Army's entire counterintelligence effort. Not to be confused with the Central CIC Files which had recently been microfilmed and consolidated in the CIC Center at Fort Holabird, this new field facility was originally intended to furnish a central-^{available}

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ized repository for all closed personnel security cases of the Continental Armies, Military District of Washington (MDW), and OACofS G-2, D/A. Remaining under G-2 control but supervised directly by the Commanding General, Fort Holabird, who was also Chief, CIC, the CRF was officially charged with the "maintenance, processing and administration" of the files in its custody. It was not in any sense an investigative agency nor was it capable of making ^{any} loyalty evaluations. In January 1952, its specific functions could thus be described to the Commanding Generals of the Continental Armies and MDW, as follows:

- a. To provide a central repository for all intelligence investigative files compiled by the above-named commands.
- b. To provide a master index to all intelligence investigations which have been or are being conducted by the above-named commands, who will be furnished a copy thereof, including changes when issued.
- c. To consolidate all intelligence information which has been developed on an individual by the above-named commands, eliminating duplicate and nonessential material.
- d. To prevent duplication of intelligence investigative effort by investigative agencies of the above-named commands.
- e. To provide a standardized filing system for all intelligence personality investigative files within the above-named commands.
- f. To facilitate the use of personality investigative files by furnishing the files or information therefrom to the above-named commands. *

* Ltr (C), TAG to CG's Continental Armies and MDW, G-2.020

Central Records Facility, 18 Jan 52 (18 Jul 51). ACSI Rec Sec. The ^{control} CRF₁ function in the OACofS G-2, D/A, was first given to the Control

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(Management) Office but later transferred to the Security Div, effective 16 Aug 52.

While the new CRF was promptly recognized by all concerned as representing a major contribution in simplifying and facilitating procedures for checking the security background of persons who had previously come under the cognizance of an Army counterintelligence investigative agency, it soon ran into severe personnel difficulties of its own. Initially allocated just 8 military and 32 civilian spaces, these totals were raised to 11 military and 86 civilians on 29 October 1952, in view of the increased emphasis that was ^{then} being placed upon personnel clearance matters throughout the United States Government. This favorable action did not provide much real relief for the CRF, however, because it could only employ trained civilians possessing the highest possible security qualifications and by that time there were very few such persons readily available for procurement. The facility was thus forced to operate during most of the Korean Conflict period by utilizing whatever "pipeline" military personnel happened to be passing through the CIC Center from time to time on a temporary duty or other transient status.

* See: SS, G-2 to CofS and Sec Army, 1 Apr 53, G-2.020 Central Records Facility, 1 Apr 53 (6 Jan 53). ACSI Rec Sec. Additionally,

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10-FBI, 5-USAF, 2-Navy and 4-Civil Service Commission personnel were working at the CRF in direct support of their own agencies.

(S). Early in 1951, the Secretary of Defense had queried the Secretary of the Army with reference to the current security status of the Panama Canal. The result was that Secretary Pace ordered Maj. Gen. John K. Rice, Chief, CIC, and Col. Duncan S. Somerville, from the OACofS G-3, D/A, to visit the Canal Zone as his personal representatives for the purpose of examining the "question of counterintelligence measures . . . now being taken to provide for the protection and security of the Panama Canal." During their visit, they discovered that CIA activity within the Canal Zone and surrounding areas had been quite limited and most of the required counterintelligence operations were being performed by CIC personnel assigned to Headquarters, United States Army, Caribbean (USARCARIB). This was an Army command that functioned under the Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB), who acted in the capacity of Executive Agent for the JCS.
*

* See: Memo (TS), Maj Gen John K. Rice to Sec Army, 19 Feb 51, G-2 350.09, 19 Feb 51 (24 Sep 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

After Lt. Gen. Horace L. McBride, U.S.A., became CINCARIB on 1 April 1952, the question of responsibility and means for conducting

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counterintelligence operations within his command again came to the fore. He felt that because of his JCS mission he ought to assume operational control of the 470th CIC Detachment, Headquarters, USARCARIB, but this view was not shared by either Maj. Gen. Lester G. Whitlock, CG, USARCARIB, or Maj. Gen. Richard C. Partridge, the newly appointed ACoFS G-2, D/A. * Following an exchange of several unyielding letters

* Gen Partridge took over as the ACoFS G-2, D/A, effective 19 Aug 52. See: G-2 Memo #31, 19 Aug 52, G-2 300.6, 19 Aug 52 (11 Jan 52).
ACSI Rec Sec.

on the subject between Washington, D. C. and Quarry Heights, C. Z., it appeared that the problem could probably best be settled through personal contact. On 22 October 1952, therefore, Generals McBride, Whitlock and Partridge, along with Brig. Gen. Martin F. Hass, Chief of Staff, Caribbean Command, conferred together at Quarry Heights in the matter and reached an agreement that:

1. CINCARIB would assume direct control of the 470th CIC Detachment but leave a small group of its personnel with CG USARCARIB for his own investigative use. CINCARIB would then not only be responsible for the "investigation, collection and reporting of intelligence matters in the Republic of Panama and the Canal Zone" but also "accept requests for in-

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information on these areas from the Department of the Army" while acting as Executive Agent for the JCS.

2. Utilizing his retained group of personnel from the 470th CIC Detachment for such purpose, CG USARCARIB would continue to undertake the reporting of "purely Army intelligence matters."

3. This new CIC organization was to remain on a trial basis until the end of March 1953. At that time, it would revert back to the prior organization if either the ACofS G-2, D/A, or CG USARCARIB felt "things were not working out properly."^{*}

* MR (C), signed Brig Gen M. F. Hass, CofS Caribbean Command, 22 Oct 52, G-2 350.09 Panama, 22 Oct 52 (24 Sep 46). ACSI Rec Sec. Gen Hass, former Secretary of the General Staff in Washington, D. C., had also served during 1949-50 as Chief of the World Wide Branch, Int Group (Div), OACofS G-2, D/A. This agreement remained in force until after the conclusion of the Korean Conflict period.

With military security problems thus continuing to demand a large share of attention within the departmental intelligence agency of the Army, the Security Division, OACofS G-2, now formed into four functions^{*}

* Chief of the Sec Div, in Jul 52, was Col. W. A. Perry. Its total authorized strength then was 111 persons, including 49 off, 11

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EM and 51 Civilian Employees. See: "Manpower Survey of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence" (S), G-2 320.2, 13 Nov 52 (24 Aug 43), Tabs B & K. ACSI Rec Sec.

branches designated respectively as Personal Security, Special Operations, Security of Military Information and Censorship, was mainly engaged during the period from 9 September 1951 to 31 December 1952 in supervising the following activities:

Personnel Security Branch - Called upon to handle all matters relating to policies and procedures for the investigation and clearance of personnel from the military security standpoint, this branch was faced with ~~the following~~ ^{these} principal problems; *as follows:*

- a. Investigation and Clearance of Foreign Personnel for Entrance into the United States under Auspices of the Joint Intelligence Objective Agency (JIOA) - On 8 May 1952, a new SR 380-160-12 (C) was issued to govern the granting of "limited access" security clearances to foreign personnel brought into the United States under JIOA auspices. One noteworthy feature of this regulation was that it authorized the substitution of a polygraph (lie detector) test for such components of the required background investigation as could not be properly accomplished due to inaccessibility of the geographic area from which the subject personnel had orig-

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Moreover,
inated. Also, an announced aim of the regulation was
to insure that the respective skills of these foreign
personnel would be exploited by the Military Depart-
ments^{concerned} to the fullest extent possible.

- b. Security Clearance of Aliens by Private Industry - While the publication of SR 380-160-12 (C) did help to ease the security clearance problem in connection with the employment of foreign personnel by the Military Departments, the polygraph substitution^{that it} authorized still could not be applied to aliens who were under consideration for employment within private industry. Feeling that some of these latter aliens were probably being denied advantageous employment from the United States viewpoint on classified contracts by private industry, the ACoS G-2, D/A, asked the Department of Defense Munitions Board to grant the same type of exemption to them as the others. Even though this request had been concurred in by all the Army agencies concerned, the Munitions Board, on 13 June 1952, chose to act unfavorably upon it.
- c. Investigation and Clearance of Aliens Serving in the United States Army - Strongly indicated at this time was a need to have the polygraph exemption

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also cover enlisted aliens serving in the United States Army, so that their individual skills could be fully utilized within the appropriate military commands. After a G-2 recommendation to permit such an exemption had been approved first by the Department of Defense and then by the Munitions Board, a new SR 380-160-13 (C) was issued, on 15 August 1952, to implement it.

- d. Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulation - Because the three Military Departments were now dealing with private industry on an ever-increasing scale, the necessity for having a single Armed Forces Security Regulation to control it soon became plainly apparent. During May 1952, therefore, the Munitions Board decided to form an Armed Forces Industrial Security Regulations Committee to accomplish that particular task. This committee was composed of two members from the Munitions Board staff plus two representatives from each of the ^{three} Military Departments. Initially, the two Army representatives on it were Lt. Col. Donald C. Landon, OACofS G-2, D/A, and Lt. Col. David G. Fitch, OACofS G-4, D/A. Capt. A. H. Ladner, OACofS G-3, D/A, however, was later permitted to attend the committee meetings and to receive copies of its agenda and minutes without ^{holding a} ~~possessing any~~ formal membership. The eventual result was the publication of a far-reaching SR 380-405-5, in January 1953, ~~that was~~ designed to establish a single

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personnel investigative and clearance system at all private industrial plants performing classified contracts for any of the Military Departments. It also returned to the OACofS G-2, D/A, several functions bearing upon safeguarding classified information which had been given to the Provost Marshal General's Office during World War II, ^{in order that} ~~so that the~~ administration of the Army part of the new Industrial Security Program would come under complete control by the departmental military intelligence agency. This work then soon grew to be so demanding that a separate Industrial Security Branch, Security Division, was formed during March 1953, in ^{accordance} compliance with a directive received from the Secretary of Defense.

Special Operations Branch - Until 19 September 1951, the entire counterintelligence responsibility for the Pentagon Building had rested with a small 118th CIC Detachment functioning directly under the Special Operations Branch, OACofS G-2, D/A. On that date, the Secretary of Defense instructed the Secretary of the Army to install a much more comprehensive program, which would not only encompass the Pentagon Building proper but also its "grounds and appurtenant buildings." In view of these additional demands, the 118th Detachment was inactivated, effective 8 January 1952, and

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replaced by a larger Sub-Detachment "A" from the 902d CIC Detachment that had recently been organized at Fort Holabird, Md., to execute special counterintelligence missions for the ACoFS G-2, D/A. On 1 December 1952, the Special Operations Branch was renamed the Special Investigations Section, Security Division, but its duties continued to remain essentially unchanged.

Security of Military Information (SMI) Branch - Held responsible for handling all Army matters concerned with the security of classified military information, this branch was involved in a remarkably wide variety of activities along such lines, as follows:

- a. Tripartite (US-UK-France) Security Agreement - The United States Government, in August 1951, formally accepted a set of "principles and standards" for safeguarding classified information that had been agreed upon by a Tripartite Security Working Group made up of top level security experts from the US, UK and France. This Working Group, with Col. Gordon E. Dawson, Chief of the SMI Branch, OACoFS G-2, D/A, acting as Chairman, had recently completed a detailed survey of the regulations and methods in current use within those three countries for that particular purpose. By May 1952, both the UK and France had also announced a similar notice of acceptance in the same matter. The Tri-

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partite Security Working Group, with its Army representation now consisting of Brig. Gen. J. H. Phillips, Deputy ACoS G-2, D/A, as Principal, and Col. John F. Schmelzer, newly appointed Chief of the SMI Branch as Alternate, then met ^{successively} in Washington, London and Paris during the period from October to December 1952 to examine and judge at first hand the progress stemming from this ^{key} international security of information agreement. The true significance of these meetings becomes well illustrated by the fact that they ultimately led to the military security arrangements which were adopted for NATO.

- b. Eligibility of Foreign Representatives to Receive Classified Security Information - In compliance with a NSC directive issued during November 1950, the security officials of the member agencies of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) were finally able some two years later to agree upon a proposed list of procedures for determining the eligibility of individual representatives of foreign governments to receive United States classified information. As recommended to the ICIS, each individual representative would ~~thus~~ be required to furnish an identification document, including a suitable photograph, for check by the FBI and other appropriate internal security agencies before any classified information could be given to him. While certain exceptions were authorized

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for high ranking foreign diplomatic or consular personnel and invited guests of the American Government, the procedures were meant to apply fully to all foreign Service Attaches. No definite action was taken by the ICIS on this touchy proposition, however, prior to the end of the Korean Conflict period.

- c. Security Agreement Between the United States and New Zealand Departments of Defense - in September 1952, the United States and New Zealand Departments of Defense concluded an agreement with reference to taking coordinated measures for the security of their own military information. This agreement called for each Department to maintain military security classifications based upon mutually approved criteria and to disclose classified information to other nationals only under regularly established rules and procedures.
- d. Security Policy Toward the European Defense Community (EDC) - The signing of the EDC Treaty, in May 1952, posed a new and difficult security of information problem to the United States authorities because the German Federal Republic, a non-NATO member, was included in it. Moreover, the treaty itself provided for the formation of an advance Interim Committee to get the EDC ready to function effectively just as soon as it had been

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ratified by the legislative bodies of the nations concerned and also activated a staff organization to commence immediate EDC military planning under the direct guidance of SHAPE. In July 1952, therefore, the ACoS G-2, D/A, forwarded a request to the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee (S-DMICC) recommending the establishment of a temporary disclosure policy toward the EDC to be maintained strictly on a "need to know" basis. The S-DMICC then officially approved the disclosure of United States information classified as high as SECRET on that ^{limited} particular basis to the Interim Committee of EDC, if such information was deemed necessary for accomplishing its defense planning objectives.

- e. Security Policy Toward the German Federal Republic -
- With the advent of German participation in the European Defense Forces of EDC, it became clearly evident that West Germany would soon have to be included within the framework of the national disclosure policies being formulated by S-DMICC. Arrangements were thus made for a combined State-Defense team to visit West Germany during October 1952 and examine the security of information system currently in use therein. Published by the State Department on 3 December 1952, the report of this team expressed

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general satisfaction regarding the legal basis of West German security, a lesser satisfaction with the actual security of some of its governmental agencies and no satisfaction at all with West German industrial security. On the other hand, because of the sound legal basis and strong will to achieve suitable information security it had observed in West Germany, the team felt that S-DMICC should "proceed with those measures which may be expected to bring about rapid improvements in the German security picture."

- f. Security Policy Toward Japan - The establishment of an adequate policy covering the disclosure of United States military information to Japan had been under active consideration ever since 1949. At that time, the Japanese Diet had enacted a National Public Service Law which provided stiff penalties for divulging government information and rendered members of subversive organizations ineligible for government employment. This law, though, promptly came under ^{concentrated} heavy internal attack and was never firmly implemented. Nevertheless, in October 1951, the ACofS G-2, D/A, did recommend the adoption of a limited information disclosure policy toward Japan on an interim basis and a course of action along ^{those} ~~that~~ lines was duly approved by S-DMICC. With the Japanese passing additional laws aimed at tightening their security procedures in May and July 1952, the situation appeared to be clearing up but

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the country shortly experienced another serious political crisis. S-DMICC then decided to postpone any further action in the matter, at least until after this latest governmental crisis had been successfully resolved.

- g. Executive Order 10290 - Designed to establish basic standards throughout the Executive Branch of the Government for safeguarding information affecting the security of the United States, this EO became effective on 27 October 1951 and caused several changes in the current Army security regulations. It required, for example, that all information of such nature should be positively identified ^{being} as "Security Information." Changes in AR 380-5 incorporating only the minimum requirements of EO 10290 were published without delay but a completely rewritten version thereof, covering the entire provisions of EO 10290, could not be prepared and issued until 6 June 1952.

Censorship Branch - Being primarily a planning group, this branch was seldom called upon to perform any actual operational or supervisory censorship functions. Its activities from 9 September 1951 through 31 December 1952, were thus principally, as follows:

- a. Civil Censorship - Although United States policy had for some time been to encourage the unconditional abolishment of civil censorship throughout Austria, there was still a

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small island of it remaining in Vienna. The main reason for this anomaly was that the Soviet element within the Censorship Technical Committee of the quadripartite Allied Council for Austria kept pressing for numerous "compromises" which were obviously calculated to assure Soviet control over all Austrian communications. It was felt best, therefore, to allow the original situation to continue ~~as~~ unchanged. *as long as possible.*

- b. National Censorship - As Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense in connection with planning for the imposition of National Censorship, the Censorship Branch was required to monitor the active duty training of Army and Air Force Reserve Officers holding national censorship mobilization assignments. Arrangements were thus made to have appropriate training courses in censorship work conducted for these personnel at Fort Benning, Ga., from 1-15 June 1952, and at the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif., from 16-30 June 1952. A special activities course was also given to selected censorship military reservists at Washington, D. C., ^{on} ~~in~~ methods of detecting messages written in code, cipher or secret ink. Other important events relating to national censorship planning at this same time were the submission of a detailed staff study to the Secretary of

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Defense, which recommended the completion of needed censorship agreements with several Western Hemisphere countries and the initiation of coordinated planning between the Censorship Branch and all governmental agencies engaged in psychological warfare.

c. Armed Forces Censorship - Censorship activities within this field were centered mostly upon accomplishing the following three tasks:

- (1) Arranging for the training of censorship units at Fort Bragg, N. C.
- (2) Shipping the 1st Military Censorship Organization to EUCOM, so that it would be readily available there to open Armed Forces Censorship in the event of hostilities.
- (3) Developing the Armed Forces Censorship Play for Exercise Long Horn, scheduled to be held at Fort Hood, Tex., during March-April 1952. This exercise not only uncovered a number of valuable indoctrination procedures but also furnished an excellent guide for the reassessment of previously accepted censorship personnel qualifications. *

* See: "History of Department of the Army Activities, 9 September 1951 through 31 December 1952," op. cit., Tab "Sec Div." ACSI Rec Sec.

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The first mention of mail being received within the United States from American prisoners of war held in North Korea or Red China was contained in a report forwarded to Washington by the ACoS G-2, Fifth Army, dated 5 April 1951. ^{IT} ~~The~~ report stated that, according to the Post S-2 at Camp Carson, Colo., Mr. and Mrs. R. W. Wegner of Denver, Colo., had recently received a letter from their own POW son along with 23 other letters written by American POW's in North Korean or Red Chinese prison camps. The Wegners had proceeded to remail the enclosed letters, ~~as requested,~~ ^{as requested.} to the respective addresses shown on them, ^A Shortly thereafter, the ACoS G-2, Second Army, took note of a similar report that 11 POW letters had been received at Mayfield, Ky., accompanied by the same sort of remailing instructions. This sudden POW mail influx plainly represented an integral part of a vigorous Communist psychological warfare offensive, which was also featuring anti-American propaganda disseminated through radio broadcasts, news organs, typical hate pamphlets and undercover agents on a global basis. The offensive was

See: File (S), Apr-Dec 51, G-2 383.6 Korea, f/w (25 May 51).

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undoubtedly aimed at gaining a "cease fire with complete exchange of all POW's" for the Communist truce negotiators at Panmunjum, regardless of whether or not the North Korean or Red Chinese POW's in UN prison camps

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wished to be repatriated. As a matter of fact, a large number of these prisoners had actually signified a desire to refuse such repatriation and to remain on the Free World side of the Iron Curtain.*

* See: DF (S), G-2 to LLD, 11 Feb 53, and Ltr (S) State Dept to TAG, 24 Apr 53; G-2 383.6 Korea (7 Jan 53). ACSI Rec Sec.

(S) In May 1951, the ACoS G-2, D/A, forwarded a summary sheet to the Chief of Staff on the subject of POW mail, the terms of which had already been discussed with the ACoS G-1, D/A, and interested CIA, FBI, ONI and AFOIN officials. It not only called attention to the favorable worldwide reaction that the publication of POW lists in Communist news organs was receiving but also pointed out that the Red Chinese were encouraging correspondence between selected POW's and their relatives within the United States for the obvious purpose of distributing Communist propaganda. The feeling was, therefore, that an ^{appropriate} explanatory statement should be devised and forwarded to the next-of-kin of American POW's, in order to offset any psychological warfare gains the Red Chinese may have achieved by releasing their POW lists in ^a ~~this~~ seemingly forthright manner. The Communist propaganda drive then showed signs of becoming so increasingly successful that the departmental military security officials, during March 1952, joined with CIA in preparing a plan for the censorship of all communications, including POW mail, passing between the

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United States and Chinese mainland. A series of representative conferences were ^{thus} soon held under Army G-2 sponsorship to inquire into the feasibility of establishing that type of censorship without further delay. On 11 August 1952, though, it was decided that two separate studies ought to be initiated in the matter, one to cover just the censorship of POW mail problem and the other to explore "larger-scale censorship."^{*}

* See: MR (S), 11 Aug 52, subj: Conference on PW Mail Project, G-2 383.6 Korea, 11 Aug 52 (25 May 51). ACSI Rec Sec. Lt Col Ross M. Taylor, C & D Div, OACofS G-2, D/A, presided over these conferences, which were attended by appropriate representatives from ONI, AFOIN and CIA. Lt Col Dori Hjalmarson and Capt G. P. Cuttino of the Sec Div, OACofS G-2, D/A, were also present, to give advice on censorship or any other military security matters, as needed.

Meanwhile, late in December 1951, the Chief of Staff had approved an intelligence project authorizing the ACOF S G-2, FECOM, to read and microfilm prior to remailing, all POW mail turned over to the UN negotiators by the Communists during the truce talks ^{which} ~~that~~ were taking place ^{at} Panmunjum. Although most of the propaganda included in these letters was so specious that it could hardly be considered dangerous, some few of them did contain invidious remarks or potentially valuable military

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information and they were sent directly to the ACofS G-2, D/A, for final review and disposition. This mail inspection effort promptly proved to be such a major drain on G-2, FECOM's limited personnel resources, however, that he was forced to request permission to discontinue it. In May 1952, General Bolling did grant permission for G-2 FECOM to cease examining but not microfilming the POW mail, and at the same time, forwarded a so-called "Watch List" to him presenting the names of 7 officers and 24 enlisted men who had either "given definite evidence of Communist indoctrination" or were "suspects of successful indoctrination." Any letters received from them were to be placed at the beginning of the microfilm and after that handled in a special manner. * This Watch List, which was carefully kept up to date in ac-

* See: File (S), Dec 51 - May 52, G-2 383.6 Korea, f/w (25 May 51).
ACSI Rec Sec.

cordance with the latest available information, then served to provide the initial indication to the departmental military intelligence authorities of the true nature and extent of the indoctrination being given to the UN POW's held by the Communists. *

* Notes (C) on Interview with Mr. C. M. Trammell, Jr., Special Asst to Chief, R & D Div, D/A, 12 Sep 61. Author's File.

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With the OACofS G-2, D/A, having thus already embarked upon a program of seeking to collect as much information as possible about the Communist indoctrination of American POW's held in North Korea and Red China, that distressful subject suddenly became of serious national concern late in 1952, when the truce talks at Panmunjum gave distinct promise of yielding an agreement for the large-scale exchange of captured personnel from both sides. Since no firm policies had as yet been announced for handling such returnees, the Secretary of the Army, during January 1953, addressed a number of pertinent questions to the Secretary of Defense regarding the Communist employment of "brain washing" techniques on United States military personnel, in order to obtain ^{proper} ~~needed~~ guidance. Secretary Wilson's ^{*} reply, dated 19 February 1953,

* Mr Charles E. Wilson, President Eisenhower's original Secretary of Defense, was sworn in to replace Secretary Robert A. Lovett, effective 28 Jan 53. Similarly, Mr. Robert T. Stevens, Mr Pace's successor as the Secretary of the Army, took office on 4 Feb 53.

first took note that the Department of the Army had a primary interest in the matter and then requested it to "develop immediate screening and deindoctrination procedures designed both to determine and to overcome any adverse mental effects found to exist

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among personnel of any of the services who have been released or escaped from prisoner of war camps in Korea." He ^{further} ~~likewise~~ asked the Department of the Army to supply the national Psychological Warfare Strategy Board with any data it managed to obtain from the screening of returned prisoners of war.*

* Memo for the Secretary of the Army, signed by C. E. Wilson, 19 Feb 53, sub: Possible Communist Indoctrination of U. S. Captured Personnel, ACSI 383.6 Korea, 15 Apr 53, f/w (24 Jun 53). ACSI Rec Sec.

