


IASE-IS (380-5)

25 March 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR US Army Intelligence and Security Command, ATTN: IACS-SMI-MH (Michael Bigelow), 8825 Beulah Street, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5246

SUBJECT: Declassification Review

1. In accordance with Executive Order 13526 all classified records that are more than twenty five (25) years old and have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, shall be automatically declassified whether or not records have been reviewed. All classified records shall be automatically declassified on 31 December of the year that is 25 years from the date of origin of information. If the date of origin of an individual record cannot be readily determined, the date of original classification shall be used instead.
2. Mandatory Declassification Review of the classified History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, General Staff, which contained 8 parts, dated 1959-1961 has been declassified in its entirety.
3. The Point of contact for this action is Cassius N. Hall, 703-428-4340, cassius.hall@mi.army.mil.



Cassius N. Hall
Classification Management Officer



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HISTORY OF THE
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF

PART SIX
(Final Form)

COLD WAR
3 September 1945 - 25 June 1950

16-4-75 J. L. L.

By
BRUCE W. BIDWELL
Colonel, U.S. Army Ret.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
CONTRACT DA-49-083, OSA 1101 AND OSA 2176 (ACSI-GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY)
1958-60

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PART SIX

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CHAPTER I

POSTWAR REORGANIZATION

The signing of formal terms of surrender by the Japanese civil and military envoys at Tokyo, on 2 September 1945, marked the final defeat of the Axis powers in World War II. Even before this memorable event, delegates from some 50 different nations had already met in San Francisco to devise a Charter for the United Nations Organization, which was duly accepted during a closing plenary session held on 26 June 1945.* Likewise, the Big Three of Truman, Churchill

* See: The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25 to June 26, 1945, Selected Documents (Department of State, 1946), pp. 920-83.

(Atlee) and Stalin had recently conferred at Potsdam for the stated purpose of discussing plans to reestablish peace. It seemed clear, therefore, despite such pressing problems as military occupation, war damage and repatriation, that the world was about to enter into a prolonged period of more or less peaceful coexistence, favorably characterized favorably by a steady decline in military commitments.

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As it actually turned out, this optimistic view of things to come proved to be entirely wrong. Instead of the gradual return to normalcy so confidently predicted by most of our national leaders, the United States was faced with a difficult period of extreme international tension generated by aggressive Communist tactics aimed at gaining worldwide ascendancy over the combined forces of western democracy. Furthermore, less than five years later, this growing tension proceeded to erupt into active hostilities when North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and launched a major offensive against the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950 (Korean time).

Although not fully recognized as such by all the authorities concerned, this pre-Korea period of the Cold War was in reality an intelligence war. It ~~thus~~ soon became of utmost importance for each side to anticipate any intended move on the part of the other in order to take timely and appropriate counter-action. ^{Also,} The role played in this tight international struggle during these five critical years by the departmental military intelligence agency ~~also~~ remains of major historical interest because the sudden opening of the Korean War once again found the United States noticeably unprepared to resist a surprise offensive within the Far Eastern area. ~~Hence~~ The question *thus* promptly arises whether or not this shortcoming represented a failure by MID in the Cold War or stemmed mainly from circumstances falling beyond its own control.

Detailed planning for the postwar Army had been initiated within the War Department at a surprisingly early date. A Special Planning

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Division (SPD), WDSS, was organized effective 23 July 1943 and, among other duties, given the primary staff responsibility for handling all matters pertaining to the postwar military establishment. * Accordingly,

* Nelson, op. cit., p. 548. The SPD was formed from a nucleus of officers who had been working on demobilization problems for the Army Service Forces (ASF).

early in November 1943, with General Strong still the ACoS G-2, WDGS, Col. Charles P. Nicholas, Chief of Group I, Policy Staff, was redesignated to act as MID liaison officer for this SPD and, on 29 November *

* Since it conflicted with his CROSSBOW Committee duties, Col Nicholas was shortly relieved of this postwar planning responsibility and replaced by Col J. K. Evans from the Far Eastern Unit, Theater Group, MIS.

1943, the departmental intelligence agency received its first postwar study assignment therefrom, as follows:

Assuming that in the postwar period there will be a single Department of War with a compact U. S. General Staff (joint), prepare the War Department's definition of the role of intelligence to include the following points.

(1) Relationship of the Intelligence Division of the U. S. General Staff (joint) to other Divisions and to the Chief of the Joint General Staff.

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- (2) Responsibilities of the Intelligence Division.
- (3) Intelligence powers and facilities (in general terms) which should be granted to the U. S. Department of War and placed under the supervision of the Intelligence Division of the U. S. General Staff.
- (4) Relationship of Military Intelligence of the U. S. Department of War to Intelligence agencies of civilian departments of the U. S. Government. *

* See: "Study on Organization of Military Intelligence in the Post-War Period" (S), G-2 388, 1 May 45 (29 Nov 43), Tabs IV, V and VI. DRB, TAG. Gen Marshall had recently presented a memorandum to the JCS (JCS 560) recommending consideration of "A Single Department of War in the Post-War Period."

MID was able to forward a finished study in compliance with this planning directive to SPD on 5 May 1944. Worthy of special note is the fact that even then the military intelligence authorities felt their agency should be kept substantially at "war strength" during the postwar period and given "ample personnel, machinery and powers so as to be aggressive, potent and thoroughly organized in peacetime." While a significant decline in American military forces was fully anticipated, they specifically cautioned against any corresponding reduction in departmental intelligence capabilities.*

* Ibid., Tab XIII.

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With the idea of forming a single Department of War ~~right~~ after ^{World War II} ~~the war~~, making very little headway, SPD^s decided to develop a War Department Basic Plan for the Post War Military Establishment along more realistic lines. On 12 September 1944, therefore, the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, was requested to prepare a suitable intelligence section for a new plan "under the assumption that the post-war period will see the continuance of separate War and Navy Departments." An "Intelligence Plan" was hastily devised for that purpose and submitted to SPD late in October 1944. It opened with a detailed study of the peacetime intelligence systems of Great Britain, Russia, Germany, France and Japan and then went on to discuss at considerable length the indicated operational requirements for an American departmental military intelligence agency in the future. In addition to recommending the retention of a Military Intelligence Service under the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, the plan proposed the creation without delay of a Military Intelligence Corps comprising a separate branch of the United States Army. This lat-

* "Plan for Organization and Operation of the Intelligence System for the Post-War Army" (S), G-2 388, 26 Oct 44 (29 Nov 43), Tab I and Appendices. DRB, TAG.

ter project ^{then} ~~thus~~ became a principal goal for the military intelligence authorities to reach in pursuing their postwar planning objectives,

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even though it invariably ran into stiff resistance from the other departmental staff sections whenever ^{it was} presented.

A War Department Basic Plan for the Post War Military Establishment was finally published by SPD on 9 November 1945, approximately ^{two} ~~three~~ months after V-J Day. * This plan did serve to furnish

* "The War Department Basic Plan for the Post War Military Establishment, November 1945" (S), MID 320, 9 Nov 45 (27 Aug 45). DRB, TAG. The Materiel, Supply and Service, and Administrative Sections of this plan were not completed until a later date.

a badly needed guide for postwar reorganization but it was soon compromised in many important respects by actions derived from a succession of various boards appointed to deal with special aspects of the subject. The Intelligence Section of the Basic Plan not only expressed in broad terms an official intelligence policy but also pointed toward the grave need of having a "virile, highly trained and capable" military intelligence system. It ^{further} ~~then~~ chose to assign a definite intelligence mission for the Armed Forces as a whole and to the two departmental agencies (MID and MIS) in particular. The Military Intelligence Service concept was still retained, with the War Department further instructed to formulate plans and policies covering "such Military Intelligence Corps or similar organizations as may be established." *

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* Ibid., pp. 57-58.

The first high level board designed to study postwar reorganization in general was the Patch Board. Appointed on 30 August 1945, under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen. Alexander McC. Patch, former Seventh Army commander, it was called upon to "examine into the present organization of the War Department and to propose an organization for peacetime adoption." This was regarded as a matter of great urgency because the existing departmental organization was based largely on an Executive Order drawn from the war powers of the President, which authority would automatically terminate six months after the end of the emergency. ^{Hence,} The board was thus directed to submit its recommendation to the Chief of Staff "as early as practicable and not later than 30 September 1945."^{*}

* Memo, CofS to Lt Gen Patch, 30 Aug 45, MID 320 (19 Oct 45). ACSI Rec Sec. This original deadline was subsequently extended to 15 Oct 45. In addition to the chairman, other voting members of the board were: Maj Gens Charles T. Harris, H. A. Craig and Harry C. Ingles, and Brig Gen Gordon E. Textor.

The Patch Board, of course, was interested in the subject of military intelligence mainly as it fitted into the big picture. Of the nu-

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merous witnesses examined, only Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, ACoS, WDGS, and Brig. Gen. E. L. Sibert, ACoS G-2, European Theater, could be considered military intelligence experts. Nevertheless, the board's findings were of far reaching importance to the departmental intelligence agency in that it chose to condemn "the much quoted statement that a General Staff should be restricted to matters of high policy planning and must not operate." The board even recommended that the operational responsibilities of the Chiefs of General Staff Divisions should be fittingly recognized by calling them Directors instead of Assistant Chiefs of Staff. With particular reference to the military intelligence function, it also declared that "intelligence is a vital function of command" so major commanders must be "permitted to operate their own intelligence agencies in the field of their primary responsibility."

* Memo for the CofS, 18 Oct 45, sub: Report of Board of Officers on Reorganization of the WD, MID 320 (19 Oct 45). ACSI Rec Sec. Gen Patch died on 21 Nov 45 and was succeeded as head of the WD Reorganization Board, effective 6 Dec 45, by Lt Gen (later Gen) William H. Simpson, former Ninth Army commander.

There were several important intelligence problems demanding immediate attention at this same time. One of these was directly traceable to an Executive Order, dated 20 September 1945, which had termin-

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ated the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) on 1 October 1945 and set forth, in part, the disposition of its currently assigned functions.*

* EO 9621, 20 Sep 45.

Under that order, the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS, along with some other miscellaneous activities, was to be consolidated into an Interim Research and Analysis Service and transferred to the State Department. Pending final abolition of this ^{temporary} interim organization on 21 December 1945, the Secretary of State was instructed to decide what functions within that particular field he wished to curtail or retain in his own department. Similarly, an accompanying letter from President Truman expressed a desire for the Secretary of State to "take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity.*"

* Ltr, Truman to Sec State, 20 Sep 45, copy f/w MID 388 (29 Nov 45). ACSI Rec Sec. The Secretary of State at this time was James F. Byrnes.

The remaining OSS functions, including its personnel, records, property and funds, were then given ^{over} to the War Department, with the Secretary of War authorized to discontinue any activities he deemed incompatible "with the national interest.*"

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* EO 9621, 20 Sep 45, par. 3.

The instant problem posed by this Executive Order was how best to carry the residual OSS group which was being turned over to the War Department. This was much more than merely an administrative matter because the group was still actively conducting secret intelligence operations throughout the European Theater and stood in obvious need of day to day executive direction. On 27 September 1945, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson announced the formation of a Strategic Services Unit (SSU) to function under the Assistant Secretary of War and appointed Brig. Gen. John Magruder as its Director. General Magruder was additionally instructed to continue the program of "liquidation of those activities and personnel which are no longer necessary or desirable." * The net result was a patently incongruous situation,

* Memo, Sec War to BG John Magruder, 27 Sep 45, MIS 334 OSS (13 Jun 42). DRB, TAG. Gen Magruder, MA in Peking and Berne following World War I and lend-lease ^{administrator} supervisor with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek just before Pearl Harbor, had been Deputy Director of OSS during World War II.

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with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, ^{now} engaged in supervising field intelligence operations of a most sensitive nature completely independent of the ACoS G-2, WDGS.

This adopted expedient for the SSU not only failed to satisfy the departmental intelligence authorities but also brought to the fore again another closely related question. After the SSU was eventually liquidated as ordered, the United States would find itself without any undercover intelligence organization whatsoever to operate within the foreign field except for a rapidly diminishing FBI effort in the Western Hemisphere. A void of that nature had been deliberately accepted by the national authorities prior to World War II but, under the threatening conditions of an unsettled ~~period~~ postwar readjustment, such a course of action seemed ^{plainly} manifestly inappropriate. Besides, it was now generally realized that a secret intelligence system needed a lengthy development period before it could produce any worthwhile or dependable results, so both the OSS structure and its experienced personnel ought to be preserved if at all possible. These scarce personnel could then be utilized either by an established department of the government or some new centralized intelligence agency, as had often been proposed during ~~the~~ progress of the late war.

Recognizing the dire need for a prompt but thorough investigation of this complicated matter, the Secretary of War, on 22 October 1945, named a special committee headed by the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett, to accomplish it. In addition to Mr. Lovett, members of the committee were: Maj. Gen. H. A. Craig, OPD; Maj. Gen.

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Elwood R. Quesada, AAF; Maj. Gen. Willard G. Wyman, AGF; Col. James M. Roamer, ASF; Brig. Gen. John Magruder, SSU, and Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke, G-2. Its assigned directive, however, covered much more territory than just the immediate OSS-SSU disposition problem and actually read as follows:

a. Consider all existing studies (including Executive Order 9621, 20 September 1945) made within the War Department, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSS, and the Bureau of the Budget, dealing with the subject of foreign intelligence activities of the Nation and of the War Department.

b. Examine the existing and proposed organization of G-2, A-2, the Strategic Services Unit, OASW and any other agencies of the War Department carrying on intelligence activities, with a view to determining whether they are adequate and to what extent duplication (either within or outside the War Department) exists, how any duplication may be avoided, and what future use or disposition should be made of all such activities.

c. Formulate at the earliest practicable date a War Department position on the general subject, leadership in the study of which was committed to the State Department by the President, including a plan for War Department activity in the field of foreign intelligence and its relation to proposed or probable activities by other Government agencies in the same field.

d. Report and comment fully upon existing views on the foregoing subjects, so far as known to be held within the War Department. *

* Memo (S), Sec War to Hon R. A. Lovett, Asst Sec of War (Air) and others, 22 Oct 45, WDOSA 350.05 (22 Oct 45). ACSI Doc Br. This committee is usually referred to as the first Lovett Board.

To examine into this admittedly controversial field, the Lovett Committee was at first given a completely unrealistic deadline date of 3 November 1945 ^{in order} to reach its considered conclusions. Since the most

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pressing problems ^{appeared} seemed to be fixing the future status of the SSU and formulating a War Department position on the creation of a central intelligence agency, authority was obtained from the Secretary of War to prepare a preliminary report concerned with those two subjects only. For assistance in accomplishing its difficult mission, the Committee invited the Directors of Naval Intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation to testify as witnesses but they both respectfully declined. Nevertheless, the views of all interested War Department authorities, as well as those of key AAF, AGF and ASF officials, were obtained either through the use of special questionnaires or ^{by} having them appear personally before the full committee during the course of nine formal meetings held between 22 October and 3 November 1945.

Among the chief witnesses ^{so} consulted were the following:

Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell - ACoFS G-2, WDGS.
Mr. William E. Jackson - Former Asst Military Attache for Air in London and Chief, Secret Intelligence Branch, G-2 ETO.
Mr. David A. Bruce - Former Chief, Planning Group OSS.
Mr. Russell Forgan - Former Chief, OSS, European Theater.
Lt. Cmdr. Milton Katz - Deputy Chief of SI Branch, SSU.
Mr. Lowell Weicker - Former Acting A-2, 8th Air Force, and Director of Intelligence, USSTAF.
Mr. Kingman Douglas - Former AAF representative with the Air Ministry in London.
Col. William Quinn - Executive Officer, SSU.
Col. Gordon B. Rogers - Former ACoFS G-2, AGF.
Lt. Gen. Stanley Embick - Member Joint Strategic Survey Committee, JCS.
Mr. Alfred McCormack - Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence and former Director of Intelligence, MIS. *

See:

* "Preliminary Report of Committee Appointed to Study War Department Intelligence Activities" (T. S.), 3 Nov 45, pp. 1-2, SD 30375-I. .ACSI Doc Br.

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The first Lovett Board arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the Government should establish as soon as possible a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, plus a representative from the JCS. Moreover, when and if the defense organization might include a Secretary or Under Secretary of Air, provision should be made for him to join this NIA, along with any other governmental officials recommended by the regular membership and approved by the President. There ^{likewise} further ought to be a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with Director appointed or removed only by the President on the recommendation of the NIA and who would sit as a non-voting member of that top body. The NIA should have complete authority for instituting policies which would not only be binding upon the CIA but also for all other intelligence agencies of the government. Additionally, an Intelligence Board should be formed "within the CIA" consisting of the AcofS G-2 of the WDGS, Director of Naval Intelligence and "chiefs of the principal civilian agencies having functions related to national security." This board ^{could} would then act mostly in an advisory capacity to the Director of CIA, with the NIA settling any differences of opinion between the board and that key official. The clear intention was for CIA to operate as ^a the sole ^{foreign} collection agency for all departments within the espionage and counterespionage fields, to enjoy full authority to evaluate and disseminate intelligence as required but not to conduct "espionage ^{activities} inside the United States nor exercise any police or law enforcement powers either at home or abroad. *

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* Ibid., pp. 3-6.

This recommended plan even promised to solve the difficult SSU disposition problem, especially as the Lovett Board ^{remained} ~~was~~ strongly in favor of divorcing the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War entirely from any military intelligence operations. Since it did not ^{seem} appear practicable to have the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, take over the total foreign espionage and counterespionage function for the United States Government, that particular part of the SSU mission could be handily passed on to the new central intelligence organization. Also, while awaiting the actual establishment of a CIA, all SSU personnel not involved in this specialized type of work could either be eliminated or transferred to the departmental military intelligence agency and long overdue steps taken to coordinate SSU activities properly with those being conducted by MID (MIS).^{*}

* Ibid., p. 7.

The Secretary of War approved the preliminary report of the first Lovett Board on 6 November 1945 and, at the same time, advised that a new committee would be appointed in order to investigate the companion subject of intelligence reorganization within the Army and the War Department.^{*} This second committee, which came into existence on 11 No-

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* Memo (S), Brig Gen Carter W. Clarke for committee members,
6 Nov 45, SD 30375-I. ACSI Doc Br.

vember 1945, still had Mr. Lovett designated as its chairman but now
included ^{only} Lt. Gen. ^(later Gen.) William H. Simpson and Lt. Gen. (later General, USAF)
Hoyt S. Vandenberg as the only other members. It was specifically di-
rected to:

examine into the present organization, functions and responsi-
bilities of all units in the War Department, and the three major
elements of the Army engaged in intelligence activities, with a
view to determining whether they are adequate, whether and to
what extent duplication may be avoided, and how great a coord-
ination can be accomplished. *

* Memo (S), Sec War to Hon R. A. Lovett, Asst Sec of War for Air
et al., 11 Nov 45, in SD 30375-A, Tab Item #3. ACSI Doc Br. Gen Simp-
son, about to replace Gen Patch as head of the War Department Reorgani-
zation Board, was widely experienced in all phases of military intelli-
gence work. Gen Vandenberg, CG of the Ninth Air Force during World
War II and currently Asst Chief of Air Staff, became the ACofS G-2, WDGS,
effective 26 Jan 46, succeeding Gen Bissell.

With a strict deadline of 5 December 1945 set for its completion
date, the second Lovett Board could only hope to scratch the surface
of ^{inquiring} inquiry into this huge field of endeavor. To make matters worse,

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the many different authorities ^{it queried} ~~directly concerned~~ failed to demonstrate any general agreement in answering the various questions which were posed to them. Commencing 15 November 1945, the board met almost daily to hear detailed testimony from some eighteen selected witnesses who were then actually performing in or had previously held responsible Army intelligence positions. Individual board members also proceeded informally to interview a large number of other persons whose knowledge or experience might be of value and to study numerous reports and documents for assistance in reaching their eventual findings. As a result, the board was finally able to present a remarkably penetrating discussion of military intelligence problems and to submit specific recommendations on the subject, as follows:

a. The greatest care should be made in choosing officers for appointment to the post of ACoS G-2, WDGS. They should always be of high rank and possess the unquestioned confidence of the Army as a whole, with the latter factor of extreme importance at this particular moment.

b. A similar enhancement of prestige should be strictly followed in the selection of ACoS G-2's for the three major force commands.

c. An appropriate WD Circular should be promptly issued to notify that intelligence in the postwar Army will be placed on an equal basis with operations, supply and war planning.

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d. The importance and techniques of modern intelligence should receive a greatly added emphasis at all Army schools, starting with the United States Military Academy.

e. There should be a central intelligence school established for the Army.

f. Officers engaged in intelligence activities should be given the same opportunity for promotion as those in other corresponding categories of military work.

g. Officers must be encouraged to make intelligence a career but, for the Regular Army, the disadvantages of a separate Intelligence Corps now appear to outweigh its advantages. On the other hand, an Intelligence Corps should be created for Reserve Officers who are interested in retaining ^{intelligence} mobilization assignments.

h. A policy should be adopted to employ permanent civil servants of high caliber in military intelligence work.

i. The position and functions of our Military Attaches should be carefully reexamined and overhauled, so they can ^{truly} become ^{the} a most valuable source of information obtained from foreign countries.

Recommendations Relating Primarily to Organization and Administration -

a. It is imperative that a clear-cut directive be issued at the earliest possible opportunity in order to define accurately the extent of responsibility and authority enjoyed by the top intelligence units of the three major force commands.

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b. The ACoFS G-2, WDGS, should constitute an informal committee, along with the intelligence chiefs of the three major force commands, for the purpose of gaining their advice on all matters relative to the collection, evaluation, synthesis and ^{distribution} ~~distributing~~ of intelligence information.

c. The tenure of office for top intelligence positions should be comparable to that of other specialists holding similar staff or command positions throughout the Army.

d. Responsibility for the direction and operational control of counterintelligence activities within the Army should be returned to the ACoFS G-2, WDGS.

e. Intelligence agencies of the War Department and the three major force commands, as well as those in lower echelons wherever practicable, should be relieved of all responsibilities having no direct intelligence function, such as public relations, preparation of histories, police investigations, etc.*

* Memo (S) for Sec War, sub: Report of Committee Appointed by the Secretary of War to Study War Department Intelligence Activities, 5 Dec 45, in SD 30375-A. ACSI Doc Br.

In final summation, the second Lovett Board flatly stated that "what is involved is nothing less than the complete rehabilitation of intelligence in the Army" which will require a "concentrated effort

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of the Army as a whole and, first and foremost, the whole-hearted support and vigorous supervision of the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff." This was certainly a most excellent design to follow but, although the findings of the board were officially approved by the Secretary of War on 12 December 1945,^{*} many serious difficulties continued

* See: "General Plan, Organization of Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff," p. 2, O20 G-2, 15 May 46 (11 Jun 46).
ACSI Rec Sec.

to stand in the way of its successful implementation.

Meanwhile, owing to the sudden death of General Patch, the War Department Reorganization Board had been re-formed with General Simpson *named* as Chairman. *The* This new board was directed to analyze comments already submitted with reference to the Patch board report, make any consequent changes therein and draft necessary orders for putting a finally recommended reorganization into effect. An initial report, dated 28 December 1945, accepted in general the findings of the Patch board but was materially revised some three weeks later along lines suggested by Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) John E. Hull, the ACofS OPD, ^{WDGS} This revised report was then promptly approved "for planning purposes" by the Chief of Staff, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, although Presidential authority for ^{actual} the reorganization could not be secured until 13 May 1946.^{*} The fol-

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* Cline, op. cit., pp. 355-58.

lowing day a WD Circular was issued to announce the reorganization and order it to become effective 11 June 1946.* The departmental

* WD Cir 138, 14 May 46.

military intelligence agency, however, had already gone ahead during April on its own to accomplish a sweeping internal reorganization "in accordance with the recommendations of the Simpson Board."*

* See: Int Group Memo No 31 (C), 17 Apr 46, O2O G-2 (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec. Gen Vandenberg took steps on 16 May 46 to legalize this prior action by officially approving a "General Plan for the Reorganization of the Intelligence Division, WDGS," which was actually in effect.

From the military intelligence viewpoint, the most important result of this latest War Department reorganization was that it fully recognized the necessity for MID to perform operational-type functions and

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changed the title of the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, to ~~#~~ Director of Intelligence. Also, by abolishing Army Service Forces, the reorganization ^{occasioned} caused the return to MID of a large number of counterintelligence activities that had been removed from the agency during World War II. Under these new circumstances, the Director of Intelligence thus felt free to do away entirely with the imposed MIS concept and ^{to} form a more compact Intelligence Division (ID) consisting of five major subordinate elements designed respectively to handle matters concerned with Intelligence, Security, Combat Intelligence and Training, Army Security Agency, and Collection.*

* "General Plan, Organization of Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff," p. 3, O2O G-2, 15 May 46 (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec. An Army Security Agency (ASA), with headquarters in Washington, D. C. and under direct command of the War Department through the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, had been established on 6 Sep 45 to perform signal intelligence and communications security missions. See: Ltr (S) TAG to CG's AAF, AGF, ASF, C in C USAFP, CG's Def Ccmds, Alaska Dept, MDW, Independent Commands, AG 322 (4 Sep 45) OP-S-B-M, 6 Sep 45, MID O2O G-2 undated (13 Apr 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

Another long overdue milestone in the postwar progress of the departmental intelligence agency occurred during November 1946, when responsibility for planning, policy guidance and general staff supervision of psychological warfare activities was assigned to the Plans

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and Operations (P & O) Division, WDGS. ID, however, continued to hold the function of "collection, evaluation and interpretation of sociological and psychological intelligence for Psychological Warfare purposes," so it remained intimately involved. Moreover, although its own Propaganda Branch ^{had been} promptly discontinued, the agency was still charged with the "analysis of foreign and domestic propaganda affecting the military interests of the United States."
*

* Memo 100, ID WDGS, 29 Nov 46, sub: Discontinuance of Propaganda Branch, MID 300.6 (1946). ACSI Rec Sec.

Strong pressures for personnel and fund cuts in support of demobilization were now mounting, with the War Department Manpower Board and other supervisory agencies constantly demanding a downward revision of planned budget estimates. The pinch finally became so severe during February 1947, that the Chief of Staff created a special board headed by Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Wade H. Haislip to review War Department policies and programs, and submit recommendations to him in connection therewith. Strangely enough, despite all the recent talk about reemphasizing the role of military intelligence throughout the Army, each of the other general staff divisions, as well as AAF, AGF and the Budget Office of the War Department (BOWD), were appropriately represented on this authoritative committee but ID was not. * ^{also occurred} This at the very time

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* See: Incl 1 (S), "Preliminary Report of the War Department Policies and Programs Review Board, Basis for FY 1949 Budget Directive, 25 April 1947," MID 020, 25 Apr 47 (11 Mar 47). ACSI Rec Sec.