Although the OACofS G-1, D/A, was designated to be the staff agency for monitoring the entire program involving the return and re-assignment of United States POW's from Korea, now officially known as the "Returned or Exchanged Captured American Prisoners - Korea (RECAP-K) Program," the OACofS G-2, D/A, continued to remain fully aware of its own fundamental intelligence and security responsibilities in connection ^{therewith} ~~with~~ it. These responsibilities not only called for deriving all possible intelligence of tactical or strategical value ^{from it} ~~therefrom~~ but also collecting information on Communist indoctrination means and methods which might serve as a basis for developing effective counter-measures.*

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* Comment No 2 (C), G-2 to G-1 and AGEZ in turn, 17 Apr 53, sub: Processing of Army Personnel Who are Recovered from Captured Status, ACSI 383.6 Korea, 17 Apr 53, f/w (24 Jun 53). ACSI Rec Sec.

Having recently prepared ^{detailed} specific letters of instruction to CINCPAC and the Commanding Generals of all Major Commands ^{relative} in regard to the intelligence processing of REGAP-K personnel, which had first been carefully coordinated with G-1, G-3, G-4, Chief Psy-War, TAG, CINFO and the Surgeon General, and then duly approved by the Chief of Staff, these letters were dispatched on 13 March 1953. ^{*} Shortly thereafter,

* See: SS (C), OACofS G-2 for CofS, 20 Feb 53, and Ltrs (C), AGAC-C 350.09 (10 Mar 53) G-2, sub: Plans for Handling Repatriated POW's from Korea; ACSI 383.6 Korea, 20 Feb-29 Apr 53, f/w (24 Jun 53). ACSI Rec Sec.

Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Robert N. Young, the ACofS G-1, ^{D/A,} appointed an ad hoc committee, composed of representatives from the Offices of the ACofS G-2, Surgeon General, Chief of Psychological Warfare and Chief of Information, to "study and prepare methods and procedures for deindoctrination of U. S. personnel" being returned from POW camps in North Korea or Red China. The proposed plan was to have the members of this committee assigned to Valley Forge Gen-

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eral Hospital, Phoenixville, Pa., where they would be able to observe personnel suffering from Communist "brain washing" techniques and, after studying the problem, submit to the OACofS G-1, D/A, adequate deindoctrination procedures "for immediate use to overcome any adverse mental effects found to exist among those present and recommend disposition in each case."^{*}

* Memo (C), G-1 for G-2, SG, Chief Psy-War and CINFO, 14 Apr 53, ACSI 383.6 Korea, 15 Apr 53, f/w (24 Jun 53). ACSI Rec Sec.

It soon became imperative that some sort of a definite plan should be agreed upon by all concerned for handling returnees from Korea because the initial exchange operation of sick and wounded captured personnel, subsequently known as "Little Switch," had already begun on 19 April 1953 and the American ex-POW's involved were scheduled to start to arrive by air at designated ports of debarkation in the Sixth Army Area within a few days. During a meeting held in the Office of the Chief of Staff on 20 April 1953, therefore, General Collins first asked several pointed questions in the matter and then approved an information seeking program calling for a preliminary interrogation in FECOM followed by a much more extensive one to be given either at Valley Forge General Hospital or in the proper Continental Army area, depending principally upon the physical condition of the individual re-

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turnee concerned. It was also understood that when these returnees were ~~eventually~~ ^{finally} discharged from the Army their respective security files would be turned over to the FBI if any additional investigation seemed indicated. *

* See: MR (C), 29 Apr 53, sub: Plans for Handling Repatriated POW's from Korea, ACSI 383.6 Korea, 29 Apr 53, f/w (24 Jun 53). ACSI Rec Sec. Gen Partridge, the ACofS G-2, D/A, personally attended this important meeting with the Chief of Staff. Lt Cols C. M. Trammell and J.W.A. Whitehorne were also present from the departmental intelligence agency, in order to brief Gen Collins on plans and procedures for interrogating the returnees as a military security measure.

Operation "Little Switch," a total of 127 (3 officers and 124 enlisted men) were from the Army, with 16 negroes included. Only 21 of this total required special Army or FBI investigations but one person did turn out to be a "hard core" Communist and he was eventually discharged without honor for "security reasons" in the Sixth Army Area. *

* See: Notes (C) on "Briefing Presented to Lt General Lemnitzer on 9 January 1954 by Major General Trudeau and Lt Col Trammell," ACSI 383.6 Korea, 9 Jan 54, f/w (14 Mar 55). ACSI Rec Sec. For a detailed discussion of the "Big Switch" POW exchange, which did not commence

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until 5 Aug 53, after the signing of the Armistice on 27 Jul 53
(Korean time), see: Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One (New York,
1959), passim.

It was, however, most productive from the standpoint of collecting
information for both future intelligence and counterintelligence use. *

* Notes (C) on Interview with Mr C. M. Trammell, Jr., Spec Asst
to Chief, R & D Div, D/A, 12 Sep 61. Author's File.

The close of the Korean Conflict period thus found the OACofS
G-2, D/A, not only faced with an ever-mounting number of difficult
military security problems but also, ^{right} in the midst of conducting a
highly sensitive counterintelligence operation that was fraught with
disquieting implications. The most striking development of the entire
period, though, had undoubtedly been the rapid growth of a vast per-
sonnel loyalty-security program which demanded numerous and varied
investigations by many different agencies before appropriate clear-
ance could be granted for an individual to have access to certain
classified information of the United States Government. The inordi-
nate growth of these investigative activities after the Korean out-
break becomes clearly apparent from the following table, designed to
compare the average

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weekly load of security cases in six different categories handled within the Security Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, during the months of June 1950 and June 1951:

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>
Civilian Removal Recommendations	3	18
Military Discharge Recommendations	3	10
National Agency Checks	750	2000
FBI Loyalty Investigations	3	17
G-2 File Checks	5000	13250
CIC Investigations	940	2280 *

* "Discussion of Loyalty-Security Program," presented at Branch Chiefs Meeting by Col Cramer, Chief Sec Div, G-2 000.24, 29 Jun 51 (16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec. In addition, the function of processing all Army requests for ^{AEC}"Q" clearances from the ~~AEC~~ had recently been transferred from the OACofS G-3, ^{D/A,} to the OACofS G-2, D/A.

One of the chief results of this huge expansion in counterintelligence activities during the first year of the Korean Conflict period was to render the already difficult CIC personnel procurement problem almost insolvable. Although from June 1950 to August 1952, the total worldwide strength of the CIC did increase by approximately 1200 enlisted men, it also decreased over the same period by some 100 officers. Furthermore, most of the new enlisted men could only be hastily trained on an emergency basis and the existing qualification standards for

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CIC duty assignment had to be habitually lowered in order to procure them. This adverse personnel situation unquestionably contributed materially to the fact that the backlog of unfinished clearance cases kept getting larger and larger while the conflict progressed. The tremendous extent of that backlog seems aptly illustrated by a report forwarded from the CIC Center to the OACofS G-2, D/A, on 21 August 1952, giving the average number of personnel clearance cases completed per month within the ZI and Overseas Theaters, along with ^{the} ~~the~~ companion backlog, during a nine-month period ending 31 March 1952, as follows:

Average number of ZI cases closed per month	-	18,694
Average number of Overseas cases closed per month	-	102,363
Average backlog of ZI cases per month	-	28,441
Average backlog of Overseas cases per month	-	61,428 *

* TT (S), CIC Center to Wash Ln Office, 21 Aug 52, G-2 350.092, 21 Aug 52, (6 Nov 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

Not all of these listed investigative cases, of course, fell under the same category. Of a total case load of 42,889 ZI cases current on 15 November 1952, for example, 25,301 were Background Investigations, 16,776 National Agency Checks and 812 Complaint Type Investigations. The latter investigations were the least numerous by far but they represented the more serious cases and always required special

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handling. The bulk of the normal backlog was ordinarily made up of National Agency Checks, due to the large number of different agencies that had to be consulted before an individual clearance could be granted. The system then in use for that particular purpose was ^{thus} described by Brig. Gen. P. E. Gallagher, Chief CIC, at an Army Commanders Conference held in December 1952, as follows:

This National Agency Check, in brief, is initiated by the requesting agency or facility and is processed to the G-2 of the Army Area. From this office it is sent to the A.C. of S., G-2, Department of the Army, who, in addition to checking their own files, obtains a check from the FBI and the House Committee on Un-American Activities. When leads so indicate, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of Special Investigation, Civil Service Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department and Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization are also checked. In many cases it has been found that a bottleneck often occurs, as far as time is concerned, in clearing a name through some of the National Agencies which I have outlined. *

* "G-2 Presentation, Army Commanders Conference, 1 December 1952" (S), G-2 337., 24 Dec 52 (18 Apr 46), p. 3. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

By the end of 1952, the number of investigative cases assigned to the CIC had finally commenced to decline, especially within the ZI. The effort was still a major undertaking, however, and, on 31 December 1952, called for the full services of a total of 7030 persons, including 1428 officers, 384 warrant officers, 4622 enlisted men and 596 civilians. At that time, the case load status of all CIC investigations for the past 6 months was officially estimated to be, as follows:

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
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	Pending 1 Jul 52	Opened this 6 mos.	Closed this 6 mos.	Pending 31 Dec 52
Personnel Security Investigations	21,677	50,420	44,611	27,486
Contractor Personnel and Facility Clearance Investigations	5,739	13,123	11,286	7,576
Other Personnel Investigations	20,273	37,848	40,386	17,735
Counterintelligence Investigations	1,898	6,529	7,080	1,347
All other types of Investigations	8,689	43,726	45,203	7,212
Grand Total	58,276	151,646	147,566	62,356 *

* See: Incl to Memo (C), G-2 to Asst for Administrative Security, OSD, 4 Mar 53, G-2 350.092, 4 Mar 53 (7 Jan 53). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

The military security function was intimately connected in a great many different ways during the Korean Conflict period with the intelligence training effort. Training considerations were not only an important influence in limiting the prompt execution of ^{all} CIC investigations but also represented a controlling factor in the proper development of such basic counterintelligence measures as censorship, industrial security and the security of military information. Since there were not

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nearly enough intelligence specialists on hand at the opening of the conflict to satisfy the sudden demands of a major Army expansion, in most cases they had to be immediately procured regardless of established qualification standards and then hastily trained on the job. Unfortunately, the matter of agency or staff responsibility for supervising the conduct of intelligence training remained so obscurely drawn that training along those lines was often badly neglected. A detailed discussion of this notably unsatisfactory intelligence training situation, therefore, is presented in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER VIII

TRAINING EFFORT

The Korean outbreak not only brought about an abrupt and belated Army-wide interest in military intelligence training matters but also served to emphasize once more the difficulties inherent in a divided system of control for such training. The Special Regulation dated 11 April 1950, which announced a new Army General Staff organization with four Assistant Chiefs of Staff instead of the previous five Directors, had failed to mention intelligence training at all within the mission assigned to the ACoFS G-2, D/A. On the other hand, it gave the entire conduct of the training function "for individuals and units (including the ORC) used by the Army in the field" to Headquarters, Army Field Forces (AFF), under general staff supervision by the ACoFS G-3, D/A. Responsibility for performing specialist training at the Strategic Intelligence School (SIS), CIC School and ASA School, however, still remained with the ACoFS G-2, D/A.

* SR 10-5-1, 11 Apr 50, pars 37 & 60.

One month after this major Army reorganization, the ACoFS G-3, D/A, forwarded to the ACoFS G-2, D/A, a "Format" and instructions for preparing the intelligence section of an Army Training Program designed

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to cover both FY 1950 and FY 1951. * When the G-2 Security and Train-

* See: OM, G-2 to S&T Div, 11 May 50, G-2 353-T (11 May 50).
WW II Rec Div, GSA.

ing Division officials sought to accomplish that important task, though, they soon ran into a number of difficult problems. One of these problems was plainly derived from the fact that G-2 responsibilities for ^{developing} ~~the development~~ of the Army Language and Area Training Program established in June 1949, especially those bearing upon operations of the Army Language School (ALS) at the Presidio of Monterey, Calif., were inadequately defined. Also, as an added complication, the ACofS G-2, D/A, mainly for personnel economy reasons, had recently concurred in having the Army Language School designated a Class I activity and placed directly under the Commanding General, Sixth Army, effective 1 July 1950. When completed, this action ^{H.S.} produced the following results:

1. Commanding General, Sixth Army became responsible for its administrative and logistical support.
2. Chief, Army Field Forces became responsible for exercising supervision over Army Language School under guidance of Department of the Army policies.
3. At Department of the Army General Staff level language training became a part of the overall Army Training Program under G-3.
4. G-2 relinquished responsibility for and control over operations, budget and policy matters concerning language training except that a "collaborating interest" in policy remains. *

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* See: OM (S), Chief, Language Training Sect to Chief, Training Div thru Chief, Training Br, 16 Apr 52, G-2 353. Army Language School (16 Apr 52). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

During early August 1950, with the Korean conflict having already been in progress over a month, an attempt was made to fix agency responsibility and student qualifications for the Army Language and Area Training Program more firmly by issuing a special regulation on the subject. Under the terms of this new regulation, such training would be given only to officer volunteers from the Regular Army possessing at least fifteen years of anticipated future service, who could meet G-2 security standards, held a Bachelor's degree, had graduated from an Advance Branch School and were considered adaptable for general staff assignment. The first year of their training was to be carried out at the Army Language School, followed by a second year of intensive language and area instruction at a designated civilian university. The rest of the course would then consist of an appropriate duty assignment within some field installation located overseas in or near the student's respective area of specialization. ACoS G-2, D/A, responsibilities regarding the program, however, were now strictly limited to establishing annual personnel quotas for it and reviewing the curricula used in the various civilian institutions and overseas

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Army installations involved.

* SR 350-380-1, 8 Aug 50, superseding Sec VI, Cir 83, 15 Jun 49.

For some time, the ACofS G-2, D/A, and Director of Intelligence, USAF, had been corresponding with each other relative to the continued use of the SIS for training Air Force officers in all aspects of strategic intelligence. Just before the Korean outbreak, they had managed to reach a formal agreement on Standard Operating Procedure in this matter, which specified generally as follows:

1. OACofS G-2, D/A, will be the executive agency for administering the School.
2. Deputy ACofS G-2, D/A, will act as Commandant of the School and be responsible for meeting USAF requirements connected with the administrative supervision of Air Force personnel either assigned to the School Staff or detailed at the SIS as students.
3. Senior Army officer permanently on duty with the SIS will serve as its Assistant Commandant and operate the School under policies prescribed by the Commandant.
4. The number of USAF personnel assigned to or detailed as students at the School will be as mutually agreed upon between

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the D/I, USAF, and ACofS G-2, D/A. Also, ~~the~~ assigned USAF personnel will function as an integral part of the School Staff and the D/I, USAF, will select and detail all Air Force students for the School within quota limits set by the ACofS G-2, D/A.

5. Subject to approval of the ACofS G-2, D/A, the Air University will provide Air Force personnel for the School Staff according to existing joint Army-Air Force regulations. *

* Memo, G-2 and D/I, USAF, to Asst Commandant SIS, 2 Jun 50, G-2 352-Strategic Intelligence School (2 Jun 50). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

Adding further to this favorable SIS development, the ACofS G-2, D/A, on 17 August 1950, directed that all officers newly assigned to the departmental military intelligence agency would be required to attend the next course presented at the school following their arrival, unless he personally exempted them from doing so. *

* G-2 Memo No. 32, 17 Aug 50, G-2 300.6 (6 Jan 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

Unfortunately, though, the exigencies of the Korea personnel augmenta-

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tion program soon prevented the full implementation of that beneficial action and, by early October 1950, it even became necessary to shorten the SIS course from twelve to four weeks in order to satisfy the heavy demand being built up for experienced intelligence officers at higher headquarters in the field. This reduction not only meant eliminating the whole research phase of the course but also deleting several highly informative lectures which had previously been included in it. A total of five of these "quickie" courses were then given between 9 October 1950 and 2 March 1951, when the SIS finally reverted back to its original schedule.

* "Summary of Major Activities of the ACoS G-2, 25 June 1950 through 8 September 1951" (C), op. cit., p. 35.

The Korean outbreak naturally created an enormous ^{requirement} ~~demand~~ for military maps of the Far East, especially those covering the Korean Peninsula. Only limited quantities of such maps with scales of 1:250,000 and 1:50,000 were currently available, although under a long-range "Post Hostilities Mapping Program, Pacific and Asiatic Areas" initiated during 1945, aerial photography mapping of Korea south of the 38th Parallel and ground control for the entire peninsula had already been completed. An overdue revision of these medium and large-scale maps, therefore, was in actual progress at the time that the hostilities opened. To expedite this essential effort the ACoS G-2, D/A, on 28 July 1950, assigned fixed responsibilities to the Office

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of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, and Headquarters, FECOM, for accomplishing the map revision and recompilation work by blocks of sheets on a priority schedule. The Map and Photo Branch, Security and Training Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, then took over active supervision of ^{that important} ~~this~~ essential project, with a view to providing accurate South Korea sheets and suitable tactical maps of North Korea for theater use just as soon as possible. Since the combat in Korea presented an excellent opportunity to apply the recently developed Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Grid Reference System to military operations, a successful changeover was made from the previous World Polyconic Grid System to that new system, effective 12 October 1950. Thereafter, only UTM was utilized for control of all ground support missions fired by the U. S. Army, Navy and Air Force in Korea. Medium scale (1:250,000) plastic terrain models produced by the Army Map Service for badly needed assistance in planning combined military operations, were also rushed to FECOM during the early months of the Korean Conflict period. *

* Ibid., pp. 33-34.

On 30 September 1950, the Chief of the Security and Training Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, was able to sum up the intelligence specialist training situation within the United States for the requested information of Secretary Pace, as of the end of August 1950, in the following manner:

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At the Army Language School in Monterey, 21 languages (Albanian, Arabic, Bulgarian, Chinese, Czechoslovakian, Danish, French, Greek, Hungarian, Japanese, Korean, Norwegian, Persian, Polish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish) are being taught. There were, on 31 August 1950, 507 students of whom 141 were Air Force. Classes starting in September and November will raise this to approximately 900. In an emergency, the Army Language School could accommodate 2000. The requirement for emergency training of linguists already exceeds the capacity of the installation.

The mission of the Intelligence Division, Army General School, Fort Riley, is to train officers and enlisted men in intelligence specialist duties at battalion and division level. These duties are: Intelligence General, Photo Interpretation, Order of Battle, POW Interrogation, Translator, Interpreter, Censorship, Strategic Intelligence and Equipment Identification. Courses are 10 weeks for officers and 9 weeks for enlisted men. Capacity at present is 100 each but, starting 17 November 1950, it will be 200 each. New classes are scheduled every 5 weeks.

Language and Area Courses (SR 350-320-1) are in Russian, Greek, Japanese, Persian, Chinese, Arabic and Turkish. *

* OM, Chief S&T Div to Asst Exec P&C, 30 Sep 50, G-2 020 Training Division (30 Sep 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

As indicated in this brief summation, major shortages of foreign linguists had already started to appear in the United States Army before 31 August 1950. Furthermore, the demands for such specialists, most of whom were performing some type of military intelligence duty, kept mounting so rapidly that little or no improvement could be expected in the situation for many months to come. On 2 September 1950, G-2 FECOM forwarded an estimate to the ACofS G-2, D/A, which not only

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called attention to critical shortages existing within the theater in Russian (Great Russian dialect), Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese), Korean and Japanese linguists but also warned that, based upon World War II experience, there would be a tremendous increase in these shortages "should the Korean situation expand to involve Asiatic Communist areas." * The departmental intelligence officials were thus

* Ltr (S), G-2 FECOM to G-2, D/A, 2 Sep 50, G-2 350.03-T, 20 Sep 50. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

made aptly aware of the urgency and magnitude of the foreign language specialist problem at this early date, even though their assigned role in the matter was now strictly limited to an advisory one and a final determination of the steps that should be taken to alleviate the problem would have to come from the OACofS G-3, D/A.

The intelligence section of the Army Training Program for FY 1950 and FY 1951, prepared under the general staff direction of the OACofS G-3, D/A, was eventually published during the latter part of October 1950. Observing a prescribed list of separate paragraphs dealing, in turn, with "objectives," "policies," "methods," "facilities requirements," "personnel requirements" and "fund requirements" for each main G-2 training activity, it discussed in considerable detail the planned programs for Language and Area Training, Army Security Agency, Counter



Intelligence Corps School and Strategic Intelligence School. Because these planned programs give such an illuminating insight into the often unappreciated complexities of the intelligence specialist training function, a number of selected extracts from them are being reproduced herein, more or less in full, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY LANGUAGE AND AREA TRAINING PROGRAM

OBJECTIVES

The objective of the Department of the Army Language and Area Training Program is to train carefully selected officers, potentially qualified for high level staff and/or command assignments, with such knowledge of the intelligence aspects of languages and areas as will assist them, when assigned to positions of responsibility, in forming sound decisions. Twenty-seven officers are selected annually under this program.


POLICIES

Language and Area courses . . . involve three to four years of study, with the first year almost entirely devoted to obtaining fluency in the language, whereas subsequent years stress the political, economic, sociological, and topographic aspects of the general areas and their peoples. The following annual quotas are allotted. . . .:

Russian	5	Greek	4
Japanese	4	Persian	4
Turkish	4	Chinese	2
Arabic	4		

METHODS


The first year's instruction is conducted at the Army Language School, Presidio of Monterey, California, Thereafter, the sequence of training will normally be as follows:



- [REDACTED]
- a. Japanese
 - 1. Stanford University, Stanford, California, for 1 year.
 - 2. Detachment "S", Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Tokyo, Japan, for remainder of course.
 - b. Russian
 - 1. Columbia University, New York, New York, for 1 year.
 - 2. Detachment "R", Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Regensburg, Germany, for remainder of course.
 - c. Chinese
 - 1. Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, for 1 year.
 - 2. On-the-job training with the appropriate United States Army Attache.
 - d. Persian
 - 1. Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., for 1 year.
 - 2. On-the-job training with the appropriate United States Army Attache.
 - e. Greek
 - 1. Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., for 1 year.
 - 2. On-the-job training with the appropriate United States Army Attache.
 - f. Arabic
 - 1. Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., for 1 year.
 - 2. On-the-job training with the appropriate United States Army Attache.
 - g. Turkish
 - 1. Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., for 1 year.
 - 2. On-the-job training with the appropriate United States Army Attache.

FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS

Detachment "R", Facilities furnished by Commanding General, EUCOM.
Detachment "S", Facilities furnished by Commanding General, FECOM.



PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

		<u>FY - 1950</u>		<u>FY - 1951</u>	
		<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>
Detachment "R")	Staff	6	8	6	8
	&				
Detachment "S")	Faculty	2	10	2	10

FUND REQUIREMENTS

	<u>Cost Elements</u>	<u>FY - 1950</u>	<u>FY - 1951</u>
Army Language School	Contractual Svcs	\$3,656.24	\$3,700.00
Civilian Institutions			
Columbia	Contractual Svcs	6,100.00	6,100.00
Princeton	Contractual Svcs	16,070.00	16,070.00
Yale	Contractual Svcs	1,200.00	1,200.00
Stanford	Contractual Svcs	3,909.32	3,909.32
Detachment "R"	Pay of Civ	30,859.00	30,777.00
	Training Aids	5,000.00	5,000.00
	Contractual Svcs	1,500.00	2,000.00
Detachment "S"	Training Aids	2,500.00	2,500.00
Military Attache System (Overseas)		45,940.00	66,000.00

Note: In order to increase their value to the Service, officers, enlisted men and U. S. civilians stationed in the offices of the U. S. Army Attaches in countries where English is not the language of the country, are required to study the language normally spoken in that country. It is estimated that approximately 300 personnel will receive instructions in any one of 28 languages. In addition to regular language instruction, the sum of \$15,000 is included in the total amount to cover the cost of language instruction and textbooks for fifteen Language and Area students who will be attached to the office of concerned Army Attaches in the Near East for on-the-job training, augmented by language instruction. This figure is based on the fifteen students being located in five different U. S. Army Attache offices and receiving a minimum of eight hours language instruction per week.

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

OBJECTIVES

To qualify individuals and units to accomplish communication security and communication intelligence missions required of Armed Forces Security Agency and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. . . .

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POLICIES

... Training Emphasis

Officer Specialists - During Fiscal Year 1951, officer training will be accelerated and intensified . . . by instituting the following mobilization specialist courses, conducted in a 44-hour training week:

Radio Intelligence Officer Course
Traffic Analysis and Cryptanalysis Officer Course
Communication Security and Security Officer,
Cryptographic, Course

Enlisted Specialists - During Fiscal Year 1951, enlisted training will be accelerated and intensified by eliminating all "desirable to know" material and conducting a 44-hour training week. . . .

Individual Training. Army Security Agency School.

. . . conducted in accordance with principles set forth in TM 21-250 and Training Memorandum No. 1, Hq. ASA, 1 June 1950.

Unit Training . . . conducted in accordance with principles set forth in TM 21-250, FM 21-5, FM 22~~5~~ as superseded, TF 7-295 and Training Memorandum No. 1, Hq. ASA, 1 June 1950.

Combined Training. In general, it is the desire of ASA to participate in combined training whenever the scope of the training and personnel availability permit. Known combined training for Fiscal Year 1951 will be the participation of one Detachment, Communication Reconnaissance (Scty) in field exercise conducted by the 82d Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, N.C., during October, November and December 1950.

Field Exercises. Field exercises in communication security and communication intelligence will be conducted by all units within the ZI during their training cycle. . . .

Joint Training. For Fiscal Year 1951, joint training will be conducted during Operation LONESTAR in communication intelligence by two communication reconnaissance companies (Intel) and in communication security by one communication reconnaissance company (Scty) Emphasis will be in the detection, recording and reporting of violations of communication security by participating units.

On-the-job Training with industrial organizations. Specialists, in a limited number, will be trained by the manufacturer in the maintenance and repair of International Business Machines

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Army Security Agency School

FY - 1950		FY - 1951	
MIL	CIV	MIL	CIV
327	25	484	50

[REDACTED]

FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS

Army Security Agency School				
Classrooms				71,908 sq. ft.
Offices				14,320 sq. ft.
Maintenance shops, warehousing and misc.				64,846 sq. ft.
Housing, messing, administration, recreation and associated facilities for personnel strengths as follows:				
	OFF	W/O	EM	Total
Staff and Faculty (incl UTC overhead)	173	4	530	707
ASAS Students	200	-	1800	2000
Unit Training Center (less UTC overhead)	155	-	1688	1843
School Troops	23	-	473	496
Total	551	4	4491	5096 5046

FUND REQUIREMENTS

Schools (Army System)	Cost Elements	FY - 1950	FY - 1951
	Pay of Civilians	\$94,000	\$150,000
	TDY Military	3,000	6,000
	Training Aids	15,000	30,000

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS SCHOOL

OBJECTIVES

a. To provide training for selected officers and enlisted men to collect, evaluate, and disseminate information pertaining to enemy activity, sabotage, treason, disaffection, or subversive activities; and to perform background investigations of military and civilian personnel within the jurisdiction of the Army.

b. To provide training for selected enlisted men in administrative procedures peculiar to the Counter Intelligence Corps.

c. To provide training in the fundamentals of the German and Japanese languages and in the basic geographic, economic, historical, and political information necessary for effectiveness on Counter Intelligence Corps assignments in Germany and Japan.

d. To provide special training in clerical procedures, photography, and technical subjects peculiar to the Counter Intelligence Corps.

e. To provide special training in subjects peculiar to the Counter Intelligence Corps to Army Attaches and selected State Department officials

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POLICIES

... Training Standards.

- a. Security clearance of all students at the Counter Intelligence Corps School is required in accordance with present regulations.
- b. Minimum AGCT requirements for enlisted courses at the Counter Intelligence Corps School is a standard score of 110 or higher on aptitude in area 1.
- c. Prerequisites for officer CIC courses: Commissioned officers of the Regular Army or an active member of a Reserve Component whose assignment, actual or anticipated, is to counter intelligence activities. A college degree or equivalent in permanent experience.
- d. Prerequisites for enlisted CIC courses: Must be U. S. citizen between ages of 18 and 38. High School graduate or equivalent as measured by the general educational development test standard score of 110 or higher on aptitude in area 1.
- e. Language course students must have credit for either enlisted or officer regular course and current assignment to the Counter Intelligence Corps.
- f. CIC special course prerequisites are as required by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Training Emphasis.

- a. Officer Specialists. During Fiscal Year 1951, officer specialists in Investigative Course, Part I, will receive training in Counter Intelligence Corps administration and historical subjects; investigative subjects; technical subjects; legal subjects; geo-political subjects; and current military training in counter intelligence staff duties. Officers enrolled in the Investigative Course, Part II, will receive training in counter intelligence staff duties; Counter Intelligence Corps administration; detachment operations; technical subjects; intelligence organizations; and geo-political subjects.
- b. Enlisted Specialists. Enlisted specialists will receive training in the mission of the CIC; organization of the National Military Establishment; intelligence procedures; administration in CIC; investigative reports; typing; English; security; observation and description; investigations; informant interrogations; counter sabotage; surveillance; undercover investigations; raids and searches; evidence; CIC incidents; CIC in combat; finger-prints; defense against methods of entry; defense against sound devices; investigative photography; legal principles; court martial procedure; weapons; international surveys; and CIC detachment problems

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METHODS

a. Basic.

<u>Courses</u>	<u>Training Doctrine</u>
CIC Investigations, Officer, Part I) (12 Weeks)	SR 380-310-1; TM's 30-215, 217, 218; Special Texts, CIC School, Ft. Holabird, Md.
CIC Administration (2 Weeks)	
CIC Investigations, Enlisted, (12 Weeks)	

b. Advance.

CIC Investigations, Officer Part) II (8 Weeks)	SR 380-310-1; TM's 30-215, 217, 218; Special Texts, CIC School, Ft. Holabird, Md.
CIC Language & Area Familiariza-) tion German and Japanese	
(8 Weeks)	

c. Special Intelligence and Counter Intelligence.

Administrative)	As required by G-2. GSUSA
CIC-ORC Specialization, Officer, (2 Weeks)) Refresher	
CIC-ORC Specialization, Enlisted, (2 Weeks)) Refresher	
Special, Photography and Technical Sub-) jects, Mil Attaches (5-Day)	
Special, Security Officers, State Dept) (2 Weeks)	
Special, Technical and Administrative Sub-) jects, Mil Attaches (2-Day)	

d. Training at Civilian Institutions.

Leonarde Keeler Polygraph Institute,) Chicago, Illinois.	As determined by Leonarde Keeler Poly- graph Insti- tute
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PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

	FY - 1950		FY - 1951	
	Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
Schools (Army System)	212	29	299	50 . . .

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FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS

Schools (Army System)	<u>Cost Elements</u>	<u>FY - 1950</u>	<u>FY - 1951</u>
	Rehabilitation	\$133,000	\$983,000
	New Construction	-	938,000
	Total -		
		<u>\$133,000</u>	<u>\$1,921,000</u>

FUND REQUIREMENTS

Schools (Army System)	<u>Cost Elements</u>	<u>FY - 1950</u>	<u>FY - 1951</u>
	Pay of Civ	\$97,000	\$117,000
	Travel of Civ	-	-
	TDY Mil	9,000	27,000
	Training Aids	31,000	48,000
	Contractual Svcs	2,000	7,000
	Total	<u>\$139,000</u>	<u>\$229,000</u>

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL

OBJECTIVES

a. To provide training in strategic intelligence procedures for Army and Air Attaches; for replacements for the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA; and for other selected personnel designated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

b. To provide administrative training for Warrant Officers, Enlisted and Civilian personnel designated for duty in the Attache System of the Army and Air Force.

c. To provide foreign language "refresher" courses for personnel designated or assigned to the Attache System of the Army and Air Force.

Individual Training requirements.

		<u>FY - 1950</u>	<u>FY - 1950 (Estimate)</u>
Army) Regular Of-	210	273
) ficers or		
) Reserves on		
Air Force) EAD	99	129
Navy		12	16
C.I.A.		26	34
Others		17	22
	Total -	<u>364</u>	<u>474</u>



POLICIES

. . . The training policy is to provide the maximum amount of training in Strategic Intelligence and Attache administration for such personnel, as designated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, within the physical capacity of the School, and within the time availability of the student concerned.

The School conducted a two-week course for Army MI Reserve Officers from 7 August to 18 August 1950. Students trained - 24.

Students designated for Attache Systems have a time requirement of eight weeks to complete the short course.

Non-Attache students have a time requirement of four weeks to complete the short course.

The regular course requires sixteen weeks for Attaches and twelve weeks for non-Attaches.

An accelerated program was adopted effective 9 October 1950 in connection with the First Augmentation Program for the balance of calendar year 1950. This program reduced the length of the course from twelve weeks to four weeks. The School has facilities to train 80 students in November and December 1950. It is contemplated to resume the regular course when the situation so merits, probably early in 1951.

METHODS

Individual Training. The method of training is by lecture and applicatory exercises supervised and guided by the School staff. The lectures are given by personnel from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, Army, Navy and Air Force, and other Governmental agencies and civilian institutions - all without expense to the School.

Group Instruction. Elementary, intermediary, and advanced courses in French, Spanish, German and Russian are offered primarily to personnel selected for attache assignments and also to other personnel in special categories. To facilitate teaching, native instructor personnel are utilized. Responsibility for learning the language rests upon the individual student.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

The Strategic Intelligence School's overhead staff requires eleven officers, three enlisted men and five civilians.

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FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS

The School requires 13,000 square feet of office and classroom space in Washington, D. C, equipped with air-conditioning and one classroom for 80 students equipped with a Public Address System, facilities for showing sound training films, and suitable slide panels for map and displays. . . .

FUND REQUIREMENTS

No funds are required other than to cover cost of language training since the overhead expense for the Army military and civilian personnel is absorbed by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and by Headquarters, USAF, for Air Force military and civilian personnel.

	<u>Cost Element</u>	<u>FY - 1950</u>	<u>FY - 1951</u>
Strategic Intelligence School	<u>Contractual</u>	\$11,800.00	\$12,200.00 *

* "Army Training Program, Section VII, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2," G-2 353-T, 24 Oct 40 (11 May 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

It had been clearly apparent for some time that the enforced merger of the G-2 security and training functions into a combined Security and Training (S&T) Division was not meeting with any real success because the two functions were so markedly different. This was especially true following the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, due to the rapid expansion it occasioned ⁱⁿ both ~~in~~ intelligence security and training activities. The S&T Division was finally abolished, therefore,

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effective 1 February 1951, and replaced by separate Security and Training Divisions, with the latter division being initially organized into four main branches which were designated respectively as the Training, Plans and Organization, Reserve Components, and Map and Photo Branches. In July 1951, its Plans and Organization Branch was renamed the Troop Requirements Branch and given the principal mission of "developing a typical Military Intelligence support structure for Theaters, Armies, Corps, Divisions and Logistical Commands" ^{derived} _{based} ^{from} upon the lessons of World War II and more recent combat experience in Korea. The same branch also soon took over the troop requirement phase of all G-2 mobilization planning and began to emphasize the progressively increasing needs of military intelligence operations for qualified personnel on and after M Day in connection therewith. *

* "Summary of Major Activities of ACoFS, 25 June 1950, through 8 September 1951" (C), pp. 32-33 and Tabs A & B.

The Army intelligence training effort, though, had been constantly beleaguered by widespread misunderstanding and inadequate recognition right from the start. The First Observer Team that was sent to FECOM from Headquarters, AFF, for example, submitted a lengthy report in October 1950, which completely overlooked the "organization, training, and function-

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ing of intelligence personnel and combat intelligence aspects." As soon as they became aware of this astonishing discrepancy in December 1950, the G-2 training officials pointedly recommended that the Second Observer Team from AFF, which was then already in Korea, should *be immediately promptly* ~~be specifically~~ directed to look into the following matters of important intelligence interest:

I. Mapping

- (a) To what degree have monochrome maps proved satisfactory for troop use?
- (b) Do you have any comments on accuracy of maps furnished thus far?
- (c) Have grid tables been employed by artillery, and, if so, how successful was their use?
- (d) Have plastic relief maps been of real value to staff planners or are they merely a luxury item? To what levels should they be distributed?
- (e) How has wet strength map paper stood up under wet climatic conditions in Korea?
- (f) Do you have any comments on the use of the UTM Grid and Referencing System by ground units? In joint close support operations?

II. Photography

- (a) Are ground needs for aerial reconnaissance photography being adequately fulfilled? If not, what are the deficiencies?
- (b) What methods are used and who is charged with bulk reproduction of aerial photography for ground troop use?
- (c) Are prints of requested reconnaissance photography being furnished to ground units in time to be of use? If not, what is causing the delay?
- (d) How much aerial and ground photography and of what type is being obtained by ground units with available organic equipment?
- (e) What items of equipment or changes are considered necessary in order to improve local photographic coverage?
- (f) What, if any, measures are necessary (equipment, training, personnel) to improve photo interpretation service?
- (g) What agency or agencies are performing photo interpretation for Army units?
- (h) What portion, if any, of the aerial reconnaissance capacity in the theater is allocated to accomplish mapping photography? Have requirements for mapping photography been adequately met?

[REDACTED]

III. Functioning of MIS Units.

- (a) Is the MISO (T/O&E 30-600) support adequate? What is the recommended MISO support in composition, i. e., Photo Interpreter, Order of Battle, PW Interrogation, and strength for commands at various levels in addition to that provided for in T/O&E organic to the command?
- (b) Recommended changes to T/O&E 30-600 personnel, equipment, etc., if any, demonstrated as necessary as a result of testing in actual combat.
- (c) Is the present CIC detachment adequate in combat areas? What changes in existing T/O&E's are recommended?
- (d) What deficiencies were noted in CIC plans as devised by the major operating units?
- (e) It has been reported that units similar to the currently training Ranger Companies have been employed in Korea. Does experience indicate that Ranger Companies could and should be charged with intelligence missions in addition to their tactical mission? *

* OM (S), Chief S&T Div to Asst Exec P&C, Item 89 in Special Chronological File, G-2 020. G-2 Training Branch, 31 Dec 50 (30 Sep 50).
ACSI Rec Sec.

During this same general period, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, ^{also} felt called upon to take official notice of certain faults existing in the organization of the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kans., which "appeared to militate against obtaining maximum results in intelligence training activities." In a Confidential letter to Maj. Gen. L. J. Whitlock, the newly appointed commandant of that school, General Bolling directed his attention to the fact that intelligence training was being cur-

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rently carried out in five separate sections and three different departments, thus permitting a division of responsibility which plainly "does not lend itself to continuity of instruction." As an added complication from the intelligence training standpoint, the Chief, AFF, had recently recommended that the school should set up four new functional departments of instruction and charge them respectively with performing the following closely related tasks:

- (a) Preparation, revision and administration of extension courses.
- (b) Preparation and revision of training literature and visual aids.
- (c) Research and analysis.
- (d) Development of tactics and preparation of literature connected with Aggressor. *

* Ltr (C), Maj Gen A. R. Bolling to Maj Gen L. J. Whitlock, Item 210 in Special Chronological File, G-2 020.G-2 Training Branch, 31 Dec 50 (30 Sep 50).

Gratifying
Significant progress, however, could still be reported within the military mapping field. During January 1951, for instance, the departmental training authorities finally came to realize the grave need for effecting an appropriate consolidation of the Army mapping program with the operational and other emergency plans that were being prepared in the OACofS G-3, D/A. This recognition soon led the OACofS G-3, D/A, to develop a preliminary mapping priority list, which had been duly concurred in by the OACofS G-2, D/A; Joint Intelligence Group of the

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Joint Staff; Office of the Chief of Engineers and Army Map Service. After this list had been successfully applied on a trial basis for approximately five months, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, then addressed a formal letter of instructions, dated 20 July 1951, to the major Army field commanders, announcing Department of the Army policies on the maintenance of military mapping priorities and describing the current mapping requirements of all types for their general guidance. Appended thereto was also a detailed "world-wide list of mapping priorities of countries and areas" as recommended to the ACoFS G-2, D/A, by the Army Map Committee. At that time, of course, Korea still held the highest priority for both large scale (1:25,000 - 1:50,000) and medium scale (1:100,000 - 1:500,000) maps but the intention was to have the list undergo a periodic review for the express purpose of keeping it constantly up-to-date.*

* Ltr (S), G-2 to AGAO, 20 Jul 51, sub: Policy on Establishment of Military Mapping Priorities, G-2 061.01, 20 Jul 51 (25 Jun 51).
ACSI Rec Sec.

In June and July 1951, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Leo W. Bagley, Chief of the Training Branch, Training Division, OACoFS G-2, D/A, journeyed to FECOM and spent over a month there on detached service visiting Army

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Headquarters down through the battalion level. This and other similar visits made to the Far East by military intelligence officials from Washington proceeded to play an important part in the eventual establishment of a theater intelligence school at Camp Drake (near Tokyo) in Japan. The need for such a school was clearly indicated because a recent survey had shown that only 7% of the personnel performing intelligence duties in FECOM ever received any special prior training or enjoyed any past experience in their assigned work. The value of these liaison visits was then further reflected in August 1951, when the departmental intelligence training authorities were able to give a large amount of practical advice and assistance, drawn from their ~~own~~ Korean ^{observations} ~~experience~~ to the VII Corps during its final SOUTHERN PINE maneuvers. They could even furnish the ACofS G-2, VII Corps, with a copy of the I Corps SOP on intelligence operations in order to direct his own future along the same lines.

* "Summary of Major Activities of ACofS G-2, 25 June 1950 through 8 September 1951" (C), op. cit., p. 31. Officers from the Training Div, OACofS G-2, D/A, visited 84 different military installations during 1951. While this did represent a total of 280 days away from Washington, the time was considered to be "well spent." See: OM, Chief Tr Div to G-2 Exec, 15 Jan 52, G-2 335.11-T, 15 Jan 52. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

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The intelligence specialist training program at home, though, kept running into all sorts of serious difficulties. There were obviously far too many different agencies now involved in it and the lines of responsibility both for planning and conducting the program continued to remain inadequately fixed. On 18 September 1951, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, forwarded a detailed staff study to the ACoFS G-1, D/A, and ACoFS G-3, D/A, which not only sharply outlined this problem for them but also listed the current shortages of military intelligence specialists within the Army in precise terms. Nothing further then happened in the matter until 13 December 1951, when, after General Bolling had discussed it personally with the Chief of Staff, General Collins directed him "to study in conjunction with G-1 and G-3, the problem of personnel requirements for intelligence activities with a view toward developing requirements by MOS and numbers required, and procurement and training plans to meet and maintain these requirements." ^{This} ~~part~~ directive actually necessitated the preparation of two separate studies, one concerned primarily with the ASA specialist problem and another to cover the "requirements for critical intelligence specialists throughout the entire range of G-2 activities."^{*}

* Memo for ACoFS G-2 from SGS, 13 Dec 51, in Special File on the "Procurement of Intelligence Specialist Personnel" (S), G-2 211. Specialists, undated 52, (27 Nov 51), Tab F. ACSI Rec Sec.



The required ASA specialist study was promptly submitted to the Chief of Staff in the form of a highly classified document and received generally favorable consideration. The broader study, however, which took great pains to point out that "there is no single operational agency in the United States Army responsible for the procurement, training and assignment of intelligence specialist personnel" failed to enjoy any such clear sailing. Among other things, it recommended that the ACoFS G-1, D/A, be called upon to undertake an Army-wide inventory to determine what personnel within the "Active Establishment possessed intelligence specialist assets but were not assigned to military intelligence duties." The indicated plan was to utilize these personnel in reducing the following estimated "current and projected intelligence specialist personnel deficits":

	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted	Civilians
1952	4861	6160	6083	1059
1953	2809	120	3101	783
1954	2748	1091	5514	735 *

* SS (S), ACoFS G-2 to CofS, 27 Feb 52, in Ibid.

The ACoFS G-1 (Lt. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe), ACoFS G-3 (Maj. Gen. R. E. Jenkins) and Army Comptroller (Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain) all non-concurred in the main recommendations of this G-2 study. They objected principally to the idea of making any changes in the existing



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personnel assignment or training policies that might tend to re-
gard intelligence specialists as being exempt therefrom. The Chief

* Ibid., Tabs G, H, and I.

of Staff thus returned it to the ACofS G-2, ^{D/A,} on 14 March 1942, and directed him to get together with the ACofS G-1 and ACofS G-3, ^{D/A,} in order to develop a practicable plan which would not only "maintain the various intelligence training courses at optimum strength" but also "reduce the deficit in intelligence specialist personnel." A

* Memo (S) for ACofS G-2 from SGS, 14 Mar 52, in Ibid.

revised plan designed to achieve these two purposes was then approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration shortly thereafter, despite the fact that both the ACofS G-1 and ACofS G-3, ^{D/A,} had registered a number of "exceptions" when they concurred in it. Besides recommending that the latter authority be called upon to adjust the capacities of the Army training installations for absorbing an expected increase in intelligence input, the new plan instructed the ACofS G-1, ^{D/A,} to accomplish the following specific tasks:

[REDACTED]

(1) Inventory the Army to identify Officers and Warrant Officers whose Duty, Primary, Secondary or Tertiary MOS's, or main civilian skills qualify them to be Intelligence Specialists.

(2) Inventory the Army to identify those individuals who possess linguistic ability, to include the degree of fluency in specified language(s).

(3) Instruct the Continental Army Commanders to solicit the application and expedite the assignment of volunteers into Intelligence Training installations.

(4) Direct the assignment into Intelligence Activities of quotas of newly commissioned officers, officers returning to Active Duty, and new Warrant officers in numbers sufficient to meet a per cent of total of Intelligence Specialists requirements.

(5) Issue instructions to the Continental Army Commanders to identify at Reception Centers and Training Divisions incoming personnel who possess skills needed in Intelligence Specialist fields in sufficient numbers to meet a per cent of total of Intelligence Specialists requirements. *

* SS (S), ACofS G-2 to CofS, 5 Apr 52, in Ibid.

^{Handwritten}
Progress reports were forwarded to the Chief of Staff on the implementation of this approved intelligence specialist study in both ⁱⁿ May and August 1952. By that time, though, the rapid military expansion occasioned by Korea was largely over and the Army had already entered into a newly imposed period of defense economy, with consequent reductions in all training funds. While the deficit in enlisted intelligence specialists had been fully erased, except for interrogators and translators, the situation for officer intelligence

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specialists was still in an unsatisfactory state at the end of August 1952, as follows:

SPECIALTY	MOS	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL	SHORTAGES
Photo Interpreter	8503	269	129	-140
Intelligence Officer	9300	660	706	+ 46
Military Intel Staff Officer	9301	952	1281	+329
Counter Intelligence Officer	9302	1931	2105	+174
Foreign Liaison Intel Officer	9303	430	162	-268
Intelligence Officer	9307	215	150	- 65
Intel & Scty Officer	9311	125	113	- 12
Chemical Intel Officer	9314	33	18	- 15
Interrogator	9316	233	109	-124
Order of Battle	9318	141	70	- 71
Translator	9380	136	54	- 82
Interpreter	9332	116	75	- 41
Censorship	9535	378	32	-346
Tech Intel Officer	9340	103	73	- 30 *
		5722	5077	

* See: SS (S), ACofS G-2 to CofS, 29 Aug 52, in Ibid. There was also a shortage of 589 warrant officers at this time for assignment to CIC duty.