~~When~~^{that} departmental intelligence policies and programs were commencing to assume such a tremendous importance from the standpoint of national defense. Nevertheless, the Haislip Board felt fully qualified to delve directly into military intelligence problems and even came up with a series of significant pronouncements in regard to them.

On 3 March 1947, ID personnel were permitted to appear before the Haislip Board for the purpose of presenting a formal discussion of current intelligence policies and programs. They were ^{thus} then able to point out that, based upon the War Department Basic Plan of 1 October 1946, the following major cuts in military resources had already been made:

- a. A reduction of approximately 25% in personnel required to maintain a total of 67 Military Attache Offices at full strength, as compared with ID estimates made in July 1946.
- b. A reduction of nearly 25% in the planned level of operations for the Army Security Agency during FY 1946.
- c. Personnel reductions of more than 50% within ID proper, achieved over the past year and a half chiefly through narrowing the scope of ^{its} essential functions.*

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* Ibid., Tab B (S), pp. 11-12. This ID presentation was delivered by Lt Col (later Col) Benjamin W. Heckemeyer of the Policy Staff.

The final report of the Haislip Board, dated 11 August 1947, went much further ^{into many subjects} than might be expected from an ordinary review of War Department programs and policies, especially in respect to military intelligence. It not only included detailed coverage of intelligence matters under such broad headings as the "Concept of Future War" and "Role of Armed Forces During the Next Ten Years" but also made several specific recommendations ~~on the subject~~ ^{which} ~~that~~ were highly controversial to say the least. The basic theme of ~~all~~ these recommendations was ~~to the effect~~ that because the U.S.S.R. was the only nation which could then be considered as posing a real threat to American security, ID should concentrate its undivided effort upon Russia and the satellite countries. * While this line of reasoning might appear quite log-

* See: "Final Report, War Department Policies and Programs Review Board, 11 August 1947" (S), Part II, sec A-D, O20 CSGID, 11 Aug 47 (11 Mar 47). ACSI Rec Sec.

ical at first glance, it completely ignored the fact that there was a

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marked difference between producing intelligence on the U.S.S.R. as a potential enemy nation in the strict military sense and on the international Communist conspiracy which was currently operating under active Moscow direction throughout the world. With the latter threat an immediate one and probably the most perilous in the long run, if ID centered its sole attention on Russia and the satellite countries at the exclusion of the rest of the globe, the results could well turn out to be disastrous. The Haislip Board, though, did exhibit a noteworthy understanding of the principal ID problem during the postwar reorganization period by recognizing the grave danger inherent in reducing ID personnel under the conditions of Cold War, as follows:

The requirements in money and men /for intelligence/ are of a relatively small order in comparison with the requirements of many other activities, and yet they may be more productive in the buying of time and consequent saving of vast sums of money in mobilization and war than any other single effort of the War Department. The doctrine set forth by the Chief of Staff in letter 3 March 1947, should be implemented. It states in part: ". . . as our positive power to provide national security i. e., military strength, is decreased, the efficiency of our Intelligence Service must be correspondingly increased in order to insure advance warning of hostile intent and capabilities to allow mobilization of our national resources." Since the number of intelligence personnel is, in general, being decreased as part of the over-all decrease in War Department activities, it would appear that actual War Department action is inconsistent with the above-stated policy. *

* Ibid., p. 18.

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Publication of the approved findings of the Haislip Board in August 1947, served to bring the postwar reorganization phase of the Cold War period to a recognizable close. There was now no longer an ACoFS G-2, ~~ADGS~~, but a Director of Intelligence, ^{WDGS} at this particular time Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Stephen J. Chamberlin who had served so outstandingly during World War II as General MacArthur's ACoFS G-3 in the Southwest Pacific ^{*} ^{*} Area. Since it was also officially ac-

* Gen Chamberlin had replaced Gen Vandenberg effective 11 Jun 46, the same date that WD Cir 138 changed his title from ACoFS G-2 to Director of Intelligence.

cepted that the departmental military intelligence agency could perform operational-type functions, the wartime MID-MIS concept had finally been discarded and supplanted by a consolidated ID. Under this new situation, the Director of Intelligence was being called upon to execute the following mission:

The Director of Intelligence is the responsible War Department instrumentality for the collection and evaluation of information and for the dissemination of intelligence pertaining to the war potential, topography, military forces, and military and related activities of foreign countries. He is responsible for --

1. Procuring information and intelligence relating to the activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the security of the Military Establishment within the Zone of the Interior.
2. Procuring information and producing Intelligence pertaining to the strategic vulnerability of the Continental United States.

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3. Executing counterintelligence measures within the Military Establishment.
4. Collecting, within the zone of the interior, foreign positive intelligence.
5. Meeting intelligence requirements of the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, the Continental and Overseas Commands, and the Administrative and Technical Services.
6. Representing the War Department on intelligence and counterintelligence matters in its relations with other departments of the Government and with foreign governments.
7. Preparing training policies, and plans for military intelligence and counterintelligence and exercising General Staff supervision in this field.
8. Exercising general supervision over the Military Intelligence Reserve. *

* WDGS Cir No. 5-2, 19 Apr 47.

In carrying out these assigned tasks, General Chamberlin ^{chose} ~~had~~ chosen to organize ID into four main groups, charged respectively with performing Executive, Security, Intelligence and Training functions, as follows:

Executive

- Planning and Control Offices
- Foreign Liaison Office
- Personnel and Administration Office
 - Personnel Br
 - Message Center Br
 - Records Br
 - Cable Br
 - Attache Br
 - Fiscal Br
 - Service and Reproduction Br
 - Special Distribution Br

Security Group

- Information Control Br
- Operations Br
- Cryptographic Security Br

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Intelligence Group	-	Strategic Br Plans and Collection Br Eurasian Br Western European Br Far Eastern Br British Empire Br Pan-American Br United States Br Topographic Br Scientific Br Special Research Br Dissemination Br Document File Br Exploitation Br
Training Group	-	Civilian Components Br Combat and Strategic Training Br Map and Photo Br *

* Chart, Intelligence Division, WDGS, MID 020 ID 1 Jul 47
(11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec. The Director of Intelligence also exercised a direct control over the commanders of the Army Security Agency and Counter Intelligence Corps, although both of these organizations had their own separate headquarters.

In addition to bringing about these various changes in War Department intelligence policies and procedures, the postwar reorganization period ~~also~~ showed an immediate need for registering certain improvements in the existing national intelligence system. It ~~had~~ thus soon ^{became} ~~become~~ plainly apparent that there was not only an urgent requirement

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to accomplish a better coordination of effort among the numerous agencies involved in intelligence activities but also to adopt a suitable plan for maintaining an up to date ^{and detailed} foreign intelligence survey ~~pro-~~gram on a worldwide basis. Furthermore, when the scheduled liquidation of the wartime OSS was finally completed, there would be a serious void to fill in connection with the conduct of American espionage and counterespionage operations abroad. Since all three of these ^{basic} problems seemed to point directly toward a greater centralization ^{of effort,} they were able to provide potent support for the growing drive which was aimed at establishing some form of a central intelligence agency within the United States Government. The devious path of this particular development will now be described in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER II
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The idea of having a central intelligence agency in the United States Government had been seriously advanced even before World War II. Politically influential enthusiasts bent upon promoting such a project were actually behind the appointment by President Roosevelt of Col. (later Maj. Gen.) William J. Donovan to function as Coordinator of Information (COI), effective 11 July 1941. Repercussions from an indicated lack of coordination among the departmental intelligence agencies preceding Pearl Harbor also gained additional adherents for this same cause. When the early wartime development of the COI Office failed to attain the true goal of these central intelligence supporters, by providing a single intelligence organization with authority to supervise and control all the others, decision was made to split it into two different parts. Its Foreign Information Service (FIS) was given to a newly-established Office of War Information (OWI), while the remainder was formed into an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under the JCS. General Donovan retained command of the latter group, which then proceeded to perform all manner of secret operations on foreign soil often inadequately coordinated with the regular departmental intelligence agencies. This, despite the fact that he himself had been an original member of the Joint Intelligence Com-

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mittee (JIC) and also ^{had} served as Chairman of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) during its comparatively brief existence.*

* The JPWC was abolished on 23 Dec 42, by direction of the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff.

The central intelligence question ^{was} ~~has~~ ^{been} not permitted to lie dormant as the war progressed and soon developed into a burning issue in connection with the detailed postwar planning which took place during late 1944. At that particular time, the agreed thought of the ^{War Department} ~~WD~~ intelligence authorities on this controversial subject was formally expressed in a "Plan for the Organization and Operation of the Intelligence System for the Post-War Army," as follows:

a. There should be no single intelligence agency for the United States Government.

b. No single department should have exclusive control of all collection in any category of intelligence wherein some other department holds a legitimate interest, however secondary.

c. A central intelligence policy-making authority should be established in order to coordinate the departmental agencies but it ought not to conduct intelligence operations. Such control

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might be given to a joint board or a coordinator represent-
ing the highest governmental authority.*

* "Plan for the Organization and Operation of the Intelligence System for the Post-War Army" (S), prepared by G-2 for SPD in Oct 44, Appendix "D", G-2 368, 28 Oct 44 (29 Nov 43). DRB TAG.

Nevertheless, General Donovan had already been in personal correspondence with President Roosevelt and several highly-placed officials of the government to recommend the creation without further delay of a central intelligence authority reporting directly to the Chief Executive. He argued that his plan, as presented, "would not conflict with or limit necessary intelligence functions within the Army, Navy, Department of State and other agencies" but merely serve to "avoid the present confusion that leads to waste and unnecessary duplication."*

* Memo (S), Donovan for the President, 18 Nov 44, copy in G-2 350.09 (6 Apr 45). DRB TAG.

The President, however, ^{wisely} decided to refer the Donovan proposal to the JCS for their consideration.*

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* See: JCS 1181 (S), 25 Nov 44.

Mr. Harry Hopkins, the powerful Special Advisor and Assistant to the President of the United States, also displayed an active interest in this same matter by asking Maj. Gen. George V. Strong of the Joint Post-War Committee^{*} to give him his personal views on General Donovan's

* Gen Strong, former ACoFS G-2, WDGS, had been retired for physical disability effective 29 Feb 44 but recalled to active duty the very next day in order to serve on this key JCS planning committee.

central intelligence plan. Based upon a notably wide experience in military intelligence and war planning, General Strong answered Mr. Hopkins along the following lines:

1. It will be essential during the postwar era for the United States Government to obtain adequate intelligence coverage of worldwide proportions so as to protect our national security and furnish a sound basis for our foreign policies.

2. It is believed that this end can be accomplished through utilizing the existing intelligence agencies in an orderly and logical manner, rather than setting up a new, cumbersome and possibly dangerous organization.

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3. It is absolutely necessary to have the FBI brought into the national intelligence picture, instead of being ignored the way it is under this proposed plan.

4. Since the OSS was established in wartime primarily to function within overseas theaters of operations, it seems reasonable that when hostilities have ceased the agency should be abolished. *

* Memo, Strong to Hopkins, 13 Nov 44, G-2 350.09 (6 Apr 45).

DRB TAG.

With the central intelligence drive thus seemingly stalled at least for the time being, literal extracts from the text of JCS 1181 and its companion JIC 239/5 containing the Donovan plan suddenly appeared in the Washington Times Herald on 9 February 1945, accompanied by a very critical article about a threatened "Super-Spy System" for the United States. * Since these JCS documents both carried a SECRET

* Times Herald, 9 Feb 45. The same article also appeared in the Chicago Tribune.

classification, their publication in this manner constituted a grave breach of wartime security and the Army Inspector General was promptly

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ordered to conduct a thorough investigation of the entire affair. Even though it did exhibit all the earmarks of a deliberate leak, he was unable to fix any definite responsibility for the disclosure. He finally concluded, therefore, that further investigation would be profitless and this negative finding was concurred in by the ACofS G-2, ^{*}WDGS.*

* Memo (S), G-2 to Dep C/S, 10 Apr 45, G-2 350.09 (6 Apr 45).

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The Donovan plan for a central intelligence service came under formal review by the JCS on 22 February 1945. While General Marshall felt the plan might hold some merit if it could be processed under normal conditions, he feared the threat of a politically-inspired Congressional investigation at that particular time might "hazard our best sources." He thus recommended a JCS reply to the President stating that the plan had received most careful study but, in view of all circumstances, its consideration should now be deferred. ^{This} Such course of action was then accepted by the other JCS members and a letter along ^{such} those lines duly dispatched to the President.*

* Memo (S), CofS to JCS, 22 Feb 45, G-2 350.09 (6 Apr 45).

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This postponement did not, of course, appeal to the dedicated partisans who were continually pushing the central intelligence project. Early in April 1945, General Donovan managed to reopen the question again through the use of a personal letter from President Roosevelt instructing him to call together "the chiefs of the foreign intelligence and internal security units in the various executive agencies, so that a consensus of opinion can be secured." It was further apparent to the President that "all ten executive departments, as well as the Federal Economic Administration and the Federal Communications Commission would have a direct interest in the proposal and should be asked to contribute their suggestions on the subject of a centralized intelligence service." * Armed with this topmost ^{authority,} ~~packing~~ General

* Memo, Roosevelt to Donovan, 5 Apr 45, G-2 350.09 (6 Apr 45).

DRB TAG.

Donovan was ^{then} able to by-pass the JCS and write directly to the Secretary of War in order to request the latter's comments on the original plan for a central intelligence service as submitted to the President during November 1944. *

* Memo (S), Dir OSS to Sec War, 6 Apr 45, MID 334. DRB TAG.

This was the very same plan the President had previously referred to

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the JCS and had already been acted upon by that highest military body.

In accordance with normal staff procedure, the task of preparing an answer to this letter from General Donovan for the Secretary of War was given to the ACoFS G-2, WDGS. Because the drafted G-2 reply did not meet with the complete approval of Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, it was first revised in his office and then forwarded to General Donovan over Mr. Stimson's signature on 1 May 1945. The answer declared that, although the War Department was in substantial harmony with the stated objectives of the Donovan plan, there were still a number of important differences in methods of approach remaining ^{at} ~~applied~~ ^{hand-} ~~cable,~~ Moreover, the Departments of State, War and Navy had all been given another opportunity to examine the proposed plan and were in full agreement that it should not be considered until after the termination of hostilities against both Germany and Japan. *

* Ltr (S), Sec War to Dir OSS, 1 May 45, MID 350.09 (6 Apr 45). DRB TAG. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Director, was apparently being studiously ignored in these deliberations, so, when Gen Bissell sent him a copy of this latest communication on the subject by special messenger, he promptly expressed his sincerest appreciation for such action. See: Ltr (S), same file, 5 May 45.

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Even this setback failed to discourage General Donovan and he continued to correspond directly with the Secretary of War in the matter. Accordingly, ^Ttwo weeks later, Mr. Stimson received another letter from him claiming the War Department position was based upon a misconception that his plan might subject the departmental intelligence operations to outside control but this would not actually be the case. On the contrary, he said, the proposed central intelligence service was designed solely "to provide the President and heads of Executive departments with broad and coordinated intelligence estimates of strategic nature" for their own use in arriving at joint policy decisions. ^{*} Since

* Ltr, Dir OSS to Sec War, 16 May 45, MID 350.09 (6 Apr 45).

DRB TAG.

both the Secretary of War and JCS had already announced an official opinion with reference to the central intelligence project, the ACoFS G-2, *WDGS*, strongly recommended that no answer should be given to General Donovan's latest letter regarding it. The Office of the Secretary of War not only agreed with this counsel but also told ^{General Bissell} ~~the ACoFS G-2~~ to consider the entire incident ^{now} _{closed}. ^{*}

* See: Summary Sheet (S), WDGBI/Pol Staff I, G-2, 22 May 45, MID 350.09 (6 Apr 45). DRB TAG.

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The central intelligence proposal came under active discussion again immediately following the conclusion of the war. When the first Lovett Board was created during October 1945 to deal with post-war reorganization, therefore, one of its main missions was to submit recommendations for a War Department position on intelligence centralization in the United States Government. Although the plan that was eventually ^{proposed} advanced by this Board differed considerably from the earlier Donovan project, it did call for establishing a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to function under a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and a JCS representative, plus any additional government officials recommended by the NIA members and approved by the President. This NIA was also to include a Secretary or Under Secretary of Air if and when either happened to be appointed. Furthermore, the clear intention was that the new CIA should operate as a real collection agency within the espionage and counterespionage fields, ^{overseas,} a point which had been left generally unsettled in the Donovan plan.

The ID officials themselves were not in accord with these Lovett Board recommendations bearing upon central intelligence. Their views, as forwarded to the board on 26 October 1945, were set forth in a detailed study covering all phases of the departmental intelligence effort both past and present. This study held that American intelligence activities within the foreign field should be guided by the following fundamental principles:

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a. A sharp distinction must always be made between ~~actual~~^{granting} authority to conduct intelligence operations and merely to achieve intelligence coordination in connection therewith.

b. Intelligence operations should be conducted only by departmental agencies of the government but whenever such operations can be better controlled on a joint basis, a joint agency may be formed to function directly under the operational chiefs of the departments concerned.

c. The coordination of intelligence operations ought to be accomplished by an agency responsible to the Secretaries of the departments charged with national defense and foreign policy.

That agency should:

(1) Not impair any department's ability to discharge its individual intelligence responsibility to the President.

(2) Not impair any department's control over its own operating facilities.

(3) Accomplish such coordination as will improve the intelligence available to the several governmental departments and to the President. *

* "Report on Intelligence Matters" (S), To: Assistant Secretary of War for Air, From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 26 Oct 45, Pt II, pp. 1-2, SD, 30375-I. ACSI Doc Br.

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
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This ID study concluded that "a central intelligence operating unit should not be established but a national coordinating agency should," with the latter agency being strictly "forbidden to engage in operating functions." * The fact was not emphasized, though, that

* Ibid.

such a system would necessarily involve the State, War and Navy Departments deeply in the conduct of secret intelligence operations on foreign soil. Therein lay the fatal weakness of the G-2 analysis because it failed noticeably to provide for any ^{acceptable} satisfactory solution to the important problem of filling the void in operations of that nature which would stem from the gradual liquidation of the OSS as already ordered.

The recommendations of the first Lovett Board were approved by the Secretary of War effective 6 November 1945, thus to become the ^{official} ~~accepted~~ War Department position on intelligence centralization. Nonetheless, there were several major points of difference still remaining to be ironed out before any definite agreement in the matter could be reached among the State, War and Navy authorities concerned. The State Department, for example, continued to feel that the Truman letter of 20 September 1945, which had instructed the Secretary of State to "take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelli-




gence program for all Federal agencies," meant for the State Department to exercise primary control over any such effort undertaken.*

* See: Study (S) by Spec Asst to Sec State, 19 Nov 45, sub: Comparison of Plans for Coordinated or Centralized Intelligence, MID 350.09 (6 Apr 45) and Memo (S), WDCSA to G-2, 14 Dec 45, WDCSA 337 (14 Dec 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

Undoubtedly in view of this, on ~~28 December 1945~~^{on 28 December 1945}, Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, the newly appointed CNO, initiated direct correspondence with his opposite number, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, to express a desire for joint Army-Navy action within "many fields of intelligence endeavor," in order "to reduce duplication, insure complete coverage and accomplish saving either in money, manpower or both." As a result, Rear Adm. T. B. Inglis and Maj. Gen. H. A. Craig were not only appointed to represent the two departments in examining into the intelligence coordination problem but also granted full authority to take whatever corrective action they might deem appropriate and feasible.*

* See: Memo (C) G-2 to Chief MIS, 334 Joint Army Navy Intelligence Effort, 5 Mar 46. ACSI Rec Sec. Gen Craig, an Air Corps officer, had recently ~~been serving~~^{served} on the WDGS as Deputy ACofS OPD.



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Negotiations along these unilateral lines came to an abrupt halt on 22 January 1946, however, when President Truman issued a joint directive addressed to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, designating them, along with one other person to be named as his personal representative, to comprise a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) for assuring "the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to national security." The three Secretaries were ^{then} ~~like-~~wise further instructed, as follows:

2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective Departments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority, and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.

3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments.

b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.

c. Perform, for the benefit of said agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be most efficiently accomplished centrally.

d. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.

4. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under this directive. *

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* Federal Register, XI (Feb 46), p. 1337.

Another part of this same Presidential directive called for the formation of an Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB) to advise the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). It was to be composed of the "heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to the national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority," which was taken to include the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, ^{*} the Director of Intelli-

* Col Alfred McCormack, Mr. McCloy's former law partner and Director of Intelligence, MIS, during the latter part of World War II, currently held this State Department position. He later resigned from it in a huff, when his Office of Research and Intelligence was "dismembered" and its personnel apportioned out to separate research divisions being established under the ^{various} Political Offices. See: Ltr, Alfred McCormack to Sec State, 23 Apr 46, in Dept of State Bulletin, dated 5 May 46.

gence, WDGS, and the Chief, Office of Naval Intelligence, with the FBI

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Director and possibly other government officials called into consultation if required.

(U) The President ^{also} again wrote to the three Secretaries ^{again} the next day, notifying them that he had appointed Admiral of the Fleet William D. Leahy, USN, to be his personal representative on the NIA and Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers as the DCI. * Thus, the initial step leading toward

* Ltr, Truman to Sec War, 23 Jan 46, G-2 040 NIA (22 Jan 46).

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a centralization of intelligence effort for the United States Government had ^{thus now} been taken, with three ~~parent~~ new groups added to the organizational structure in the form of a NIA, IAB and CIG. To the central intelligence enthusiasts this merely represented a preliminary move in the right direction but to the departmental authorities it promised to inject additional complications into an already almost overwhelming problem of achieving satisfactory coordination ^{for} in connection with their intelligence production.

(S) Immediate tasks facing the new CIG were to procure required personnel, funds and facilities from the three parent departments as provided for under the Presidential directive, and to decide upon a course of action covering the scheduled acquisition of the SSU from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. CIG Directive No. 1, issued 19 Feb-

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February 1946, ^{intended} planned to handle the latter matter by creating an ad hoc committee of five members, representing CIG, ID, ONI, FBI, and State, * to study SSU operations and submit recommendations on continuing them.

* See: CIG Dir No. 1 (T.S.), 19 Feb 46, sub: Survey of the Activities of the SSU, G-2 350.09 (6 Apr 45). ACSI Rec Sec. The Director, FBI, was invited to participate in the consideration of this particular subject only.

At the same time, the departmental intelligence authorities were ^{strongly} also urged to take steps without delay in meeting their respective personnel quotas for the CIG, ~~by~~ Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, ^{therefore} proceeded to estimate that the following persons would be needed from the War Department for such purpose:

Central Reports Staff -

- (1) Eleven (11) officers with maximum proposed grade of Colonel.
- (2) Seventeen (17) civilians with proposed grades from P-7 to CAF-4.

Central Planning Staff -

- (1) Twelve (12) officers with maximum proposed grade of Colonel but eight (8) of these positions may be filled by civilians with proposed grades ranging from P-8 to P-6 or CAF-15 - CAF-13.
- (2) Eight (8) Clerk-Stenographers at grade of CAF-5.

Administrative Division -

- (1) Five (5) officers with maximum proposed grade of Lt. Colonel.
- (2) Twenty Eight (28) civilians with proposed grades ranging from CAF-14 to CAF-3.

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- (1) Military - 28
 - (2) Civilian - 53
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* Memo (C), G-2 to Adm Asst Sec War, 8 Mar 46, MID 040 NIA (22 Jan 46). DRB TAG. The senior Army officer assigned at this time to CIG was Col (later Brig Gen) Louis J. Fortier. He was promptly named to be its Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational Services.

Relations between the Director of CIG and the other intelligence chiefs during this formative period remained far from propitious. The departmental officials, having been understandingly reluctant to transfer their best personnel to CIG, showed little confidence in the performance or capabilities of the new agency. * Besides, as a member of

* See: "An Analysis of the Mission and Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency During its First Two Years of Existence (S)," Sec. X- Personnel, G-2 020, undated 47 (11 Mar 47). ACSI Rec Sec.

NIA even though non-voting, the DCI not only persisted in by-passing the IAB and taking his problems up directly with the NIA but also demonstrated a marked tendency to consider the departmental agencies subordinate to CIG. * These disagreements, along with the

* "Review of WD Policies and Programs" (S), Tab A, p. 2, CSGID 020, undated 47 (11 Mar 47). ACSI Rec Sec.

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fact that the departmental authorities quite naturally disliked yielding any of their own appropriated funds for CIG use, continued to cause major difficulties.

Effective 10 June 1946, General Vandenberg became ^{the} Director of CIG *

* See: D/Def, Office of Public Inf, Press Branch, Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, up to date as of 18 June 1951. Adm Souers, Gen Vandenberg's predecessor, returned to civil life for approximately one year and then accepted an appointment to serve in the capacity of Executive Secretary, NSC.

and the ^{following} next day he was replaced as Director of Intelligence, WDGS, by Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin. * Shortly thereafter, the NIA made a

* WD SO 129, 10 Jun 46.

positive effort to settle the controversial question of the precise duties which should apply to the DCI by issuing a detailed directive to him based upon the President's letter of 22 January 1946. This directive not only authorized the DCI to act for the NIA in accomplishing needed coordination and centralization of intelligence activities but also announced a decision that in certain specified cases he should actually conduct intelligence operations in the field for the purpose of collecting foreign information related to national security. *

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* See: N.I.A. Dir No. 5 (T.S.), 8 Jul 46, G-2 040 CIG (11 Feb 46).
ACSI Rec Sec.

Utilizing the SSU remnant as a readily available nucleus, there-
fore, CIG^{thus} soon became actively engaged in performing several functions
that were plainly of an operational nature. * While this development

* CIG took over the administration and operation of SSU in Apr 46,
with SSU subsequently directed to discontinue its overseas activities
effective 19 Oct 46. SSU was then officially abolished on 11 Apr 47,
except for some minor administrative requirements which were not trans-
ferred to CIA until 12 Oct 50.

was not in strict accordance with the intelligence centralization plan
that had been originally proposed by the departmental authorities them-
selves, it did not appear to present any great difficulty at the moment.
The main source of trouble between CIG and the regular departmental
agencies ~~thus~~ continued to lie in the critical matter of appropriated
funds. Since CIG did not enjoy a separate budget and remained totally
dependent upon the parent departments for financial support, ^{fiscal} conflicts
of interest ^{were} ~~was~~ bound to occur. Also contributing to such friction was
use of the new term "national security information" throughout the basic

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CIG directives. Although this term sounded fine as part of these directives, it was actually impossible to distinguish in many instances whether an individual item fell properly under a national security or some other approved information classification. The result was a decided intensification of the numerous problems concerned with agency scope and responsibility that were already commencing to handicap the favorable development of an effective postwar intelligence production program.