No better example can be found to illustrate the difficulties that were constantly encountered by the departmental military intelligence authorities in connection with ~~the execution of~~ ^{the execution of} this intelligence specialist program than to follow their persistent efforts to satisfy the ever-mounting demands of the Army for trained foreign linguists during the Korean Conflict period. Although the Army Language School (ALS) had recently been removed from direct G-2 supervision, the ACofS G-3, D/A,

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on 23 January 1951, did circulate an apparently favorable plan for concurrence within the general staff, which not only contemplated utilizing the ALS at its fullest capacity but also proposed a system of contracting with civilian educational institutions to meet any Army needs for military linguists over and beyond that capacity. Four months later, however, the G-1, G-2, G-3 and AFF officials concerned were still in wide disagreement about several details of this plan, especially regarding just what the linguist requirements for the Army actually were and whether or not it would be fiscally feasible under the existing economy circumstances to conduct a major portion of the language training at civilian institutions. The departmental intelligence officials were also holding out strongly for retaining some measure of effective control over the latter training, so as to "insure a satisfactory graduate" from the military viewpoint. *

* See: OM (S), Chief Language Training Sect to Chief Training Div, thru Chief Training Br, 16 Apr 52, G-2 352. ✓ Army Language School, 16 Apr 52, par. 5. WW II Div, GSA.

Meanwhile, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, had received a continual stream of communications from G-2 FECOM, complaining about the lack of suitably trained Oriental linguists for assignment to interrogation teams and declaring that this shortage was "seriously jeopardizing the collection of information and military intelligence" in the

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field. On 29 June 1951, for example, he called specific attention to the fact that during the past year the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) in Tokyo had tested 75 Chinese and 47 Korean linguists sent from the United States, none of whom were ALS graduates, and had found only 24 of them, 16 Chinese and 8 Koreans, ^{properly} qualified for duty with theater language detachments. In order to furnish effective linguistic support to the Eighth Army, it had become necessary to procure local indigenous personnel in Korea and Chinese civilians from Formosa, which was a most dangerous practice from the military security standpoint. It was considered, therefore, that FECOM's immediate needs for Chinese and Korean linguists were, as follows:

	Present Authorization		Now Have		Immediate Requirements	
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
Chinese (Mandarin dialect)	34	114	5	11	29	103
Korean	29	102	5	3	24	99 *

* Ltr (S), G-2 FECOM to G-2, 29 Jun 51, G-2 350.03-T, 29 Jun 51 (13 Nov 50). WW II Rec Div, GSA. Only company grade officers were desired, so they could be assigned to command language detachments in the field.

By this time, though, the AFF authorities had already requested and received detailed reports from the major foreign language "users," such as "ASA, CIC, G-2, G-1, etc.," to cover their individual requirements for student spaces at the ALS during FY 1952. These same authorities had then

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calculated that, except, for an indicated deficit in Russian linguists caused by a chronic shortage of qualified instructors, the ALS alone could satisfy the entire demands of the Army language training program for FY 1952, provided its previously budgeted funds were not severely cut. The size and conformation of the new classes scheduled to enter the ALS on or about 1 July 1951, therefore, was firmly predicated upon a policy decision to that effect.*

* Ibid., par. 6.

Noting a steep drop in the total foreign language specialist requirements for the Army under this newly adopted AFF policy, ~~to~~ ^{compared} comparison with those of FY 1951 which were never met, the OACofS G-2, D/A, training officials decided to explore the subject further. They discovered that in estimating the student linguist requirements for FY 1952, the AFF had neglected to consider a customary large scale demand for replacements within the overseas commands. Moreover, during the last six months of ALS operations in 1951, the Air Force, CIC and G-1 had all failed to fill substantial portions of their assigned quotas at the school, while ASA was consistently unable to fulfill its growing need for Russian and Chinese-Mandarin linguists. With the physical capacity of the ALS now being accepted as 1600, only

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1000 students were actually on hand there during December 1951 and, unless some supplementary funds could be found to hire additional instructors, no more students were going to be admitted. *

* Ibid., pars 6 and 7.

The foreign language training program finally became so unbalanced that, in January 1952, the AFF was forced to call a representative conference of the military agencies involved for the specific purpose of rescheduling student quotas at the ALS for the last five months of FY 1952. One of the most revealing points brought out during this conference was that the ACoS G-1, D/A, had not yet felt it necessary to survey the Army to determine its real foreign linguist requirements but was continuing to rely on AFF estimates in the matter, which were based primarily upon student and space availability instead of ~~the~~ actual Service needs. *

* Ibid., par. 8.

Meanwhile, the ACoS G-2, D/A, had initiated a survey as requested by the Chief of Staff, in coordination with the ACoS G-1, ^{D/A,} and ACoS G-3, D/A, to ascertain the true requirements for all types of military intelligence specialists within the Army, including foreign linguists. linguists.

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With the figures from this survey becoming available during mid-March 1952, the AFF authorities then called another representative conference to fix student quotas at the ALS for FY 1953. The grand total of foreign language specialist training requirements for the Army and Air Force, though, was now acknowledged to be 4189 or over twice the capacity of the ALS. The result was that, after the Air Force requirements had first been met, the Army quotas were pro-rated among the various user agencies strictly on a percentage basis. *

* Ibid., par. 10. The Air Force was given its full quota because it had supplied "sufficient funds and civilian spaces to support their student load."

In August 1952, therefore, when the linguist training situation was again summarized for the Chief of Staff, it still showed notable deficits in officer interrogators, translators and interpreters, along with smaller deficits in enlisted interrogators and translators. *

* See: SS (S), ACofS G-2 to CofS, 29 Aug 52, in Special File on the "Procurement of Intelligence Specialists," G-2 211 Specialists, 29 Aug 52 (27 Nov 51), Tab A. ACSI Rec Sec.

The valuable Language and Area Specialization Program, currently

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called the Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) Program, also proceeded to run into a series of difficult personnel problems during this same general period. While the original plan to support it had envisioned an annual quota of 27 officers, only 3 qualified officers were reported in July 1950 by the Career Management Division, AGO, as being available to take such training during FY 1951, two for the Russian course and one for the Turkish course. * A renewed effort

* MR on Ltr, ACoFS G-2 to AG, 13 Jul 50, G-2 350.03-T, 13 Jul 50 (1 Nov 45). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

was then made to publicize the FAST Program throughout the Army but it only produced four more approved applications, three of them from WAC officers and the other from a male officer who was promptly accepted for Russian specialization. *

* See: DF, ACoFS G-2 to AG, 25 Oct 50, G-2 350.03-T, 25 Oct 50 (1 Nov 45). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

By July 1951, with an Army requirement now firmly established for 95 foreign language and area specialists, just 47 officers were occupying the total of 108 spaces allocated to the seven-year FAST Program and only 4 new students stood ready to enter it in the near future. The AGO

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had actually received a total of 30 applications for participation in the program and at least 11 of them would have been accepted by the ACoS G-2, D/A, if they had been reported available. All but 9 of the 30, however, were disapproved by the various branch representatives within the Career Management Division on the grounds that such an assignment would seriously interfere with the officer's normal career development and handicap his future advancement. Unfortunately, under the current personnel policies, there was enough truth in this contention that discussions were already in progress aimed at broadening the selection base for Regular Officers and initiating a modified form of the course so it could include some selected Reserve Officers. In

See: SS, G-2 to G-1, thru G-3, 12 Jun 51, sub: Status of Department of the Army Language and Area Program, G-2 350.03-T, 12 Jun 51 (1 Nov 45). WW II Rec Div, GSA. The first class to graduate from this important post-World War II training program, in 1951, was composed of 1-Persian, 3-Turkish and 12-Russian specialists.

connection with these discussions, Brig. Gen. J. H. Phillips, the Deputy ACoS G-2, D/A, on 10 October 1951, forwarded recommendations to the ACoS G-1, D/A, as follows:

- a. That acceptance of Reserve Officers for training be held in abeyance until curricula adjustments are made and the results of the revised selection criteria for Regular Officers can be studied.

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b. That the training program continue under the presently established concept - the training of relatively small numbers of bona fide area specialists for high level command and staff assignments. If requirements exist for lesser qualified area specialists in substantial numbers (military government, bulk of mission assignments, etc.) that a separate program be established under a training agency other than the G2, Department of the Army.

c. That immediate recruitment begin for the 1952 classes beginning in July 1952. This recruitment to be initiated by means of an Army-wide message modifying paragraph 7, SR 350-380-1 in accordance with recommendations contained in paragraph 4b of Comment No. 4 and inviting immediate submission of applications.

d. That students of Advanced Classes, branch schools, be advised to submit applications at least six (6) months prior to scheduled graduation dates.

e. That major curricula changes which may be indicated as a result of current G2 studies be made beginning with the 1953 class. In this connection it is necessary that major changes in curricula be made prior to acceptance of volunteers for training since such changes might affect the individual's willingness to continue in the program. *

* Comment No. 6, 10 Oct 51, on SS, G-2 to G-1, thru G-3, 12 Jun 51, G-2 350.03-T, 12 Jun 51, (1 Nov 45). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

The ACofS G-1, D/A, agreed generally with General Phillips' recommendations in this matter and an Army-wide message was sent out, ^{therefore,} dated 19 October 1951, in order to recruit students for the FAST Program courses scheduled to commence during July 1952. Since the qualification requirements for Regular Army officers desiring assignment to the program had only been slightly eased, ^{to include} ~~by including~~ 1st Lieutenants with a minimum of three years of troop duty behind them and Lieutenant Colonels

having at least twelve years of statutory service remaining before their retirement, the results were still disappointing. In the meantime, approved quotas had been announced for the FAST Program courses opening between July and September 1952, as follows:

Russian	-	10
Chinese	-	2
Japanese	-	5
Greek	-	1
Turkish	-	3
Arabic	-	2
Persian	-	2 *

* ^{DF,} ~~DE~~ G-2 to G-1, 19 Oct 51, G-2 350.03-T, 19 Oct 51 (1 Nov 45).

WW II Rec Div, GSA.

With just 2 students slated to graduate from the Russian course of the FAST Program in 1952, 4 in 1953, 3 in 1954 and 4 in 1955, it soon became obvious that the input for that course would have to be raised considerably, not only to insure maximum use of the available facilities but also to meet an ever-increasing Army demand for Russian language and area specialists. A new SR 350-380-1 was thus issued on 30 January 1952, which authorized "officers of all components on active duty" to be selected for participation in the Russian course. The informal understanding was that any Reserve Officer selected under this loosened provision would have to agree to remain in the

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Army for 3 or 4 years following the completion of his course. At the same time, another project was started to send 5 Reserve Officers who were already fluent in the Russian language to Detachment "R" for a two-year specialization course and to give 9 other officers, 3 of them from CIC, an intensive 46-week Russian language course at the ALS followed by appropriate field duty lasting ^{only} until early in 1955.

* DF, G-2 to AG, thru G-1, 14 Feb 52, G-2 350.03-T, 14 Feb 52 (1 Nov 45). WW II Rec Div, GSA. See also: SR 350-380-1, 30 Jan 52.

It was now clearly evident to all concerned that it had been a mistake ever to remove the FAST Program from direct ACoS G-2, D/A, control in the first place. Because he continued to remain intimately involved both in the planning and execution phases of the program, it was much more fitting for him to be officially charged with supervising the entire program within the limits of broad training policies and procedures prescribed by the ACoS G-3, D/A. When the next SR 350-380-1 was published in January 1953, therefore, it carefully specified that:

Over-all control of the training prescribed by these regulations is assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army. This training will conform with the policies and procedures prescribed in The Army Training Program Document and these regulations. Specifically, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 will be responsible for -

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- a. Final selection of students.
 - b. Establishment of yearly quotas in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.
 - c. Monitor and review curricula for all phases of training except that which is conducted at the Army Language School.
 - d. Control of required specialist training activities in overseas areas. *

* SR 350-380-1, 6 Jan 53.

Despite these several favorable actions, it ^{kept growing} grew more and more difficult all the time to keep the FAST Program pipeline filled up with Regular Army officers. The planned student input during calendar year 1953, for example, totalled 36 officers, including 6-Chinese, 2-Arabic, 5-Japanese, 4-Persian, 10-Russian (4-yr), 5-Russian (3-yr), 2-Turkish and 2-Greek specialists. Since only the Russian (3-yr) students could be Reserve Officers, this meant that the remaining 31 had to come from the Regular Army. By 6 March 1953, however, just 27 Regular Army applications had been submitted for it, and only 14 of them were accepted. Hence, the G-2 training authorities felt plainly justified in seeking a waiver on the stringent provisions of SR 350-380-1, in order to permit filling the rest of the available spaces from civilian component sources. This request eventually received the concurrence of all the other departmental agencies concerned, so that Reserve Officer participation in the FAST Program ^{became} ~~was~~ soon measurably increased. *

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* See: DF's G-2 to G-1, G-3, AG and Army Comptroller, 6 Mar 53, G-2 350.03, 6 Mar 53 (6 Jan 53). WW II Rec Div, GSA. The G-3 concurrence in this request, though, was given only on a "one time basis."

Another principal function of the ACofS G-2, D/A, had always been to ~~prepare or~~ superintend the preparation of intelligence training literature for Army use. In 1948, therefore, when the Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) officials first completed a new FM 30-5 "Military Intelligence" in manuscript form, they forwarded it to the departmental intelligence agency for review. This manual was intended to cover all intelligence operations from the platoon right on up through the highest command echelon but the G-2 training authorities concluded that such coverage would be too broad. Accordingly, the manuscript was returned to the C&GSC, with instructions for the school to prepare one which would include only "tactical intelligence through the division." Action was then also taken to initiate the production of a FM 30-6 "Combat Intelligence, Large Units" at the C&GSC and a FM 30-7 "Strategic Intelligence" within the OACofS G-2, D/A, in Washington.

* Study (C), "Intelligence Training Responsibility Organization and Functions of MID, War Department and Intelligence Division,

Department of the Army," prepared by O&T Br, Training Div, OACofS G-2, D/A, 1 May 53, G-2 320., 1 May 53 (2 Jan 53), pp. 16-17. ACSI Rec Sec.

After ~~it had undergone~~ ^{undergoing} many changes, the new FM 30-5 "Combat Intelligence" was finally published in February 1951. The first draft of FM 30-6 "Combat Intelligence, Large Units," originally prepared at the C&GSC but subsequently taken over by AFF, was also received in the departmental intelligence agency for review during June 1952 and a manuscript copy of FM 30-7, "Strategic Intelligence" was completed within the Training Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, in December 1952. These two latter publications, though, still needed a great deal of improvement and were both being extensively revised when the Korean Conflict period ~~came to an end,~~ ^{ended,} on 27 July 1953 (Korean time).

* Ibid.

During December 1951, the G-2 training authorities instructed the CIC School at Fort Holabird, Md., to prepare, in cooperation with the ZI Armies, a new FM 30-8 "Domestic Intelligence" to serve as a combined replacement for the obsolete TM 30-230 "Post, Camp and Station Intelligence, ZI" of 3 March 1941 and the TM 30-222 "Corps Area Intelligence" of 8 January 1942. It could only be finished in first draft, however,

prior to the close of the Korean Conflict period. Likewise, the completion of an important FM 30-10 "Terrain Analysis, Intelligence" at the Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Va., was being delayed pending the signing of a formal agreement between the ACofS G-2, D/A, and the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army in respect to their individual responsibilities for terrain analysis and engineer intelligence production. The terms of this agreement, which were announced to the Army in January 1953, specified that making terrain estimates was still a G-2 function but analyzing the terrain from the technical standpoint would be an Engineer function. Work on the FM 30-10 was then immediately restarted but with its scheduled review date moved up to December 1953.*

* Ibid.

The existing FM 30-15 "Examination of Personnel, Documents and Material" was substantially revised at the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kans., and forwarded to the OACofS G-2, D/A, for approval, through AFF, in September 1950. No satisfactory agreement could be reached within the Department of the Army, however, on the instructions it contained ^{relative} ~~with reference~~ to the examination of captured enemy material. All information pertaining to that particular subject was thus extracted from the manual to form the nucleus of a new FM 30-16 "Technical

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Intelligence" and the remainder was published, in September 1951, as FM 30-15 "Examination of Personnel and Documents." A first draft of FM 30-16 "Technical Intelligence" was completed within the OACofS G-2, D/A, during January 1952 and forwarded to the Army General School for editing. After this editing, it was again reviewed both by the C&GSC and AFFM and finally returned to the OACofS G-2, D/A, in August 1952. Still considered unsatisfactory, it was then practically re-written in the Technical Branch of the Training Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, and once more circulated for concurrence among interested agencies throughout the Department of the Army. The manual was ^{ultimately} ~~eventually~~ published, effective 29 June 1953.

* Ibid. Col George H. Schwedersky, MI Res, former Chief of Technical Intelligence at SHAEF, was called to active duty in OACofS G-2 for a 90-day period, commencing 1 Nov 51, for the specific purpose of writing the first draft of FM 30-16.

Other noteworthy events and accomplishments bearing upon the intelligence training publication field at this same time were, as follows:

1. Publication, between 21 March 1951 and 19 February 1953, of badly needed revisions in the four Aggressor Manuals (FM 30-101, 102, 103 and 104) to bring them more up to date.

2. Publication, on 17 June 1952, of a new FM 30-19 "Order of Battle Intelligence" to replace TM 30-240.

3. Issuance of a new SR 140-190-3 "Criteria for Assignment and Retention in Military Intelligence and Army Security, ORC Units," on 9 May 1952, designed to eliminate past confusion in this matter and to strengthen the personnel base of the various units represented by these two reserve organizations.*

* "History of Department of the Army Activities, ACoFS G-2, 9 September 1951 through 31 December 1952" (S), Tab "Tng Div," Reserve Components Br, p. 3.

4. Formation, effective 16 September 1952, of a G-2 "Working Group", composed of appropriate personnel from the Collection and Dissemination, Production, Security, and Training Divisions, to "review drafts of proposed field manuals and existing intelligence manuals and T/O&E's for the purpose of preparing recommended statements of policy, doctrine, procedure, and/or organization relating to the functions and responsibilities of the G-2 at higher echelons of command.*"

* Memo, G-2 to Chiefs, C&D Div, Prod Div, Sec Div and Tr Div, 16 Sep 52, G-2 350.09-T, 16 Sep 52. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

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5. Revitalization and extension of a General Foreign Armies Recognition Program ^{established} designed to distribute handbooks throughout the Army on all major foreign military forces of the world. This same program also called for giving a highly classified Soviet Armed Forces orientation and training course to selected officers at certain designated Service Schools, ^{as well as} and a general foreign armies recognition course of lower security classification to the rest of the Army. *

* Ibid., Organization & Training Br, pp. 4-5. See also: File (C), 21 Jan - 24 Jul 52, G-2 353. (10 Jan 52). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

6. Issuance, during March and April 1953, of seven Army Training Program Publications (ATP 30-201 to 207 incl), aimed at giving the commanders of Military Intelligence Service Organization (MISO) detachments necessary instructions for training their respective units. *

* See: SR 310-20-3, 1 Aug 53, and Change No. 1 to it, dated 13 Oct 53.

At the end of the Korean Conflict period, therefore, the Training Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, was executing a remarkably wide variety of different functions, despite the fact that its total officer complement

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had recently been reduced from 16 to 14. Organized into three basic branches, namely the Organization and Training Branch, Reserve Components Branch, and Map and Photo Branch, it not only supervised the actual conduct of intelligence training falling under direct G-2 control but also represented the G-2 viewpoint in all matters pertaining to military intelligence training within the Army. Serving to illustrate the broad scope and extent of these twin responsibilities in a most striking fashion, is the following list of detailed duties being performed by the four sections of the Organization and Training Branch, Training Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, on 23 April 1953:

OPERATIONS SECTION -

1. Reviews the Intelligence Portions of Operational Plans and Troop Bases prepared by Department of the Army and major commands.

2. Exercises General Staff supervision over Army Intelligence Units (T/O&E and Organic) engaged in Field Exercises and Maneuvers.

3. Exercises the G2, DA, responsibility for Aerial Reconnaissance.

4. Furnishes G2 Policy Guidance for training films for which the OACofS, G-2, DA, is responsible (CIC, ASA). This includes training films for which ^{DA, DA, is proponent.}
G-2,

DOCTRINES AND PROCEDURES SECTION -

1. Reviews Army intelligence doctrines and procedures, in relation to both Joint and Army requirements, generated by changing concepts or weapons systems, and provides guidance and consultation to the General Staff on such matters.

2. Reviews intelligence and counterintelligence training publications to insure conformance with basic intelligence doctrine.

3. Coordinates, reviews, and/or approves all training literature requiring action by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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4. Monitors, for ACofS, G-2, of Department of Army, and Army Field Forces, publications for which G2 has review responsibility.

5. Initiates staff action to ensure intelligence training reflects intelligence requirement, generated by new tactical concepts or weapons systems.

6. Provides the G2 membership of the Army Publications Board, and such other boards or committees as may be deemed desirable.

ORGANIZATION AND REQUIREMENTS SECTION -

1. Determines and insures the adequacy of intelligence troop unit support of Army mobilization and operation plans.

2. Represents G2 in the preparation and review of Army mobilization and operation plans, with particular emphasis on the intelligence portion of the troop bases.

3. Reviews and comments for G-2 on the mobilization and operation plans of the several major commands, with particular emphasis on the intelligence portion of the troop bases.

4. Exercises general staff supervision for G2 over the activation, movement and deployment of intelligence units, or units primarily designed to perform intelligence functions.

5. Reviews for G2 and makes recommendations on T/O&E, T/D, T/A, E&L and other organizational and equipment tables, pertaining to intelligence units.

6. Recommends priority and allocation of available military intelligence specialists, including linguists, to and among intelligence agencies other than the OACofS, G-2.

7. In collaboration with other interested agencies determines the personnel and training requirements of intelligence agencies other than the OACofS, G-2.

8. Exercises surveillance over the training program as pertains to military intelligence specialists to insure sufficient input and output to meet requirements.

TRAINING AND PROGRAMMING SECTION -

1. Formulates intelligence and counterintelligence training plans in coordination with Army Field Forces. (Par 23a, SR 10-120-1 and Par 4b(2) SR 11-10-60).

2. Reviews the intelligence and counterintelligence training directives, plans, and programs of Army Field Forces, major commands, schools, and of the administrative and technical services to insure conformance with training policy (Par 23b, SR 10-120-1).

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3. Plans, coordinates, and supervises DA Foreign Area Specialist Training (Par 23h, SR 10-120-1 and SR 350-380-1).

4. Discharges the responsibility accruing to G2 as an organizational element and operating agency of a DA Primary Program No. 6, Training. This includes:

- a. Execution, review and analysis of the G-2 activity of the training program.
- b. Preparation of detailed and summary schedules.
- c. Allocation of quotas to G2 schools.
- d. Maintenance of policy and doctrine for G2 schools (SR 11-10-60).

5. Exercises direction and control of the ASA School, GIC School, and SI School to include approval of curricula and programs of instructions. (Par 4b and 8b(3), AR 350-5).

6. Coordinates and supervises any other training required by OACofS, G-2, and subordinate agencies. Example: Quotas for special weapons courses; utilization of Army service schools, other than G2 schools; and utilization of training facilities of other governmental departments. (Assigned by OACofS, G-2). *

* Study (C), "Intelligence Training Responsibility Organization and Functions of MID, War Department and Intelligence Division, Department of the Army," prepared by O&T Br, Training Div, OACofS G-2, D/A, 1 May 53, op. cit., Appendix 1.

Nevertheless, the military intelligence training effort during the Korean Conflict period plainly ~~did not~~ ^{failed to} meet with any high degree of success. In April 1952, for example, CINCFE (General Ridgway), while reporting to the JCS on the intelligence deficiencies he had noted within the Far East Command, called attention to an "urgent need for a theater intelligence service organization adequately supported by the training es-

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tablishment in the ZI." Shortly thereafter, CG MUSAK (General Van

See: JCS 1924/64, 30 Apr 52, App. "D".

Fleet) not only described "aerial photography, aerial visual reconnaissance, covert collection, ground reconnaissance and communications reconnaissance" as comprising the five main intelligence deficiencies he had observed within his command but also summed up the current intelligence situation in Korea along the following frank lines:

During the two years that the US Army has been fighting in Korea (and the year in which I have had the privilege of commanding our ground forces), it has become apparent that during the between-war interim we have lost, through neglect, disinterest and possible jealousy, much of the effectiveness in intelligence work that we acquired so painfully in World War II. Today, our intelligence operations in Korea have not yet approached the standards that we reached in the final year of the last war. *

* See: "Draft of Staff Study No. IV, Status of the Army Intelligence System, OACofS, G-2, DA, 15 December 1953" (S), G-2 322.4 Field Intelligence, 15 Dec 53 (6 Feb 53), Appendix "C", p. 2. ACSI Rec Sec. This significant staff study, compiled for the ACofS G-2, D/A, by Col William M. Black, MI Res, during a tour of active duty extending from Mar 52 to Feb 54, will be cited hereafter as "Staff Study (Black)" (S).