(U) Establishment of the NIA-IAB-CIG system likewise failed to satisfy the influential group that was constantly pressing for more and more intelligence centralization within the United States Government. In April 1946, ~~for example,~~ General Donovan, the group's most prominent spokesman, had chosen to deliver a much discussed address before the New York Herald Tribune High School Forum in which he demanded a "centralized, impartial, independent intelligence agency reporting directly to the President." * At the same time, Congress² began to evince a be-

* William J. Donovan, "A Central Intelligence Agency; Foreign Policy Must Be Based on Facts," Vital Speeches, 1 May 46, p. 446.

lated interest in the subject. On 17 December 1946, following a series of exhaustive hearings, the House Military Affairs Committee published a comprehensive report covering both past and present intelligence methods and made nine specific recommendations for appro-

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appropriate legislative action in connection therewith. While these recommendations seemed to call chiefly for enacting the provisions of the Presidential directive of 22 January 1946 into law, ^{several} some of them did deviate from ^{the terms of this earlier} this executive authorization, as follows:

1. The CIG should receive appropriations direct from Congress and have complete control over its own personnel, instead of being required to draft such assistance from other governmental departments.

2. The Director of CIG should be a civilian appointed for a preliminary term of 2 years and a permanent term of 10 years, at a salary of at least \$12,000 per year. Moreover, his appointment should be made by the President with the consent of the Senate.

3. The CIG should not undertake intelligence collection operations but ought to concentrate more upon analyzing and evaluating high-level intelligence for the President and officials who determine national policy.

4. The Army should be requested to examine sympathetically into the establishment of an Intelligence Corps for the training, development and assignment of especially qualified officers.*

* H. Comm. on Military Affairs, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., "Report on H. Res 20," 17 Dec 46, p. 31.

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The Senate, on the other hand, chose to attack the intelligence centralization problem from a much broader viewpoint and to consider it in conjunction with a major program aimed at reorganizing the whole structure of national defense. The eventual result turned out to be the National Security Act of 1947, which was passed on 26 July 1947 and created a Department of Defense consisting of the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy and Department of the Air Force. In

* 61 Stat. 495.

respect to military intelligence, this ^{historic} memorable legislation abolished the existing NIA, IAB and CIG, and, even though it did establish an authoritative coordinating group^{for the} in the form of a National Security Council (NSC), failed to provide any suitable replacement for either the NIA or IAB. Presumably it was felt that the NSC itself could insure an appropriate coordination of intelligence matters but the mission given to this top level council called for it to function mostly as an intelligence user rather than as a directive agency within that particular field. Hence, because the national intelligence effort now lacked expert guidance from the IAB, it was in reality less coordinated at the policy level than it had been before.

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In place of CIG, the new act created a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the NSC, gave it complete independence from the departmental agencies and materially broadened its powers to enforce intelligence centralization measures. The act ^{further} also provided for a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who would be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate from among commissioned officers of the armed services or individuals in civil life. He was to receive compensation at the rate of \$14,000 a year and, since the term of office remained ^{unstated,} undesignated, his removal was felt to be coincident with that same appointing authority. * Rear Adm. Roscoe H.

* Ibid. An amendment, passed in 1953, authorized the similar appointment of a Deputy DCI but specified that at no time could the positions of DCI and Deputy DCI both be held by commissioned officers of the armed forces either active or retired.

Hillenkoeter, USN, who had replaced General Vandenberg as Director of CIG on 1 May 1947, was then redesignated as the DCI for CIA. * *Detailed*

* Facts on File, 1947, p. 271 K.

<--Detailed duties assigned to the CIA under this National Security Act of 1947 were, as follows:

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. *

* 61 Stat. 495.

(5) The absence of any fitting advisory function by the departmental intelligence chiefs for the new CIA was an obvious fault in the National Security Act of 1947. ^{Consequently,} Accordingly, on 19 September 1947, the DCI submitted a plan to the NSC which recommended the establishment of an Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) under authority contained within the act itself, in order to perform generally along the same lines as the previous IAB. Upon detailed analysis, however, it soon became clearly apparent that there were several very important differ-

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ences between this proposed IAC and the previous IAB, as follows:

1. The IAB had been appointed by the President and was responsible to the NIA but the IAC would be appointed by and be responsible to the DCI.

2. Membership in the IAB had been restricted by Presidential directive to the heads of the principal military and civilian agencies of the government involved, while the IAC would be composed merely of appropriate representatives therefrom.

3. Under the earlier system, by NIA direction, all recommendations of the DCI had to be referred to IAB before the NIA would consider them. The proposed IAC, however, was ^{called upon} to hold itself available to advise the DCI only in matters concerned with intelligence coordination.

4. The IAB had always been an interdepartmental committee with representation plainly from each department. Under the new plan, though, it remained uncertain whether this representation was intended to be on a departmental or personal basis.*

* Memo (C), DI to CofS, 22 Oct 47, sub: Appointment of an Intelligence Advisory Committee, MID 334 IAC 22 Oct 47 (19 Sep 47). ACSI Rec Sec.

These indicated departures from the prior system were so sweeping that Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall was ~~soon~~ prevailed upon to

address a personal memorandum to the Executive Secretary of the NSC calling his attention to them and requesting the prompt establishment of an IAC capable of performing functions analogous to those which had been accomplished by IAB for the NIA. This memorandum was

* Memo (C), Sec Army for Exec Sec NSC, undated, Sub: Appointment of an Intelligence Advisory Committee, MID 334 IAC, 22 Oct 47 (19 Sep 47). ACSI Rec Sec.

then referred to an ad hoc committee ^{already} recently formed for the purpose of drafting a series of NSC directives under the National Security Act of 1947, to replace obsolete NIA directives. While the depart-

* ID member of this working committee was Col. E. J. Treacy Jr. from the Office of the Asst Exec for Planning and Coordination, ^{later killed} in action in Korea.

mental military intelligence representatives on that committee strove hard to retain some semblance of an effective advisory control over the CIA and did succeed in winning a few significant concessions from the CIA members, the final decision, as announced by NSCID No. 1 on 12 Dec 1947, was along the following lines:

To maintain the relationship essential to the coordination between the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations, an Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of the respective intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and from the Joint Staff (JCS), and the Atomic Energy Commission, or their representatives, shall be established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central Intelligence will invite the Chief, or his representative, of any other intelligence Agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the Intelligence Advisory Committee whenever matters within the purview of his Agency are to be discussed. *

* NSCID No. 1, Duties and Responsibilities (S), 12 Dec 47, par 1, f/w G-2 350.09, 12 Dec 47 (23 Sep 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

Since this new IAC could be by-passed by the DCI almost at will in his dealings with the NSC on intelligence matters, the chiefs of the departmental intelligence agencies had obviously lost their crucial battle. As a matter of fact, it had really been lost when the National Security Act of 1947 did away with the NIA and formed a much broader NSC for a completely different purpose. By appointing a Secretary of Defense and thus downgrading the Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force to a comparatively subordinate position and at the same time creating an essentially independent CIA, the act also served to alter the entire military intelligence picture from that of the preceding years. In effect there were now four major agencies involved in foreign intelligence operations, with one of them holding a some-

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what inconclusive authority over the other three. This situation patently demanded the highest degree of policy coordination but the means available for attaining such coordination were even less now than in the past. The ^{plainly} observable result was a great deal of argument about individually assigned responsibilities and a considerable amount of duplication of effort on the part of all concerned. *

* See: Intelligence Division Comments (S), Tab A, G-2 O40 CIA, 10 Oct 50. Although the G-2 memo transmitting these comments to Lt Gen Walter B. Smith was classified TS, this was done only because of some information contained in ^a Tab C.

Despite the fact that numerous NSC and DCI directives were eventually issued to guide each particular phase of intelligence activity, serious questions bearing upon control, coordination and overlap continued to hamper the satisfactory progress of the national intelligence program. There was general agreement among the departmental officials that the IAC had been unsoundly conceived as a body lacking in suitable authority and it ought to be granted actual governing rather than merely advisory powers. It was further felt that the IAC should habitually render its advice directly to the NSC rather than through the DCI. This was much more than just a matter of prestige

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because the DCI had recently shown a pronounced disposition to formulate national intelligence estimates without any prior IAC discussion or approval. Since these estimates could prove to be of utmost importance in crisis situations, the departmental intelligence chiefs ^{firmly} strongly believed that their own combined judgments should play a larger role in preparing them.

With the pre-Korea Cold War period already moving rapidly toward a sudden and unexpected climax, it ~~thus~~ ^{clearly} becomes plainly evident that the national intelligence effort was not developing as smoothly under the new system of centralization as had been envisioned. Two conflicting views on CIA functioning in the production and dissemination of national intelligence ^{thus} continued to remain notably unreconciled. The established agencies not only felt that CIA should make greater use of their ^{own} readily available and experienced departmental facilities in order to avoid wasteful duplication but also before CIA presented any national intelligence to the NSC, it should either be concurred in by the departmental authorities or else carry a statement of substantial differing opinion. On the other hand, CIA held that a certain amount of duplication in research and analysis was unavoidable for it to execute its assigned mission properly and whether or not any particular item of CIA intelligence required concurrence or dissent from the departmental agencies was purely a matter for the DCI himself to decide.

Inter-agency disputes in this same connection also often hinged upon varying interpretations given to the handy phrase "national in-

telligence" which was so freely utilized throughout the basic instructions on intelligence centralization. Even after it had been officially defined as "integrated intelligence covering the broad aspects of national policy and national security, transcending the exclusive competence of a single department or agency of the government," the phrase still remained woefully deficient in practical application. Added to this functional handicap was the fact that CIA was both newly organized and aggressively directed. A considerable amount of confusion and inter-agency rivalry, therefore, ^{could} ~~might~~ well be expected. It seems clear, though, that the announced goal of achieving an effective coordination of effort for intelligence production within the United States Government had not been truly reached by the time the Korean War broke out in June 1950. Actually, progress along such lines appears to have been more favorable under the brief NIA-IAB-CIG regime, which was created following World War II for that specific purpose, than during any comparable period ~~right~~ after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

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CHAPTER III

COLLECTION PROBLEMS

The trend toward extending direct MID (MIS) control over the field collection effort which became so marked during the peak of World War II operations, had already been reversed prior to VJ Day. For example, when the New York Branch was closed late in December 1944, the only branch office of the departmental intelligence agency still remaining open was the Miami Branch and it was being administered through the local Service Command. While this branch did continue to collect a small amount of information on Latin American affairs, ^{but} it was essentially a foreign liaison unit with only limited personnel available for accomplishing any actual intelligence research. Similarly, such fruitful sources of foreign information as the JICA's, ALSOS Mission, American Intelligence Command and Prisoner of War Interrogation Centers were either out of existence or in the process of gradual liquidation.

Collateral sources of foreign information for the departmental agency were also fast drying up. Capabilities of the secret FBI organization which had performed so creditably in South America during the war were diminishing at a rapid rate and, although MID continued to keep small detachments stationed within both the British War Office and Canadian Defense Ministry, a great deal of the favorable wartime

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structure which had been built up for inter-Allied collaboration in intelligence matters fell apart right after the combat operations ceased. With the OSS abolished effective 1 October 1945 and its SSU remnant functioning only on a reduced scale, that particular information source could no longer be counted upon to supply much foreign coverage. To make matters worse, all regular intelligence agencies of the government, including MID itself, were in the midst of a most difficult period of postwar readjustment ^{and} so that they could barely meet their own day to day requirements, ^{and} the two major overseas Army commands, AFPAC and USFET (later EUCOM), had recently experienced practically a complete turnover in veteran intelligence personnel.

By the end of 1945, it was obvious that the entire field collection effort stood badly in need of a thorough overhaul and reorientation. In the first place, MID (MIS) remained deeply involved in a number of sensitive intelligence activities which might better be handled during peacetime by some other governmental organization. Furthermore, it was increasingly apparent that the departmental intelligence agency would soon have to return to its pre-war custom of relying chiefly upon the American Military Attaches for collecting ^{desired} foreign information by overt means and methods. The primary goal of any revitalized field collection effort, therefore, manifestly should be ~~able~~ to maintain an effective MA system on a global basis in order to

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satisfy the new requirements of large-scale military occupation and growing international tension.

Another major influence calling for a prompt reorganization of the MID collection effort was the fact that the basic intelligence objectives of the War Department had recently undergone a complete change. During the war, of course, ^{its} the main effort had been concentrated upon defeating the Axis powers but this mission was now successfully accomplished. Although these same nations still constituted important intelligence targets, especially with reference to the problems of military occupation, emphasis for them had ^{now} shifted from combat intelligence to counterintelligence activities. On the other hand, it was already clear to most of the departmental authorities that world War II had created a ^{potentially ~~very~~ dangerous} ~~practically~~ threat to our national security in the form of a powerful and aggressive U.S.S.R. actively supporting the combined forces of international Communism throughout the world.*

* Winston Churchill forcefully proclaimed this same thought to the world in his famous speech given at Westminster College, Fulton, Mo., on 5 Mar 46. See: The Sinews of Peace, Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill, ed. Randolph S. Churchill (Boston, 1949), pp. 93-105.

Since basic intelligence objectives for the United States Army are normally announced in terms of Essential Elements of Information (EEI),

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the immediate task confronting the military intelligence officials was to devise an ^{all-inclusive} inclusive set of EEI's ^{to replace} for replacing those which had been utilized during the war. This important project was completed on 18 February 1946, under the personal direction of Brig. Gen. Paul E. Peabody, Chief, MIS, with the new EEI's comprising seven pointed questions so phrased as to furnish necessary guidance for the subordinate Army intelligence services in making a maximum contribution to the demands of national security. * The departmental intelli-

* See: MID 350.09 (T. S.), 18 Feb 46, f/w (21 Feb 46). ACSI Rec Sec. The new EEI's were formally noted by the CofS on 12 Feb 46.

gence agency then proceeded to issue a comprehensive War Department Intelligence Plan based upon these latest EEI's * and to expedite the

* See: CSGID 350.09 (S), 18 Feb 46, f/w (21 Feb 46). DRB TAG.

completion of a long overdue revision of its wartime Basic Intelligence Directive (BID) without further delay. *

* See: "Basic Intelligence Directive (BID)" (C), Jun 46, MID 313.2 (23 Oct 44). DRB TAG.

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Two additional complicating factors had now entered into the national intelligence objectives picture. The first of these was the previously described NIA-IAB-CIG coordination system formed during January 1946 and the other was the establishment through Congressional action of an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), effective 1 August 1946, accompanied by a Military Liaison Committee (MLC) designed to assist it in acting upon atomic energy matters from the military viewpoint. * Not only did the AEC require an intelligence organ-

* 60 Stat. 755.

ization to execute information and security missions for its own needs *

* On 5 Aug 47, AEC Chairman David E. Lilienthal named Rear Adm John E. Gingrich, USN, to be Director of Intelligence and Security for the AEC and to serve as a regular member of the IAB. See: G-2 334 IAC, 12 Aug 47. ACSI Rec Sec.

but also the War Department representatives assigned to the MLC looked toward the departmental intelligence agency to provide them with suitable information in order to perform their prescribed liaison duties. As a matter of fact, even though the NIA was supposed to be able to derive national intelligence objectives from ^{adopted} American foreign policy,

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current developments within the atomic energy field kept assuming such transcendent importance that the entire subject of basic intelligence objectives had to remain under almost continuous review for the rest of the Cold War period.

One of the main announced goals of the newly established NIA-IAB-CIG coordinating system was to improve intelligence collection procedures, so most of the initial NIA directives were aimed at accomplishing that particular purpose. NIA Directive #6, for instance, which was issued on 26 July 1946, set up a permanent inter-departmental committee under chairmanship of the Librarian of Congress to facilitate the acquisition of foreign publications and library materials generally in the same manner that had been done during World War II. In

* NIA Dir #6, 26 Jul 46, G-2 350.09, 29 Jul 46, f/w (as Sep 46). DRB TAG. The State Dept was directed to administer this committee and to furnish its Secretariat.

contrast, a similar effort to effect a corresponding revival of collection coverage obtainable from the foreign language press within the United States ran into stiff resistance because of the large amount of resources it would entail. ^{Accordingly,} ~~Hence,~~ the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence was merely told to

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maintain that coverage "to the extent of his capabilities" in meeting his own and other departmental needs for information from foreign language press sources.

* See: CIG 11 (C), 8 Jul 46, G-2 350.09, f/w (23 Sep 46). DRB TAG.

Unfortunately the strength of ID was being steadily reduced during this difficult readjustment period, which served to restrict severely its capabilities for collecting foreign information. Whenever the War Department was called upon to suffer any major personnel cut, the departmental intelligence agency had to bear a full share of the consequent WDGS reduction more or less on a proportionate basis. This ^{addition} regardless of the fact that the approved findings of the second Lovett Board had recently ^{heralded} proclaimed the grave necessity for a "complete rehabilitation of intelligence in the Army" to cope with the dangerous international situation. ^{Chiefly} Mainly as a personnel economy move, therefore, the ID Collection Group was abolished effective 1 September 1946 and its functional branches distributed through the rest of the division, as follows:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Transferred to</u>
Domestic	Intelligence Group
Reading Panel	Intelligence Group
Foreign	Intelligence Group

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Washington Liaison
Attache
Orientation and Instruction
Foreign Liaison
Analysis

Intelligence Group
Exec for Pers. and Adm.
Exec for Pers. and Adm.
Executive Director
Abolished *

* ID WDGS Memo, 27 Aug 46, G-2 020 (13 Apr 45). ACSI Rec Sec.
A Collection Branch was then formed within the Intelligence Group but
it also soon had to be abolished as another economy measure. Never-
theless, ID field collection activities continued to receive a certain
amount of ^{centralized} ~~direct~~ supervision from either a Plans and Collection Branch
(Section) or a Collection and Dissemination Branch (Section) which was
ordinarily found under the Intelligence Group.

Still at hand and requiring the full time services of 50 officers
and 139 enlisted men was the seemingly endless task of examining the
tremendous mass of captured enemy documents flowing into ID for intel-
ligence exploitation in accordance with a formal agreement reached
shortly after VE Day between General Bissell, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and
Maj. Gen. John A. Sinclair, OBE, Director of Military Intelligence,
British War Office. This agreement included "all moveable inscribed
material on Japanese and German Armed Forces, except Air and Navy and
other covered by agreements of higher authority" and called for such
material to be first exploited in the theater or zone of operations,
then shipped to London and finally to Washington, D. C. The avowed

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intention was to concentrate German military documents within the latter city, not only for intelligence use but also for post-war historical purposes. * By July 1946, some 88 officers and enlisted men var-

* This agreement is commonly referred to as the Sinclair-Bissell Agreement. See copy (S) in G-2 386.3 Germany, undated (29 Jun 42).
ACSI Rec Sec.

iously representing British, Canadian, United States Army and United States Navy interests were thus actively participating in the Washington phase of this extensive program, which was organized under the Documents Branch, Intelligence Group, ID, along the following lines:

1. Special Documents Section (SDS), located at the Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore, Md., to extract and translate information gained from captured German documents for special projects as determined by the Intelligence Group of ID (U. S. Army personnel only).

2. German Military Document Section (GMDS), located at the Pentagon, to receive and process incoming German documents, publish appropriate accession lists and develop an active library derivable therefrom (Joint U. S. Army, British and Canadian participation).

3. Washington Document Center (WDC), located in the Stuart

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Building at 5th and K Streets, N. W., Washington, D. C., to exploit Far Eastern documents from the military intelligence standpoint and maintain a comprehensive research library in connection therewith, consigning to the Library of Congress all documents of no apparent value to the War or Navy Departments (Joint U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, British and Canadian participation).^{*}

* Int Group Memo No. 103, 29 Jul 46, incl 2, Document Branch, MID 020 Int Group (9 Jul 46). ACSI Rec Sec. A Tempelhof Collection Center was also operating at this same time in Berlin under joint US-UK auspices and the Halstead Document Center near London still remained open for exploitation by US personnel. See: Proposed Committee Report (S) on Coordinated Exploitation of Enemy Repositories for the Purpose of Extracting, Cataloging and Abstracting Documents Relating to Political-Social-Psychological Warfare, G-2 350.09, 22 Jan 47 (23 Sep 46). DRB TAG.

That these captured documents were able to provide a most profitable information source during the early postwar period seems clear in view of the ^{very promising} interesting material ^{which} that was reported as being under GMDS control on 25 November 1946. Considered useful to the subject of "political-social-psychological warfare," this ^{captured} material consisted of the following items:

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- (1) Records of Abteilung fur Wehrmachtpropaganda (high level psychological warfare agency of the German Army).
- (2) Ic (Intelligence) records from diaries of the German Field Armies (50,000 volumes).
- (3) Partial records of the 30th (Russian) SS Division.
- (4) Small collection of leaflets directed by the Germans against the Russians.
- (5) Small collection of Russian leaflets directed against the Germans.
- (6) German anti-Russian propaganda material for education of the German Army.
- (7) German books on Communism, Russia etc (100 volumes).
- (8) Ausland Abwehr collection (German counter-intelligence agency).
- (9) Haushofer's private collection of geopolitical reference works.
- (10) German records of war crimes directed against the German Army and civilians. *

* Memo, Chief Int Group to Exec ID, 25 Nov 46, G-2 350.09, 22 Nov 46 (23 Sep 46). DRB, TAG.

~~Hot with contact~~ Nevertheless, ~~it~~ soon became painfully evident, ^(though) that because of the ever-mounting personnel reductions this advantageous but relatively expensive intelligence activity could no longer be properly supported by ID. Plans were thus made to close out the WDC during October 1946 and to absorb its personnel into other more essential phases of the collection effort. When the CIG Director, General Vandenberg, learned of this contemplated action, he wrote to General Chamberlin suggesting that the WDC should be transferred to his own agency. * Such a transfer

* Memo, DCI to Gen Chamberlin, 1 Oct 46, MID 040 CIG (10 Oct 46)

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ACSI Rec Sec. CIG had already taken over the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) from the War Dept, which had assumed that monitoring function on 30 Dec 45 when the FCC announced plans to liquidate it. See: Encl B to CIG 1, 25 Feb 46, MID 020 G-2, undated, 1946 (13 Apr 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

was duly accomplished and similar arrangements were later completed to have CIG take over both the GIDS and work of the SDS before June 1947. The Adjutant General was then given sole responsibility for the custody of all German documents held by the United States Army.*

* Memo 25 (C), ID WDGS, 9 May 47 and Memo 30 (C), ID WDGS, 19 Jun 47; copies in MID 300.6 (1947 & 1948). ACSI Rec Sec.

Detailed instructions bearing upon the coordination of collection activities abroad were announced early in 1947, through the issuance of NIA Directive No. 7. This basic directive ^{specified} declared that the following measures should be promptly taken in order "to effect sound and efficient utilization of the various departmental overseas collection and reporting services:"

a. There shall be an allocation within certain broad categories of agency responsibility for collection in the field, as follows:

Political	State Department
Cultural	State Department
Sociological	State Department

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Military
Naval
Economic)
Scientific)

War Department
Navy Department
Each agency in accordance
with its respective needs

b. Intelligence information and material regardless of the collector, shall, wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the field representative of the agency most concerned. However, the collector may also send copies to his own agency.

c. The senior U. S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign service post shall be responsible for the coordination of all collection activities in his area and the proper implementation of that coordination within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein.

d. In order to avoid unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap all collection activities will be utilized to their maximum within budgetary limitations for the production of that full flow of intelligence material which is the major need of all departments.

e. There shall be free and unrestricted interdepartmental flow of all intelligence information and intelligence to meet the recognized secondary need of each department for intelligence usually prepared or obtained by other departments. At present this Directive is interpreted to apply only to those departments represented by the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

f. Common sense shall be applied to the implementation of these established over-all policies and objectives to insure the full utilization of individual initiative and favorable contacts by collecting agents.

g. No interpretation of these established over-all policies and objectives shall negate the basic principle that all departmental representatives abroad are individually responsible for the collection and for the appropriate transmission to Washington of all intelligence material of possible usefulness to their departments and to the effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission. *

* NIA Directive No. 7 (C), "Coordination of Collection Activities,"
MID 350.09, 22 Feb 47 (23 Sep 46). DRB TAG.

Resting as they did mostly on cooperation and understanding by the field personnel, these instructions could scarcely be expected to answer all questions concerned with the coordination of collection activities.

However, due to the ^{continuing} ~~perennial~~ fund shortages, some degree of specialization for the IAB agencies was definitely indicated, so the allocation of primary collection responsibilities to each of them under a broad functional assignment seemed both logical and necessary. That this particular solution might also result in a considerable amount of confusion because the exact line of delineation between the different functional categories would be almost impossible to determine was apparently not fully appreciated. As a matter of fact, any system which tried to force an agency to rely upon the performance of another agency in satisfying its own intelligence needs was sure to stir up serious trouble.

On 27 February 1947, in compliance with NIA 7, the ACoS G-2, WDGS, attempted to correlate all existing War Department policies on collection and reporting from the field, not only for use by the American Military Attaches but also for Theater or other Army Commanders stationed outside the continental limits of the United States. Since the provisions of NIA 7 ^{applicable to} ~~as applied to~~ foreign areas stood in obvious need of further clarification, the following additional instructions were published to govern the actions of all overseas intelligence personnel until subsequent notice:

a. In those areas of the world where the United States maintains a foreign service establishment, the senior U. S. Diplomatic representative has been designated as the coordinator of all collection activities within his area of accreditation.

b. Similarly, but in those areas to which no Diplomatic officer is accredited, the assigned U. S. Consular officer has been designated as the coordinator of all collection activities at his post.

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c. In those areas of the world under the jurisdiction of a U. S. Military Commander, each Commander is already charged by the War Department with coordination of all military intelligence activities within his command area . . .

d. When any of the areas or posts of paras. a and b above are included partially or wholly within Theater or other U. S. Military Command boundaries (para. c), U. S. Military Commander remains the coordinator of all military intelligence activities within his command area, except that, when in the opinion of such commander, delegation of his coordinating authority to the Senior Foreign Service officer of a given included area or post will not mitigate against the discharge of his assigned mission, delegation may be made and the War Department so informed.

e. War Department intelligence personnel located in any area, who receive conflicting instructions, will refer the details of such conflicts direct to the War Department and copies will be furnished those issuing such orders. *

* Ltr (C), DI to Distribution, 25 Feb 47, sub: Coordination of Collection Activities, MID 350.09, 25 Feb 47 (23 Sep 46). DRB TAG.

With the military intelligence authorities thus wrestling with these difficult coordination problems and reductions in authorized personnel strength having already forced MID to shed many of its outside collection functions, one particular field activity continued to show noteworthy progress. This was the PAPERCLIP (originally OVERCAST) project, which had been initially conceived during December 1944 in order to bring qualified Axis scientists and technicians to the United States for national defense exploitation. The JCS had ^{subsequently} logically directed the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, to exercise required general supervision and inter-agency coordination over this important foreign specialist program guided

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by a Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA).^{*} Because the De-

* "The PAPERCLIP Project: Its Concept, Implementation and Control" (S), passim, G-2 311.7, undated (10 Oct 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

partment of State was also ^{materially} involved, PAPERCLIP operations soon came under the review of the high-level State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee known as SWNCC (later SANACC).^{*} It was not until

* SWNCC resulted from a series of letters which were passed between the Secretary of State and Secretaries of War and Navy ^{during} ~~toward~~ the latter part of World War II in the hope of improving inter-departmental coordination on matters of common interest, especially those pertaining to foreign policy or relations with foreign nations. Comprising the Assistant Secretaries of these three departments, the committee held its initial meeting on 19 Dec 44, attended by Mr. James Dunn (State), Mr. John J. McCloy (Army) and Mr. Artemus L. Gates (Navy). It was reconstituted as SANACC, effective 4 Dec 47, with Mr. C. V. Whitney ^{then} representing the newly created Department of the Air Force.

4 March 1946, however, that an official government policy seeking to facilitate the entry of these foreign specialist personnel into the United States was actually formulated and even then ^{major} serious difficul-

ties along such lines kept plaguing the project right up to the very end. In October 1946, though, following a lengthy period of devious negotiations, SWNCC finally did approve a workable set of procedures aimed at permitting a limited number of carefully screened specialists to enter the country under temporary military custody until regular visas might be issued ^{for them} or their repatriation completed.*

* Ibid., p. 74.

There were several different aspects to this memorable exploitation program, ^{and} with each ^{received} a separate degree of emphasis during its gradual evolution. At first the program was intended primarily to provide appropriate assistance to selected national defense projects of a scientific or technical nature. For this reason, the original list of desired personnel was based largely upon advice ^{given} furnished by ~~officials of the~~ ^{the} ALSOS Mission ^{officials}. It soon became apparent, however, that a great many of these foreign personnel could also furnish valuable information about activities taking place within their own specialized fields behind the Iron Curtain, so the intelligence features of the program were ^{duly} stressed. Later on, after having overcome a succession of obstacles seemingly imposed at every turn by the multitude of governmental bureaus concerned, the program was ^{duly} opened to "civilian exploitation" in private industry and this phase proceeded

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to reach major proportions. Lastly, there was the matter of taking positive steps to deny certain key scientists and technicians from Russian control and this consideration ^{gained weight} often weighed heavily in the ~~ultimate~~ ^{final} development of the program.

The departmental intelligence agency ran into a large number of difficult problems while handling this PAPERCLIP project, many of them stemming from the repeated economy drives. For example, it promptly ^{promptly} became essential to find a suitable location in the United States which might serve as an assembly point for the foreign specialists during the time they were being processed and held under military custody. Fort Standish (later renamed Fort Strong), an island in Boston Harbor, was selected for ^{that} such purpose because sufficient housing was available ~~there~~ and the foreign personnel could be isolated effectively from adjacent civilian communities. In January 1946, when Fort Strong had to be closed as an economy measure, the entire installation was shifted from there to Fort Hunt, Virginia. Nine months later, with Fort Hunt also being released from War Department control for reasons of economy, the installation was again forced to move, this time to Mitchel Field, New York, where the ID personnel were organized into a separate field unit designated as Detachment "B". Even this new situation failed to last for more than a few weeks, though, so Detachment "B" was deactivated and most of its trained interrogators were transferred to Headquarters, USFET. A small liaison team was then stationed at the New York Port of

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Embarkation in order to assist the expeditious movement of the foreign specialists to their assigned destinations without unnecessary delay but that was all the field support possible under the existing ID strength allotment.*

* Ibid., pp. 10 - 21. This New York Port liaison team was also deactivated on 30 Sep 47.

Meanwhile, it had become increasingly clear that the PAPERCLIP policies as originally conceived ^{were} stood in need of a major revision. The morale of the foreign specialists already under contract kept dropping because there was no provision for their families to join them while they were ^{being} employed in the United States. Although a large-scale housing project was already in the process of construction at Landshut, Germany, to take care of these dependents,* many of the for-

* See: "History of Landshut," G-2 314.7, undated (30 Oct 42).
ACSI Rec Sec.

foreign technicians had signified ~~that~~ they would not extend their current contracts unless some means could be found to reunite them with their families. Besides, the top salary of \$10.00 per day that had been established for their remuneration did not compare favorably with the salaries offered by the French and Russian Governments, who also

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allowed dependents to accompany ^{the} specialist personnel in the field regardless of assignment. These two problems were eventually solved through SWNCC action, approved by the President on 3 September 1946. The total foreign specialist quota was thus raised from 350 to 1,000 persons and, if certain provisos could be met, authorized dependents were permitted to come to the United States right along with them. Moreover, all contracts for foreign specialists in the future ~~were to~~ ^{would} be drafted by the Commanding General, USFET, so as "to provide suitable salary and working conditions without obligating the War or Navy Departments beyond the legal limitations of their respective appropriations."
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* "The PAPERCLIP Project: Its Concept, Implementation and Control" (S), pp. 5-7, G-2 314.7, undated (10 Oct 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

The procurement of these PAPERCLIP scientists and technicians ^{came to an} ~~end~~ ^{was ended} ~~came to an end~~ effective 30 September 1947, with only special cases thereafter being considered on an individual basis under a different legal authority. Nevertheless, both ID and the JIOA continued to remain actively involved in the exploitation of foreign specialists whose employment in this country appeared justifiable either from the standpoint of national security or for denial purposes. The PAPERCLIP project most assuredly was of immense value to the United States as a

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whole and, particularly during the early stages of its development, constituted an important source of information for the departmental intelligence agency.

Even though numerous personnel reductions had recently forced it to relinquish or decrease several worthwhile collection activities, in ~~early-1947~~, the departmental intelligence agency, ^{in early 1947,} was still maintaining a comparatively favorable flow of foreign information into Washington from the field. This was due largely to an extensive MA system which had received ^{effective} practical guidance from a realistic set of EEI's disseminated the preceding year. It was now clearly apparent, however, that the overseas collection effort not only needed additional personnel but also ought to undergo a timely reexamination in light of the ^{ever-worsening} international situation. An authoritative impetus for just such a survey came from the issuance of the preliminary report of the Haislip Board during April 1947. As previously mentioned, this board had been formed for the announced purpose of reviewing War Department programs and policies but chose to delve much more deeply into military intelligence subjects than might well be expected under its ^{actual} given terms of reference.

It was the fixed opinion of the Haislip Board that ID had been paying too much attention to the rest of the world and should immediately redirect its main effort toward Russia and the satellite countries. The fact that this altered emphasis might result in a ^{dangerous} serious

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neglect of other possible threats to United States security engendered by the international Communist conspiracy remained completely ignored. ^{Even though} Although it was already plainly apparent that because ^{of} growing police restrictions ^{being} enforced behind the Iron Curtain better information about Russia and the satellite countries could in many cases accrue from outside sources rather than from American diplomatic personnel stationed within

those countries, the findings of the Haislip Board were promptly approved.

Steps were then taken without delay to revise the existing EEI's in accordance with this new concept and, on 6 August 1947, the Chief of the Intelligence Group, ID, ordered the formation of a representative committee "to study collection coverage with special emphasis on the U.S.S.R."*

* See: Memo (T.S.) for Branch Chiefs Int Group from Recorder, Committee on Collection of Intelligence Information, 6 Aug 47, G-2 350.09, 6 Aug 47 (23 Sep 46). DRB TAG. The committee was composed of Col. G. S. Smith, Chief, Eurasian Branch (Chairman); Col. C. C. Dusenbury, Chief, Far Eastern Branch (Member) and Lt Col P. H. Lash, Jr., Chief, Plans and Collection Branch (Recorder).

This committee proceeded to explore every conceivable avenue of approach in the direction of obtaining a fuller collection coverage for the U.S.S.R. and satellites. While some of its more ambitious re-

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commendations were quite obviously impracticable, especially those bearing upon ^{permitting} covert intelligence collection activities at the American military attache and mission offices, others did disclose several important areas in which postwar collection practices could be considerably improved. Furthermore, the committee recommendations were not confined solely to ID operations but also contained certain specific suggestions for action on the part of associated departmental staff agencies, the State Department and CIA. When a forthright attempt was made to put as many of these recommendations into effect as possible, though, it soon ran up against the realities of personnel and budgetary limitations, so few new collection means or methods were actually adopted. * One promising development was that the State De-

* See: Intact Folder (S), "Haislip Bd. Rep. and Staff Studies," G-2 020, undated 47 (11 Mar 47). ACSI Rec Sec.

partment did agree to ^{have its} having Consular Officers who were scheduled for assignment at posts where the Army remained unrepresented, such as Aden, French Indo China, Java, Palestine, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, attend special briefings in ID on military information requirements prior to their departure. *

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* Ltr, W. Park Armstrong, Acting Special Asst to Sec State, to Maj Gen S. J. Chamberlin, DI GSUSA, 22 Dec 47, G-2 350.09, 22 Dec 47 (23 Sep 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

The chief area promising to offer additional foreign information at this time lay in the further exploitation of commercial sources within the United States, especially American business concerns or other non-governmental organizations holding overseas interests. Under a National Security Council directive (NSCID No. 7), ~~as~~ approved 12 February 1948, the function of exploiting domestic sources of foreign information had been allocated directly to CIA but the departmental intelligence agencies were also authorized to assign their own personnel to ~~the~~ CIA field offices engaged in that form of collection. * Hence, ID ~~is~~ ID ~~is~~ ID ~~is~~

* See: File (S), Representatives in CIA Field Offices, MID 350.097 (7 Dec 45), 23-31 Dec 47 and 27 Jan 48. DRB TAG.

planned to station one qualified Army colonel at each of eight CIA regional field offices for ~~this~~ ^{that} particular purpose and had even managed to acquire enough scarce personnel spaces to support such a collection

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project. Only three of the available spaces were ever filled, however, because the actual procurement of eight colonels with appropriate experience and background to execute the function properly presented ^{too} many practical difficulties. These ^{three} representatives, located in New York (Col. Meredith C. Noble), Chicago (Col. Terrell E. Price) and San Francisco (Col. Leslie R. Forney, succeeded after one year by Col. Alex Campbell), were ^{then} instructed to keep their respective CIA Field Office Managers fittingly advised on Army requirements for foreign information from domestic sources and to operate under his personal orders in the following manner:

(1) Participate in the establishment and maintenance of effective contacts with those domestic sources of particular interest to the Department of the Army, including the briefing or interrogation of individuals going to or coming from foreign areas whenever it is determined that such persons can obtain or may possess military information of particular interest to the Department of the Army.

(2) Participate in the collection of information requested from CIA by the Department of the Army which is primarily military in nature and requires collection effort on the part of a trained Army officer. *

* Ibid., 23 Jul - 1 Nov 48. The ID representatives at these field offices were administered through a Headquarters, Detachment "A", which was formally established in Washington, D. C., effective 1 May 48. See: Ltr, TAG to D/I, 322.7 Detachment "A", 30 Apr 48. DRB TAG.

Another National Security Council directive (NSCID No. 2), dated

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13 January 1948, had sought to establish appropriate policies and objectives for ^{guiding} collection activities abroad. It charged the newly created Department of the Air Force with primary responsibility for the collection of "Air" information in the field and added a "Technological" classification to the general collection category but otherwise closely resembled its NIA 7 predecessor. The expressed wish was that the directive might serve "to avoid unproductive duplication and uncoordinated overlap" so as to insure within budgetary limitations the full flow of intelligence to all departments and agencies in performing their assigned intelligence missions.*

* NSCID No. 2 (C), "Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad," 12 Jan 48, ^{f/w} G-2 350.09, 13 Dec 48 (²³ ~~22~~ Sep 46). DRB TAG.

This, of course, was a most excellent goal to pursue but, due chiefly to complications stemming from the recent formation of a separate Air Force within the National Military Establishment, the detailed application of NSCID 2 actually produced more disputes than the previous NIA 7, ^{on the same subject.} For example, arguments bearing upon responsibility for the collection of information ^{about} foreign naval air operations continued to mount between the Navy and Air Force, while all the field agencies remained in strenuous competition with each other over the collection of technological and scientific intelligence. There was also a noticeable lack of under-

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standing displayed by many of the officials concerned in ^{regard} ~~respect~~ to ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{interpreting} ~~necessity~~ ^{the} ~~for listing~~ specific collection responsibilities ^{listed} under NSCID 2. They ~~thus~~ persistently ignored the fact that there had been no intention of compromising the time-honored practice of having each departmental representative stationed abroad held individually responsible for transmitting back to his own department whatever collected information he felt might tend to support its ^{respectively} assigned mission. Most certainly, just as long as intelligence was an accepted function of command, ^{no} ~~no~~ infringement could ever be permitted to weaken that fundamental principle in any significant manner.

This new collection system for foreign intelligence was soon put to the acid test in Bogota, Colombia, where Secretary of State George C. Marshall and a number of other top Western Hemisphere diplomats had gathered to attend an important Conference of the American States. On 9 April 1948, the local Communists seized upon the assassination of Colombian Liberal Party leader Jorge E. Gaitan to turn the ensuing disturbance into a riot of such widespread proportions that they actually threatened to gain an effective control over the entire country. With Colombian airfields only about two hours away in bomber time from the Panama Canal, this eventuality ~~most certainly~~ would have posed a truly hazardous threat to United States security.*

* See: Facts On File, 1948, p. 109 A.

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That an event of such grave nature could occur without any suitable advance warning from American intelligence agencies was naturally the subject of a large amount of critical discussion throughout the United States. Appearing before an investigating House subcommittee, *therefore* Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, the DCI, declared that CIA had called attention to the State Department as early as 2 January 1948 of the "possibility of violence" in Colombia during the forthcoming conference. He further claimed that the American Embassy in Bogota had even refused to transmit back to Washington another CIA warning along the same lines. * Be that as it may, Communist success in this

* Ibid., p. 117 K.

revealing affair at least should have shown the Army authorities the utter folly of a policy that insisted on the departmental intelligence agency concentrating solely upon U.S.S.R. and satellite military capabilities, instead of seeking to uncover threats against United States security anywhere in the world. It had ^{thus} ~~thus~~ been clearly demonstrated that the international Communist conspiracy was capable of suddenly transforming a nearby friendly country into an enemy of the United States, which possibility not only called for constant vigilance ~~on the part of~~ ^{by} CIA but also by all military intelligence agencies of the government ~~from the national defense viewpoint.~~ ^{on a global basis.}

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There were other Communist-inspired disturbances occurring at scattered points throughout the ^{world} globe during this same general period *

* The most notable of these ^{was a} series of crushing military victories ^{achieved} accomplished by the Chinese Reds that finally forced the evacuation of Chiang Kai-shek and his followers to Formosa in Dec 49. Major Communist-led successes were likewise gained in Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala and the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia).

but there is no evidence to the effect that the higher military authorities planned to alter their previously announced position on basic intelligence objectives to any appreciable extent. As a matter of fact, this position grew understandingly ^{much} firmer when the Russians created an access to Berlin crisis which forced the opening of a combined American-British airlift to supply that beleaguered city, on 26 June 1948. *

* The Berlin airlift ~~then~~ continued in full swing until the U. S. and British Governments declared, on 29 Jul 49, that its reduction would begin effective 1 Aug 49 and all special air operations were scheduled to end by 31 Oct 49. See: Facts on File, 1949, p. 242 L.

With the Army EEI's already in the process of a major revision following the passage of the National Security Act, ^{they finally} they eventually turned

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out to be more specific than ever in directing ID to center its main intelligence effort upon Russia. The new EEI's even went so far as to state that the U.S.S.R. constituted the greatest and at that particular time the only real threat to the security of the United States.*

* See: "Essential Elements of Information (EEI's)" (T.S.), ID GSUSA, 350.09, 1 Sep 48. ACSI Rec Sec.

So many questions had now arisen with reference to the detailed application of NSCID No. 2 that, in October 1948, the Director of Central Intelligence deemed it advisable to issue an "Implementation of Coordination of Collection Plan" for further guidance. This new directive was of especial interest to the departmental intelligence officials because it once more reiterated the ^{fundamental} essential need for them to procure information outside their assigned primary collection categories in producing so-called staff intelligence and also explicitly affirmed that no official should presume authority "to delay, suppress or make substantive changes in any intelligence report." On the other hand, it did contain the following rather optimistic and vaguely defined instructions for coordinating collection activities in the field:

a. The senior U. S. representative in each foreign area where the United States maintains a foreign post shall, within the spirit of the principles enunciated herein, be responsible for the coordination of all collection activities in his area.

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b. To implement this coordination, each such representative shall:

(1) Exert every effort to centralize all intelligence information for the use of all authorized personnel.

(2) Eliminate undesirable duplication of collection effort and reporting and assure the proper channeling of information.

(3) Insure that whenever one or more of the departmental intelligence agencies are not represented at a foreign post, reporting on the appropriate categories is delegated to the extent possible to other members of the staff. *

* DCI 2/1 (C), "Implementation of Coordination of Collection Plan," 25 Oct 48, G-2 350.09, 25 Oct 48 (23 Sep 46). DRE TAG.

In May 1949, an effort was made by the Chief of the Intelligence Group, ID, to improve current operational procedures connected with the preparation and distribution of requests for information from the field. Two different types of such requests were ^{thus} officially recognized, in the form of Standard Specific Requests to obtain "spot information" and Collection Memorandums either to enunciate broad information requirements or furnish guidance to field agencies for the performance of their regular reporting missions. At the same time, personnel originating collection requests of any sort were cautioned first to make a positive determination that the information was not already available within ID itself before submitting them and ^{then be properly} ~~always to be prepared~~ prepared to initiate without delay whatever follow-up might become necessary or advisable. The Collection Branch, in turn, was

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then called upon to:

- a. Thoroughly check each collection request for duplication, clarity, completeness, security classification and general suitability, as well as its having a properly assigned deadline date and control number.
- b. Whenever indicated, return the request promptly to the originator along with additional instructions as needed.
- c. Insure that the requested information is not available elsewhere in Washington.
- d. Maintain pertinent records to prevent the duplication of requests.
- e. Direct the appropriate transmission of processed requests to collection agencies in the field.*

* See: Int Group Memo 15 (C), 20 May 49, CSGID 319.1/T, 20 May 49 (24 Sep 44). DRB TAG.

While these were all steps in the right direction for bettering current collection procedures, they proved to be of little lasting value because, effective 20 October 1949, the Collection Branch itself was abolished as an economy measure. The ID collection function was then ^{to be} performed on a completely decentralized basis, which not only increased the possibility of delay or failure in the handling of spe-

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cific requests for information from the field but also practically put an end to any exhaustive searches for uncovering new intelligence sources. Nevertheless, ^{though} during April 1950, BID was brought up to date and reissued as a Special Regulations (SR) carrying the title of "Army Intelligence Collection Instructions," which served to give it more official status. The primary purpose of these new instructions was to "furnish guidance for the collection and reporting of intelligence information by Army commanders and attaches outside the continental limits of the United States." * Efforts were likewise continued to sys-

* SR 380-305-5 (S), 28 Apr 50, superseding, with certain listed exceptions, BID, ID GSUSA, dated 1 Sep 48.

temize the collection of technical intelligence by issuing a newly prepared Collection Memorandum to each of the technical services and publishing a group of special guides for the collection of technical or scientific information in the field. *

* See: "Intelligence Reference Materials" (S), sec four, pt 1, prepared for Maj Gen R. C. Partridge, G-2 350.05 undated 52 (5 Dec 47). DRB TAG. An "Aids to the Collection of Information for Biological Warfare Intelligence" (S) was disseminated prior to the outbreak of the Korean War but a general "Guide to the Collection of Technical In-

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telligence (Part I)" could not be completed until shortly after the arrival of that unlooked for event.

Thus, with the Korean War fast approaching, the ID collection effort was still being severely handicapped by a number of difficult problems that were all tending to limit the maximum flow of information into the departmental intelligence agency from the field. Most of these problems were plainly derived from an ever-increasing demand to reduce outside collection activities for reasons of economy and this unfavorable development soon reached a peak in its crippling effects upon the vitally important Military (Army) Attache system, ^{to} which will be discussed in detail during the next chapter. Other major problems ^{had} also ^{come} ~~came~~ from the establishment of CIA and consequent attempts to enforce a stronger centralization of the field collection effort under that new body, as well as from the sudden creation of an entirely separate intelligence organization within the Department of the Air Force. The net result was a constant series of arguments and misunderstandings in regard to specific responsibilities among the various agencies concerned, accompanied by a sharp drop in departmental collection activities. ^{*} This shrinkage was critical to say the least because the suc-

* For example, see: Memo (S), Chief Contact Br CIA to G-2, 15 Feb 49, CSGID 350.097T (7 Dec 45). DRB TAG.

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cess of any intelligence agency must always depend upon collection and it remains axiomatic that the finished intelligence produced can never be any better than the raw information received from established sources, principally those existing throughout the field. For the national authorities to encourage or even permit of a reduction in ID collection capabilities under the dangerous conditions of Cold War was not only false economy but also plainly courting ^{major} disaster from the standpoint of national defense.

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CHAPTER IV

MILITARY (ARMY) ATTACHES

With its outside collection capabilities being rapidly diminished ^{by} ~~under the terms of~~ by the postwar retrenchment, it soon became apparent that MID would again have to rely mainly upon a productive military attache (MA) system for satisfying departmental requirements within the foreign intelligence field. Furthermore, since the new conditions of Cold War would undoubtedly demand a global collection program of widespread proportions and the wartime effort in that direction had been designed primarily to achieve the military defeat of the Axis powers, it seemed clear that the existing MA system not only ought to be considerably broadened but also thoroughly reoriented just as soon as possible. An initial effort along such lines was made even before V-J Day, when, on 7 July 1945, the Deputy ACoFS G-2, ^{WDGS)} requested the preparation of an "up-to-date estimate of the intelligence potential of every foreign echelon of MID (MIS) during FY 1945-46." * Because the numerous factors upon

* Memo (C), Deputy ACoFS G-2 to Chief MIS, 7 Jul 45, MID 320.2, 16 Aug 45 (23 Aug 43). DRB TAG.

which this estimate rested could change so often, this early attempt at setting a fixed intelligence potential for each foreign country turned

out to be unrealistic but plans were concurrently approved to expand the MA system in order to cover 63 different countries or strategic areas under a personnel allotment of 258 officers and 65 warrant officers.
* Positive steps were likewise taken to raise the representa-

* See: MID 320.2, 6 Oct 45 (27 Aug 43), Tab (C). DRB TAG.

Countries not included at that time in this projected worldwide MA coverage, for various reasons, were: Germany, Japan, Roumania, Ukraine (USSR), Austria, Bulgaria, French Indo China, Hungary and Siam.

tion of the Army Air Forces therein from a total of 44 to 94 officers.*

* Memo (S), Chief MIS to ACofS G-2, 23 Oct 45, G-2 O41.221, 23 Oct 45 (27 Dec 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, the ACofS G-2, WDGS, and Rear Adm. Hewlett Thebaud, the Director of ONI, were already corresponding directly with each other in seeking ways and means to obtain a closer integration between the intelligence activities of the United States Military and Naval Attaches stationed abroad.* As a result, on

* ^{This} The matter of Army-Navy intelligence coordination had recently come under heated discussion in Congress with reference to proposals

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for establishing a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. Such a committee was actually formed, effective 11 Sep 45.

7 August 1945, they addressed a joint letter to all the Service Attaches, which gave ^{these are the} them the following carefully worded instructions:

1. Wherever practicable, Military and Naval Attaches will maintain a joint intelligence library, to include reference works, files of intelligence reports and other pertinent intelligence information. Duplication in reporting will also be avoided, if at all possible under their respectively assigned missions.

2. Political and economic reports prepared by State Department personnel which are of interest to the War and Navy Departments will be transmitted to Washington after ^{having been} being made voluntarily available to the Service Attaches by the Chief of Mission. Whenever a Service Attache has any additional, confirmatory or contradictory information about such reports, or his conclusions differ materially from those of the writer, he will so indicate on his report of transmittal. In case the Chief of Mission does not choose to supply copies of these reports, Military and Naval Attaches will, if possible, inform Washington as to their title, date and serial number.

3. In respect to subjects not adequately covered by Embassy or Legation personnel and at posts where both Service Attaches are

stationed, the division of responsibility for reporting will be, as follows:

- a. Military Geography: Coastal areas and navigable streams - Naval Attache. Interior areas - Military Attache.
- b. Coastal Hydrography and Oceanography: Naval Attache.
- c. Climate and Meteorology: Naval Attache.
- d. Resources and Trade: Foreign trade, shipbuilding and closely related resources - Naval Attache. Other resources and domestic trade - Military Attache.
- e. Communications and Transportation: Waterways, radio communications (except radio aids to air navigation) and cable communications - Naval Attache. Roads, railroads, telephone, telegraph, commercial aviation and radio aids to air navigation - Military Attache.
- f. Port Facilities: Naval Attache.
- g. Cities and Towns: Coastal - Naval Attache. Inland - Military Attache.
- h. Army: Military Attache.
- i. Army Air (including separate Air Force): Military Attache.
- j. Navy: Naval Attache.
- k. Naval Air: Naval Attache.
- l. Subjects falling outside the above categories: By personal agreement between the individual attaches concerned.

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4. Military and Naval Attaches will consult frequently with each other so-as to assure that their respective departmental requirements are being met. Also, all reports, whether prepared by the Military or Naval Attache, will carry both BID (MID) and Mono Guide (ONI) index numbers.

5. This directive in no way relieves either Service Attache from responsibility for accurately and fully informing his own department on political, economic and psychological factors, which may serve to influence the war-making ability of the country. He must stand ready at all times, therefore, to present an integrated and coordinated evaluation of war capability, potential and intention for his assigned country, including proper consideration of these contributory factors.

6. Military and Naval Attaches should maintain a free exchange of reports and information, other than those relating to secret sources, particularly in countries where governmental attitudes hinder intelligence collection.*

* MID-ONI Ltr (C) to All Mil and Naval Attaches, 7 Aug 45, sub: Coordination of Intelligence Activities, MID 350.09 (12 Jul 45). DRB TAG.