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On 1 July 1952, Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, ACoS G-3, D/A, formally notified the major Army commands that "numerous training, inspection, and other reports" had disclosed "vitally serious intelligence deficiencies in both training and operations." ^{As a} Accord-
^{results} ingly, the Chief of Staff desired each commander to give his "immediate personal attention and active guidance and supervision leading to prompt improvement in all fields affecting intelligence activities." The next day, General Jenkins addressed another letter directly to the Chief, Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., instructing him to place "increased stress on intelligence subjects in all unit training and in all school programs" and to follow up closely "on this program in all training inspections and maneuvers."^{*}

* See: Ibid., Appendix "C", Annex B, Item 4.

By the time that this long overdue action had been taken, however, the fighting in Korea had already started to wane and one year later it ceased altogether. Thus, the sins of neglect in military intelligence training, which were so materially aggravated by the faulty system adopted for supervising that type of training within the Army, could not be successfully overcome before the end of the Korean Conflict period. It seems hard to place any real blame for

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this important failure on the shoulders of the OACofS G-2, D/A, training officials themselves because they consistently displayed a ready awareness of the unfavorable situation and constantly sought to register improvements in it as best they could. It was not until the departmental training officials commenced to receive a series of adverse reports on the subject from the top commanders in the field in mid-1952, that the problem was properly recognized and suitable corrective measures were undertaken. The truth of the matter is that the invaluable intelligence training lessons derived from World War II experience and presented to higher authority by the Lovett Board in November 1945 continued to remain largely forgotten, especially during the critical Cold War years preceding Korea when defense economy became such a determined goal of the United States Government.

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CHAPTER IX

OTHER MATTERS

Four other matters bearing upon operations of the departmental intelligence agency of the Army during the Korean Conflict period appear to warrant special mention under the separate headings of Foreign Liaison, Research and Development, Corps Concept and Personnel Reductions. They are, therefore, discussed in that same order herein, as follows:

FOREIGN LIAISON

The traditional G-2 function of providing an official channel of communication between the Department of the Army and foreign military representatives stationed, visiting or training in the United States had always been performed by a semi-independent Foreign Liaison Office operating directly under the DI (ACofS G-2) himself. During General Irwin's tour of duty as the DI (ACofS G-2), however, to further the organizational simplicity he desired, it was made a part of the Administrative and Liaison Group (Division), on 20 December 1948, and thus became merely the Foreign Liaison Branch.

This reduction in status for the departmental Foreign Liaison Office was especially upsetting to the officials directly concerned because it occurred just when the foreign liaison activities of the

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Army, due to MDAP, NATO, etc., were reaching a new peak in intensity. Formation of the United Nations Command right after the Korean outbreak also served to multiply the Army's foreign liaison commitments to an even greater extent. General Bolling, General Irwin's successor, though, did not see fit to reestablish the Foreign Liaison Office as a separate entity until the major OACofS G-2, D/A, reorganization of 1 February 1951. At that particular time, it carried an authorized strength of 8 officers and 13 civilians, and was organized

* See: G-2 Memo, 1 Feb 51, signed by Chief Adm Div, in special "Space Authorization File," G-2 320.2, Undated (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

into four functional sections designated respectively as the Administrative (including Protocol), Visits and Tours, Schools and Training, and Foreign Contact Sections. The names of these sections generally

* Chart, "Department of the Army, OACofS G-2, Chiefs and Key Personnel, 2 April 1951," G-2 020.G-2, Undated 52 (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec. The Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) at this time was Col. T. W. Hammond, Jr. Following his departure from the OACofS G-2, D/A, in Jul 51, Lt Col (later Col) Matthew C. Stewart took over as ~~the~~ Acting FLO until 1 Feb 52, when Col Ned T. Norris was appointed to be the new FLO, effective that date. See: G-2 Memo, G-2 300.6, 1 Feb 52 (11 Jan 52).

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ACSI Rec Sec. Col Norris then served as the FLO for the rest of the Korean Conflict period.

reflected the four principal tasks of the Office in accomplishing its assigned mission, which were then considered to be as follows:

1. Serve as the Protocol Office for the Department of the Army.
2. Process, administer and monitor all visits of foreign military personnel to the United States, wherein the Department of the Army is host.
3. Administer the program for training foreign military personnel in Army Service Schools.
4. Process requests from foreign Military Attaches for information, material and services, and to render all possible assistance to them in the performance of their assigned mission within the limits of established policy. *

* "History of Department of the Army Activities, ACoS G-2, 9 September 1951 through December 1952" (S), op. cit., Tab "FL Office."

By far the most demanding problem to confront the Foreign Liaison Branch during the early months of the Korean Conflict period was connected with supervising an ever-expanding Foreign Student Training Program. Accordingly, at a widely attended Pentagon conference held in August 1950 to discuss the future development of this program, it was announced that MDAP funds were available to train "some 674 foreign military students" in Army schools during FY 1951 as compared with only 135 during FY 1950. There would also

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be a large group of ROK Army personnel and a greatly increased number of non-MDAP students, mostly Canadian, authorized to attend American Military Schools during the same period. The Schools and

* See: "Conference Notes, MDAP Training, G-3 USA" (S), G-2 350.2, 17 Aug 50 (12 Jun 45). WW II Rec Div, GSA. The OACofS G-2, D/A, representative at this conference was Lt Col (later Col) A. M. Gandia from the Foreign Liaison Branch.

Training Section of the Foreign Liaison Branch was officially charged with processing every one of these foreign military students from the time ~~that~~ they were first selected and security cleared by the U. S. Army Attache within their own country, until they had finished their individual courses over here and ^{had for} started home.

As soon as the United Nations Command was established in Korea, several of the foreign countries involved requested that their formally accredited military representatives in the United States should be given timely and appropriate information on the military situation existing throughout the combat zone. The Foreign Contact Section of the Foreign Liaison Branch, therefore, proceeded to schedule a combined weekly briefing in the G-2 War Room for all foreign Military Attaches stationed in Washington, except those representing the USSR

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and Satellites. * Three other significant events relating to op-

* "Summary of Major Activities of ACoFS, G-2, June 1950 through 8 September 1951" (C), pp. 36-37.

erations of this same section during the Korean Conflict period later took place, as follows:

1. The United States and French Governments, in November 1952, agreed to exchange liaison officers ^{at} for their respective Army Service Schools. Eleven American Army officers were thus shortly assigned to serve on liaison duty in French military schools and five French officers were assigned to like duty at Army Service Schools in the United States.

2. In order to facilitate the processing of requests for maintenance equipment and supplies from the U. S. Army by certain approved Latin American nations, the ^{relevant} ~~applicable~~ SR 550-10-10 "Liaison and Channels of Communication between Foreign Nationals and the Department of the Army" was amended, effective 8 January 1953. This amendment enabled the accredited military representatives of these nations in Washington to address any such request, after an initial one had been approved by the Foreign Liaison Office, OACoFS G-2, D/A, directly to the Foreign Military Assistance Branch, OACoFS G-4, D/A, instead of through the

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^{more}
usual formal channels.

3. A new official "Guide for Military Attaches and Foreign Military Representatives in the United States" was published in January 1953, chiefly to describe the following principal policy changes:

- a. Procedure for submitting requests for Department of the Army publications such as field manuals, technical manuals, training circulars, graphic training aids, training films, Army training programs, Army Service Schools publications, tables of organization and equipment, specifications, drawings, and technical data. Prescribes that requests for such documents be submitted by the foreign government to the MAAG stationed in the country concerned.
- b. Outlines in detail the policy governing medical treatment and hospitalization of foreign personnel at U. S. Army medical treatment facilities as prescribed in AR 40-508, dated 15 August 1952.
- c. Requires that requests for visits of foreign military personnel within the U. S. be submitted no later than three (3) weeks in advance of the date that the visit is to take place rather than the previously required two (2) weeks.
- d. Outlines the policy on foreign military personnel delivering addresses at U. S. Army installations. *

* "History of Department of the Army Activities, ACoFS G-2, 9 September 1951 through 31 December 1952" (S), Tab "FL Office."

The Korean outbreak naturally caused a tremendous growth in the number of official visits being made to the United States by foreign ~~with~~

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military personnel. During the period extending from 9 September 1951 to 31 December 1952, for example, the Visits and Tours Section of the Foreign Liaison Office was called upon to arrange for the conduct of 178 VIP tours, not including those that were either cancelled or postponed. This represented an increase of 14% over the corresponding previous period. At the same time, the section also had to process clearances for a total of 5419 "working level" visits which did not require any special escort or the expenditure of official entertainment funds. In planning for these numerous visits on the part of foreign military personnel from almost 50 different countries, the foreign liaison authorities soon found it advisable to divide them into four separate and distinct categories, as follows:

- a. Guests of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and Chiefs of Technical Services.
- b. High-ranking, Latin American officers invited under the auspices of Inter-American Relations Program, Department of the Army (IRDA).
- c. Key officers under the auspices of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP).
- d. High- and low-ranking self-invited guests. *

* Ibid.

The big problem still confronting the departmental foreign liaison officials, though, was how best to handle successfully the multi-

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tude of details being constantly posed by the ~~ever~~-growing Foreign Student Training Program, especially with only a small number of personnel ^{currently} available for that purpose. ^{On 1} In August 1951, for instance, based upon the approved quotas for FY 1952, there were a total of 452 Army-sponsored foreign military students attending 23 different Service Schools within the United States, ~~who were~~ distributed as follows:

Army Ground School -	1
Armed Forces Information School -	2
Armed Forces Staff College -	3
Armored School -	60
Army Language School -	7
Army Medical Service Graduate School -	1
Artillery School (Fort Sill) -	59
Artillery School (Fort Bliss) -	17
Command and General Staff College -	61
Engineer School -	35
Finance School -	2
Infantry School -	96
Counter Intelligence School -	18
Medical Field Service School -	12
Ordnance School -	29
Ordnance Depot, Atlanta -	3
Provost Marshal School	4
Quartermaster School -	2
San Marcos AF Base (Army Flying School) -	5
Signal School (Fort Monmouth) -	18
Southeastern Signal School (Fort Gordon) -	4
Transportation School -	10
Strategic Intelligence School -	3
Total -	452 *

* See: File (S), G-2 350.2, 31 Aug 51 (12 Jun 45). WW II Rec Div, GSA. A total of 158 foreign military students were also scheduled to complete ^{training} courses at 18 different Service Schools during the month of Aug 51, some under FY 51 and others under FY 52 quotas.

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The number of students involved in this Foreign Student Training Program kept right on increasing every month without any sign of a letup. An allocation of quota spaces for it through FY 1952, announced in December 1951, not only listed a total of 1547 students from 15 MDAP nations to attend 18 different Service Schools but also 705 students from 30 non-MDAP nations to attend 19 different Service Schools. One year later, another similar quota allocation for the program "projected through 30 June 1953," showed 2035 students from 17 MDAP nations and 497 from 32 non-MDAP nations accepted for attendance at the same Service Schools in general. *

* See: File (S), G-2 350.2, 27 Dec 51 and 8 Dec 52 (12 Jun 45).
WW II Rec Div, GSA.

Many of these foreign military students encountered serious language difficulties while attending Service Schools in the United States. Even if they did happen to enjoy a fairly reasonable knowledge of English grammar, they often could not follow the given instruction because of an inability to understand Army "jargon" or uncommon technical military terms. A circular letter was duly dispatched, therefore, to all the Army Attaches and Chiefs of MAAGS concerned, cautioning them to approve only personnel for the Foreign Student Training Program who possessed enough knowledge of spoken English to absorb regular Service School

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instruction. The same overseas officials were also issued a special English word list to distribute among their tentatively selected students, which had been prepared at the Command and General Staff College for use by foreign personnel taking a 60-day course of instruction therein. Nevertheless, despite such positive steps aimed at remedying this unfavorable situation, language barriers continued to handicap the satisfactory development of that important training project in a large number of cases.

* "History of Department of the Army Activities, ACoFS G-2, 9 September 1951 through 31 December 1952" (S), Tab "FL Office."

For some unaccountable reason, during the early months of the Korean Conflict period when the first Army augmentation program was already in full swing, the departmental foreign liaison officials were unable to obtain approval from higher authority for the personnel increases they deemed necessary to sustain the proper functioning of their agency. It was not until 20 February 1951, that the Foreign Liaison Office, ^{finally} did gain 3 civilian clerk spaces and this happened only because the spaces could be charged against a special MDAP allotment. These additional spaces, ^{then} served to bring the actual strength of the Office back up to 8 officers and 13 civilians again, and it was also granted 2 new enlisted spaces in February 1952, but,

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after that, the agency could just barely hold its own in the matter. On the other hand, ^{pressures from the all types of} ~~the~~ required foreign liaison activities, especially those contributing to the Foreign Student Training Program, kept mounting at an extremely rapid rate.

On 26 May 1952, a three-member civilian committee composed of management representatives from the Staff Administrative Office (OCS), OACofS G-1, D/A, and OACofS G-2, D/A, was directed by the Chief of Staff to conduct a manpower survey of the latter agency, in order to determine what personnel it really needed to perform its assigned mission. With particular reference to the Foreign Liaison Office, this committee, in August 1952, presented two noticeably confusing general conclusions, as follows:

FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE

1. This Office "provides the official channel of liaison between the Army and foreign military representatives on duty, visiting, or training in the U. S. and acts as the Protocol Office of the Department of the Army." The survey team concludes from its findings that these functions are not germane to the mission of G2 except in regard to the following:

a. Security clearances involved in visits and tours to classified contract installations, etc., and clearance of information released to foreign attaches and representatives.

b. Responsibility for operation of the U. S. military attache system which requires cognizance of developments in the attache staffs of foreign countries here at the seat of government.

2. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 recognized that the functions of this office are not directly related to the mission of G2. *

* Report of Manpower Survey of the Office of the Assistant

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Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, 28 May 1952 - 12 August 1952" (S),
G-2 320.2, 13 Nov 52 (24 Aug 43), p. 22. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

The Foreign Liaison Office, of course, held no responsibility at all for operating "the U. S. military attache system." Neither could it be rightly claimed that its functions did not relate directly to the mission of the ACofS G-2, D/A, because they were being carried out in strict accordance with his assigned mission to provide an "official channel of liaison between the Army and foreign military representatives on duty, visiting or training in the U. S." and a "Protocol Office of the Department of the Army." These were most certainly both basic functions attributable to the Secretary of the Army himself. The Management Survey Committee, though, not only recommended complete abolishment of the Foreign Liaison Office's Executive Section, with its total space allocation of 1 officer, 1 enlisted man and 2 civilians, but also transfer of the entire Schools and Training Section, including a space allotment of 1 enlisted man and 3 civilians, to the OACofS G-3, D/A. Two main reasons were advanced by the Committee favoring the transfer of this Schools and Training Section, as follows:

- a. This function is not essential to the accomplishment of the mission of the Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence.
- b. Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations has primary responsibility for schools and training in the Army Establishment for the training of foreign nationals

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seeking training in the U. S. The actual allocation of quotas is made by G3. Also, primary and administrative control of this program is exercised by G3 through the MAAGS. Therefore, the role of G2 is principally service or auxiliary support to G3 because of responsibilities for military attache relations. *

* Ibid., p. 23.

Formal transfer of the "functions pertaining to the administration of the Foreign Student Training Program now performed by Schools and Training Section, Office Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Foreign Liaison Office, to the Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Operations," was announced by the Secretary of the General Staff on 19 May 1953, effective as of 15 May 1953. The same announcement, though, also contained a qualifying statement that "the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, will continue to provide the necessary liaison and channel of communications with foreign governments represented in the Continental United States." *

* An unrealistic attempt was thus apparently being made to

* Memo, SGS to Chiefs of Staff Sections, 19 May 53, G-2 323.361, 19 May 53 (15 May 53). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

divide the total foreign liaison function into two separate parts, one of them to remain with the OACofS G-2, D/A, and the other to be assumed by the OACofS G-3, D/A. Unfortunately, the Foreign Liaison Office did not now have any personnel available to accomplish its retained tasks bearing upon the Foreign Student Training Program, since the spaces for that purpose had all either been abolished or transferred to the OACofS G-3, D/A.

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Actually, it never did prove possible to divorce the Foreign Liaison Office entirely from the Foreign Student Training Program because too many of the details connected with that program were dependent upon inter-governmental negotiations, which could only be worked out in an effective manner through the appropriate military attache offices concerned both here and abroad. This limitation held true even after the ACoFS G-2, D/A, sought to simplify the program procedures by authorizing direct communication between the OACoFS G-3, D/A, and U. S. Army Attaches "on details relating solely to this function." It also soon became plainly evident that the Manpower Survey Committee's thesis that "primary administrative control of the program is exercised by G-3 through the MAAG's" had been an incorrect one. There were no MAAG's established within many of the foreign countries participating in the program and, besides, the Army Attache Offices, rather than the MAAG Offices, were the proper action agencies for clearing recommended foreign students from the standpoint of American military security.

As might well be expected, the situation within the Department of the Army relative to supervision of the ever-expanding Foreign Student Training Program immediately following the transfer of the Schools and Training Section, Foreign Liaison Office, to the OACoFS G-3, D/A, in May 1953, was a most chaotic one. The foreign liaison officials tried hard to answer the multitude of inquiries and voluminous correspondence still coming in on that complicated subject but they could not accomplish it successfully because there were simply not

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enough personnel available for the task. This unfavorable situation then kept getting worse, so that by the end of the Korean Conflict period some sort of a change was plainly indicated in order to prevent further embarrassment for all concerned. The whole affair represented a perfect example of false personnel economy, foisted upon the departmental intelligence authorities by a survey committee whose members were obviously more familiar with the theory of good management practices than they were with the wide ramifications of the various military staff functions involved. A suitable modus operandi could undoubtedly have been worked out to solve the problem in a satisfactory manner without upsetting the entire inter-governmental foreign liaison system as customarily accepted. It seems clearly apparent, therefore, that this would have been a far better course to pursue than the one which was actually adopted.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

From 11 June 1946 to 7 January 1952, ^{primary} responsibility for organizing and administering the Army Research and Development Program rested either within the OACofS G-4, D/A, or one of its several predecessors, such as the Logistics Division, WDGS. On the latter date, though, the Chief of Staff announced that the Secretary of the Army had approved a wholesale reorganization of the departmental research and development effort, which, among other things, would establish a Chief, Research and Development (R&D) ^{within} in the Office of the Chief of Staff, to serve directly under a Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, effec-

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tive 15 January 1952. This new plan also specifically charged the ACoFS G-2, D/A, with providing general staff supervision over ASA and CIC research and development matters, and furnishing a general officer to be a member of the Army Research and Development Budget Review Board. *

* Memo, OCS to ACoFS G-2, D/A, and others, G-2 400.112 Research, 7 Jan 52 (8 Jan 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA. See also: GO 4, 11 Jan 52.

tional civilian (consultant) space allotted to the OACoFS G-2, D/A, for that particular purpose, ^{thus} therefore, he promptly formed a Research and Development Section within the Plans and Research Branch, Collection and Dissemination (C&D) Division and assigned it the following *typical* functions:

- (1) Supervises the research and development activities in the area of responsibility assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence in the Department of the Army Research and Development Program.
- (2) Participates in the Department of the Army Research and Development Program as the representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 in matters falling within the intelligence research and development field of interest.
- (3) Performs such other duties in the intelligence area of the Research and Development field as may be required or assigned. *

* "History of Department of the Army Activities, ACoFS G-2,

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9 September 1951 through December 1952" (S), Tab "Coll & Disem Div," pp. 1-3. The first Chief of the Research and Development Sec was Lt Col John P. Merrill. He was succeeded, in Jun 52, by Lt Col Wm. H. Saunders.

Since there had been no original provision made for the new Research and Development Section, OACofS G-2, D/A, to have any clerical help of its own, it was soon given an administrative assistant on loan from Headquarters, C&D Division. The Section also received another officer space at this same time but, because of its continued small size, it could ~~still~~ only perform tasks that were strictly of a general staff nature. It was, however, able to render material assistance to the ASA and CIC, in the preparation of their respective R&D budget estimates for both FY 1954 and FY 1955, and to establish close liaison contacts with companion R&D personnel in the Human Resources Research Office (HUMRRO) of OACofS G-1, Operations Research Office (ORO) of OACofS G-3, Research and Development Board of OACofS G-4, Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, Army Technical Services, Navy Department, Department of the Air Force and CIA. Its two most significant early accomplishments were the initiation of a card file system designed to cover in detail the progress of all known intelligence R&D projects * and the successful sponsorship of an agreement

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With the military intelligence phase of the Army Research and Development program now being constantly broadened, the Research and Development Section, OACofS G-2, D/A, soon became directly involved in monitoring a considerable number of specific R&D projects of an intelligence nature. By the end of the Korean Conflict period, therefore, it could report definite progress along that line, as follows:

1. ORO Project TACIT - This important ORO project, which receives strong support from the R&D Section of G-2, constantly seeks to determine how Army combat intelligence activities can be improved and places special emphasis on the development of devices, techniques and methods that will "insure the timely and adequate production of the intelligence required by Commanders in connection with the tactical use of atomic weapons." It has already completed pertinent studies or surveys covering physical detection devices, battlefield surveillance systems, battlefield communications techniques, feasibility of methods for locating mortars, precise kinds of target information required by intelligence users and high-speed combat information services.

2. CIC Board - With operations of the existing CIC Board under the Army Research and Development Program having ~~proved~~ ^{been} ~~to be~~ unsatisfactory, action was initiated during early June 1953 to obtain OCS permission for the establishment of a new

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CIC Board to function without formal participation in that program through authority delegated from the ACoFS G-2, D/A, to the Chief, CIC. After this proposal was fully concurred in by the Army Comptroller and the sum of "not to exceed \$50,000 per year" earmarked for the procurement of non-standard CIC investigative equipment, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Administration, on 3 July 1953, approved it.

3. "Agent-type Radio" - The R&D Section of G-2 is actively assisting the Signal Corps in the development of a miniature "agent-type" radio set for use during guerrilla and clandestine military operations. Both USAREUR and USAFFE have been requested to review the specifications and expected capabilities of this badly needed set, with the latter having already submitted a favorable preliminary report on it.

4. Signal Corps Project MICHIGAN - The OACoFS G-2, D/A, is duly represented on the steering committee for this key Signal Corps battlefield surveillance project and has recently furnished personnel to meet with the civilian officials ^{who are} directing it at Ann Arbor, Mich., in order to give them necessary intelligence guidance. A summer study group is also currently engaged at that same place in exploring ~~such subjects as~~ the practicability of using Army aircraft, high-speed drones or missiles equipped with television, thermal, infrared or acoustic detection devices; moving target indicators; ~~utilizing~~ photographic and other equip-

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ment, as a method of battlefield surveillance and target location under all conditions of visibility up to a distance of 200 miles from front line positions.

(u) 5. Research and Development Files - The R&D Section of G-2 is not only continuing to maintain an up-to-date file on all Research and Development Board (RDB) projects of the three Services falling within an Intelligence Operations category but also has just taken steps to be put on the distribution list for all R&D progress reports being received by that board from the General Staff or Technical Services. These latter reports are promptly screened to determine whether or not the project has any intelligence interest and, if so, it is then introduced into the card file system.

(c) 6. Camera for Intelligence Use - The ACoS G-2, D/A, has established an official requirement for a camera set and accessories to be used with an available Signal Corps camera ⁱⁿ collecting markings data for intelligence analysis. He has further recommended that the Signal Corps investigate the possibility of developing a new 35 mm. single lens reflex camera with certain stated military characteristics.

(u) 7. Army Security Agency - Among the nine R&D projects presently underway in ASA, two of them appear to be of major significance. One of these has to do with developing a suit-

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able set of mobile analytic equipment and the other a wide band recorder-reproducer for combat use. In regard to the second project, a feasibility study has recently been satisfactorily concluded on a recorder with a band width of 250 kilocycles kcs, ^{and} ~~so~~ specifications are now being prepared to cover its actual development.*

* See: Summary of Major Events and Problems (Reports Control Symbol CSHIS-6), FY 1953, (S), G-2 3D1.7, 31 Aug 53 (6 Jan 53), Research and Development Section, OACofS G-2, D/A and Tab B, CIC.