As might well be expected, this latest attempt to delimit intelli-

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gence responsibilities between the Military and Naval Attaches soon brought forth a ^{prompt} deluge of queries from all concerned. * In the first

* See: File (C), MID 350.09 (12 Jul 45). DRB TAG.

place, no two situations in the field were ever exactly alike, a fact that always seemed to escape due recognition on the part of the authorities back in Washington. For example, the Military and Naval Attache Offices were often not located in the same building or even within the same geographical area. ^{Again, in} ~~Similarly,~~ in many instances, the Naval Attaches were accredited to several different countries and merely paid brief periodic visits to those felt to be of less importance from the naval standpoint. The immediate problem, though, was to settle confusion caused by the continued receipt of information requests from Washington which were inconsistent with the topical divisions as outlined in the recent MID-ONI directive. To prevent any further difficulties of this ^{problem} nature, a second joint letter was dispatched to the Service Attaches, on 5 January 1946. It announced adoption of the following standard procedures for processing information requests before sending them out to offices in the field:

In every instance in which the Military Intelligence Service has a specific requirement for information which is of naval character, the Office of Naval Intelligence will be contacted through liaison channels to determine whether the information is already available within that office. If the requirement cannot be satisfied in the Office of Naval Intelligence from material available, it will be made the basis of a formal request by the

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Military Intelligence Service to the Office of Naval Intelligence through regular channels. In similar fashion, the Office of Naval Intelligence will seek information of a military nature from the Military Intelligence Service which will make the necessary checks and direct appropriate collection and transmission by the Military Intelligence Service Activities. *

* MID-ONI Ltr (C) to All Military and Naval Attaches, 5 Jan 46,
sub: Coordination of Intelligence Activities, MID 350.09 (12 Jul 45).
DRB TAG. This ^{more} formal procedure may have been favorable from the coordination standpoint but it also served to slow up markedly the entire process of getting information from the field.

One of the most difficult problems relative to reorienting the MA system for postwar operations lay in the field of technical intelligence. During the latter part of the war this significant effort had been largely decentralized to representative JICA's formed within the various combat theaters, supplemented by a number of intelligence teams operating overseas under the direct supervision of Headquarters, ASF. Now, however, emphasis had to be shifted away from simply gaining technical information on enemy weapons or equipment and pointed more toward keeping up with ^{the} latest scientific developments in modern warfare throughout the world. One major attempt to accomplish such an alteration took place in December 1945, when a conference was held among interested MID (MIS) and ASF officials for the purpose of reallocating technically qualified Assistant Military Attaches to certain key foreign stations

and increasing the flexibility of their future selection from the standpoint of rank, age, branch, etc. * Although this new arrange-

* Memo (C), DDI for Planning to DI, 14 Dec 45, MID 041.221, 14 Dec 45 (27 Dec 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

ment did ~~seem to~~ provide a comparatively satisfactory solution to the problem for awhile, the subject came under active review again during June 1946, after ASF was abolished and its intelligence section transferred to the Office of the Director of Intelligence, WDGS. ~~At the~~ ^{Also} ~~same time~~ ^{Additionally}, effective 10 October 1946, greater autonomy was ~~also~~ granted to the Military Air Attaches in connection with ^{their} reporting on air technical intelligence matters directly to the AAF. *

* See: Memo DI to CG AAF, sub: Changes in MA System, 10 Oct 46, MID 041.221 (17 Jun 46). DRB TAG.

The MA system ran into further ^{troublesome} complications when SSU was discontinued and the newly-established CIG started to assume full responsibility for conducting espionage and counterespionage operations overseas. This not only meant that the MA Offices still engaged in covert intelligence activities would have to close them out without ~~the~~ ^{any} delay but also brought to the fore the question of what coordination procedures

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should apply between American military attache and CIG personnel who were stationed in the same country. Because of their diplomatic status it appeared desirable for the MA's to remain completely uninformed about CIG field operations, while it seemed equally clear that the two organizations ^{should} ~~ought~~ to cooperate with each other ^{just} as much as possible. Although coordination problems continued to pose serious difficulties between the agencies for ^{a long} ~~some~~ time to come, detailed instructions were issued to the Military and Naval Attaches during October 1946, generally along these indicated lines. ^{Likewise,} ~~additionally,~~ the Service Attaches were ^{sp. inf.} encouraged to negotiate local coordination agreements ~~directly~~ with CIG personnel in the field. *

* See: Ltrs (T.S.), ID WDGS to all MA's, dated 21 Oct 46 and 24 Apr 47, MID 040 CIG (24 Sep 46). ACSI Rec Sec. The second letter superseded the first one without altering the earlier instructions to any appreciable degree.

In striving to keep the strength of the MA system up to a point where it could function efficiently on a global basis, ID kept encountering more and more difficulties. The first major reduction for the system, resulting from the Army reorganization of 11 June 1946 (Simpson Board), had served to cut its total personnel authorization by approxi-

mately 25 percent. The original plan was to reach this lower strength ^{by} through ordering a 50 percent reduction within the "Pan American Offices" plus a 25 percent decrease in the number of air officers assigned to the system. When the AAF refused to concur in such a large reduction for its personnel and it was also realized that the proposed Pan American cut would force ^{the closing of} several key MA Offices, ~~to close~~, a compromise was reached ^{soon} ~~which called~~ ^{calling which called} for cuts in authorized strength of only 6 percent for the AAF, 35 percent in the Pan American Offices and 26 percent at other stations. ^{*} Nevertheless, this still represented a sizeable

* Memo (C), Chief Int Group to DI, 14 Oct 46, sub: Reduction in MA System, CSGID Orl.221, 14 Oct 46. DRB, TAG.

reduction in the capabilities of the system for collecting ^{to} information throughout the ^{entire} world.

The actual strength of the MA system on 22 April 1947, shortly before the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, was 244 officers, 54 warrant officers, 148 enlisted men and 216 civilians. ^{*} Some four

* See: Memo, G-2 to Budget Div WDCS, 22 Apr 47, MID 320.2 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG. The civilian total given covers only American civil service personnel. There were also approximately 300 local nationals carried on the MA payroll, who were employed mostly as receptionists, messengers, chauffeurs, translators, mechanics, etc.

months later, as part of a major ID reorganization, the Attache Branch was deactivated and its functions distributed among several other branches which, ^{were} were in turn, grouped together under a new Assistant Executive for Administration. * At the end of November 1947, therefore,

* ID Memo No. 48, 2 Sep 47, sub: Reorganization, Office, Asst. Exec. for Pers. and Adm., ID, MID O20 ID, 2 Sep 47. ACSI Rec Sec.

and just prior to the establishment of an Air Attache system controlled by a separate Department of the Air Force, the composite picture for the American Military Attache system was, as follows:

<u>Offices (Open)</u>	<u>Tour (Yrs)</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Military</u>			<u>Assigned</u>			<u>Total</u>	<u>Civilian Authorized</u>
			<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>		
Afghanistan	2	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	1
Argentina	3	6 (3 Air)	1	1	8	6	1	1	8	7
Australia	3	3 (1 Air)	1	1	5	3	1	1	5	2
Belg. and Lux.	3	4 (1 Air)	1	2	7	4	1	2	7	4
Bolivia	2	2 (1 Air)	1	1	4	1	1	1	3	2
Brazil	3	4 (2 Air)	1	1	6	4	1	1	6	4
Bulgaria	-	4 (2 Air)	1	5	10	3	1	5	9	3
Burma	-	2 (1 Air)	1	1	4	0	0	1	1	1
Canada	3	5 (3 Air)	1	2	8	5	1	2	8	5
Chile	3	3 (1 Air)	1	1	5	3	1	1	5	3
China	2	23 (3 Air)	1	13	37	21	1	12	34	10
Colombia	3	3 (1 Air)	1	0	4	3	1	0	4	2
Costa Rica	3	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	0
Cuba	3	3 (2 Air)	1	0	4	3	1	0	4	3
Czechoslovakia	3	7 (2 Air)	1	6	14	7	1	5	13	6
Denmark	3	3 (1 Air)	1	1	5	3	1	1	5	3
Dominican Rep.	3	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	0
Ecuador	2	2 (1 Air)	1	0	3	2	1	0	3	2
Egypt	3	4 (2 Air)	1	2	7	4	1	3	8	3
El Salvador	3	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	1

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Offices (Open)	Tour (Yrs)	Off	Military							Civilian
			Authorized			Assigned				Authorized
			WO	EM	Total	Off	WO	EM	Total	
Finland	3	3 (1 Air)	1	2	6	3	1	2	6	2
France	3	10 (3 Air)	1	7	18	11	1	7	19	10
Great Britain	3	16 (4 Air)	1	8	25	15	1	9	25	27
Greece	3	16 (4 Air)	2	13	31	16	3	12	31	8
Guatemala	3	3 (2 Air)	1	0	4	3	1	0	4	3
Haiti	3	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	0
Honduras	3	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	1
Hungary	2	6 (2 Air)	1	6	13	6	1	5	12	2
India	-	4 (2 Air)	1	2	7	3	1	2	6	3
Iran	2	5 (1 Air)	1	4	10	4	1	3	8	3
Iraq	2	3 1/2 (1 Air)	1	4	8	3	1	4	8	0
Ireland	3	1 (Air)	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	1
Italy	3	12 (2 Air)	1	5	18	10	1	3	14	6
Lebanon	-	3 (1 Air)	1	3	7	3	1	3	7	3
Mexico	3	5 (2 Air)	1	1	7	4	1	1	6	5
Morocco	2	3 (1 Air)	1	2	6	3	1	2	6	3
Netherlands	3	4 (1 Air)	1	1	6	4	1	2	7	4
New Zealand	3	2 (1 Air)	1	1	4	2	1	1	4	2
Nicaragua	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	0
Norway	3	3 (1 Air)	1	1	5	3	1	1	5	3
Pakistan	-	3 (1 Air)	1	1	5	1	1	1	3	2
Paraguay	2	2 (1 Air)	1	0	3	1	1	0	2	2
Peru	3	3 (1 Air)	1	1	5	3	1	1	5	3
Philippines	2	3 (1 Air)	1	1	5	2	1	1	4	2
Poland	3	6 (2 Air)	1	8	15	6	1	7	14	3
Portugal	3	3 (1 Air)	1	1	5	2	1	1	4	4
Roumania	-	7 (3 Air)	1	5	13	7	1	5	13	5
Siam	-	2 (1 Air)	1	1	4	2	1	1	4	2
Singapore	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	2	4	1
Spain	3	7 (2 Air)	1	2	10	7	1	2	10	7
Sweden	3	5 (2 Air)	1	2	8	5	1	2	8	4
Switzerland	3	5 (1 Air)	1	2	8	5	1	2	8	5
Syria	3	2	1	2	5	1	1	2	4	0
Turkey	3	7 (2 Air)	1	4	12	7	1	4	12	5
Union of S. Af.	-	3 (2 Air)	1	0	4	3	1	0	4	3
U.S.S.R.	3	16 (7 Air)	1	27	44	15	1	21	37	0
Uruguay	3	3 (1 Air)	1	0	4	3	0	1	4	0
Venezuela	3	3 (1 Air)	1	1	5	2	1	0	3	4
Yugoslavia	3	5 (1 Air)	1	4	10	5	1	5	11	4
Totals-										
(59 Stations)		270(87 Air)	60	164	494	251	59	155	465	204

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Offices(Unopened)	Off	Authorized		Military Assigned			Total	Civilian Authorized	
		WO	EM	Off	WO	EM			
Albania	2 (1 Air)	1	1				4	1	
Angola	1 (Air)	1	1				3	0	
Algeria	1 (Air)	1	1				3	0	
Austria	3 (1 Air)	1	2				6	3	
Belg. Congo	1	1	1				3	0	
Fr. Equat. Af.	1 (Air)	1	1				3	0	
Fr. Indo China	2 (1 Air)	1	1				4	1	
Fr. West Af.	1 (Air)	1	1				3	0	
Iceland	1 (Air)	1	1				3	0	
Palestine	1	1	1				3	1	
Saudi Arabia	1 (Air)	1	1				3	0	
Totals-									
(11 Stations)	15 (9 Air)	11	12				38	6	
Grand Totals-									
(70 Stations)	285(96 Air)	71	176	532	251	59	155	465	210 *

* "MA Strength Table, Authorized Strength corrected to 5 Jan 48 and Actual Strength as of 24 Nov 47," CSGID 320.2, 21 May 48 (24 Aug 43).
ACSI Rec Sec.

The most notable feature of this MA organization, toward the end of 1947, would seem to lie in the fact that the size of the offices for the U.S.S.R., China, Greece and satellite countries had been purposely built up at the expense of the others. For the U.S.S.R. and satellites this stemmed mainly from pressures generated by the approved findings of the Haislip Board. Since those nations were the ones about which the United States needed the most information, it appeared quite logical

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to expand the MA effort within them. Actually, though, because of the stringent internal security measures being currently practiced behind the Iron Curtain, these added strength increases merely served to ^{accentuate} ~~complicate~~ an already nearly impossible collection problem. With restrictions on unchaperoned travel by the American Military Attaches mounting daily and their successful contacts among the general populace now reduced to almost nothing, the assignment of more personnel to such Offices was ^{certainly} not the correct answer. As a matter of fact, there were often much better sources of information on Russia and the satellites available outside the Iron Curtain than behind it. Besides, concentrating the departmental intelligence effort primarily upon U.S.S.R. military capabilities had the further effect of hindering an appropriate expression of the grave dangers to our national security which could come from Communist subversion inside the so-called friendly countries.

There was considerable delay after the formation of the United States Air Force under the National Security Act of 1947, before it became practicable to attain a complete divorcement of USAF personnel and functions from the ^{existing} ~~previous~~ MA system. Eventually, however, an initial Joint Army and Air Force Adjustment Regulation (JAAFAR) was issued, ^{dated} on 16 July 1948, for the express purpose of creating an independent Air Attache system in accordance with the following plan:

1. The Departments of the Army and the Air Force will operate completely autonomous attache systems, with no command jurisdiction exercised in either case over the other.

2. Expenses incident to these two systems will be borne separately by each department, with a fair share of common expenses, such as office rental etc., suitably apportioned.

3. Present field personnel and civilian spaces will be allocated on the basis of 60% to the Army and 40% to the Air Force.

4. Although each department should in general furnish its own administrative and clerical personnel, only one department will operate the finance office and code room at each individual attache station. Initially, the Army will provide for these joint facilities in 60% and the Air Force in 40% of the established stations.

5. Transfer of troop spaces and civilian authorizations to put this plan into effect will commence on 1 October 1948 and be completed by 1 January 1949.

6. ^{Existing}~~Current~~ administrative instructions regarding attache functions will remain in force for USAF personnel until such time as they may be replaced through subsequent departmental action.*

* See: JAAFAR 1-11-34, 16 Jul 48.

By the end of 1948, the MA system had thus been reduced to a total of 473 persons, including 180 officers, 46 warrant officers, 121 enlisted men and 126 U. S. civilians. These personnel were authorized

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for assignment at 62 different foreign stations, ^{but} although three additional stations were scheduled to be opened in the near future. New developments for the system were the designation of a Military Attache at Large with one assistant to serve on the staff of ECA Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman in Paris, France, * ^{plus} and the fact that the Army

* Pres Truman, on 21 Apr 48, appointed Sec of Commerce Harriman to be his Special Representative abroad for the Economic Cooperation Administration and to hold the rank of Ambassador while being accredited to the 16 European Recovery Plan (ERP) nations. ID, ^{then} reluctantly acceded to Amb Harriman's repeated requests for the assignment of a Military Attache and Assistant Military Attache to his personal staff, following the receipt of definite orders to do so from higher authority.

^{now} currently was ~~now~~ operating 39 joint finance offices and code rooms within its active offices. Also, after a protracted series of inter-departmental discussions, the MA system had finally been granted a specific allotment for two Major Generals and four Brigadier Generals for assignment to Argentina (Brig. Gen.), Brazil (Brig. Gen.), China (Maj. Gen.), France (Brig. Gen.), Great Britain (Maj. Gen.) and Mexico (Brig. Gen.). These six general officer spaces, however, still had to be divided ^{up} be-

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tween the Army and Air Force in compliance with an impending joint ^{personnel} adjustment regulation.*

* See: Table of Organization, Military Attache System, 31 Dec 48, G-2 320.2, 31 Dec 48 (24 Aug 43). ACSI Rec Sec.

Another significant event bearing upon the conduct of the American Military Attache system during this same period was the appearance, on 14 September 1948, of a new Executive Order setting forth "Rules of Precedence Relating to Officers of the Foreign Service and other Officers of the United States Government."* Previous rules cov-

* See: Standing Instructions for Military Attaches, STADIN (C) 12 Dec 48, Ch 1, sec III, Annex "A", CSGID 095, 3 Jan 49 (7 Mar 44). ACSI Rec Sec.

ering this matter of protocol had been proclaimed under a similar directive dated 2 March 1940, which authorized the Military and Naval Attaches to "take place and precedence next in succession after the counselor of embassy or legation, or at a post where the Department of State deemed it unnecessary to assign a counselor, after the senior secretary." Within these given limits, military personnel were ~~then~~ ^{then} to hold precedence in the order of their respective military grades and seniority,* as customarily accepted.

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* See: Standing Instructions for Military Attaches, STADIN(C),
1 Jul 47, ch III, sec 1, Annex "A," G-2 095, 1 Jul 47 (7 Mar 44). ACSI
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The question of rank and precedence at a diplomatic post was not only of ^{paramount} importance to each individual officer for gaining tangible personal prerogatives but also a very practical consideration in regard to ^{his} enjoying ^{necessary} prestige within the local Corps Diplomatique and among key officials of the host government. The 1940 Executive Order had provided a workable solution to this touchy problem during World War II because most of the American diplomatic missions were then organized on a comparatively simple basis. With the State Department embarking upon an extensive post-war expansion program and commencing to introduce a number of new ranks into its larger diplomatic missions, though, the situation ^{became} ~~has~~ noticeably altered. ^{Besides,} Furthermore, other Departments, such as Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, etc., were starting to attach personnel to these overseas diplomatic missions on a greatly increased scale, so there was an obvious need for reexamining the entire rank and precedence structure. While the new 1948 Executive Order left the relative position of Service Attaches essentially unchanged, it did serve to clarify several disputed points for them and formally recognized their precedence over all non-Foreign Service attaches stationed at the same diplomatic post.

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Despite severe personnel losses resulting from the creation of a separate Air Attache system and other adverse factors, the ~~American~~ ^{Military} Military Attache system was still functioning in a generally satisfactory manner during the latter part of 1948. Serious troubles now loomed ahead, however, with "defense economy" having recently become a major political theme and the first Secretary of Defense, James E. Forrester, announcing a firm determination to reduce governmental expenditures through the elimination of functional duplication within the National Military Establishment (NME). Accordingly, ~~Accordingly~~, ^{Early} in July 1948, he addressed a joint memorandum to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, instructing them "to examine the service attache systems for possible means of better coordination" and to report to him in the matter before 31 December 1948. An ad hoc committee, composed of Col. F. D. Sharp, USA; Col. F. A. Pillett, USAF, and Capt. H. H. Rodgers, USN, was thus formed under the JIC for that particular purpose. ^{*}

* See: File, 2 Jan 47 thru 29 Dec 48 (S), CSGID 350.09, 2 Aug 49 (31 Dec 48). DRB TAG.

Mr. Forrester's approach to the problem of improving coordination among the Army, Navy and Air Force Attache systems seemed reasonable

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enough. He strongly emphasized that the purpose of his directive was not "merely to find ways of saving money by eliminating duplication" but even more so to achieve "whatever means of coordination is necessary in order to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the Military Establishment." The ad hoc committee, therefore, proceeded to pursue these dual objectives along practical lines and soon discovered that no true merger of the three systems could be accomplished as long as the Navy Department continued to operate under an entirely different legislative authority from the other two departments, especially with reference to fiscal matters. On the other hand, it did appear both feasible and desirable for them to perform a number of other administrative functions jointly and steps were promptly taken to initiate that type of action within several different fields of endeavor.*

* Ibid.

Shortly after the sudden resignation of Mr. Forrestal in March 1949, Mr. Louis A. Johnson was appointed to be the new Secretary of Defense.* and the situation regarding the reorganization of the three

* Mr. Forrestal resigned effective 3 Mar 49 and Mr. Johnson's appointment as Secretary of Defense was dated 31 Mar 49. On 22 May 49,

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Mr. Forrestal leaped to his death from a 16th floor window of the Bethesda Naval Hospital where he had been undergoing treatment for "physical and mental exhaustion." See: Facts On File, 1949, p. 176 E.

service attache systems promptly took a distinct turn for the worse. Mr. Johnson remained firmly convinced that large-scale economies could be secured through an enforced unification of these separate systems, regardless of any obstacles presented by different command requirements or variations in departmental legislative authority. He not only put renewed pressure on the JCS to achieve immediate personnel and fund reductions along such lines but also named Gen. Joseph T. McNarney to represent him in the execution of a prescribed unification program for the NME. * During August 1949, General McNarney informed the JIC that

* Gen McNarney was actually designated to head up a Defense Department Management Committee which had been formed right after the passage, on 10 Aug 49, of a bill ^{known as the} entitled "National Security Act Amendments of 1949." The mission of that committee was "to bring about progressively better use of defense dollars through elimination of nonessential expenditures ..." and it utilized the civilian management firm of Robert Heller and Associates to help in the accomplishment of its ^{detailed} assigned tasks. See: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess.,

"To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his Assignments in that Area," Part 5, Appendix Z, p. 3245. Hereafter cited as: MacArthur Hearings, 1951.

progress toward merging the service attache systems had been unsatisfactory to date, so he directed the preparation of a definite plan for closing certain attache stations and effecting a reduction at some of the others to include personnel, airplanes, motor vehicles, etc. The JIC, of course, was loath to do this but eventually did produce a plan designed to eliminate 16 Army, 8 Navy and 12 Air Force stations, while sharply cutting back the current authorizations for personnel and facilities at 21 Army, 15 Navy and 37 Air Force retained stations. Even then, the committee members felt constrained to point out to the JCS that, in addition to curtailing many regular functions of the service attache systems, especially intelligence collection, their submitted plan would also bring about either a complete discontinuance or sizeable reduction in the following support activities which were being performed by attache personnel for other military staff groups and outside governmental agencies, as follows:

1. Rendering required administrative, fiscal and logistic assistance to special detachments stationed abroad, for example:
 - a. Veterinary Food Inspection Teams.

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- b. Inter-American Geodetic Survey offices.
 - c. Officers serving as English instructors at the Escuela Superior de Guerre and football coach at the Colegio Militar in Mexico, under auspices of the Joint Mexican-U. S. Defense Commission.
 - d. American Military Mission personnel, particularly in connection with the processing of customs clearances.
 - e. Numerous Army Postal and Finance Offices located overseas.
2. Communications support for certain Economic Cooperation Administration officials and at all American Military Missions.
 3. Fleet support and liaison, covering such important matters as: pilotage, berthing and tug arrangements, protocol for official visits, briefing liberty parties, health clearances, ship contracts, waste disposal, mail, harbor boats, communications, transportation facilities and meteorological information.
 4. Special diplomatic representation as exemplified by the Military Attache at Large and various Treaty Implementation Officers.
 5. Payments and searches relative to the processing of ex-Prisoner of War applications.
 6. Formal clearances for local airplane flights.
 7. United States military permit control.

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8. Reception and clearances for official visitors, to include their transportation, clerical assistance, communications support, reservations, billeting and other requested services.

9. Procurement of material and documents for use by the technical branches or services.

10. Investigations performed for the Provost Marshal General and Inspector General, U. S. Army.

11. Requests from the Adjutant General and other military staff agencies for information about persons living abroad.

12. Supervision and clearance of foreign students attending American service schools and the conduct of examinations for foreign cadets seeking admission to United States Service Academies.*

* See: JIC 462/6, ^{19 Aug 49, 1/1 w CSGID 350.09, 1 Sep 49 (31 Dec 48)} Many more of these non-intelligence activities could easily have been added to this list. For instance, demands on the Service Attaches with reference to the operations of American Military Cemeteries; necessary arrangements pertaining to arrested, financially stranded or deceased American service personnel in foreign countries; investigations covering American military property damaged during transshipment; execution of court martial depositions received from military trial judge advocates; interviews with retired personnel under Army travel regulations; involvement in American and International

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Red Cross matters; handling reserve officer extension courses and so forth.

The economizers were markedly unimpressed by these implications of the JIC plan as presented, so the ad hoc committee was told to go right ahead in preparing a series of actions aimed at merging functions for the service attache offices. Effective 12 August 1949, the name of the Military Attache system was officially changed to the Army Attache system and a Senior Military Attache was designated to function within each of the combined attache offices in ^{accordance} ~~compliance~~ with orders issued by Secretary Johnson himself. This Senior Military Attache was held responsible for centralized administration at the office, "including such functions as communications, library services, transportation, supply, office force, and finance." The question of which service would furnish the senior attache for any particular station was to be determined primarily by the ^{NME} intelligence interest ~~of the NME~~ in the host country but rotation could apply if considered appropriate. A special message was then dispatched to all the Service Attaches explaining the principles that they should follow in reorganizing their respective offices under the new system. Finally, on 24 August 1949, a slightly revised version of the proposed JIC plan for closing or reducing selected attache stations was approved by the JCS and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense in order to form the basis for all future actions concerned with NME representation in foreign countries. *

* Memo, DI for C/S, 1 Sep 49, sub: Report of Action Taken from 1 August to Date by Joint Army, Navy and Air Force Ad Hoc Committee implementing Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, 1 July 1949, on: National Establishment Representation in Foreign Countries, CSGID 350.09, 1 Sep 49 (31 Dec 48). DRB TAG.

There were now no further restraints at hand to prevent or even delay the full force of this rigorous economy drive directed against the service attache offices. The Army Attache system, ^{presently} currently consisting of 181 officers, 44 warrant officers, 122 enlisted men, 120 American civilians and 263 indigenous personnel, was thus faced with the immediate prospect of being reduced to 111 officers, 33 warrant officers, 92 enlisted men, 75 American civilians and 187 indigenous personnel. Although there were many detailed problems still remaining unsettled, especially in respect to fiscal arrangements, administrative difficulties were not to be permitted to interfere with the execution of the basic plan as approved by the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, because it was anticipated that the State Department would probably receive a large number of angry complaints from its Chiefs of Diplomatic Mission just as soon as they became aware of the contemplated reductions in their own service attache ^{offices,} objections from such sources were ^{firmly} also to be disregarded.*

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* See: G-2 350.09, 12 Oct 50 (31 Dec 48). DRB TAG.

The most unfortunate part of this misguided attempt to economize at the expense of these overseas operations was that it took place right when the work load of the Service Attaches themselves had reached a brand new ^{high} ~~peak in intensity~~. With the departmental intelligence authorities having to lean more and more heavily upon service attache reports in preparing their essential estimates on day to day Cold War developments, the United States Government had recently adopted a foreign policy of positive counteraction against the forces of Communism throughout Western Europe ^{which} ~~that~~ was featured by the European Recovery Program (Marshall Aid Plan) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).^{*} Early in October 1949, Congress also authorized a Mutual De-

* This NATO treaty, representing the culmination of a series of earlier alliances on a lesser scale, was first signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States, on 4 Apr 49.

fense Assistance Program (MDAP), ^{which} ~~which~~ was later implemented by an Executive Order dated 27 January 1950. Under this order, the Secretary of State was given primary responsibility for administering the program but further instructed to make full use of other governmental agencies so as to assure the proper coordination of MDAP activities

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with both the national defense and economic recovery efforts. *

* See: Operation MLAP, FY 1953, Deputy ACofS G-4 D/A (Feb 53 - JAGO),¹¹ ch. V, p. 1.