It thus seems manifest that by the end of the Korean Conflict period, the Army intelligence authorities not only had become aptly aware of the dire need for organizing a large scale R&D effort to keep fully abreast of the latest scientific and technological advances within the intelligence operations field but also were trying hard to obtain their fair share of the rapidly growing amount of funds being budgeted in the Department of Defense for R&D purposes. Since activities of that type were usually quite expensive, there was a vigorous competition constantly going on among the numerous agencies concerned to secure as many of these funds as possible. ^{Actually,} Moreover, when the ACoS G-2, D/A, on 27 May 1953, submitted a list of nine "fundamental problems facing G-2" to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Lyman L. Lemnitzer, for him to present to the incoming Chief of Staff, Gen. Matthew B.

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Ridgway, two of them read, as follows:

To improve the techniques and procedures of combat intelligence in the fields of:

(a) Battlefield surveillance to include electronic aids, aerial, visual and photographic reconnaissance.

(b) Techniques for determining and reporting targets for atomic weapons.

(c) Effective basic, unit, and service school intelligence training for combat soldiers and officers.

To increase the emphasis on intelligence operations items in the Research and Development Program. *

* Memo (S), G-2 to Lt Gen Lemnitzer, G-2 350.09, 27 May 53.

ACSI Rec Sec.

The very fact that these two R&D ^{items} ~~problems~~ were included in this carefully prepared list, along with such basic problems as improving collection capabilities behind the Iron Curtain, procuring and training military intelligence specialists, satisfying the requirements of theater commanders for the conduct of clandestine intelligence operations and maintaining an effective Army voice in strategic bombing targeting studies, serves well to show the greatly increased comparative importance of this G-2 Research and Development effort within the total ACoFS G-2, D/A, mission.

CORPS CONCEPT

The controversial question of whether or not there should be an Intelligence Corps established in the United States Army, which had come under ^{heated} heavy discussion both during the latter stages of World War II and throughout the Cold War period that followed, still remained unsettled by early June 1950. At that time, after hearing a great deal of argument in the matter from all sides, the ACoS G-2, D/A, (General Irwin), had finally decided to forward a "Department of the Army Intelligence Career Plan" to the ACoS G-1, D/A, for his approval, which would provide guided career specialization on a voluntary basis for selected personnel within some five different fields of military intelligence activity. This plan did not contemplate the creation of any type of Intelligence Corps but merely authorized the career management ~~from the G-2 standpoint~~ of personnel who had signed up and been accepted for it under the supervision of an existing Career Management Division (CMD), AGO.

The sudden advent of the Korean Conflict while this proposed Intelligence Career Plan was still under consideration in the OACoS G-1, D/A, naturally delayed any conclusive action on it for several months. Effective 22 September 1950, however, the ACoS G-1, D/A, did approve "in principle" the formation of an Intelligence Career Management Branch within the CMD, AGO, and also announced that details of running new branch would be worked out directly between the "appropriate

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personnel of G-1 and G-2." No noticeable real progress was then

* See: Memo, G-2 to SGS, 27 Sep 50, G-2 016/2-T, 27 Sep 50
(1 Aug 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

made in accomplishing that particular task until February 1951, when the G-2 training officials initiated correspondence with the CMD authorities for the avowed purpose of implementing the "Intelligence Specialization" program.

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* See: Memo for Record on Comment 2, G-2 to Staff Adm Br, CMD, AGO, 9 Mar 51, G-2 211.Specialists-T, 9 Mar 51 (17 Jan 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

Despite continuing disagreement on the subject among the G-1, G-2 and CMD officials concerned, a special regulation was ^{finally} issued in May 1951 to establish a formal system of intelligence career specialization for Regular Army, Reserve and National Guard officer volunteers. Expressing the hope that such specialization would serve "to produce qualified and experienced officers for the more professional and technical phases of intelligence," the new system called for giving controlled military duty assignments to accepted applicants so they might eventually become recognized experts within one of the following

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important intelligence fields:

- (1) Strategic intelligence, to include the General Staff, joint intelligence agencies, and the Army attache system.
- (2) Intelligence staffs of major commands and field armies and higher headquarters.
- (3) Army Security Agency.
- (4) Counter Intelligence Corps.
- (5) Specialized intelligence units. *

* SR 605-150-30, 16 May 51.

Under the terms of this same special regulation, eligible officers desiring to participate in the intelligence specialization program were instructed to submit their applications through channels to The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C. While officers of the Army Medical Service, Chaplains and Judge Advocate General's Corps were ineligible for the program, personnel already assigned to the MI or AS Reserve would automatically be included in it provided they met the standard prerequisites for participants as set forth in *the new* SR 605-150-30. Final selections for the program were to be made by The Adjutant General with the concurrence of the ACoS G-2, D/A, but, in the case of officers from administrative or technical services, the head of such service would also be consulted. In addition to the participants receiving appropriate military duty assignments for career guidance within their respective intelligence specialization fields, they could normally count on attendance at one or

more of the following schools:

- (1) Civilian colleges and universities under Department of the Army school program for advanced training in international relations and allied subjects (Regular Army officers only).
- (2) Military schools, to include -
 - (a) Army Language and Area Program (Regular Army officers only).
 - (b) Strategic Intelligence School.
 - (c) Army Language School.
 - (d) Counter Intelligence Corps School. *

* Ibid.

Even with the publication of SR 605-150-30, the Intelligence Specialization Program continued to lag. Only a very few of the key G-2 officials felt that it would really alleviate the unfavorable personnel policies which had so consistently handicapped the military intelligence effort in the past. When these particular officials were circularized in June 1951 to determine the best method of putting the new system into effect, therefore, Col. Joseph K. Baker, Chief of the Special Research Branch, summed up this widespread feeling of skepticism by declaring that "the proposed plan will probably be ineffective, inasmuch as the outlines method of implementation does not materially change the existing situation which heretofore has been considered inadequate." * Nevertheless, the ACofS G-2, D/A, (General *Bolling*)

* Memo, Chief Spec Research Br to Plans and Control Sec, 13 Jun 51, G-2 211.Specialists-T, 13 Jun 51 (17 Jan 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

Bolling) was:

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personally pushing the intelligence specialization project, ⁵⁰ two letters bearing upon the subject were distributed to all major Army commanders during the next month. The first letter, dated 20 July 1951, described in lengthy detail the recent development of the Military Intelligence Service Organization (MISO) concept, which was designed to furnish suitable support to tactical units requiring the "utilization of foreign languages or the employment of unusual intelligence skills" in the field. * The second letter, sent out just one week

* Ltr, TAG to Commanders, 20 Jul 51, AGAO-S 322 (16 Jul 51)
G2-M, sub: Military Intelligence Service Organization. WW II Rec Div., GSA.

later, then pointedly presented an urgent appeal for qualified officers to apply for participation in the Intelligence Specialization Program, especially as "it has been acknowledged at the highest government levels that all intelligence agencies of the government must be brought to and maintained in a state of efficiency and effectiveness in consonance with technological progress and global strategic and geopolitical requirements." *

* Ltr, TAG to Commanders, 27 Jul 51, AGAO-S'210.31 (2 Jul 51)
G2-M d/w G-2 211.Specialists-T (17 Jan 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

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Regardless of the ultimate success or failure of the new Intelligence Specialization Program, it was now clearly apparent to all concerned that there were not nearly enough intelligence specialists available to satisfy the ever-mounting demands of the Army in the field. This same deficiency, of course, had led to the previously described directive from the Chief of Staff, dated 13 December 1951, for the ACofS G-2, D/A, in collaboration with the ACofS G-1 and ACofS G-3, D/A, to prepare a full-scale study on Army intelligence personnel "with a view toward developing requirements by MOS and numbers required, and procurement and training plans to meet and maintain these requirements." * Three months later, when the Chief of Staff

* Memo for ACofS G-2 from SGS, 13 Dec 51, in Special File on the "Procurement of Intelligence Specialist Personnel" (S), G-2 211. Specialists, Undated 52 (27 Nov 51), Tab F. ACSI Rec Sec.

returned the original study stemming from this 13 December 1951 directive to the ACofS G-2, D/A, for further action, the letter of transmittal ^{which accompanied} ~~accompanying~~ it contained a statement that he was also interested in the "consideration of the desirability of the establishment of a separate branch or corps for intelligence specialist personnel." Moreover, if this new study threatened to delay the prompt resubmission of the original one, the ACofS G-2, D/A, could make it the subject of

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a special paper. *

* Memo (S) for ACoFS G-2 from SGS, 14 Mar 52, in ibid.

This brief instruction from the Chief of Staff for the ACoFS G-2, D/A, to prepare a study about the desirability of establishing an Intelligence Corps in the Army was just what General Bolling wanted. Long an ardent advocate of action along those very lines, he believed that the time had now come to put the idea successfully into effect. To handle the project, he selected Lt. Col. William M. Black, a capable and experienced MI Reserve Officer, who was already on extended active duty within the Training Division and could be readily relieved of normal staff work in order to devote his entire time to monitoring the Intelligence Corps study. Additionally, during September 1951, Lieutenant Colonel Black had received an official commendation for the superior manner in which he represented the ACoFS G-2, D/A, as a member of the important departmental Scientists Committee ^{operating} ~~that operated~~ directly under the ACoFS G-1, D/A, and he was also a recent graduate of the SIS. *

* See: G-2 and AG 201 Personnel, William Murray Black, 0138988. WW II Rec Div, GSA. Lt Col Black, brother of Col Percy G. Black, Asst MA in Berlin shortly before WW II and later Chief of the MID

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Special Study Group (SSG), was actually a Col, MI Res. When he first applied for extended active duty in Feb 51, however, there was no G-2 position vacancy available in that grade, so he voluntarily accepted an active duty assignment for two years (Category IV) as a Lt Col. In Mar 52, at the time he was given this task of monitoring the Intelligence Corps study, his extended active duty tour still had approximately one more year to run.

The main obstacle which kept standing in the way of the satisfactory progress of the Intelligence Corps study was the fact that the higher authorities involved persistently underestimated how long it should properly take to complete it. The Chief of Staff naturally wished to act on the study without delay and General Bolling was very anxious to see a favorable start made toward the formation of an Intelligence Corps prior to the scheduled end of his assignment as the ACoS G-2, D/A, in August 1952. Despite strenuous efforts on the part of Lieutenant Colonel Black, though, the most that could be accomplished along such lines was the preparation of a staff study by 28 June 1952, which was merely intended to provide a broad base for a better understanding of the entire subject. The first Corps Concept study thus consisted mainly of an appropriate discussion of "extracts from official papers that traced DA policy and development of intelligence activities from World War I to date, with special emphasis on those

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from 1942 to date; the Lovett Board Report . . . and extracts from current and past files pointing to the intelligence problem that exists today." On the other hand, its principal recommendation did declare that a further development of the Corps Concept was
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plainly indicated.

* "Chronological Development of Intelligence Organization and G-2 Department of the Army Responsibility for Intelligence Training," G-2 322.4 Field Intelligence, Undated 53 (6 Feb 53), Tab C, p. 16. ACSI Rec Sec. See also: Ltr, Col Bruce W. Bidwell, U.S.A. Ret. from Wm. M. Black, Col USAR Ret., 15 Nov 61, "Corrections to Col. Bidwell's MS." Author's File.

The initial Corps Concept study was presented personally by General Bolling to Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Maxwell D. Taylor, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, on 11 July 1952. One result of this ^{presentation} was that the latter authority requested the ACofS G-2, D/A, to furnish him right away with a compilation of current deficiencies in the intelligence system and possible corrective measures to overcome them. A compilation of that nature was then hastily prepared within the departmental military intelligence agency and attached to the study when it was resubmitted, on 22 July 1952. The four intelligence deficiencies listed therein, were as follows:

(1) There is no centralized intelligence organization responsible for the procurement of personnel.

(2) Preferential treatment and/or special privileges are necessary to procure personnel for key intelligence positions and personnel possessing unique skills required for intelligence activities.

(3) Existing Special Regulations have failed to attract personnel, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to the intelligence career field.

(4) Intelligence is dependent upon the other Arms and Services for officer personnel. *

* "Staff Study (Black)" (S), op. cit., Appendix C, Annex G, Item 2.

On 1 August 1952, the ACoS G-2, D/A, received a memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Staff telling him to prepare an outline plan for review and approval in accordance with the provisions of the Intelligence Corps study that he had recently submitted. Eleven days later, though, General Partridge became the new ACoS G-2, D/A. After being fully briefed in regard to the numerous and varied complexities of this important ^{staff} study, General Partridge soon reached a considered conclusion that more time was needed before he could announce any firm decision in the matter. Nevertheless, he did issue verbal instructions for the study to be continued embodying a Corps Concept along the same lines ^{that} as were previously favored by General Bolling. *

* Ibid., Appendix C, p. 19.



Although the Chief, ASA, had agreed to the idea expressed in the first Corps Concept plan of having a Chief of Intelligence Corps placed directly over him, the Chief, CIC, had not. The latter official ~~then~~ proceeded to propose an alternate plan, which provided for three subordinate Headquarters headed by Deputy Chiefs, representing respectively "Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Communication *
Reconnaissance," to operate under this Intelligence Corps Chief. In

* Ibid., pp. 19-20.

his quarterly report of progress addressed to the Secretary of the Army on 29 December 1952, therefore, General Partridge stated ~~that~~ he had carefully investigated the question of establishing a separate Intelligence Corps or Service but recommended against making such a basic change in personnel policy at that particular time. He felt it would be better to take a ^{forward} ~~firm~~ step in the development of an Intelligence Service for the Army by creating "an organization comparable to those already in existence for counterintelligence and communications intelligence (CIC and ASA)."

* Ibid., p. 20; "History of Department of the Army Activities, ACoFS G-2, 9 September 1951 through 31 December 1952" (S), op. cit., Tab "Tng Div," Organization and Training Branch, p. 2.

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General Partridge's thoughts on the creation of an intelligence service for the Army before attempting to establish a full-scale Intelligence Corps were in fundamental accord with a staff study on the subject which had been originally drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Black during April 1952 and then completed in revised form some eight months later. This staff study envisaged the formation of an integrated military intelligence service, to be known as the Corps of Reconnaissance, operating ^{under} the general staff supervision of the ACoS G-2, D/A, along the following lines:

The mission of the Corps was to provide the intelligence support (including counterintelligence and communication and ground reconnaissance) to the Army Establishment as directed. Its objective was to support commanders of tactical and logistical units of division or larger size and higher headquarters, including the Department of the Army, by providing the intelligence support necessary to execute the command responsibility for intelligence. The Reconnaissance Corps would furnish, administer and service intelligence support personnel, units, or agencies as required. It would coordinate intelligence operations, eliminate duplication of effort, and relieve the General Staff, to the greatest degree possible, of command and operational responsibilities relating to the intelligence function of command. The Corps concept was in consonance with basic Army doctrine and principles of organization and through the troop base gave intelligence personnel the opportunity to develop their skills on a thorough and continuing knowledge with military field operations. It did not violate the command prerogative of choice of staff officers as branch immaterial assignments. *

* "Staff Study (Black)" (S), Appendix C, p. 22.

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Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Black's tour of active duty was rapidly coming to a close. He signified a willingness, though, to remain on active duty for another year in the hope of bringing his assigned study task to a satisfactory conclusion. When General Partridge personally supported that voluntary action in a letter addressed to The Adjutant General during the last week in January 1953, his tour was duly extended until 28 February 1954.*

* See: AG 201 Personnel, William Murray Black, OI38988, WW II Rec Div, GSA.

A new committee had recently been formed within the OACofS G-2, D/A, composed of Lieutenant Colonel Black and two other officers from the Training Division, plus representatives from ASA and CIC, in order

* Ltr, Col Bruce W. Bidwell, U.S.A. Ret., from Wm. M. Black, Col USAR Ret., 15 Nov 61, "Corrections to Col Bidwell's MS." Author's File. The two other Training Division officers on this committee were Lt Col (later Col) Howard W. Greer and Lt Col (later Col) Leo W. Bagley.

to develop a workable concept for the proposed Army intelligence service. First presented to General Partridge on 28 January 1953, this

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concept was approved by him in the form of a finished staff study entitled "Field Intelligence Service" about one month later and ~~then~~ promptly circulated for outside coordination as required. However, it only received a full concurrence from the ACofS G-4, D/A, and drew strong non-concurrences from both the ACofS G-1, ^{D/A,} and ACofS G-3, D/A, as well as from the Army Comptroller and Chief, Army Field Forces. Faced with such formidable opposition, General Partridge decided to hold the matter in abeyance and not to forward the Field Intelligence Service study for Chief of Staff approval, at least for the time being. *Then,* Early in June 1953, ^{more or less} ~~though,~~ to replace it, he announced the adoption of a "Four Point Program" which was designed to improve the current intelligence system by progressively concentrating on reaching the following major goals:

(a) Point One - Clarification of Regulations. To clearly define the scope of authority of G2, OCAFF and other DA agencies with respect to intelligence in the 10 and 11 series of AR's and SR's.

(b) Point Two - Establishment of an Intelligence Board. Based on the delineation of responsibility in (a) above.

(c) Point Three - Correlation of G2 DA and G2 OCAFF Organization and Functions. Based on the delineation of responsibility in (a) above and decentralization of responsibility to the Intelligence Board in (b) above, to reach a clear-cut allocation of the training and R & D responsibility for intelligence between G2 and G3, DA, and G2 and G3, OCAFF, and determine that the personnel requirements and spaces allocated in the two headquarters are commensurate with their responsibilities.

(d) Point Four - Establishment of an Army Intelligence School and Field Intelligence Center. Consolidation of intelligence schools at one location with the Intelligence Board and concentration of General Reserve Units. *

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* "Staff Study (Black)" (S), Appendix C, pp. 20-21.

Thus,
Hence,
Thus, the Intelligence Corps Concept project, which had been so optimistically started in March 1952 by General Bolling and then vigorously pushed by his successor General Partridge, although on a more limited objective basis, failed to make any *notable* headway prior to the *end* close of the Korean Conflict period. A great deal of discussion had gone on, as usual, with reference to the adverse personnel policies that were *continually* constantly handicapping the effective conduct of the Army intelligence effort but no satisfactory agreement was ever reached among the officials involved regarding what positive steps should be taken to alter them. General Partridge's own feeling in the matter, expressed when he was seeking to resolve the non-concurrences received by the Field Intelligence Service study during February 1953, was that no such agreement could be reached because there were two diametrically opposed views existing within the General Staff on the subject, as follows:

The view of G1, G3, COA, and Chief, AFF is that the present structure of the Army for administering and integrating the manpower, money, and materiel authorized for the intelligence function is basically sound and adequate. My view is that this structure is fundamentally unsound and inadequate. The Basic Study outlines factually the principal deficiencies in the present Army system and recommends a minimum remedy. I do not submit that it is the final solution of the deficiencies but rather that it is the optimum solution under existing conditions. It is my considered opinion that continued adherence by the Army to

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a proven false premise will perpetuate the intelligence functional, managerial, and administrative deficiencies inherent in the Army structure. As a result the principal adviser on the Department of the Army staff, who is charged with responsibility for the production of intelligence, will continue to operate without commensurate authority over the resources authorized. *

* Ibid., Annex G, Item 4b.

PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS

The sudden outbreak of the Korean Conflict had found the departmental intelligence agency of the Army badly understrength, especially in respect to its invaluable attache system. As a matter of fact, it was still in the midst of trying to cope with a recent series of personnel cuts that were not only occasioned by defense economy considerations but also derived from the earlier creation of a separate Air Force. Although the Army personnel augmentations which immediately followed the outbreak did serve abruptly to reverse this unfavorable trend, most of the increases it provided were granted strictly on a temporary basis. The principal problem during the latter part of 1950, therefore, was not so much to gain additional space authorizations but more to secure qualified personnel to fill the spaces after they had been already obtained. While MI Reserve Officers could be called to active duty in certain instances

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for that purpose, even this primary source held serious limitations because so many of the reserve officers were either specialists or currently employed in positions from which, for one reason or another, they could not receive an emergency military assignment. * Further-

* See: Summary of Division Chiefs Meetings, " G-2 337., 14 Aug 51 (1 Jul 51). WW II Rec Div, GSA. By this time, a total of 1914 MI Reserve Officers had been recalled to extended active duty.

more, there was such a vigorous competition constantly going on throughout the United States Government to procure new employees during the emergency, that it soon became almost impossible for the Department of the Army to fill any of its available research or clerical vacancies with properly qualified civilians.

These unusual conditions did not last very long, however, and the situation gradually began to show unmistakable signs of reverting back to normal. As a matter of fact, shortly after the ^{Korean} truce talks were opened in July 1951, strong pressures from higher authority started to build up again for the Department of Defense to accomplish sizeable across-the-board reductions in all personnel categories both at home and abroad, including those connected with military intelligence activities. The key lesson of the entire Cold War period, to the effect that the national intelligence effort should be proportion-

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ately increased whenever combat operations were decreased, had thus apparently been conveniently forgotten.

Early in August 1951, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel directed the Army to take positive action before 18 October 1951, to reduce departmental military and civilian personnel strengths by "5% below the actual strength carried on the rolls 20 July 1951." * An OCS Memorandum, dated 18 Septem-

* Memo, Chief Adm Div to Deputy ACofS G-2, 3 Aug 51, G-2 320.2, 3 Aug 51 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

ber 1951, then proceeded to schedule cuts in compliance with that directive within the Chief of Staff area. For the OACofS G-2, D/A, these ~~listed~~ cuts showed a ^{loss} reduction in authorized strength from 1088 persons (455 military and 633 civilian personnel) to 962 persons (442 military and 520 civilian personnel). The chief trouble with this planned reduction was that the agency was already 80 persons short of its full authorized strength in civilian employees and its assigned functions were steadily mounting rather than diminishing. For example, the following important functions were currently operating only on a "partially staffed" basis:

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- a. Determination of classified information which is now or will be released to foreign governments. Expeditious action is required in this connection to serve SHAPE needs.
- b. Security investigations and checks on individuals and agencies. These must be expedited. The number has increased from 60,000 in May 1951 to 67,000 in June 1951.
- c. Financial work in connection with expanding foreign training programs in the United States.
- d. Establishment of additional SSO's (Special Security Officers).
- e. Increase in Communication Intelligence activities.
- f. Increase in foreign visitors. The number of students have increased from 900 in FY 1950 to 1400 in FY 1951 with an expected 3,200 in FY 1952. The number of tours have increased from 120 in FY 1951 to an expected 220 in FY 1952. Personnel making visits have increased from a total of 3,100 in FY 1951 to an expected 5,000 in FY 1952.
- g. Increase in the Attache System. Personnel authorized in the Attache System has increased 27% since June 1950. When fully staffed, the coverage for intelligence information will increase accordingly and will necessitate increased personnel in the OACofS, G2 to process the information into intelligence.
- h. Increase in intelligence requirements for SHAPE.
- i. Increase in work with CIA.
- j. The initiation of the Escape and Evasion Program.
- k. Increase of representation on interdepartmental boards and committees.
- l. Intelligence support for Psychological Warfare.
- m. Army Augmentation to Air Targets Division, D/I, USAF.
- n. Project Paperclip. *

* See: Memo (S), ACofS G-2 for Deputy CofS for Operations and Administration, 3 Oct 51, G-2 320.2, 3 Oct 51 (24 Aug 43). WW II Rec. Div, GSA.