The advent of MDAP, which not only authorized military aid to the NATO countries but also to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Philippines, Korea *

* American Military Government (AMG) was terminated in south Korea and the government of the Republic of Korea inaugurated, ^{effective} ~~on~~ ¹⁵ Aug 48. The American MA Office was not opened, though, until 20 Apr 49, with Col James W. Fraser, AGD, designated to be the Military Attache. See: ID Memo 17, 26 Apr 49, CSGID 300.6 (17 Jan 49). ACSI Rec Sec.

and nations in the "general area of China," served to increase the work load enormously for most Service Attaches. While the ^{Army} intelligence officials recognized that a number of the attache offices stood badly in need of extra help, this could not be accomplished because the Department of Defense had seen fit to freeze the station complements at such offices and retain sole power for reassigning surplus personnel obtained ^{Therefrom in} ~~from~~ ^{view of} the recently approved reorganization. ~~The~~ ^{The} plan was to utilize these personnel as a ready nucleus in forming Mutual Assistance Advisory

Groups (MAAG's) within the countries where they happened to be already stationed. There were some obvious advantages in this procedure but it left the Army Attache system without any flexibility whatsoever and many of its key posts continued to remain seriously undermanned. Another difficulty along the same lines was occasioned by the JIC having chosen to accept the Haislip Board thesis of concentrating the military intelligence effort mainly upon Russia and the satellite nations, so the attache strength for those particular countries had not been reduced at all under the approved reorganization. When the governments of the satellite nations opened a deliberate campaign to decrease the size of the American diplomatic staffs therein, the spaces gained in that way for the Army Attache system could not be transferred to any other station except upon receipt of specific authority from the Department of Defense in each individual case and this was rarely ^{ever} granted.

The Army intelligence officials were prompt in realizing the grave implications of the deteriorating ^{service attache} ~~service attache~~ situation to the conduct of national defense. During April 1950, the Chief of the Intelligence Division, ID, submitted a memorandum to the ACoFS G-2, GSUSA,*

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* A major reorganization announced to the Army by SR 10-5-1, 11 Apr 50, among other things, changed the title of its principal general staff officers from Director back to Assistant Chief of Staff. Formal legislative enactment authorizing this particular reorganization was not approved, though, until 28 Jun 50. See: 64 Stat. 263.

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^{ID} had to rely upon the service attache system for collecting the bulk of its foreign information, lower standards were ^{already} plainly observable in connection with the production of the new national intelligence survey. Actually, more attache personnel were needed instead of less, especially in view of the fact that "approximately 80% of the useable intelligence information received by G-2 is furnished by Service Attaches." *

* See: Memo (T.S.), Chief Int Div to ACofS G-2, sub: Reduction of Service Attache Personnel, 24 Apr 50, G-2 320.2, 24 Apr 50 (24 Aug 43). ^{ACSI Rec Sec.}
~~PRB-TAG.~~

Further ID action on this critical problem was then purposely delayed in the hope that the ad hoc committee of JIC might be able to come up with a satisfactory plan for unfreezing some ^{of the} surplus attache spaces and thereby gain personnel increases for the more hard-pressed offices. The Communist-dominated governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary had ^{managed to} ~~meanwhile~~ forced successive reductions in the size of their respective American diplomatic missions through refusing to issue visas for normal replacements. The State Department wished to avoid any areas of friction regarding these satellite governments and to maintain diplomatic relations with them at all costs but the three service departments objected strenuously to such a negative policy. They felt that every possible effort should be made to counter this deliberate action on the part of the Communist officials even

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if it meant taking strong retaliatory measures against them. Never-*

* Ltr (S), Dean Rusk to Maj Gen James H. Burns, Off Secty Def,
29 Mar 50, G-2 320.2, 5 Apr 50 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG.

theless, early in April 1950, Mr. Johnson decided to support the State
Department position and directed the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and
Air Force to reduce the ^{total authorized} ~~total~~ strength of the service attache staffs
^{within} in these three satellite countries, ^{as follows:} ~~to the following:~~

- Poland - Officers from 10 to 4.
Warrant Officers from 1 to 0.
E.M. and Civilians from 20 to 8.
- Czechoslovakia - Officers from 9 to 4.
Warrant Officers from 1 to 0.
E.M. and Civilians from 17 to 10 (E.M. only).
- Hungary - Officers from 5 to 3.
Warrant Officers from 1 to 0.
E.M. and Civilians from 12 to 6 (E.M. only).*

* Memo (S), Louis Johnson to Secretaries of the Army, Navy and
Air Force, 5 Apr 50 and Memo (S), Chief A & L Div to ID Exec, 6 Apr 50;
G-2 320.2, 5 and 6 Apr 50 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG.

S. Leroy Irwin, therefore, ordered the preparation in ID of a proposed
letter to Secretary Johnson for signature by Secretary of the Army
Frank Pace, Jr., describing the unsatisfactory state of the Army Attache

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system and inclosing a detailed study entitled "The Effect of the Reduction in the Army Attache System on the Adequacy and Timeliness of Intelligence Information Received by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, to Include its Effect on the Production of Intelligence." Based upon the facts presented in this revealing study, the Army not only requested that it be given full authority to assign and distribute personnel throughout the Army Attache system but also granted an immediate increase in strength for the system up to a total of 200 officers, 49 warrant officers, 132 enlisted men, 135 United States civilians and 283 alien employees. The drafted letter, with its inclosure, was then forwarded over General Irwin's signature to the Office of the Chief of Staff, on 23 May 1950, approximately one month before the outbreak of the Korean War.*

* See: Summary Sheet (S), with incl., ACofS G-2, GSUSA, for Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army, 22 May 50, G-2 320.2, 22 May 50 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG.

The only concrete result of this latest effort by the ACofS G-2, GSUSA, to revitalize the Army Attache system occurred on 13 June 1950, when the Secretary of Defense finally did agree to the transfer of several personnel spaces rendered surplus by recent reductions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland "to other Attache Posts on the periphery

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of Eastern Europe and intelligence sections of USFA, EUCOM and TRUST."*

* See: Summary Sheet (S), Pers Br, Maj Converse, 7 Jul 50, G-2 320.2, 7 Jul 50 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG.

It thus seems clear that the eyes of the Secretary of Defense, as well as many of the departmental intelligence authorities themselves, were still focused more upon Western Europe than toward the Far East, even though the North Korean Army was already poised to cross the 38th Parallel and invade the Republic of Korea within only a matter of days. Lending additional support to this contention is the fact that, on 8 December 1949, the ad hoc committee, ~~as~~ formed under the JIC in accordance with Secretary Johnson's expressed wish "to consolidate Defense representation in foreign countries," had recommended the following major strength decreases for service attache offices in the Republic of Korea and they were all promptly effected:

	From -					To -				
	Off.	W.O.	E.M.	Civ.	Alien	Off.	W.O.	E.M.	Civ.	Alien
Army	6	1	10	0	0	1	1	4	0	0
Navy	2	0	3	3	3	1	0	4	1	2
Air Force	3	0	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	<u>11</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u> *

* See: JCS 2028/9, 8 Dec 49, f/w MID 320.2, 8 Dec 49 (31 Dec 48)

DRB TAG.

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One of the new ideas which had been advanced in connection with the attempt of the Defense Department to consolidate American military representation abroad was that whenever the United States established a MAAG within a foreign country, ^{it} that agency would then be able to furnish all needed information on the military forces thereof so the strength of the corresponding service attache offices could be reduced accordingly. Since the ^{Republic of} Korean Government was expected momentarily to sign a formal agreement for such a MAAG, ^{*} the JIC ad hoc committee ^{had} felt that

* Although the American occupation force had left a sizeable Military Advisory Group behind upon its departure from south Korea, effective 1 Jul 49, the formal agreement for establishing ^{within} KNAG in the Republic of Korea was not signed until 26 Jan 50. See: Monograph, Capt. Robert K. Sawyer, "United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea," pp. 70-75. Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

an Army Attache and a Naval Attache, plus a small group for administrative support, would suffice to perform the entire service attache mission ^{therein.} ~~within the Republic of Korea.~~

The fallacy behind the reasoning that MAAG personnel could suitably replace service attache personnel in the execution of intelligence functions should have been readily apparent to all concerned. In the first place, military intelligence activities were an accepted

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part of the duties of diplomatically accredited service attaches throughout the world and military mission personnel were not only not supposed to ^{become} get mixed up in that type of activity but also, ^{was} often specifically forbidden to do so by the host government itself. Besides, even though the MAAG files might contain a good deal of statistical data on the strength, organization, weapons, equipment, etc. of the military forces being assisted, the MAAG personnel seldom had the time, inclination or training to dig the information out and to prepare it properly for submission as an evaluated intelligence report. The fatal fault in such a system, however, was derived from the fact that the MAAG interests remained centered almost exclusively upon the military forces of the host country and there was no real need for them to develop any outside information sources. Yet, in the case of Korea, for example, the primary American intelligence requirement was to keep track of all hostile capabilities within the Far Eastern area and especially those, ^{developing} to the immediate north of the 38th Parallel. This was an appropriate task only for a well organized intelligence agency, manned by sufficient and expert personnel who were operating under the coordinated direction of the departmental intelligence authorities in Washington.

Hence, as has happened so often before in American history, the ^{resources} ~~capabilities~~ ^{personnel} of the departmental military intelligence agency were materially weakened under the impact of an economy-inspired reduction in

force just when it was ^{just} essential for ^{the agency to reach a new} them to attain a ^{new} ~~high~~ peak in efficiency. A drive of such nature had been initiated by Secretary of Defense Forrestal on 10 July 1948, in the expectation that money might be saved and better coordination achieved if certain functions being currently performed separately within the service attache offices overseas were combined. Because his action represented a comparatively reasonable approach to the complicated merger problem, it did promise to provide some worthwhile results in the direction of gaining an effective functional centralization for these offices. The main obstacle continuing to stand in the way of any large scale consolidation of effort among them, however, was that the existing fiscal and administrative procedures for the Navy were based upon an entirely different set of legislative enactments than those which were applicable to either the Army or the Air Force. No ^{true} ~~real~~ administrative merger was practicable until this fundamental difficulty could be duly resolved.

As soon as Secretary of Defense Johnson replaced Mr. Forrestal, operational economy commenced to assume a controlling interest at the expense of ^{practically} every other consideration. Personnel reductions and functional centralization were ^{thus} ~~arbitrarily~~ imposed upon the three service attache systems even while intelligence and non-intelligence demands on them kept steadily mounting. These demands proceeded to reach a new high during October 1949, shortly after the establishment of a global military aid program by the United States Government. The combined result was a sharp drop in collection capabilities for the

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service attache offices ^{just} right when their intelligence reports were most needed. A little less economy and better judgment on ^{the} part of the higher departmental authorities, therefore, in issuing inflexible merger directives concerned with field collection prior to 25 June 1950, might well have saved a considerable number of American lives. As usual, though, timely protests and pointed warnings from the working intelligence officials themselves were either persistently neglected or ignored. This seems especially hard to understand in view of the fact that the economies gained through attache strength reductions were so very small in comparison to the total financial requirements for national defense. *

* The ID and OSD officials were apparently not in agreement regarding the exact amount of savings ~~which~~ ^{to} would accrue per year from the personnel reductions ordered for the Army Attache system. On 24 Aug 50, ID forwarded an estimate to the Defense Management Committee stating that these savings would be \$960,000 but accompanied by a decrease in intelligence collection, particularly behind the Iron Curtain, of approximately 60 percent. Gen McNarney, however, had several months earlier reported to the Secretary of the Army that the total savings in this same respect would come to \$1,678,098. See: G-2 Memo (S) to Col Vining, Army Liaison to Defense Management Committee, 350.09, 24 Aug 50 (2 May 50) and Memo, McNarney, OSD to S/A, 350.09, 9 Dec 49 (31 Dec 48).
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No better investment could possibly have been made than to keep the entire service attache system at full strength during this difficult Cold War period but it soon found itself the target of a determined economy drive pressed personally by the Secretary of Defense. With the production of military intelligence depending directly upon successful collection in the field, these attache activities should certainly have been ^{at} carefully fostered instead of being handicapped at every turn as was actually the case.

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CHAPTER V

PRODUCTION SYSTEM

The departmental military intelligence agency was still operating on V-J Day under the imposed concept of having a separate MIS organized in order to produce its required intelligence. This semi-independent MIS was an extremely large unit, staffed to function both in Washington and throughout the field, with a total strength allotment of nearly 5,000 persons who were distributed at that particular time, as follows:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>W.O.</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Chief, MIS	9		2	6	17
D/Information	131		66	235	432
D/Intelligence	350	2	267	507	1126
D/Administration	24		7	99	130
Special Assignment	4				4
Training Group	50	1			51
Total MIS (Wash.)	<u>568</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>342</u>	<u>847</u>	<u>1760</u>
Miami Branch	7		7		14
MITC	120	2	1040		1162
MISLS	41	2	380		423
CPM Field	87		149		236
Pac MIRS	30		74		104
GMDS	17		64		81
C&I Field	3				3
Total Field (Continental)	<u>305</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1714</u>		<u>2023</u>
MA/MLO	197	47	74	363	681
JICA	33	1	32	3	69
Special Br.	95	1	64	1	161
London Doc. Cent.	3		5	1	9
ALSOS	15		48		63
Special Enl.			12		12
Total Field (Overseas)	<u>343</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>235</u>	<u>368</u>	<u>995</u>
Total MIS	1216	56	2291	1215	4778 *

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* Military Intelligence Division Strength as of 2 September 1945, MID 320.2, 2 Sep 45 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG. On this same date, the so-called G-2 Staff or MID proper consisted of only 105 persons, including 42 officers, 1 warrant officer, 7 enlisted men and 55 civilians.

It was, of course, fully recognized that this immense production organization would soon have to undergo a severe shrinkage under the impact of the new peacetime conditions and many of its field elements were already in the process of being liquidated. As a matter of fact, anticipatory planning for a postwar intelligence system along more modest lines had actually been initiated by MID (MIS) during the latter part of 1943, in compliance with instructions received from the Special Planning Division (SPD) of the War Department Special Staff (WDSS). The eventual result was the submission to SPD, on 31 October 1944, of a "Plan for Organization and Operation of the Intelligence System for the Post-War Army" prepared by the G-2 Policy Staff. Unfortunately, this plan turned out to be of little real value because it was prepared under a given assumption that the War Department structure would remain essentially unchanged and the Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces and Army Ground Forces ^{would} continue to execute intelligence missions as currently assigned. It also chose to retain the MIS concept even

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* "Plan for Organization and Operation of the Intelligence System for the Post-War Army" (S), G-2 388, 28 Oct 44 (29 Nov 43). DRB TAG.

though practically every intelligence official concerned, including the first peacetime Chief of ^{the} MIS himself, remained in ready agreement that it had been a mistake ever to ^{adopt} ~~adopt~~ it in the first place. *

* Memo, Brig Gen Paul E. Peabody for General Bissell, 24 Feb 45, sub: Observations on MIS, G-2 020, 24 Feb 45 f/w (13 Apr 45). ACSI Rec Sec. Gen Peabody became the Chief of MIS, effective 27 Feb 45.

The War Department Basic Plan for the Post War Military Establishment, as published during November 1945 to guide the postwar reorganization, not only embraced the MIS concept but also failed to alter the existing intelligence production system in any important degree. On the other hand, under active consideration at this same time were the findings of an authoritative Patch Board and its successor the Simpson Board, which both held that no attempt should be made in the future to limit WDGS activities solely to matters of high policy planning. Because a philosophy of ^{that} such nature had constituted one of the chief reasons for creating the separate MIS back in 1942, a reorgani-

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zation of the WDGS invalidating it would ^{at least} ~~most certainly~~ serve to throw the entire MIS-MID question open again for further review. Shortly after the Simpson Board published an initial report dated 28 December 1945, therefore, recommending a departmental reorganization along these less restrictive lines, the new ACoFS G-2, WDGS, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, directed the formation of a representative committee within MID "to prepare a general over-all plan for the reorganization and realignment of functions of the War Department Intelligence Division." This committee was composed of the following broadly experienced officers:

- Col. E. K. Wright, GSC - President
- Col. Willard R. Wolfenbarger, AC - Member
- Col. Joseph K. Dickey, Inf - Member
- Col. Edgar J. Treacy, Jr., GSC - Member
- Col. H. L. Richey, GSC - Member
- Col. M. N. Huston, GSC - Member *

* See: "General Plan for Reorganization of the Intelligence Division, WDGS," p. 2, G-2 020, 15 May 46 f/w (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

Another high-level departmental board, commonly referred to as the first Lovett Board, was also functioning during this early postwar period for the main purpose of formulating a War Department position on the subject of ^{centralizing} foreign intelligence activities from the national viewpoint. Several recent events had brought that complicated matter to the fore, notably the issuance of an Executive Order terminating

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the wartime OSS, which was accompanied by a Presidential letter instructing the Secretary of State to "take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity." When the members of the first Lovett Board reached ^{an} unanimous conclusion that the United States Government should establish a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to operate under a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and an organization of such type was actually adopted ^{effective} in January 1946, the MID Reorganization Committee had to consider these new developments before it could recommend any realistic changes in the departmental intelligence production system. Lending additional support to the committee's growing belief that several significant changes ought to be made in this system were the findings of a second Lovett Board, which even went so far as to call for a "complete rehabilitation of intelligence in the Army."

In March 1946, the MID Reorganization Committee submitted an "Informal Report of Special Board on G-2 Organization" to the ACoFS G-2, ^{WDGS, which} that he promptly approved "as a basis for further study." After being slightly revised and ^{then} put into standard study form, it presented the following major conclusions:

- a. G-2 and MIS should be amalgamated into the War Department Intelligence Division under the Director of Intelligence, who will exercise both staff and command functions for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
- b. An executive staff should be organized to coordinate and control the activities of the Intelligence Division.

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c. Five major operating chiefs should be established with staffs and personnel necessary to carry out the detailed functions prescribed for the Director of Intelligence by the Simpson Board. Of these, three operating chiefs will assume functions regarding Security matters and Combat and Domestic Intelligence activities which were not previously assigned to G-2. *

* Ibid.

These committee findings were in complete agreement with those of the Simpson Board, which had ^{recently} already been approved by the Chief of Staff "for planning purposes" but still needed appropriate Presidential authority before they could go into actual effect. ^{Accordingly} ~~Hence,~~ ^{AT}

^{first,} General Vandenberg at first merely directed a trial run of the newly-recommended ID reorganization. On 16 May 1946, however, after the publication of WD Circular 138 announcing an Army and War Department reorganization along Simpson Board lines, he ^{felt} free to order its full implementation without further delay. In this roundabout manner, MIS was thus finally abolished and replaced as the primary production means for the departmental military intelligence agency by the more traditional Intelligence Group, ^{set} now to operate under a Director of Intelligence (DI), ~~GSUSA,~~ instead of the previous ACoS G-2, ^{*} WDGS.

* Nevertheless, the MIS concept kept right on persisting. In Oct 48, for example, the Deputy CofS instructed the DI, GSUSA, to undertake a


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study "to determine the feasibility of reestablishing the Military Intelligence Service as a separate field agency which would incorporate all operating functions now conducted within your Division at the seat of the Government." When this G-2 study, ^{rather} ~~rather~~ tellingly pointed out the unfavorable results that could be expected in intelligence production if any considerable physical separation developed between principal divisional elements, ^{though} ~~though~~ the move was successfully blocked. See: Memo, Deputy CofS to DI, 25 Oct 48, CSUSA 310.2 (25 Oct 48) and Study (S), MID O20 undated f/w (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

The Intelligence Division, WDGS, as formed during May 1946, was far simpler in an organizational sense than its wartime MID predecessor which had included the ^{more or less} ~~more or less~~ separate MIS ^{for production.} ~~for production.~~ All administrative, coordinating and planning responsibilities assigned to the agency were ^{now} ~~thus~~ grouped together under a single Executive Director, while the rest of the division was divided into five main subordinate units charged respectively with handling matters pertaining to Security, Intelligence, Combat Intelligence and Training, Collection, and Army Security Agency. *Also,* except for a few security matters, intelligence production was centered entirely within an Intelligence Group containing a balanced combination of six geographic and eight functional branches supervised directly by the Group Chief. One unusual feature of this new production organization was a seeming desire to have the functional branches regarded ~~more~~

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or less in the light of "service" elements for the geographic branches, so that the organization chart for the Group presented the following somewhat strange appearance:



* "General Plan for Reorganization of the Intelligence Division, WDGS," p. 11. G-2 020., 15 May 46 f/w (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

[REDACTED]

With this new Intelligence Group representing the basic departmental unit for intelligence production under the postwar reorganization, it becomes important to observe its officially assigned mission, as follows:

The Intelligence Group is the agency of the Director of Intelligence which produces intelligence to meet the needs of the War Department and the Major Commands. It conducts the research, interpretation and dissemination of War Department intelligence; evaluates the significance of trends and developments at home and abroad as they affect Army plans and operations; disseminates information and intelligence relating to the activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the preservation of the military establishment; disseminates intelligence pertaining to foreign countries, their war potential and military forces; and prepares intelligence estimates for the Chief of Staff and appropriate War Department agencies. *

* Ibid., p. 10.

Appearing throughout this basic mission was much of the exact language that had been utilized in June 1944, when the departmental authorities were seeking to impose a radically different intelligence production system upon MID (MIS) from above and to centralize all such production under a Director of Intelligence, MIS. Even though there was now a completely separate Security Group with an assigned mission of its own to cover the counterintelligence field, the Intelligence Group still remained responsible for "disseminating information and intelligence relating to activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the preservation of the military establishment." As long as this noticeable conflict of interest continued to endure between these two major elements, future trouble was plainly predictable.

[REDACTED]

With personnel cuts ~~now~~ continuing at an ever-increasing rate throughout the entire military intelligence effort, the only possible course of action for the departmental production officials to follow appeared to lie in some sort of functional elimination which might help to minimize their more harmful effects. Accordingly, ^{WV/S} In May 1946, therefore, ~~the~~ Chief of the Intelligence Group recommended to the ACoFS G-2, that his unit should "concentrate on the production of military and scientific intelligence" and abandon all research within the fields of "political, economic, sociological, biographical (except military and scientific), subversive and topographic intelligence." These latter fields could then be redistributed among governmental agencies through CIG action and each agency directed to produce Strategic Intelligence Digests (SID's) for use by the others in making ~~their~~ required studies and estimates. Under this system, the Intelligence Group would be organized to include "a series of regional branches" designed to prepare Strategic Intelligence Estimates (SIE's) for distribution as prescribed. An alternate solution might be to hold the individual MA Offices responsible for preparing the SID sections relinquished by the Intelligence Group but this seemed unacceptable because the "MA's are not qualified to produce finished SID material and they do not have the benefit of all information available in ID." On the other hand, the intelligence sections of the major occupation headquarters could probably maintain field copies of SID's for their own countries, if the ap-

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appropriate paragraphs already completed by ID were forwarded to them
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for comment and retention.

* IOM (C), Chief Int Group to G-2, 24 May 46, MID 320 (19 Oct 45).
ACSI Rec Sec.

SID production was actually decentralized to the military occu-
pation headquarters along these ^{latter} indicated lines in December 1946, after *

* See: Intelligence Reports, Appendix 3 (C), 31 Dec 46, MID 319.1,
31 Dec 46 (24 Sep 41). DRB TAG.

the personnel economy drive had shown no signs of abatement. The mag-
nitude of this crippling drive from the departmental production stand-
point had been pointedly described just three months previously by a
detailed study entitled "Personnel Requirements of the Intelligence
Group, ID," which ^{noted} summarized as follows:

From a war-time peak in personnel of 1,115 officers and
civilians devoting their main energies to two enemy countries
and their satellites, the strength of the Intelligence Group
was cut as of 1 January 1946 to a total of 763, consisting of
224 officers and 539 civilians. A present reduction further to
403, comprised of 130 officers and 273 civilians, renders im-
possible the production of intelligence and the maintenance of
an information library covering the major portion of the sur-
face of the world including Western Europe, The Far East, Africa,
the British Empire, South America and the United States, reduces
critically the preparation of intelligence on the USSR and the
Satellites and in the remaining part of the world's surface and
precludes the possibility of accurate forecasts of the world sit-
uation upon which the safety of the United States depends. *

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* "Personnel Requirements of the Intelligence Group, ID," (C),
1 Sep 46, G-2 020 ID (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

This same study also proceeded to list the minimum intelligence production that should apply to ID under the new postwar conditions and to comment specifically upon the unsatisfactory status of several of the production projects which were currently underway therein. It thus considered that the agency should take prompt steps to:

a. Complete up to date compilations of pertinent factual information for all countries, as furnished by -

(1) Strategic Intelligence Digests, maintained in loose-leaf form at the research desk level, to present factual intelligence on all factors in the war potential of any given country and to provide the primary basis for intelligence production. (Planning for these digests is now finished but they are actually only in the earliest stages of completion)

(2) Detailed descriptions of all military organizations, weapons, tactics, etc., for the major powers in the form of Military Handbooks. (The U.S.S.R. Handbook is nearing completion but it is the only one that has even been started)

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(3) Special Studies on national, regional and global subjects of strategic importance, such as weapons, transportation, key materials and armament industries. (A program of 40 such studies has been established under the WD Basic Intelligence Plan, with just 2 of them finished)

(4) Analytical topographic surveys (JANIS) covering all critical areas of the world, to present sufficient topographic intelligence for planning joint military operations within ^{each} the area. (Only 24 of a possible 200 of these studies are completed)

(5) Production of factual intelligence bearing upon strategic targets throughout the world, to assist the Army Air Force in developing its required Bombing Encyclopedias. (Plans are being formulated for the production of this important intelligence because ID recently found that it had on hand in useful form less than 5% of the information needed to prepare an effective Bombing Encyclopedia on the U.S.S.R.)

b. Prepare appropriate Strategic Intelligence Estimates, representing the final step in the production of intelligence and the most authoritative interpretation of the capabilities of foreign nations to prosecute war. (Present SIE's are mark-

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edly inadequate, in that they are not derived from any comprehensive compilation of ^{pertinent} ~~authoritative~~ factual information which can only come after the production of suitable SID's.*

* Ibid.

The idea of decentralizing intelligence production along functional lines among the various governmental agencies, as described to the ACoS G-2, ^{WDGS,} by the Chief of the Intelligence Group in May 1946, continued to remain under active discussion ^{within} throughout departmental intelligence circles. When NIA Directive No.7 was issued on 2 January 1947, therefore, announcing specific categories of agency responsibility for intelligence collection in the field, Maj. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS, took particular pains to notify both the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War that he merely considered it "an approach to the solution of the basic problem of allocating among federal departments the responsibilities for the production of intelligence."* Nevertheless, most of the Intelligence Group officials them-

* See: AG File A984345, Coordination of Intelligence Production, Tab D-18 (C), 8 Jan 47 (23 Sep 46). DRB TAG.