Deeply concerned over the prospect of this ^{stiff} major OACofS G-2, D/A, personnel cut when the Korean Conflict was still in actual progress,

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General Bolling decided to give General Taylor, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, a personal briefing on the subject and to request reconsideration of the reductions scheduled for the departmental military intelligence agency. With General Taylor showing no signs of accepting his proffered arguments in support of this reconsideration, General Bolling felt that he should make them a matter of official record. ^{Accordingly,} ~~On~~ 3 October 1951, therefore, he addressed a written memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration in the matter, which not only repeated his verbal request for reconsideration but also listed 21 intelligence functions that "may be curtailed" and 46 intelligence functions that "may be eliminated" if the scheduled cuts were carried out. * While some of

* Ibid., Tabs A and B.

these listed functions may have seemed rather trivial, taken as a whole they did represent an impressive bill of particulars against the threatened cuts and most certainly they all had a direct bearing upon the performance of the assigned G-2 mission. General Taylor, though, continued to make light of them, as follows:

While it is recognized that the expansion of intelligence functions in the present emergency would justify some increase in your authorized personnel ceiling beyond that established for 18 October 1951, it is not apparent that

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your loss in personnel will affect the discharge of your primary G-2 functions to a critical degree. It is recognized, on the other hand, that certain secondary or tertiary activities may have to be curtailed, or even discontinued, in view of the personnel limitations. If such curtailments become necessary, it is desired that this office be informed of the specific contraction of functions contemplated in advance of implementation. *

* Memo for ACoFS G-2 from Deputy CoFS for Operations and Administration (S), 10 Oct 51, G-2 320.2, 10 Oct 51 (24 Aug 43).
WW II Rec Div, GSA.

The departmental personnel reductions under discussion during this exchange of correspondence were ^{duly} finally put into effect on 4 October 1951^{*} but General Bolling continued to inveigh against

* See: Special "Space Authorization File," G-2 320.2 Undated 52 (24 Aug 43), Personnel Authorization, Change No. 11, issued 4 Oct 51, effective 1 Oct 51. WW II Rec Div, GSA.

against them to all concerned at every possible opportunity. The matter did not come to an official head again, though, until April 1952, when the OACoFS G-2, D/A, was faced with another major reduction of twenty-two officer spaces "resulting from limitations in the FY 1953 budget."^{*} Mainly because of strenuous objections raised by

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* Ibid., Personnel Authorization, No. 10, 25 Apr 52.

General Bolling in regard to this new cut, the Chief of Staff, on 26 May 1952, instructed the Staff Administrative Office, OCS, to conduct a manpower survey of the OACofS G-2, D/A, and to analyze its "organization for duplication of functions, appropriate decentralization of activities, and the adequacy of the organization-structure, all with a view toward indicating areas of manpower conservation in G2." Appointed to undertake this special survey was a civilian Management Survey Committee composed of representatives from the Staff Administrative Office, Office of the ACoFS G-1 and Office of the ACoFS G-2, D/A.

* "Report of Manpower Survey of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, 28 May 1952 - 12 August 1952" (S), op. cit., attached copies of pertinent orders and Introduction. The G-2 member of this committee was Mr. E. Sterling McKittrick, from the Management Office.

After examining all phases of ^{the} OACofS G-2, D/A, operations, the OCS Management Survey Committee submitted a lengthy report, dated

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12 August 1952, which recommended a total strength reduction for the agency amounting to 43 personnel spaces. This total actually represented proposed decreases of 47 officer and 6 enlisted spaces in military personnel that were to be partially counteracted by increases of 10 spaces in civilian personnel. With General Partridge just taking over from General Bolling as the new ACoS G-2, D/A, and most of the committee recommendations having stirred up violent objections among the G-2 officials directly involved, some reasonable delay in arriving at a final decision in the matter seemed plainly indicated. As soon as General Partridge did become fully familiar with the detailed recommendations of the Committee, though, his reaction to them was distinctly unfavorable. In a memorandum addressed to the Chief of the Staff Administrative Office, OCS, on 18 September 1952, he not only declared that the Management Survey Committee's recommended reorganization would not meet the basic needs of the departmental intelligence agency in any satisfactory manner but also stated that "my observation during the short time I have been here is that the organization of G-2 as it now exists is doing an extremely fine job." Then, by promising to appoint a G-2 committee to discuss

* Ibid., Tab P.

each individual item of the report with Management Survey team members in person,

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he managed to obtain the following important concessions from the Secretary of the General Staff:

1. Organizational changes which are not concurred in by the G-2 committee should be dropped from consideration.
2. The Survey Team should then submit recommendations concerning manning levels within the agreed upon organizational structure.
3. Where the Survey Team feels there is a duplication among personnel, that statement should be made with appropriate recommendation for reduction. However, the question as to whether key personnel should be military or civilian is a matter for decision by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and unless the Survey Team feels there are important reasons to the contrary, the question of whether a military or a civilian space should be dropped should be left to the decision of G-2. *

* Ibid., Tab Q.

General Partridge ^{soon proved} ~~turned out~~ to be a worthy successor to General Bolling in protesting against any further strength reductions for the departmental intelligence agency of the Army. On 22 October 1952, for example, he called the personal attention of the Chief of the Budget Division, D/A, to the grave danger of "restricting intelligence capabilities, at this time, in view of the increasing physical threat of the Soviet Bloc." * Nevertheless, he was only able to

* See: DF (C), G-2 to Chief, Budget Div, 22 Oct 52, G-2 112.5-T (22 Oct 52). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

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delay rather than to prevent the scheduled reductions and, in March 1953, the official announcement came through decreeing that the OACofS G-2, D/A, would be authorized a total of 933 spaces, comprising 328 officer, 71 enlisted and 534 civilian spaces. While this might not appear at first glance to have been much of a personnel cut, it really was a severe one because the given totals also included an increase of 37 officer, 13 enlisted and 28 civilian spaces recently granted to the agency to cover its ordered expanded participation in Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, operations.*

* See: DF, OCOF S Army to OACofS G-2, D/A, 13 Mar 53, G-2 O2O.G-2 13 Mar 53 (24 Oct 51). ACSI Rec Sec.

This latest adverse decision by higher authority in the matter of maintaining the OACofS G-2, D/A, at sufficient strength to carry out its assigned mission led General Partridge to register a most vehement objection. He promptly prepared and forwarded a Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, United States Army, through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, not only to warn both of these authorities against continuing such ^{an unfavorable} ~~a crippling~~ personnel policy but also once more to request reconsideration of the agency strength cuts derived from the OCS Management Survey Committee's report. The principal points that he made in this personally signed communication, were as follows:

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1. Never before in history has the United States stood more in need of accurate military intelligence.

2. Due to the effectiveness of enemy counterintelligence measures, our military intelligence estimates of his real intentions have often been inadequate and in some cases merely guesses.

3. By voluntarily rearranging the distribution of personnel in the Army Attache system, I have already saved about 20 military and 39 civilian spaces, and am still determined to eliminate any non-essential effort or wasteful processes within the OACofS G-2, D/A.

4. The present strength of the departmental intelligence agency remains quite inadequate to meet the demands of the military situation facing the nation in the foreseeable future. Its entire collection effort must be intensified, particularly with reference to technical intelligence, and the current program of basic intelligence production is far behind schedule. Furthermore, no provision has yet been made to fill the planning and operational needs for military intelligence information of the new Psychological Warfare special staff section.

5. These factors all add up to important personnel increases for military intelligence but just the opposite has occurred. For example, based upon a manpower survey conducted in May 1952 by a civilian board without detailed knowledge of national intelligence requirements, the OACofS G-2, D/A, was

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assessed serious personnel cuts which gravely threaten its effectiveness.

6. Since my recommendations to modify these cuts have not been accepted, I feel it my duty to inform you that:

- a. Cutting the Army intelligence effort at this period of our history is unrealistic.
- b. To make a minor financial and personnel saving we are disproportionately increasing the military risk to the United States.
- c. The cut in personnel presently imposed on G-2, reduces the strength of the Army intelligence division to a point where I must reorganize and eliminate functions that are more important now than ever before. *

* Memo (S), ACoFS G-2 (signed R. C. Partridge, Maj. Gen., GS) for Chief of Staff, United States Army, thru Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, 8 Apr 53, G-2 350.09 (8 Apr 53).
WW II Rec Div, GSA.

This fervid ACoFS G-2, D/A, memorandum for the Chief of Staff was ^{first} noted by Lt. Gen. Anthony J. McAuliffe, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, but then failed to get any further than the Vice Chief of Staff's Office, where, on 20 Apr 1953, General Partridge conferred to no avail in the matter with General John E. Hull, the Vice Chief of Staff. At the same time, the G-2 Management ^{Office} was called upon to submit a new Table of Distribution for the

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OACofS G-2, D/A, in strict accordance with the recently announced space ceiling. Forwarded right along with this requested Table of Distribution, though, for the record, was a statement describing the immediate impact of these personnel cuts ^{upon} ~~in~~ the following assigned functions and responsibilities of the departmental military intelligence agency:

a. Discontinuance of the document "Communist Party (USA)," which has been distributed on a monthly basis to all high-level governmental agencies and military commands needing knowledge of subversive individuals or organizations potentially or actually dangerous to the accomplishment of the Army mission.

b. Discontinuance of the Weekly Intelligence Review, which has presented an analysis and evaluation of world events reported during the previous week. This publication was given wide distribution throughout the United States Government and all major Army Commands, including Army Attache and Mission Offices, while edited copies were furnished to SHAPE and ^{to} the British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Governments.

c. Latin American intelligence will now have to be restricted entirely to covering purely military matters. This will be accomplished by eliminating all details on economic, psychological and political aspects, even though such aspects usually do influence military developments and give clues to ^{impending} ~~to~~ coups d'etat.

d. There will be an increased delay in the production of basic technical intelligence, NIS chapters, handbooks, and staff

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intelligence required by Army and other training or planning
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agencies.

* SS (S), ACof G-2 for OCofSA, 20 Apr 53, G-2 350.09, 20 Apr 53
(8 Apr 53). WW II Rec Div, GSA.

From then on until the end of the Korean Conflict period, only
minor upward adjustments were permitted in the authorized strength
of the OACofS G-2, D/A. * The final Table of Distribution issued for

* The SGS had recently granted 3 additional officer spaces to
staff the G-2 Inspector General's Office, which ^{was} had been formed ef-
fective 11 Feb 53, and also authorized the conversion of 8 civilian
spaces to officer spaces within the departmental military intelligence
agency. See: Memo, SGS to ACofS G-2, 3 Apr 53, G-2 020.G-2, 3 Apr 53
(24 Oct 51). ACSI Rec Sec.

the agency during that period, therefore, dated 30 June 1953, estab-
lished ceilings of 409 military personnel and 531 civilian employees,
totalling 940 spaces. These figures represented a reduction of 13.6%
from the corresponding ceilings of 455 military and 633 civilian spaces,
totalling 1088 persons, which were given to it in July 1951, but this
was really beside the point. As brought out so often by both General

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Bolling and General Partridge, the Korean Conflict period was most certainly not the appropriate time to reduce the capabilities of the Army intelligence effort at all. In mid-1953, being faced with the grim prospect of an ever-expanding Cold War on a worldwide basis, the national defense authorities should have taken determined steps to increase rather than decrease our military intelligence potential in every way possible. The intelligence officials of the Army had thus plainly lost their crucial battle to put that vital point across to these same authorities and the lessons derived from the Cold War period preceding Korea were apparently again about to be grievously ignored.

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CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The general pattern of the departmental intelligence effort of the Army during the Korean Conflict period was quite similar in many ways to that of World War II but completely different in several others. Some of the chief differences between the two periods, of course, stemmed from the fact that the combat operations in Korea were originally designated as being merely a so-called "police-action" rather than a full-scale war. Furthermore, largely for political reasons, defense economy was reintroduced as a governmental policy right after the truce talks were opened in July 1951, even though heavy fighting was still going on in Korea and peaceful conditions could not be really attained there until two years later. Unlike World War II, the Korean Conflict was fought only within a single theater of military operations but this difference did not affect the Army intelligence effort to any great degree because the Cold War, which was essentially an intelligence war, continued simultaneously and unabated on a global basis.

The almost total surprise gained by the Communists in accomplishing their successful crossing of the 38th Parallel during early Sunday morning, 25 June 1950 (Korean time) to invade the Republic of Korea, naturally aroused a storm of protest throughout the United

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States. Terming the unanticipated event another Pearl Harbor, demands were soon heard from all sides for an official investigation aimed at fixing specific blame for the indicated intelligence failure. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson thus became one of the first casualties of this public pressure, when President Truman accepted his resignation, effective 19 September 1950, "with regret."

A detailed analysis of the American intelligence performance prior to the Korean outbreak actually does show some important similarities between it and the one which preceded Pearl Harbor, especially in respect to the low evaluation that was given to certain potentially revealing items of collected information. There was plainly a considerable amount of fragmentary information available to provide a more timely warning against both of these foreign military aggressions but the intelligence officials involved simply refused to believe it. This faulty evaluation on their part, coupled with the utilization of markedly rewarding deception procedures by the other side, clearly served to color our own national intelligence estimates so that no suitable forewarning of either event was ever given. Probably one of the most effective of these deception procedures before Korea was for the Communist security authorities to introduce into customary military intelligence channels a whole series of conflicting reports on the planned invasion date for the express purpose of misleading the opposition. The American intelligence authorities were not only

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badly confused by the deliberate inconsistency of these varying dates but also encouraged to adopt a negative or "cry wolf" too often attitude in the matter, which eventually proved to be fatal.

The main difference between the military intelligence situation existing before Pearl Harbor and the one preceding Korea was directly related to the subject of economy in national defense. President Roosevelt had already declared an unlimited national emergency more than six months prior to 7 December 1941 and the departmental intelligence officials of the Army were in the process of putting a planned expansion program into actual effect when the Pearl Harbor attack suddenly took place. In sharp contrast to this, a defense economy drive was in full swing at the time that the Korean invasion occurred, which had been applied with crippling force against the OACofS G-2, D/A, despite the ever-increasing intelligence demands of the Cold War. Secretary Johnson himself had even displayed a strong personal bias against the Army Attache system by insisting on heavy personnel cuts for it regardless of repeated protests^{received} from the JCS and other concerned military officials that its collection activities were truly essential to the successful production of foreign intelligence.

It should also be carefully noted that the American intelligence system was much more complex in an organizational sense at the time of Korea than it was just before Pearl Harbor. During 1941, for example, the State, War and Navy Departments, with only limited assistance from the FBI and FCC, were being called upon to produce practically all foreign

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intelligence for the United States Government. Higher authority though, had for many years frowned on the formation of any covert intelligence nets within foreign countries and particularly throughout the Far East. Passage of the National Security Act of 1947 then added materially to this comparatively simple organization not only by creating a new CIA with an assigned worldwide covert intelligence mission but also a separate Department of the Air Force which, early in 1950, was just beginning to establish its own collection sources on a coequal basis with the two older Services. Hence, the Army's responsibility for warning the nation against a surprise foreign attack had already undergone considerable dilution since December 1941 and one of its most difficult problems during the pre-Korean period soon became how best to achieve some sort of a satisfactory coordination of effort with CIA and the USAF regarding the production of military intelligence both in Washington and the field.

Much of the public criticism connected with the failure of military intelligence to anticipate the Korean invasion properly ^{seemed} ~~was~~ ^{was} prone to overlook the fact that there were a number of other extremely threatening situations developing in the Far East during the same time that the Communists were surreptitiously building up for it. The Viet Minh rebels, for instance, had recently dealt the French a series of crushing defeats in Indo-China and the Red-led Huks were making alarming gains in the Philippines. Likewise, the Chinese Nationalist Government had been forced to evacuate its forces from the island of

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Hainan and a bitter Netherlands-Republic of Indonesia dispute over the future status of Dutch New Guinea was serving to keep the strategic East Indies area in a constant turmoil. With the mounting demands of the American military occupation in Japan and Germany also constantly calling for more and more intelligence resources, there were soon not nearly enough of such resources to go around.

The Army intelligence officials had derived most of their basic guidance in allocating scarce intelligence collection resources throughout the world from the findings of an authoritative policy review board, commonly known as the Haislip Board, which were approved by the Chief of Staff in August 1947. These findings consistently held that only the U.S.S.R. was powerful enough to pose a really dangerous threat to United States security, so the Army should concentrate its main intelligence means on keeping close track of Russian and Satellite military capabilities. Moreover, in order to conserve its available resources for accomplishing that primary task, the departmental intelligence agency of the Army ought to rely solely upon outside agencies, such as the CIA and State Department, to furnish it with any needed political, economic or other non-military information. This adopted emphasis on seeking to determine U.S.S.R. and Satellite military capabilities naturally turned the principal attention of the Army field collection effort toward western Europe rather than the Far East. Further contributing to the

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same tendency, was a recent and almost successful Communist attempt to oust the Allies from their exposed position in Berlin, plus strong Red pressures that were being continually directed against the anti-Communist regimes in Greece, Iran and Turkey.

Besides having to contend with this firmly fixed priority for western European coverage, the Army intelligence effort in the Far East also found itself during early 1950 in a weakened condition for several other reasons. Based upon the mistaken thesis that military personnel serving with American training missions could provide an appropriate replacement for attache personnel in reporting needed information to Washington from friendly foreign countries, the authorized strength of both the Army and Navy Attache Offices in Korea had been reduced to only one officer each and the Air Attache Office, Korea, completely abolished. To make matters worse, the Army Attache Office, Formosa, was currently undergoing a major reorganization following its hasty move there from Nanking, China, and CIA covert collection capabilities within the Far East were at a noticeably low level of accomplishment. While the Office of the ACoFS G-2, FECOM, was fully developed, its collection organization had been intentionally designed more to satisfy the ~~intelligence~~ needs of the American military occupation in Japan than to furnish general ^{intelligence} coverage of the Far East. Nevertheless, because Korea did constitute one of his designated secondary areas of collection responsibilities, G-2, FECOM, took prompt

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steps to station a small group of intelligence personnel in Seoul for the specific purpose of collecting information which might be of military security interest to CINCPAC. The actual performance of this Seoul detachment, though, had not been very impressive and he was trying hard to improve it when the Korean invasion suddenly started.

This unfavorable military intelligence situation did not change immediately, of course, upon the commitment of American troops to the defense of South Korea. However, with Congress acting without delay to pass necessary legislation and grant appropriate supplementary funds in support of a large-scale Service expansion, both the OACofS G-2, D/A, proper and the Army Attache system soon received a ~~rapid~~ succession of small personnel increases. These early piecemeal actions in the matter still fell far short of satisfying the critical intelligence demands of the Far Eastern emergency and, even a month after the Korean outbreak, Secretary of Defense Johnson apparently continued to consider that the primary requirement was "for continuous intelligence collection from areas peripheral to the Soviet Union." Notwithstanding, by mid-October 1950, all important requests for additional personnel to sustain a planned Army intelligence augmentation program had finally been approved, at least on an emergency or temporary basis. One of the most significant of these requests, which was agreed to by Secretary of Defense Marshall in October 1950, authorized the first sizeable strength increase since World War II

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for the Army Attache system, amounting to 29 officers, 5 warrant officers, 21 enlisted men, 19 American civilians and 33 alien civilians.

As usual, though, the big problem was not so much to gain additional personnel spaces in support of a rapid expansion of the departmental intelligence agency but more one of procuring qualified persons to fill the spaces after they had been officially authorized. The most promising source for the procurement of experienced intelligence personnel was from the MI and AS Reserves, so these two key organizations were promptly exploited to the limit. Many of the persons belonging to them, however, were strictly specialists who could only be fitted into specific assignment spots. Others, for a wide variety of reasons, could not be recalled to active military duty at that particular time. The agency was thus soon forced to rely ^{mostly} ~~chiefly~~ upon detailing personnel from the rest of the Army to fill the majority of its newly-acquired military spaces, while a great many of its civilian vacancies remained unfilled because an active competition was then going on throughout the United States Government to recruit qualified clerical help of almost every conceivable type. ^{Moreover,} ~~Resides,~~ there were simply no trained researchers or other ^{available} military intelligence specialists available for procurement from the outside at all.

The sudden opening of the Korean Conflict ~~period~~ also found the departmental intelligence agency of the Army organized on an over-

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simplified basis. This had been done by General Irwin shortly after his appointment as the Director of Intelligence, OSUSA, for the stated purpose of reducing the total number of key subordinates who would regularly be called upon to deal directly with him. The totally different security and training functions were placed under one single head and the Foreign Liaison Office, which really performed a departmental function, was made an integral part of the agency's main administrative element. General Irwin was transferred from his ACoS G-2, D/A, assignment, effective 29 August 1950, but the agency continued to operate with this same unsatisfactory organization until 1 February 1951, when General Bolling, his successor, eventually got around to separating the security and training functions again and restoring the Foreign Liaison Office to its previous semi-independent position. Still remaining ^{undetermined} ~~badly unsettled~~ for nearly six more months, was the controversial question of whether the collection and dissemination functions should be executed within the production division or completely divorced from it. Following the reestablishment of a separate Collection and Dissemination Division on 16 July 1951, therefore, the agency finally did come to present an intelligence organization more or less along traditional lines.

The American intelligence effort was severely criticized again when it failed to anticipate correctly the Chinese Communist decision to intervene openly in the Korean Conflict during October 1950

on a major scale. With reference to this particular criticism, though, it seems only right to point out that the intelligence circumstances surrounding that historic event were abnormal to say the least. Since there was never any doubt among the American military intelligence authorities that the Red Chinese were perfectly capable of intervening across the Yalu River in force within a matter of just a few hours, the problem obviously became one of obtaining reliable information on the actual issuance of their orders to do so. Two principal methods of approach were available to accomplish that difficult feat and, due mainly to the time element involved, the first of them, which would call for the exploitation of every possible source throughout the world in trying to obtain an accurate insight into the Chinese Communist plans or intentions, appeared to be almost hopeless. The second and much more promising method, which would merely require the establishment of ^{an unceasing} ~~a close in-~~ intelligence surveillance over the Manchurian areas lying opposite the combat theater for the purpose of observing troop, supply and other military movements to indicate that the CCF intervention plan had been put into effect, was denied to the Army intelligence authorities by a national policy decision. With CINCFE's chances of giving any suitable advance warning of the CCF intervention thus reduced to practically nil, it becomes manifestly unfair to blame him or even the departmental intelligence officials back in Washington for not anticipating the exact timing of the full-scale CCF intervention. On the other hand, it must be readily admitted that a detailed examination of the

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intelligence estimates submitted just before and immediately after this intervention did disclose a singular reluctance on the part of the military intelligence authorities concerned to believe the event was either going to or had actually happened. ^{The} ~~An~~ unfortunate habit of wishful thinking could also be seen in these same estimates, as well as a harmful disposition to arrive at considered conclusions based more upon logic from the American viewpoint than from that of the Red Chinese leaders themselves.

The sudden Korean outbreak created an immediate and almost insatiable demand for the production of intelligence handbooks, terrain studies, identification guides and instructional pamphlets of many different kinds to be issued to the UN forces in the Far East. Since that type of work utilized extremely scarce and highly specialized intelligence researchers, other similar projects, such as the production of NIS chapters, had to suffer. Although the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was willing to accept a temporary NIS production decline in view of the national emergency, he did not desire it to last any longer than necessary. Accordingly, ^{thus} ~~The~~ departmental intelligence authorities ^{thus} decided to sponsor a special personnel augmentation program aimed at obtaining 143 more civilian researchers for assignment to the various Army Technical Services that were engaged in NIS production. Most of this augmentation program was eventually approved by higher authority but it turned out to be a marked

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failure because there were not enough personnel available for procurement from any source with fitting qualifications to do ^{research} ~~the work~~ of that special nature. The result was a sharp reduction from 15 to 8 in planned goals for NIS chapter completions during FY 1951 and the general caliber of this basic intelligence production soon became measurably poorer.

(S) Despite the constantly growing demands for intelligence, in support of Korean combat operations, the OACofS G-2, D/A, could not afford to neglect the rest of the world even for a single moment. There were, of course, still important American ^{military} occupations going on within the EUCOM, FECOM, USFA and TRUST areas and it was now more essential than ever to maintain a thorough intelligence coverage of all existing global trouble spots in order to prevent the Communists from achieving any more surprise aggressions while we were so deeply committed in Korea. Most discouragingly, though, the vital question of responsibility for the conduct of covert intelligence activities overseas involving the security of a military command continued to remain notably unresolved during the entire Korean Conflict period.

(S) Mainly because of persistent personnel shortages, anticipatory planning for several important combat intelligence activities had been seriously neglected after World War II. Among these activities were preparations for the establishment of an effective technical intelligence organization to exploit captured enemy arms and equipment from

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the departmental standpoint, and the development of a proper escape and evasion (E&E) program for use by military personnel who might suddenly find themselves located in enemy or other forbidding territory. While determined action on the part of the intelligence officials directly concerned, both in Washington and the Far East, served to clear up the first matter without too much delay, the second one soon got mixed up in a many-sided dispute over agency responsibility for controlling it. Hence, even though the E&E returnees in the Far East had already demonstrated they could provide a valuable source of military intelligence information, it was not until July 1951 that G-2, FECOM, managed to institute a set of standard operating procedures for promptly interviewing them within the theater and an Army-wide indoctrination program on the subject of E&E did not get fully underway until early in 1952.