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selves ^{remained} were fully convinced that the departmental military intelligence agency should develop an effective SID program to satisfy its own needs regardless of any outside commitments. Because a simple country-by-country system would be manifestly inadequate to support proper theater strategic planning, many of them also believed that the agency ought to undertake without further delay a series of broader studies in the form of Theater Intelligence Digests (TID's). *

* See: "The Organization and Functions of the Intelligence Division, GSDA" (C), p. 8, O20.G-2 ID, undated (17 Apr 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

(S) The matter of taking more positive steps to coordinate the intelligence production system among governmental agencies was first discussed by the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB) on 12 May 1947, with the members generally agreeing upon a proposed NIA directive ^{to accomplish} for that purpose which had been submitted to them by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). ^{It} When implemented, this directive would not only serve to divide the intelligence production field into four newly-defined classifications of basic, current, staff, and strategic or national policy intelligence but also establish the following "general delineation of dominant interests" for such production:

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Political, Cultural, Sociological Intelligence	-- State Department
Military Intelligence	-- War Department
Naval Intelligence	-- Navy Department
Air Intelligence	-- Army Air Forces
Economic and Scientific Intelligence	-- Each agency in accordance with its respective needs *

* "Proposed N.I.A. Directive, Coordination of Intelligence Production (S)," f/w MID 350.09, 1 Jul 47 (23 Sep 46). DRB TAG.

Other closely related factors, however, were ^{already} ~~now~~ tending to delay the immediate adoption of any directive along these suggested lines. For example, the JCS was about to act upon a JIC recommendation that the entire JANIS program should be transferred to CIG for the purpose of forming an integral part of a new National Intelligence Survey (NIS). With reference to what effect this NIS might have on the SID system already in force within MID, the Director of Intelligence, WDGS, ^{adv} reported to his superiors, as follows:

Approval and implementation of the proposed NIA Directive is expected ultimately to relieve the War Department of the necessity for publishing the Strategic Intelligence Digest. The War Department must, however, retain liberty of action, both now and in the future, to produce Basic Intelligence in case the National Intelligence Surveys should at any time fail to meet ID requirements. The ID will, therefore, continue to produce and disseminate the Strategic Intelligence Digest until the production and dissemination of the National Intelligence Surveys shall actually have been initiated in order to ensure that there shall be no prolonged interval during which the necessary Basic Intelligence will be unavailable. *

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* Summary Sheet (S), DI for CofS and Sec War, 1 Jul 47, sub: Co-ordination of Intelligence Production, MID 350.09, 1 Jul 47 (23 Sep 46).
DRB TAG.

Since the proposed specialization of intelligence production among the various governmental departments was such a controversial question, it still remained under active consideration on the NIA agenda when the National Security Act of 1947 was passed abolishing *that key* *committee* NIA and creating the NSC and CIA. *Appropriate* *proper* anticipatory steps had been taken by the IAB, though, to develop a practical outline for starting the new NIS if the survey was actually established. NSCID No. 3, pertaining to the "Coordination of Intelligence Production," was ^{*then*} finally published effective 13 January 1948 but, instead of the four classes of intelligence as previously defined by the IAB, it chose to divide the total production field into basic, current, staff, departmental and national intelligence. Departmental intelligence, the added classification, was thus held to include the basic, current and staff intelligence required by a department or independent agency of the government in order to execute its own assigned mission. Most important of all, only the DCI could now produce and disseminate national intelligence, although he was instructed to coordinate with the other production agencies in securing from them whatever departmental intelligence they

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might be able to furnish for his ^{needed} assistance. At the same time, subject to further refinement through a continual program of coordination conducted by the DCI, the following schedule was intended to "serve as a general delineation of dominant interests" for the agencies concerned:

Political, Cultural, Sociological Intelligence	-- Department of State
Military Intelligence	-- Department of the Army
Naval Intelligence	-- Department of the Navy
Air Intelligence	-- Department of the Air Force
Economic, Scientific, and Technological Intelligence	-- Each agency in accordance with its respective needs *

* See: File (S), G-2 350.09, 13 Jan 48 (23 Sep 46), Tab 3.

DRB TAG.

While promising to work out fairly well for basic intelligence, this latest attempt at dividing the total production field into strict functional compartments soon ran into serious difficulties. The most consequential of these stemmed from a running dispute between the Navy and Air Force over exactly where ^{naval} air intelligence should fit into the delineation picture. Moreover, with scientific and technological intelligence constantly increasing in importance, each of the departmental agencies claimed a fundamental need for achieving full coverage of those twin subjects regardless of any action taken

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by the others. An expensive competition along such lines, therefore, eventually led to the creation, during October 1949, of a Scientific Intelligence Committee under CIA direction ^{so as} to prevent unnecessary duplication and resolve production differences for that type of intelligence. The chairman of this committee, who was also the CIA representative, was then designated to be the Coordinator for Chapter VII (Scientific) of the NIS.*

* DCI 3/3 (C), Scientific Intelligence, 28 Oct 49, f/w G-2 350.09, 28 Oct 49 (23 Sep 46). DRB TAG.

Although the Haislip Board had declared in April 1947 that ID was paying too much attention to the rest of the world and should direct its main effort more toward Russia and the satellite nations, this ~~particular~~ allegation does not appear to stand up well under detailed examination. The Eurasian Branch, for instance, which provided most of the ^{military} intelligence on Russia and the satellites, even then carried an authorized strength of 17 officers and 55 civilians, and was by far the largest branch of the Intelligence Group. Besides, ^{some} ~~several~~ months before this, when the Intelligence Group was suddenly faced with ^{an ordered} ~~a major~~ reduction in civilian spaces from 337 to 242, Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Riley F. Ennis, the Group Chief, had notified the Director of Intelli-

gence, WDGS, that he planned to accomplish the cut through emphasizing the production of intelligence of primary importance to the War Department and placing the greatest possible weight on coverage of the Soviet Union and satellites. Under his new table of organization, the geographic branches would thus produce only military, logistical, current political and who's who intelligence, except for the Eurasian Branch which would also prepare economic intelligence. ^{Also,} moreover, in connection with its production, the latter branch would also receive necessary assistance from a Strategic Section composed almost entirely of specialists grouped together for the purpose of developing the economic and sociological chapters of SID but further called upon to observe closely the following fields of national activity in major foreign countries from the military standpoint:

Minerals and Metals
Ground Forces Industries
Food and Plant and Animal Products
Transportation and Communications
Shipping and Port Facilities
Manpower and Population
International Organizations,
Conferences and General Developments *

* Memo (C), Chief Int Group to DI, 27 Aug 46, MID O20 IG, 27 Aug 46 (9 Jun 46). DRB TAG.

In addition to this noteworthy concentration on Russia and the satellites by the Eurasian Branch, the Exploitation Branch of the Intelligence Group was concurrently carrying out a series of special produc-

tion tasks based upon information extracted from captured German documents relating to atomic energy, railroads, shipbuilding and the machine tool industry within the USSR. A total of 23 different U.S. agencies both at home and abroad, as well as a number of companion British agencies, were being regularly contacted in order to obtain suitable supporting material for this important project. By September 1946, the branch was able to submit a total of 56 useful reports or translations concerned with these strategic subjects and could even promise to have the complete German intelligence picture of the Russian economy reconstructed prior to 30 May 1947, for check against information obtained from other sources. In November 1946, though, because of personnel

* See: "Ten-Minute Talk to be given to General Council 1 Dec 46" (S), G-2 020 Special Document Section, undated (28 Jun 46). DRB TAG.

shortages, negotiations were opened with a view toward transferring the complete exploitation function to CIG, and this was duly accomplished on 29 June 1947.

* ID WDGS Memo No. 30 (C), 19 Jun 47, sub: Research on Captured German Documents, MID 300.6 (1947 & 1948). ACSI Rec Sec.

Another significant feature of the ID organization during this same general period was continued reliance upon the Intelligence Group, rather

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than the Security Group, for producing most intelligence of a military security or counterintelligence nature. On 6 January 1947, therefore, the Chief of the United States Branch of the Intelligence Group was formally directed to prepare all intelligence ^{covering:} ~~relating to:~~

- a. Soviet espionage or sabotage agents, or similar agents of any other nationality operating on behalf of the USSR, or any of its satellites.
- b. Soviet espionage or intelligence organizations and methods of operation, except those of combat units or those designed for tactical use by the armed forces.
- c. Clandestine or subversive activities of Soviet and satellite diplomatic or other official representatives in countries other than the USSR.
- d. Subversive activities of persons in the U.S. except members of the U.S. Armed Forces or persons employed by them (governed by outstanding directives relating to domestic intelligence).
- e. Communist infiltration into labor organizations or any national educational, social or political organization of any country other than the USSR and the U.S.
- f. Principal personalities, in countries other than the USSR, associated with the preparation or distribution of Communist propaganda.
- g. The organizations and media employed for the dissemination of Soviet or Communist propaganda in countries other than the USSR.
- h. Clandestine or subversive activities of other than Soviet nationals and organizations. *

* Supplement to Intelligence Group Memorandum No. 155 (S),
8 Jan 47, G-2 020 ID, Intelligence Group, 8 Jan 47 (9 Jul 46). ACSI
Rec Sec.

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Doing away with the SID and JANIS basic intelligence programs and replacing them with the new NIS under the terms of NSCID No. 3, provoked many difficult problems. It was not simply a matter of just devising an all-inclusive NIS outline and then fixing agency responsibility for the preparation of each individual item listed therein but the changeover had to be made gradually enough to take full advantage of the information already at hand from the preceding programs and to furnish the best possible national security protection while the NIS remained in the early stages of its development. Initially, with the Civil War in Greece having recently displayed alarming signs of reaching an explosive climax and Communist pressures continuing to mount throughout the entire strategic Middle East, it was decided to utilize finished material from SID Turkey

* Gen Chamberlin, the DI GSUSA, was actually in Greece to observe this ^{critical} situation at first hand from 26 Sep to 11 Oct 47. See: Ltr (S), G-2 to Chief of Staff, 20 Oct 47, 092. Greece, 20 Oct 47 (19 Sep 47). ACSI Rec Sec.

and JANIS Turkey for producing a NIS (Tentative) on that strategic country without delay. Effective 17 October 1947, therefore, an agreement was reached in committee to allocate the work for this special purpose among the intelligence agencies involved, as follows:

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<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Responsible Agency</u>
I Estimate (similar to Strategic Intelligence Estimate for Sweden)	(to be decided)
II Geography	ID (overall)
Introduction	ID
Terrain	ID
Weather and Climate	Joint Metro Com
Coasts and Landing Beaches	ONI
Oceanography	ONI
Analysis of Military Areas	ID
III Transportation and Telecommunications	ID (Transp Corps, Off Chief Eng and Off Chief Sig Officer)
IV Cities and Towns	ID (Off Chief Eng)
V Sociological	State Dept
VI Political (incl subversive)	State Dept
VII Economic	ID
VIII Scientific	ID
Ground and General	ID
Navy	ONI
Air	A-2
IX Armed Forces	ID (overall)
Ground Forces	ID
Naval Forces	ONI
(incl Naval Facilities)	
Air Forces	A-2
(incl Air Facilities)	
X Map, Chart and Photo Appraisal	CIA *

* Memo (C), Chief Int Group to Branches, 17 Oct 47, sub: NIS (Tentative) Turkey, CSGID 319.25, 17 Oct 47 (13 Jun 47). DRB TAG. NIS (Tentative) Turkey was to be promptly produced in mimeograph form for limited use by the "Joint Planners and Intelligence Agencies" but also reviewed at frequent intervals until it ^{could} conform to the general scope and treatment of the ^{regular} NIS outline. See: Memo (S), Deputy DCI to ID and others, 19 Nov 47, CSGID 319.25, 19 Nov 47 (13 Jun 47). DRB TAG.

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This decision soon brought forth a sharp note of protest to the DI, GSUSA, from the deeply concerned Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE). It ^{was} pointed out that for some time, in compliance with official G-2 directives, OCE had been recruiting and training personnel to maintain the JANIS program at a specified rate of six publications per year. Furthermore, even if the JANIS program was ^{wholly} ~~completely~~ abandoned, the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, would still have to collect, catalogue, evaluate and prepare world-wide reports on landing beaches, ports, roads, railroads, inland waterways, water supply, electric power, utilities, pipelines, terrain trafficability, construction materials, airfield sites, etc., in order to fulfill his own assigned operational and mapping missions. The new NIS program instead of reducing duplication within the intelligence production field would thus actually tend to encourage such duplication. Most certainly the background and experience of organized Corps of Engineer units already engaged in producing "line-of-communication intelligence," along with their unexcelled collection of valuable source material, should not be wasted under any conditions. *

* Ltr, Asst Chief Eng Int Div to DI GSUSA, 26 Dec 47, MID 319.25, 26 Dec 47 (13 Jun 47). DRB TAG.

Because the technical services had ^{always} been ^{intimately} ~~intimately~~ con-

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nected with the production of foreign military intelligence and would undoubtedly continue to remain so, there was considerable truth in this OCE claim that the ^{NIS} program promised to increase duplication of effort ^{within} for the Army rather than reduce it. As a matter of fact, due chiefly to ^{constant} ~~continual~~ shortages of trained personnel and appropriated funds, the new program was actually exhibiting very little real progress except in ID and ONI, the two agencies that had been previously engaged in producing intelligence studies of the same ^{basic} nature. ^{therefore,} On 27 April 1948, ^a the DCI even felt it necessary to ask the IAC chiefs to support the program more strongly and to set a definite target date for the completion of "those NIS having JCS priorities." ^{*} In answer-

* Memo (C), DCI for IAC Agencies, 27 Apr 48, sub: NIS program, G-2 319.25, 27 Apr 48 (13 Jun 47). DRB TAG.

ing this CIA communication, General Chamberlin not only announced that his agency was prepared to complete its portion of the NIS program by 30 June 1952, but also requested the scheduling of an immediate IAC meeting "with a view to placing the NIS Program in full operation." ^{*}

* Memo (C), DI for DCI, 5 May 48, sub: NIS Program, CSGID 319.25, 5 May 48 (13 Jun 47). DRB TAG.

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The Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, having personally committed ^{his} departmental military agency to meet this early target date for accomplishing the Army's share of the NIS program, it then became a matter of urgency to fit the intelligence effort of the technical services into the new production program as soon as possible and regardless of any threatened complications. ^{Therefore,} Accordingly, effective 30 June 1946, ID issued a "Proposed Technical Services Responsibilities for N.I.S.", which was later accepted as being an official guide on the subject, as follows:

Chapter I - The Brief	In accordance with responsibilities for other chapters
Chapter II - Military Geography	
Coasts and Landing Beaches	OCE Beaches only
Weather and Climate	All Technical Services contribute on matters of primary interest to them regarding effect of weather and climate on ground operations. Coordination by ID
Terrain of Area as a whole	OCE contributes on matters of primary interest to them
Towns	OCE has entire responsibility for this section and corresponding Supplement
Descriptive Analysis of Military Region	OCE covers items of primary interest
Chapter III - Transportation and Telecommunication	
Introduction	ID
Railway Transport)	OCT and OCE both have complete responsibility. ID will allot studies to each based on capabilities
Highway Transport)	
Inland Waterways)	
Petroleum Pipelines)	
Ports and Naval Facilities	Same as above except Navy responsible for all Naval Facilities and Supplement
Telecommunications	OC Sig O, plus responsibility for corresponding Supplement

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Chapter IV - Sociological
Health and Sanitation

O Surg Gen, coordinating with
OCE on Public Utilities in
Relation to Health

Chapter V - Political

None

Chapter VI - Economic

Power
Motor Vehicles
Explosives
Guns and Ammunition
Other Mil Equipment and Supplies

Telecommunications, Signal and
Lighting Equipment

OCE
OC Ord
OC Ord
OC Ord
ID coordinating with all
Tech Services

OC Sig O, coordinating with OCE

Chapter VII - Scientific

Armed Forces Organization and
Appropriations for Research

All Tech Services, coordinated
by ID

Electronics
Special Electronic Devices

OC Sig O
OC Sig O; OC Ord and OCE, co-
ordinated by ID

Guided Missiles

OC Ord, OC Sig O, coordinated
by ID

Explosives and Propellants
BW General

OC Ord
OC Chem C, O Surg Gen, coordi-
nated by ID

BW Special
BW Protection

OC Chem C
OC Chem C, O Surg Gen, coordi-
nated by ID

Chemical Warfare
Misc. General
Misc. Optics
Misc. Metallurgy
Misc. Fuels and Lubricants
Other Chemicals and Synthetics
Photography

OC Chem C
All Tech Services
All Tech Services
All Tech Services
OQMG
All Tech Services
OC Sig O

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Chapter VIII - Armed Forces
Standards of Fitness and
Deferment
Arms and Services

Service Units

Armament
Permanent Fortifications
Location and List of Schools

Logistics

Weapons and Equipment

O Surg Gen
OCE, OC Chem C, OC Sig O,
coordinated by ID
All Tech Services, coord-
inated by ID
OC Ord
OCE
All Tech Services, coord-
inated by ID
All Tech Services, coord-
inated by ID
(1) - OC Ord
(2) - OC Sig O
(3) - OQMG
(4) - OCE
(5) - OCT
(6) - O Surg Gen
(7) - OC Chem C

Chapter IX - Maps and Chart Appraisal ^{OCE} ~~CSA~~ for all Army responsibilities *

* Proposed Technical Services Responsibilities for N.I.S. (C), 30
Jun 48, CSGID 319.25, 30 Jun 48 (13 Jun 47). DRB TAG.

In order to adjust the ID system for producing basic intelligence under the new NSCID 3, it was soon found necessary to undertake a thorough reorganization of the Intelligence Group. On 12 August 1948, areas of responsibility for most of the geographic branches were ^{thus} altered considerably and a new Middle East Branch formed instead of the historic British Empire Branch. At the same time, the Pan American Branch was re-designated as the Western Hemisphere Branch, while the Strategic and

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Scientific Branches were both deactivated and a new Intelligence Staff and ^a Logistics Branch established to replace them. These changes then enabled the Group Chief to assign specific tasks regarding the production of the Army portion of NIS in accordance with the following ^{detailed} outline:

Chapter I - Brief	Intelligence Staff, based on outline drafts turned in by other branches as indicated below
Chapter II - Military Geography	Topographic Detachment (1)
Chapter III - Transportation and Telecommunications	Logistics Branch (1)
Chapter IV - Sociological	Logistics Branch (2)
Chapter V - Political	Geographic Branch (2)
Chapter VI - Economic	Logistics Branch (2)
Chapter VII - Scientific	Logistics Branch (1)
Chapter VIII - Armed Forces	Intelligence Staff (3) except for -
Section 80 (except 80 D (3) (c))	Geographic Branch (1)
Section 80 D (3) (c)	Logistics Branch (1)
Section 81, except for -	Geographic Branch (1)
Section 81 F (2)	Logistics Branch (1)
Section 81 I (1) through (5)	Geographic Branch (1)
Section 81 J and L	Geographic Branch (1) & (4)
Chapter IX - Map and Chart Appraisal	Topographic Detachment (1)
Supplement I - Ports and Naval Facilities	Logistics Branch
Supplement III - Telecommunications	Logistics Branch
Supplement IV - Towns	Topographic Detachment

- (1) Coordinate production; produce Army portion; synthesize final product.
- (2) Coordinated by State.
- (3) Coordinate production; produce Army portion based on recommended drafts submitted by geographic branches; synthesize final product.
- (4) Based on characteristics of weapons and equipment obtained from Logistics Branch. *

* Int Group Memo No. 32, 12 Aug 48, CSGID 020. ID, Intelligence Group, 12 Aug 48 (9 Jul 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

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In
By September 1948, the IAC, ^{found} considered it practicable to prepare a tentative NIS production schedule for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1949 and submit it to the NSC for approval. Although it was realized that some of the governmental intelligence agencies were already occupied in initial NIS production that would carry them well beyond FY 1949, the new schedule was intended to cover just finished intelligence turned over to CIA for final review, editing and publication during the current fiscal year. The areas listed conformed to established JCS priorities and embraced most of Europe, including the USSR, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, plus the important Middle East but Burma and Korea were the only Far Eastern countries mentioned. The NSC proceeded to approve the proposed schedule without change on 24 November 1948, with Secretary of Defense Forrestal remarking that he saw no reason for its members to act upon a paper of this kind "which deals in detail with a strictly operational matter*."

* Summary (S), National Intelligence Survey Production Schedule, Fiscal Year 1949, 5 Nov 48, G-2 319.25, 5 Nov 48 (13 Jun 47). DRB TAG.

Thus
Derived mostly from strong pressures exerted by the IAC authorities, a brand new system for producing basic intelligence within the United States Government had thus been inaugurated less than two years

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before the sudden outbreak of war in Korea. ID, GSUSA, was not only heavily involved in this significant development but also called upon to produce the largest part of the NIS ^{in comparison} as compared with the other departmental intelligence agencies. It was fortunately well prepared to accomplish such production because of experience gained earlier in handling the SID and JANIS programs of a similar nature both during and after World War II. On the other hand, it could not be expected to do full justice to the NIS if its capabilities were continually reduced for the purpose of achieving further personnel or fund economies. The required production of basic intelligence was bound to be an expensive proposition under any circumstances and, with the new system ^{just} getting underway toward the close of 1948, the NIS would not reach ^{even a minimum} just a maintenance level for many years to come. In November 1949, therefore, ID ^{considered} found it necessary to report to the DCI that:

A re-examination of the D/A capability for fulfilling its share of the NIS has been completed and because of personnel stringency it will be able to do only the equivalent of eight chapters per fiscal year, except the chapter on Public Health and Sanitation of which it will be able to complete only four chapters per year. In consequence, ID is concentrating its effort on Europe, USSR, Near and Middle East, China, North Africa, Iceland and Greenland. *

* Ltr (S), ID to CIA, G-2 319.25/T, 9 Nov 49 (13 Jun 47). DRB
TAG.

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Meanwhile the departmental military intelligence agency had been undergoing a series of major reorganizations, many of which were of important consequence to the Intelligence Group. Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Stafford LeRoy Irwin, who had succeeded General Chamberlin as the DI, GSUSA, on 1 November 1948, not only felt that the agency's internal structure should be simplified so he could deal directly with a fewer number of key subordinates but also that steps should be taken to enhance the security of its intelligence production. * Effective

* Gen Irwin's tour of duty as the DI (ACofS G-2), GSUSA, extended from 1 Nov 48 to ^{22 Aug 50.} 22 Jun 50. Despite a lengthy and varied Army career, service, this was his first departmental general staff assignment.

17 January 1949, at his expressed wish, the Intelligence Group abolished all ^{of its} geographic branches and adopted an essentially functional organization featured by a large Military Branch designed to concentrate exclusively upon the production of ground forces intelligence on a global basis. Additionally, the numerical designation system that had been utilized as a counterintelligence measure to ^{disguise} ~~cover~~ MID units during World War I was revived for the Intelligence Group. Its principal elements, with their respective "unit designators," were ^{then} ~~then~~ listed, as follows:

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Office of The Chief, Intelligence Group (ID-11)
Executive Office (ID-9)
Plans Section (ID-10)
Production and Control Section (ID-8)
Intelligence Staff (ID-6)
Basic Intelligence Section (ID-7)

Collection Branch (ID-1)
Dissemination Branch (ID-5)
Special Research Branch (ID-2)
Logistics Branch (ID-4)
Military Branch (ID-3) *

* See: ID Memo No. 1, 17 Jan 49. and ID Memo No. 3, 3 Feb 49;
CSGID O20. ID Int Gp (9 Jul 46). ACSI Rec Sec. The sections organized within these functional branches ^{were given} also had cover designations based upon their ^{own} branch number, for example: the Arms and Equipment Section of the Military Branch was ID-30, Eurasian Section ID-31, Western European Section ID-32, etc.

The unit designator system, as applied to the ID Intelligence Group early in 1949, caused considerable confusion for all concerned and afforded practically no real security protection to the production effort. It was rescinded on 19 August 1949, ^{therefore,} at the same time that several other changes were announced in the Intelligence Group organization. These changes consisted mainly of splitting the Group Executive Office into two parts, one to handle "Intelligence" and the other "Operations," and redesignating the Logistics Branch as a

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Technical Branch while transferring the Arms and Equipment Section from the Military Branch to it. This latter move then left the Military Branch with a five-section geographical organization ^{covering} ~~to cover~~ the Eurasian, Western Europe, Middle East, Far East and Western Hemisphere areas, and the new Technical Branch organized into seven functional sections along the following lines:

Economic Section
Scientific Section
Technical Services Section
Topographic Section
Military Manpower Section
Special Projects Section
Arms and Equipment Section *

* ID Memo No. 32, 19 Aug 49, CSGID O20. ID IG, 19 Aug 49 (9 Jul 46).
ACSI Rec Sec.

The final major reorganization of the ID Intelligence Group prior to Korea occurred on 12 December 1949. In an effort to achieve greater simplification, the Military Branch was entirely eliminated and replaced by three broad geographic sections (Eurasian, Western and Eastern) which were in turn raised to branch status. These new geographic sections were not only called upon to produce both military and political intelligence but also permitted to determine field collection requirements for their assigned areas. ^{Accordingly} ~~Consequently~~, the hitherto separate Collection and Dissemination Branches were merged ^{together} ~~into~~ one and given a very

limited collection mission. Although the functionally organized Technical Branch continued to remain generally unchanged, a new World-Wide Branch was created for the purpose of executing the various intelligence tasks that had been performed within ^{the} Office of the Executive for Intelligence. The ID Intelligence Group during early 1950 was thus actually organized with six different branches, four of them being geographic and two functional, ^{as follows:} in the following manner:

World-Wide Branch	Eurasian Branch	Western Branch	Eastern Branch
Sections	Sections	Sections	Sections
Estimates	U.S.S.R.	Atlantic Pact	China
Current	Satellite	Western Europe	S.E. Asia
Plans Survey		Latin American	Jap-Korea
		Near East	
		Middle East	
Technical Branch		Collection/Dissemination Branch	
Sections		Sections	
Economic		Liaison	
Scientific		Reading Panel	
Tech Services		Document Files	
Topographic		Editorial	
Mil Manpower		Publications	
Arms & Equip		Cartographic	
Special Projects		Visual Aids	
		Operations Room *	

* ID Memo No. 46, 12 Dec 49, G-2 020. ID Intelligence Group, 12 Dec 49 (9 Jul 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

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One of the principal functions of the Intelligence Group in meeting the military intelligence needs of the War (Army) Department and major commands had always been to prepare periodic or special Strategic Intelligence Estimates (SIE's) for ^{all} potentially dangerous areas. Production of these important studies ordinarily commenced within one of the geographic branches but then came under ~~thorough~~ ^{expert} review by personnel of either a Strategic Section (Branch) or Intelligence Staff designed to coordinate intelligence production falling beyond the scope of any single branch. Since such estimates of the situation were intimately connected with the fundamental mission of the Director of Intelligence (ACofS G-2) _{to} keep his Chief of Staff properly informed on ^{all} developments _{throughout} the world, there was never any doubt among the military intelligence officials themselves as to the absolute necessity of ID continuing to produce them. Nevertheless, following the formation of CIA and growing usage of the term "national intelligence," ^{though,} a great deal of confusion ^{was also introduced} arose in regard to just where these departmental estimates should fit into ^{the} an intelligence warning system being ^{currently} established for the United States Government.