Regardless of these numerous and varied difficulties, however, once the Army intelligence production effort did succeed in overcoming the initial handicaps it had inherited from the defense economy drives of the preceding Cold War period, its performance during the Korean Conflict was generally excellent. Contributing substantially to this favorable performance were several forthright steps taken in connection with military intelligence production by the appropriate authorities, as follows:

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(S) 1. The Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), during September 1950, announced a series of "critical national intelligence objectives in respect to the USSR," to emphasize the grave necessity for collecting information and producing intelligence on Soviet capabilities and intentions to adopt certain specified lines of action against the United States.

(S) 2. G-2, FECOM, in March 1951, published a theater handbook covering the collection and processing of name plates removed from captured enemy arms and equipment for military intelligence analysis, and then added a special Signal supplement to it some five months later. In June 1951, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, also issued a directive to the Army on this same subject, which defined in precise detail his own continued interest and requirements within that notably productive intelligence field.

(U) 3. The ACoFS G-2, D/A, established an intimate ^{inter-agency} liaison with the recently formed Psychological Warfare Division, Special Staff, D/A, not only to provide for their mutual assistance in devising an effective Army E&E program but also to promote further research regarding all forms of unconventional warfare.

(U) 4. The IAC, on 17 May 1951, agreed upon formal terms of reference for a new Economic Intelligence Committee, to consist of designated representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force and State Departments, plus the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Intelligence Agency, in the hope of improving economic intelligence production related to national defense.

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5. Under pressures generated by the OACofS G-2, D/A, production officials, the Chief of Staff, in May 1952, authorized the re-establishment of a valuable postgraduate educational program which had been suspended following the Korean outbreak and was aimed at training officers for overseas service in Military Geographic Specialist Teams.

6. The ACofS G-2, D/A, Director of ONI and Director of Intelligence, USAF, signed a joint agreement, effective 16 May 1952, to formalize G-2 and ONI participation in the operations of the Air Intelligence Production Division, DI, USAF. Actually, though, such participation had been going on informally ever since September 1945.

7. The DCI, in August 1952, directed the creation of a Scientific Estimates Committee, in order to integrate and coordinate the production of scientific intelligence at the national level.

8. The ACofS G-2, D/A, during March 1953, personally sponsored the formation of an ad hoc Technical Services Committee, and named the Chief of the Technical Branch, Production Division, OACofS G-2, D/A, to be its Chairman. Composed of representatives from G-2, G-4, AFF and the seven Technical Services, this committee was then charged with assigning specific production responsibility to the various departmental agencies that were involved in accomplishing a greatly intensified Army Intelligence Program.

If nothing else, the sudden opening of the Korean Conflict did serve to alert most of our national leaders to the gravity and extent of the Army's many difficult military security problems. During the pre-

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ceding Cold War period, it had been deliberately prevented by higher authority from undertaking any preliminary counterintelligence investigations bearing upon the possible use of Federal troops in domestic emergencies and even denied an effective control over the establishment of policies designed to uncover subversion or sabotage within its own ranks. Under the new conditions of combat in Korea, though, the prompt elimination of all serious security risks and disloyal persons from the Army became literally a matter of life or death. Fortunately, there were already suitable legal and administrative means at hand to accomplish this elimination in a fairly satisfactory manner and the United States Government had also recently adopted an ambitious personnel security program for the purpose of safeguarding classified information. On the other hand, the Army counterintelligence effort had been starved so long for want of adequate support from above that it soon fell far behind in conducting practically every phase of its military security work.

The most immediate counterintelligence problem to confront the Army security officials right after the Korean outbreak was one of keeping unauthorized information on such important matters as UN troop movements, combat results and ~~the~~ introduction of new weapons into the theater of operations from reaching ^{the} enemy hands. While detailed censorship planning had been faithfully carried out during the previous Cold War period, the plans derived therefrom were only intended to go into effect following a regular declaration of war. With ^{the} Korean Con-

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flict then being officially regarded merely as a "UN police action," there were weighty diplomatic and political considerations serving to hinder the establishment of any form of national censorship. About the most that could be expected along those lines under the existing circumstances was the acceptance of some sort of an arrangement for voluntary censorship by the public information personnel directly concerned. This, ^{then} ^{of system} was the type ultimately chosen within the Department of the Army and at Headquarters, FECOM, for the purpose of preventing damaging disclosures of military information from getting to the enemy. Although such a voluntary system did admittedly hold several distinct advantages over an enforced censorship system, its actual performance during the Korean Conflict plainly left much to be desired.

There was an obvious need likewise indicated during the early stages of the Korean Conflict for the imposition of armed forces censorship, at least throughout the theater of operations. However, as so tellingly reported to the JCS by General MacArthur in August 1950, its establishment would require training and subsequent employment of thousands of persons to check the public communications media involved, which lay completely beyond the currently available resources of his UN command. It might also engender a number of serious international complications that could well prove to be insurmountable. Because personnel demands on the Army were mounting daily, an authoritative decision was finally made to employ a voluntary system supplemented by an intensified educational campaign in order to handle this major counter-

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intelligence problem both at home and abroad.

Other important developments within the military security field during the Korean Conflict period, were, as follows:

1. Issuance of an Army-wide directive, dated 20 September 1950, covering the creation of Loyalty-Security Hearing Boards to receive testimony from civilians answering charges filed against them on loyalty-security grounds, in compliance with the terms of a ^{new} newly-passed law (PL 733) dealing with that same subject.

2. Approval by the Secretary of Defense, on 2 October 1950, of a specific list of "Criteria for Determining Eligibility for Employment for Sensitive and Non-Sensitive Duties in the Department of Defense."

3. Dispatch of detailed instructions to the Army occupation commanders, in November 1950, furnishing them with necessary guidance for performing the security screening operations required by a recent amendment to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which permitted 500 additional DP's to enter the United States as "national interest cases."

4. Formation, effective 7 February 1951, of a fully representative Physical Equipment Agency, to operate under the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force for the purpose of developing "physical security and related investigative equipment as a common service for all agencies of the Department of Defense."

5. Establishment, on 17 August 1951, of a G-2 Central Records Facility at Fort Holabird, Md., to provide a centralized repository

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and master index for all personnel security information available to the Army from closed investigative cases.

6. Acceptance by the US, UK and France, in May 1952, of a set of "principles and standards" for safeguarding classified information, ^{that} ~~which~~ soon came to be known as the Tripartite Security Agreement.

7. Adoption, during May 1952, of a military security policy toward the new European Defense Community (EDC) which included the German Federal Republic, authorizing the disclosure of United States information as high as SECRET on a "need to know" basis whenever such information was considered essential to the accomplishment of EDC defense planning objectives.

8. Conclusion of an agreement between the United States and New Zealand Departments of Defense, in September 1952, calling for each of them to take coordinated measures to protect the security of military information held by the other.

9. Signing of a formal agreement, in October 1952, by CINCARIB, CG USARCARIB and the ACoFS G-2, D/A, relative to utilizing 470th CIC Detachment personnel within the Republic of Panama and Canal Zone on military security missions.

10. Publication, during January 1953, of a new SR 380-405-5, instituting a single personnel security investigative and clearance system in private industrial concerns performing classified contract

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work for any of the three Service Departments.

By far the most significant development to occur within the military security field during the Korean Conflict period, however, was concerned with Red Chinese attempts to exploit their UN prisoners of war (POW's) in every way possible, especially those from the United States. It had been a foregone conclusion, of course, that the Communists would seek to indoctrinate or "brain wash" these POW's but, early in 1951, it also became abruptly apparent they were encouraging selected POW's to write to relatives and friends in America for the express purpose of disseminating Communist propaganda. When the truce talks^{were} opened in July 1951, therefore, G-2 FECOM was promptly instructed to read and microfilm all POW mail being turned over by the Communist officials to the UN negotiators at Panmunjum. The ACofS G-2, D/A, was then soon able to give him a "Watch List" of American POW's who had shown definite evidence or strong indications of Communist indoctrination, so that suitable arrangements could be made for processing any letters to or from them in a special manner.

Late in 1952, with the truce talks promising the possibility of a large-scale exchange of captured personnel from both sides, the highly controversial subject of Communist indoctrination of American POW's came under active discussion throughout the Nation. Although the ACofS G-1, D/A, had been placed in direct charge of monitoring the development of an appropriate program for the return and reassign-

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ment of such personnel, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, was fully aware of his own basic counterintelligence responsibilities in the matter. As a result, when the so-called Little Switch operation began on 19 April 1953, ~~satisfactory~~ ^{workable} procedures were already in force for interrogating the 149 ex-POW's involved either at a West Coast port of debarkation or the Valley Forge General Hospital, Phoenixville, Penna., depending mainly upon their ^{respective} physical condition. While only one of this initial group did turn out to be a "hard core" Communist, the very satisfactory interrogation system which was devised for it thus stood ready to function without delay if any other POW exchanges were effected in the near future.

The military intelligence training situation during the Korean Conflict period was notably unfavorable in many important respects. This condition was derived largely from two adverse decisions which were made by higher authority with reference to that complex subject during the preceding Cold War period. The first of these decisions, announced by the Chief of Staff in February 1946, not only disapproved a recommendation from the authoritative Gerow Board on military educational facilities that there should be an Intelligence College of broad scope established in the post-war Army but also failed to provide any proper replacement for the recently abolished Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Md. The Director of Intelligence, WDGS, ^(MOSBY) was still permitted to hold an appropriate general staff responsibility within the military training field in coordination with

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the Director of Organization and Training, WDGS. The second adverse decision ^{relative to this} regarding this same matter took place in April 1950, when, as part of a major Army reorganization, the entire Army training function was given to the Chief of Army Field Forces, under general staff supervision by the ACoFS G-3, D/A. Despite the fact that he would have to continue to remain deeply involved in all phases of the military intelligence training effort, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, was then only permitted to conduct specialist training at the Strategic Intelligence, CIC and ASA Schools.

After the Army started to expand so rapidly following the Korean outbreak, it was discovered, as usual, that there were not nearly enough military intelligence specialists available to satisfy the ever-mounting demands of the troop units in the field. The ACoFS G-2, D/A, promptly set out to remedy these shortages as best he could within his own intelligence schools but soon ran into numerous obstacles in seeking to raise the student quotas at several of the others, particularly the Army Language School, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. The ACoFS G-1, D/A, wanted these student quotas held down as much as possible and even objected to undertaking a thorough survey of the Army to determine what its true requirements for military intelligence specialists really were. Eventually, on 13 December 1951, the Chief of Staff directed the ACoFS G-2, D/A, to prepare a detailed study covering the Army requirements for critical intelligence specialists "throughout the entire range of G-2 activities." As late as

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the end of August 1952, though, there were still severe shortages existing in such badly needed intelligence specialist categories as photo interpreters, foreign liaison officers, POW interrogators and censorship officers.

The invaluable Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) Program for Army officers also suffered materially during the Korean Conflict period from a lack of effective support by higher authority, especially in respect to procuring personnel for it under the current career management policies. In July 1951, with an annual requirement firmly established for 95 foreign language and area specialists, just 47 officers were participating in the seven-year program and only 4 new officers were slated to enter it in the immediate future. This deficit resulted in the entrance standards for Regular Officers being steadily lowered and ~~encouraged~~ ^{caused} the admittance of ~~more~~ ^{a number of} Reserve Officers to the program. Finally, on 6 January 1953, over-all control of the FAST program was returned to the OACoFS G-2, D/A, where it undoubtedly should have been allowed to remain in the first place.

The military intelligence training picture during the Korean Conflict period was not completely bleak, however, and four significant gains were actually registered within that very important field, as follows:

1. A hasty but remarkably successful map revision project was initiated in July 1950, designed to furnish more accurate and suitable tactical maps of the Korean Peninsula for combat use. Among other things, it ^{also} facilitated the changeover, effective 12 October 1950, to a

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new Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Grid Reference System for controlling all ground support missions fired by the U. S. Army, Navy and Air Force in Korea.

2. An auspicious start was made during July 1951, in developing a standard intelligence support structure, known as MISO, for the assignment of units to Theaters, Armies, Corps, Divisions and Logistical Commands, based upon lessons derived from World War II and initial combat experiences in Korea.

3. Positive steps were taken early in 1952 to revitalize and extend a lagging Foreign Armies Recognition Program, which had been previously organized to produce and distribute military handbooks on all major foreign armies of the world as required. This program soon came to include a highly classified orientation and training course of instruction regarding Soviet Armed Forces that was given to officers at certain designated Service Schools, and a more general course of the same nature presented throughout the entire Army.

4. Strong pressures were constantly exerted by the OACofS G-2, D/A, officials directly involved for the preparation of up-to-date manuals covering intelligence subjects. This pressure resulted in the publication, prior to June 1953, of such ^{basic} ~~essential~~ field manuals as FM 30-5 (Combat Intelligence), FM 30-15 (Examination of Personnel and Documents) and FM 30-19 (Order of Battle Intelligence).

The difficult question of how best to overcome the unfavorable personnel policies that had been plaguing the military intelligence effort for so many years in the past, continued to remain markedly unresolved by the end of the Korean Conflict period. Shortly before

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the Korean outbreak, General Irwin, the ACoFS G-2, D/A, had formally recommended the establishment of a career management program aimed at encouraging intelligence specialization by Army officers and combatting the unrewarding personnel policies which were continually turning promising young officers away from intelligence duty assignments. Although the ACoFS G-1, D/A, did approve "in principle" the formation of an Intelligence Career Management Branch to operate under the Career Management Division, AGO, it was not until May 1951 that all the authorities concerned were in enough agreement on the subject to publish a special regulation establishing ^{SUCV} the new branch.

Meanwhile, General Bolling, General Irwin's successor, had been persistently pressing for the creation of an Intelligence Corps within the United States Army, in order to give military intelligence personnel a coequal career status with members of the existing Technical Corps and Branches. This so-called Corps Concept was also firmly espoused by General Partridge after he took over from General Bolling in August 1952 but the specific plan ^{that} he proposed to implement it failed to gain a full concurrence from the ACoFS G-1, ACoFS G-3, Army Comptroller or Chief of Army Field Forces. ^{Its} That failure, along with the unyielding action of the higher Army administrative authorities in seeking to force a series of heavy personnel cuts against the OACoFS G-2, D/A, while there was still heavy fighting going on in Korea and worldwide military intelligence demands had become even

greater than ever before, caused General Partridge personally to address a memorandum to the Chief of Staff during April 1953, calling ~~his~~ attention to the grave risks involved in these cuts. However, nothing came of ^{his} ~~his~~ fervent note of protest and the proposed strength reductions for the OACofS G-2, D/A, were subsequently carried out in full.

It thus becomes clearly evident that, while some definite progress was made within all major military intelligence fields during the Korean Conflict period, most of the fundamental problems ^{that} ~~which~~ had been handicapping the successful conduct of the departmental intelligence effort of the Army for so long in the past were still at hand when it ended. The very same adverse personnel policies, for example, which had been carefully spelled out by the Lovett Board shortly after World War II continued to confront the Army intelligence authorities when the armistice was signed at Panmunjum on 27 July 1953 (Korean time). The members of the second Lovett Board had called for a "complete rehabilitation of intelligence in the Army" along certain specified lines, not only to attract the best possible personnel for military intelligence duty assignments but also to encourage such personnel to pursue military intelligence as an amply rewarding Service career. It could scarcely be claimed, though, that much real improvement had been registered along those particular lines during the almost eight years which followed.

It would seem to be ^{practically} almost axiomatic that, in view of the heavy combat intelligence demands stemming from Korea and the threaten-

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ing conditions of the Cold War, the Army intelligence effort should have received every possible consideration to assist its operations both in Washington and the field during the entire Korean Conflict period. Yet, the Army administrative officials opened a determined drive to apply severe personnel cuts against that ^{vital} ~~essential~~ effort as early as the summer of 1951 and were even able to sustain it successfully to the bitter end, despite strenuous protests submitted in the matter by each of the ACoS G-2's, D/A, concerned. With these protests gaining little or no support from higher authority, ^{in 1952} a civilian management committee was ordered, in May 1952, to make an exhaustive manpower survey of the departmental military intelligence agency for the announced purpose of recommending appropriate strength reductions in it. Although the members of this committee had no true understanding of the wide implications of the numerous functional reductions and alterations that they recommended, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, on 13 March 1953, chose to announce new personnel space allocations for the OACoS G-2, D/A, which were based mainly upon them.

The alarming tendency of military intelligence operations to become more complicated and thus require an ever-increasing amount of coordination before they could be undertaken, showed no signs of abatement during the Korean Conflict period. The formation of the Central Intelligence Agency, which its enthusiastic supporters had confidently

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asserted would reverse this harmful trend, and the creation of a new Department of Defense with separate Department the Air Force, had merely served to accentuate it. Moreover, the sudden Korean outbreak revealed a number of important intelligence functional assignments and coordination procedures which were still inadequately defined or delimited, especially within the covert collection field. Since neither the DCI nor the departmental military intelligence authorities were willing to compromise at all in such a ^{basic} ~~total~~ matter as agency responsibility for clandestine intelligence collection overseas involving the security of a military command, no satisfactory agreement was reached in that particular direction prior to the signing of the Korean armistice on 27 July 1953 (Korean time).

The controversial question of responsibility for staff supervision of military intelligence training throughout the United States Army likewise continued to remain noticeably unsettled during the Korean Conflict period. The Chief of Staff, in April 1950, had decreed that the total training function should be given to the Army Field Forces, under general staff supervision by the ACoFS G-3, D/A. This decision, however, completely ignored the fact that the ACoFS G-2, D/A, also held a legitimate general staff interest in the conduct of intelligence training within the Army and was plainly the proper person to organize a major training program designed to provide the multitude of military intelligence specialists the Army needed for combat, occupation or other foreign duty. The ACoFS G-2, D/A, was thus gradually called upon to reenter the intelligence training picture and,

at the end of the period, was once more found to be performing his accustomed military intelligence training responsibilities in appropriate coordination with the ACoS G-3, D/A, and Chief of the Army Field Forces.

Additional conclusions with reference to the conduct of the departmental military intelligence effort of the Army during the Korean Conflict period, which appear worthy of special note, are as follows:

1. Mission or other American military personnel stationed within friendly foreign countries seldom possess suitable sources of information and are ordinarily insufficiently trained in intelligence work to accomplish military intelligence reporting in any satisfactory manner. Furthermore, because of the localized character of their own duties, they ordinarily exhibit very little interest in collecting information on other countries or areas, even though such information ^{may} ~~might~~ be readily available within the country of their assignment. They should never be regarded, therefore, as ~~fitting~~ substitutes for military attache personnel, who are not only regular members of the American Diplomatic Mission and accredited to the host country but also fully accepted under established international protocol as the proper United States Army personnel to perform military intelligence tasks therein.

2. Organizational simplicity for the departmental intelligence agency of the Army is a most excellent goal to pursue but this type of simplification can be carried too far, especially when it attempts to combine two entirely different basic functions under one single head.

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(U) 3. The question of whether it is better to keep the collection and dissemination functions separate from the production function or to join all three of them together within the departmental intelligence agency, continues to remain essentially unresolved. In this connection, though, it must be realized that, since collection constitutes the very lifeblood of the intelligence process, every possible step should be taken to emphasize and encourage a maximum collection effort in support of the production function.

(U) 4. Two serious faults still readily observable in far too many American military intelligence estimates are the inclusion of wishful thinking and the application of logic more from our own national viewpoint than from that of the foreign country concerned.

(S) 5. If anticipatory planning for such important wartime intelligence activities as escape and evasion, technical intelligence teams, and nameplate analysis is neglected during peacetime, it will ^{then} become almost impossible to set them up either promptly or efficiently after the ^{actual} start of _A combat.

(U) 6. The exceptional surprise which was achieved by the Red Chinese in their large-scale intervention across the Yalu River during mid-October 1950, stemmed principally from the fact that CINCFE was not permitted to utilize all available intelligence means for protecting the security of his military command.

(U) 7. Intelligence researchers are highly trained technicians and once they have been removed for any reason from the departmental in-

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telligence agency of the Army, they cannot soon be replaced in an emergency.

8. Military (Army) intelligence continues to hold major responsibilities bearing directly upon the conduct of ~~the~~ American psychological warfare.

9. Military (Army) intelligence also continues to maintain a valid and important interest in strategic bombing target plans or studies ~~being~~ made by the Air Force.

10. Intelligence production is apparently ^{best} accomplished through the use of an organization containing both geographic and functional elements, with the latter specifically designed to handle subjects of a technical or scientific nature.

11. The demands of military security rightly call for the Army intelligence authorities to possess an effective voice in the establishment of policies and procedures aimed at promptly eliminating subversives or serious security risks from its own ranks and disloyal civilians from Army employment.

12. Under the abnormal conditions of Cold War, military security officials will require the commitment of a notably large number of highly trained personnel in order to keep reasonably up-to-date on completing their numerous and varied investigative assignments.

13. A separate system should be carefully devised in each individual case to obtain adequate security protection for classified United States Army information being given to foreign countries.

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14. A most significant development took place within the counterintelligence field toward the close of the Korean Conflict period, when the Red Chinese returned a group of prisoners of war to American control which included several persons who had been patently Communist indoctrinated or "brain washed."

15. The Army Language and Area Specialist Training Program, commonly known as the FAST Program, is truly an invaluable one and deserving of the strongest possible support at all times from higher authority.

16. The preparation of needed intelligence publications and manuals for the Army should be vigorously pressed during peacetime, regardless of the resources that the effort may entail, so as to have them immediately available in the event of an emergency.

17. The Army Foreign Liaison Office often performs a non-intelligence function but accepted American and international tradition is such that it should continue to comprise an integral part of the departmental military intelligence agency.

18. Whether or not there ought to be an Intelligence Corps established within the United States Army still remains a moot question. The great difficulty in adopting ^{this} ~~such~~ a course of action for personnel policy improvement lies in the fact that, although military intelligence specialists and technicians can be rather easily fitted into an Intelligence Corps, key personnel detailed on general military intelligence duty cannot.

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The most striking conclusion obtainable from any detailed analysis of the Army intelligence effort during the Korean Conflict period, though, would seem to be that many of the higher authorities concerned, both civilian and military, were unable to derive certain important lessons from it for themselves. The departmental military intelligence agency of the Army had manifestly been forced to enter that conflict in a badly understrength and curtailed functional condition, due mainly to personnel reductions which were inspired by a series of defense economy drives and applied against it largely on a proportionate basis. This, despite the fact that the unusual conditions of Cold War kept making greater and greater demands upon the agency as the post-World War II period progressed. While the agency was granted additional personnel spaces shortly after the Korean outbreak in a belated attempt to remedy ^{its} ~~the~~ adverse ^{strength} situation, suitable persons could then seldom if ever be procured to fill them. Moreover, when the truce talks were opened at Panmunjum in July 1951, the agency was again confronted with similar reduction pressures from above even though its intelligence requirements were still rapidly increasing.

There was, of course, nothing new about this marked lack of understanding about Army intelligence problems by higher authority because it had been going on in varying degrees ever since the departmental military agency was first formed. Nevertheless, it does seem truly amazing that, with the unfortunate and revealing experi-

ence of the recent defense economy drives so readily at hand, these authorities would again display such clear indications of repeating the very same mistakes as before. The signing of the armistice in Korea, effective 27 July 1953 (Korean time), did not actually reduce the difficult demands on the departmental intelligence agency of the Army stemming from the global Cold War in the slightest and even served to add to them measurably by asking it to determine when and where the Communists might choose to make their next aggressive move in connection therewith. Regardless of a vigorous protest in the matter presented by the ACofS G-2, D/A, during April 1953, however, the agency was not only called upon to undergo another severe personnel cut just before the end of the Korean Conflict period but also given to understand that further cuts could well be expected to occur in the near future. The simple question must thus promptly arise - for how long can the lessons of history be ignored with impunity?

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