The problem of departmental versus central intelligence estimates had not been acute under the early CIG-IAB-NIA system because it was then fully accepted that all key estimates, even those prepared in CIG, should be considered by ^{the} IAB before going to the

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NIA. As a matter of fact, on 5 November 1946, each of the IAB members had agreed to appoint a personal liaison representative to the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) of CIG for the specific purpose of either concurring in or presenting departmental dissents on strategic estimates produced therein. Besides, NIA itself was a ^{fully} coordinated body ^{of this} capable of approving intelligence estimates for consideration at the highest level. Passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and formation of the new CIA-IAC-NSC organization, however, created an entirely different situation in this respect. Only CIA was now supposed to produce and disseminate national intelligence, which was ^{later} ~~soon~~ officially defined as "integrated departmental intelligence covering the broad aspects of national policy and national security, and transcending the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment."^{*}

* NSCID No. 2 (S), 13 Jan 48, G-2 350.09, 13 Jan 48 (23 Sep 46),
Tab 3. DRB TAG.

In view of the carefully weighed wording of NSCID No. 3, the departmental intelligence authorities felt that CIA should continue ~~as~~ as far as possible to utilize finished intelligence furnished by the established agencies in producing national intelligence, rather than seek

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to process raw information acquired from its own sources for such purpose. Furthermore, any national intelligence produced by CIA should always carry a formal concurrence from the departmental agencies or at least include a statement of substantial differing opinion. The DCI, on the other hand, regarded his central agency as comprising the intelligence facility for use by both the President and NSC, and thus without any production limitations whatsoever. He even believed that the current NSC intelligence directives should be modified in order to emphasize these top level responsibilities and the departmental agencies barred from offering dissents in estimates extending beyond their own normal fields of endeavor. * This disagree-

nevertheless
* The DCI, effective 8 Jul 48, had published a "Standard Operating Procedures for Departmental Participation in the Production and Coordination of National Intelligence," which ^{did} provided for forwarding departmental concurrences or dissents along with the final presentation in all but exceptional circumstances. See: DCI 3/1 (S), 8 Jul 48, f/w G-2 350.09, 8 Jul 48 (23 Sep 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

importance with reference
ment was manifestly of utmost significance relative to the precise role that the IAC, DCI and departmental heads should play in formulating estimates of the situation under crash conditions or

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issuing crucial warnings of an intelligence nature to higher authority.

The latter matter came under active consideration early in August 1949, ^{when} ~~after~~ Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., ^{JIC} State Department member of IAC, ~~had~~ recommended the formation of a permanent committee to coordinate the production of estimates on probable Soviet intentions which would affect the security of the United States. His suggestion for ^{creating such a} ~~A~~ representative "Watch Committee" was heartily endorsed by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) George S. Smith, Chief of the Intelligence Group, who felt it might help to supplement a similar project he had already started in ID. As it actually turned out, the proposition encountered such time-consuming opposition from CIA that, according to Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) A. R. Bolling, General Irwin's successor, "six months were required to get it started at all and then the operations of the Committee under CIA auspices left so much to be desired that a parallel but much more effective committee developed as a JIC responsibility."^{*}

* Incl (S) to Memo (TS), Maj Gen A. R. Bolling, ACoFS G-2 for Lt Gen Walter B. Smith, 10 Oct 50, G-2 OHO.CIA, 10 Oct 50. ACSI Rec Sec. Gen Bolling, who had been serving as Deputy DI (ACoFS G-2), ^{GSUSA,} since 16 Jan 48, became the ACoFS G-2, ^{GSUSA,} on 23 Aug 50.

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It thus seems clearly evident that the critical period, ^{shortly} before Korea not only found the new national system for intelligence production in the throes of a most difficult preliminary adjustment but also strongly characterized by ^{constant} ~~persistent~~ argument over detailed agency responsibility. While these handicaps applied in some degree to all classes of intelligence, they held particularly true for the production of so-called national intelligence. As usual, it had proved much easier to define this top category of intelligence than ^{to} put the agreed definition to practical use. Almost any estimate of the situation prepared by one of the departmental intelligence agencies might fall within the accepted boundaries of national intelligence and yet only CIA was authorized to produce that theoretically distinct type of intelligence. At the same time, though, the departmental agencies could ^{not} ~~never~~ give up making their own strategic estimates of the situation because basic command requirements ^{continued} ~~would con-~~ tinue to demand them. The eventual result was a serious area of disagreement which undoubtedly contributed to the intelligence failures ^{that} ~~which~~ were so plainly observable, ^{in connection with} ~~with reference to~~ the surprise opening of the Korean War.

When the period came to a close, the Intelligence Group was still the principal agency of the ACoS G-2, GSUSA, for producing intelligence to meet departmental and Army needs, and to give him "timely notification of any event or condition immediately affect-

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ing the security of the United States or its forces." While this Group had been forced to undergo a steady succession of crippling personnel cuts along with the rest of the division, it remained a very sizeable unit consisting of 91 officers, 116 civilians (professional) and 110 civilians (clerical), ^{*} who were on the whole

* See: Special File (C), 020. G-2 Intelligence Group, undated (9 Jul 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

both expert and experienced. Since the Group was also seemingly well organized and capably led, there appears to be no valid reason why it should have failed to execute its given tasks in any but an efficient manner. Whatever important production mistakes did occur, therefore, were probably derived more from factors beyond the ^{direct} ~~immediate~~ control of the departmental military intelligence officials themselves than from defects existing in the production system devised for use by the Intelligence Group. As mentioned earlier, the pre-Korea Cold War was in reality an intelligence war, although this fact was never fittingly appreciated by many of the national authorities concerned. The unfortunate result was that military intelligence production often lacked full or effective outside support and had to overcome a number of major handicaps imposed on it from above in attempting to carry out ^{the} ~~its~~ assigned mission.

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CHAPTER VI

SECURITY FUNCTION

The conclusion of World War II found the departmental intelligence agency shorn of most of its traditional military security responsibilities, especially in regard to the Zone of the Interior. This development had taken place against the expressed wishes of the intelligence officials themselves and was accomplished by a succession of orders from higher authority which were deliberately aimed at centralizing as many activities of such type as possible under the Commanding General, ASF. Although the ACofS G-2, WDGS, continued to remain charged with exercising general staff supervision over counterintelligence policies throughout the military establishment, even this basic mission soon became badly compromised when the Assistant Secretary of War insisted on assuming personal control of policies adopted for handling known or suspected Communists and fellow-travellers in the United States Army.

Despite an enforced drive to divest the ACofS G-2, WDGS, of all his so-called operational functions within the military security field, there was still a small Security Branch organized in MID on V-J Day. It consisted of only two officers, ^{along} with some investigative and clerical help, and had been engaged since 24 July 1944 in

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performing a number of more or less unrelated but often very sensitive counterintelligence tasks. With the need for activities of that special nature diminishing right after V-J Day, the strength of this Security Branch was cut during September 1945 to just one officer and it ~~then~~ became mainly a local unit to check on internal security practices in MID (MIS) itself. * General staff actions covering mili-

* "History MIS" (S), Security Branch (C), pp. 1-9, MID 314.7, undated (30 Oct 42). ACSI Rec Sec. This lone officer was Lt Col Robert H. Harris, GSC.

tary security matters were thus habitually referred to Group III of the G-2 Policy Staff, made up of Col. Leslie R. Forney and two officer assistants, plus three civilian clerks, which was ^{then} being called upon to formulate plans and policies concerning:

- (1) Censorship of personal communications of military personnel through postal and electrical channels.
- (2) Censorship of documents and effects of military personnel traveling on surface ships or by military aircraft.
- (3) Censorship of prisoner of war mail.
- (4) Censorship of civil communications of all types in occupied areas.
- (5) War Department General Staff supervision over safeguarding of military information.
- (6) Security regulations of general application throughout the Army.
- (7) War Department viewpoint in matters of concern to Joint Security Control which involve security of information.
- (8) War Department assistance to the State Department in connection with the issuance of visas and passports.

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- (9) War Department General Staff supervision over:
- (a) Counterintelligence investigations and reports.
 - (b) Disposition of subversive military personnel and of subversive civilian personnel employed by the military establishment.
 - (c) Loyalty screening of military personnel, of civilian personnel employed by the military establishment and of commercial facilities receiving classified War Department contracts.
 - (d) Loyalty screening in connection with induction of aliens into the Armed Forces.
- (10) Regulations concerning counterintelligence investigations and reports.
- (11) Liaison with Federal Bureau of Investigation. *

* "Report on Intelligence Matters" (S) To: Assistant Secretary of War for Air, From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 26 Oct 45, MID 350.09, 26 Oct 45 (6 Apr 45). ACSI Rec Sec. Note that this Group III did not carry any general staff responsibility, ^{either} for the security of Army signal communications or the production and distribution of Army cryptographic material. These functions were assigned to Group IV of the G-2 Policy Staff.

The proper relationship of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), U.S. Army, with reference to the ACoS G-2, WDGS, and the Director of Intelligence, ASF, had not ^{yet} been established on a satisfactory basis even by the end of World War II. It should be recalled that, derived from an Inspector General's report submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff during November 1943, all CIC activities within the Zone of Interior, with a few approved exceptions, were ordered discontinued in

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MID (MIS), effective 1 January 1944, and given to the Commanding General, ASF. Likewise, the CIC Headquarters at Baltimore, Md., which was actually a CIC Section of the Counterintelligence (Security) Branch, MIS, as well as the CIC Staging Area at Camp Holabird, Md. and the preparatory CIC School at Chicago, Ill., were abolished. While "staff action on changes in allotment of Counterintelligence Corps personnel" would still be performed by the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, all remaining MIS functions connected with CIC were transferred to the ASF in July 1944. These ^{shifted} ~~former~~ functions included personnel procurement and assignment, and the supervision of technical supply, specialized training, administration and operation of the CIC. *

* Ltr (C), AGO to CG ASF, sub: Transfer of Functions of Counterintelligence Corps Section, Security Branch, MIS to Army Service Forces, 25 Jul 44, copy in; "History of the Intelligence Division, Army Service Forces" (S), Text, vol.1, sec.III, ch.nine, p. 13 (C). Hereafter cited as "Hist ID, ASF" (S). Gen Ref Off OCMH.

With the matter of where and how best to conduct CIC training in the United States continuing to present many serious difficulties following this ~~all-encompassing~~ ^{venture contemplated} attempt at total centralization under the ASF, decision was eventually reached in August 1944 to concentrate all future CIC training within the Military Intelligence Train-

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ing Center (MITC), Camp Ritchie, Md., which was a MID (MIS) field installation. Since it necessarily took considerable time for the MITC officials to ^{their current} adjust ~~their~~ regular effort along these new lines, CIC training remained in an unsatisfactory state even though the demand from overseas for such personnel kept mounting as the war progressed. Based upon an ASF recommendation, therefore, concurred in by the ACoS G-2, WDGS, the Deputy Chief of Staff, on 23 June 1945, authorized the reestablishment of an Office of the Chief, CIC, and a CIC Detachment, ASF, as Class IV activities under direct supervision of the Director of Intelligence, ASF. Effective 13 July 1945, Col. H. R. Kibler, Executive Officer for the Director of Intelligence, ASF, was ^{then} designated to be the new Chief, CIC, in addition to his other duties, while a CIC Branch, Intelligence Division, ASF, and a CIC Center were also formed at Fort George G. Meade, Md. ^{*} Finally,

* "Hist ID, ASF" (S), vol.1, sec.I, ch.two, p. 9 (C) and Appendices, vol.2, ch.two, p. 17. Col Kibler had been ^{the} Chief, CIC, when that Office was eliminated earlier in World War II.

on 15 August 1945, ^{less than three weeks before} ~~just one day after~~ V-J Day, several important counterintelligence functions currently held by the Office of the Provost Marshal General were ²¹ transferred to the Director of Intelligence, ASF,

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together with five officers and ten civilians who had been engaged in performing them. These functions were ^{briefly,} generally, as follows:

a. Staff supervision over counterintelligence investigation of all military personnel and War Department civilian employees, including investigations of loyalty type.

b. Supply of all counterintelligence investigative agencies in the United States, including the Security and Intelligence Corps, with specialized equipment and supplies.

c. Administration of confidential funds for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes.

d. Staff supervision over the activities of the Security and Intelligence Corps, to include intelligence and counterintelligence training, personnel qualifications and assignment outside of service commands or technical services, and transfers to the Counter Intelligence Corps.

e. Coordination, control and channeling of counterintelligence investigative matters between the Zone of Interior and overseas commands.

f. Interrogation of prisoners of war to obtain intelligence information about enemy forces, installations, policies, persons and war crimes.*

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* "Hist ID, ASF" (S), Appendices, vol. 2, ch. two, p. 18. ^{After McDL} ~~then~~

ASF gained the investigative supply function as indicated, the ^{CIC} ~~SIC~~
Supply Depot at Camp Ritchie was also promptly moved to Fort George
G. Meade, Md.

In view of the recent concentration of counterintelligence func-
tions directly under the Director of Intelligence, ASF, it had now be-
come clearly evident to all concerned that there was no real need for
two separate Army investigative organizations, one to operate over-
seas (CIC) and the other within the Zone of the Interior ^(SIC) ~~(SIC)~~. Steps
were duly taken, therefore, to obtain approval from the Chief of Staff
for deactivating the SIC and absorbing its best personnel into the
CIC. The War Department Circular which announced this long overdue
action further chose to clarify the precise duties of the ACoFS G-2,
WDGS, relative to military security, in the following terms:

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS, will continue
to exercise general staff supervision over counterintelligence
policies and activities throughout the military establishment.
In certain cases directed by higher authority he will exercise
direct operational supervision. Consistent with his responsi-
bilities for counterintelligence and in coordination with the
Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-3 and G-1, WDGS, he will assist
in the procurement and allotment of CIC personnel. *

* WD Cir 108, 15 Apr 46 and Ltr (C) Deputy ACoFS G-2 to CofS,
thru; G-3, G-1 and OPD, sub: Counter Intelligence Corps, 20 Mar 46,



MID 322.999, 20 Mar 46 (6 Feb 46). DRB TAG.

The military and civil censorship situation for the United States Army was, of course, materially altered by the cessation of hostilities. Along with the rest of the MID (MIS) counterintelligence functions, all activities of such nature had previously been centralized within the ASF, the latest transfer being that of the Censorship Liaison Section, Security Branch, MIS, effective 25 July 1944. This section, composed of one officer and ten civilians, *was performing the performed* ~~had been performing~~ the important mission of receiving, allocating and distributing information obtained from censorship sources throughout the War Department. * After its transfer to ASF, only

* "Hist ID, ASF" (S), Text, vol 1, sec I, ch II, p 6 (C).

broad policy matters concerned with censorship were then handled in MID, by Group III of the G-2 Policy Staff.

Planning had been early inaugurated for eliminating most forms of military censorship within the European Theater of Operations immediately following ~~a German~~ ^{The of Germany,} defeat, so the chief censorship problem toward the close of 1944 was mainly one of opening civil censorship ^{the recently} in occupied Pacific territories and developing plans for an eventual censorship

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in Japan itself. ^{Coping with} ~~Disposal~~ of the actual civil censorship problems not only meant procuring and training a large number of especially qualified personnel but also dealing directly on a continuous basis with headquarters of the various Pacific theaters involved. Because the newly reorganized MID did not include any unit which could handle such an operational-type project, the Commanding General, ASF, on 12 September 1944, was directed ~~through The Adjutant General~~ to form a Special Overseas Planning Group (SOPG) for that particular purpose. To assist in this complex task, three officer specialists were transferred from MIS to the SOPG and necessary arrangements made to have a naval officer detailed with it for expert guidance in planning telecommunications censorship. By V-J Day, the SOPG ^{thus} carried a total strength of ten officers and was organized into four different sections, designated respectively as the Plans Section, Administrative-Training Section, Military Censorship Section and Dissemination Section.*

* "History of Civil Censorship" (C) in Activities of the War Department during World War II, pp. 23-25, MID 314.7, 17 May 46 (30 Oct 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

Military censorship both in the United States and overseas areas was terminated on 2 September 1945, ^{immediately} ~~immediately~~ after the Japanese Govern-

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ment had announced its acceptance of formal terms of surrender. This applied even to personal communications of Army or civilian personnel serving at AAF or ASF staging areas and ports of embarkation within the United States. The same order also stated that specialized training of military personnel for assignment as Unit and Base Censors at these staging areas and ports of embarkation would cease but censorship indoctrination of personnel in connection with basic training, civil censorship training and training for Prisoner of War censorship functions could still be continued. Two days later, ^{though} ~~therefore~~, the Chief of Transportation, U. S. Army, was directed to halt the following military censorship activities which were being carried out under his command jurisdiction:

- a. Censorship indoctrination of units and individuals passing through ports of embarkation.
- b. The issue of censorship supplies to units en route overseas.
- c. All unit and base censorship operations.
- d. All monitoring of telephone lines, to include the removal of monitoring equipment.*

* "History of Military Censorship" (C), in Activities of the War Department during World War II, pp. 111-12 and Appendices, Tabs LVII and LVIII, CSGID 314.7, undated (30 Oct 42). ACSI Rec Sec. In

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compliance with a Presidential directive received ^{earlier} that same ^{day,} afternoon,
Byron Price, the national Director of Censorship, had, on 15 Aug 45,
not only announced the end of voluntary censorship of the domestic
press and radio but also instructed the Office of Censorship to cease
at once all censorship of international communications. See: A Report
on the Office of Censorship ("United States Government History Reports
on War Administration") Series I /Washington, 1945/, p. 18.

While military censorship activities were being terminated in
this notably decisive manner, civil censorship requirements for the
occupation areas kept right on growing. As soon as it was realized
^{after} following V-E Day that there would no longer be any need for maintain-
ing military censorship pools at east coast ports of embarkation, most
of the trained censorship personnel had been moved to the San Francisco
Port of Embarkation. ^{From 7/15/45 A. 11:01} when V-J Day arrived, all officers held in
military censorship pools were interviewed for the express purpose of
determining their suitability for a civil censorship assignment and
those found qualified promptly transferred thereto. The rest of these
officers, except for a number of experienced specialists who were occu-
pied in examining diaries and other personal records gathered from over-
seas at the Kansas City Quartermaster Depot, were ^{promptly} then reported surplus
for normal reassignment or relief from active duty. On 25 August 1945,
the SOPG, ~~the~~

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Intelligence Division, ASF, was renamed the Office of the Chief Military and Civil Censor and, finally, effective 1 December 1945, the entire military censorship pool system came to an ^{abrupt} end.*

* "History of Military Censorship" (C), in Activities of the War Department during World War II, p. 114. ACSI Rec Sec. "Hist ID, ASF" (S), Text, vol. 1, sec. I, ch. ^{two} 11, p. 10 (C). Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

One of the principal problems bearing upon the security of military information (SMI) function during the latter stages of World War II had been to devise appropriate policies on the exchange or release of technical information, such as scientific data, plans, specifications and manufacturing "know-how," to properly accredited foreign nationals. Although the responsibility for making such disclosures within the boundaries of established policy was decentralized as early as February 1944 to the Commanding Generals of AAF, ASF and AGF, the departmental military intelligence agency continued to remain actively involved in all phases of this program. After the Counter-intelligence Group of MIS was abolished in June 1944, however, that participation became strictly limited to policy guidance and representation on several joint and combined committees dealing with the general ^{security} subjects.

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The ^{chief} main difficulty encountered by the numerous agencies being called upon during the war to exchange or release technical information to foreign nationals was the fact that the ^{of it} announced policies were ^{far} too broad to give them adequate guidance in each individual case. This was particularly true for the Army technical services which were operating under a blanket authorization from the Director of Intelligence, ASF, to make decisions in accordance with existing policies on the release of technical information about their own items of equipment. As a result, the Director of Intelligence, ASF, kept complaining that the instructions issued by the ACoS G-2, WDGS, in regard to what foreign nations were entitled to classified technical information and the lists of persons authorized to receive it, were insufficient for any practical use. The JCS eventually gave to JIC the task of determining within certain policy limitations what information should be released and, on 29 November 1944, this top intelligence committee published a much more detailed directive governing the disclosure of technical information to foreign governments that was intended to ^{last} ~~remain in effect~~ for the rest of the wartime period. *

* "Hist ID, ASF" (S), Text, vol 1, sec II, ch ^{five} N, pp. 1-4.
 Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

There was still an observable need, though, for some sort of a

representative committee at the working level which could resolve individual cases concerned with the release of technical information to foreign governments. Also, because the current JIC policy directive in such matters was based upon combat conditions, ^{and} a return to peacetime practices would promptly serve to render it inappropriate. During the course of its 15th Meeting on 30 March 1945, therefore, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) agreed to organize a special subcommittee for the ^{specific} purpose of controlling the release of classified technical information to foreign nationals. Designated as the Subcommittee for Technical Information Security Control (TISC), this subcommittee commenced to operate early in April 1945 with the following membership:

- Mr. Frederick Exton, Chairman, State
- Lt. Colonel W. G. Strecker, War
- Major G. W. Galinger, War
- Lt. Cmdr. Kelso Baly, Navy *

* Ibid., p. 4. See also: SANAC Memorandum for Information No. 113, 21 Jan 48, Appendix "E", SMI Branch File. ACSI Rec Sec.

Lt Col Strecker and Maj Galinger were both from the ASF ^{also} and the latter was ^{also an Army} an Air Force officer.

Among the more consequential steps taken shortly after V-J Day by the Director of Intelligence, ASF, within the military security

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field, were to issue orders directing the abolishment of all Informant and Observer systems throughout the Army and disbanding, effective 10 October 1945, the final unit of the War Department Special Organization formed to handle dangerously disaffected or suspected subversive personnel. Staff supervision over both of these important counterintelligence activities had been transferred from MID (MIS) to ASF during the latter part of the war. * On the other hand, the ASF intelligence

* See: "Hist ID, ASF" (S), Text, vol. 1, sec III, ch. eight, pp. 7 and 20-22. ACSI Rec Sec. This portion of the history was detached from the rest because of the extreme sensitivity of the subjects it presented.

authorities felt that the domestic intelligence function, which they had similarly inherited from MID (MIS), ^{remained} ~~was~~ a most essential one and should continue to receive strong emphasis just as long as the Commanding General, ASF, ^{was held} ~~remained~~ responsible for supplying and transporting the United States Army. ^{In order to} ~~To~~ accomplish this function properly, there was ~~thus~~ an obvious need for "evaluated information of incidents, trends and conditions in the Zone of Interior either within or outside the Army, which are likely to affect, by hindering or helping the accomplishment of the Army's mission and the internal Security of the Zone of the Interior, or which may require the use of federal troops." *

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* Ibid., ch. ^{seven} 7 (S), p. 1.

Ever since 1944, in furthering its assigned domestic intelligence function, the Intelligence Division, ASF, had been calling for detailed reports from the Service Commands on "racial disturbances, subversive activities, labor disturbances of a subversive or racial nature, serious fires and explosions and other internal disturbances or serious threats of such activity." After being carefully evaluated in light of information available from other sources, these reports ^{then} formed the basis for a periodic "Estimate of the Domestic Intelligence Situation" which was regularly disseminated to a large number of different governmental agencies. From time to time, more comprehensive studies were also prepared to cover special security subjects in like manner. With the Communist Party line having executed an abrupt switch even before V-J Day from active cooperation with the Allied war effort to a ^{more} typical obstructionist behaviour in all susceptible fields of endeavor, the need for military intelligence summaries of that type seemed plainly apparent.*

* Ibid., pp. 3-6.

It looked for a while as if the conduct of this controversial domestic intelligence function by the military intelligence authori-

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ties might actually escape the unfavorable outside pressures that had always built up in the past to handicap its effective performance but such was not to be the case. On 7 December 1945, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, having personally noted a G-2 Domestic Intelligence Situation Summary dated 18 June 1945, queried the Chief of Staff about their "real value" and expressed doubt as to "whether we should continue to put out intelligence reports on subjects like Negroes, Jewish-American and Labor."^{*} Although the cited document

* Memo from Sec War for CofS (S), undated, f/w (7 Dec 45).
DRB TAG. A note appended to the memo shows that the new Chief of Staff, Gen Eisenhower, agreed with the thoughts ~~being~~ expressed in this matter by ~~Secretary~~ Patterson.

was merely a post-VE Day estimate calling attention to certain domestic developments that might threaten the stepped up war effort against Japan, it had been produced in the firm belief there was a fundamental G-2 duty to provide required domestic intelligence which could not be ^{shifted} allocated to any other agency.^{*}

* See: Study (S), "Domestic Intelligence," from Chief MIS to ACoS G-2 (Thru: Policy Staff), 20 Nov 45, MID 350.097, 20 Nov 45.
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The blow fell ^{without delay} ~~right away~~ on 7 December 1945, with MID receiving a markedly terse communication from the Office of the Chief of Staff, signed by Brig. Gen. ^(1st Lt.) H. I. Hodes, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff. ~~It~~ ^{It} ~~communication~~ ^{It} was not only addressed to the ACoS G-2, WDGS, but also to the Commanding Generals AAF, AGF and ASF, and simply notified that "since the war has ended, no evaluation or analysis of the domestic situation by G-2 or by the intelligence agencies of the major commands is considered necessary."^{*}

* See: Special File (S), "Domestic Intelligence," 17 May 48, Tab A (C), CSGID 350.097, 17 May 48 (7 Dec 45). DRB TAG.

This directive, which threatened to abolish the entire domestic intelligence function, was issued without any prior notice to or consultation with the departmental intelligence officials themselves. As usual in such cases, it caused wide repercussions throughout the entire production system and resulted in a considerable confusion of effort for all concerned. A hasty MIS study on the subject found that literal interpretation of the directive would serve to eliminate the position of Domestic Specialist in the agency, do away with the Domestic Desk of its Political-Economic Branch, and seriously curtail a number of counterintelligence activities which were still being performed within the Who's Who Branch. ^{*} More important, though, was the

* IOM, Chief MIS to Chief Policy Staff, 14 Dec 45, G-2 350.097, 14 Dec 45 (7 Dec 45). DRB TAG.

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inescapable fact that the ACOFS G-2, WDGS, would not now be able to keep ^{either} his Chief of Staff or the Army suitably informed regarding domestic situations calling for the possible use of federal troops in an emergency. A vigorous protest, therefore, was promptly entered against full implementation of the directive and, after much discussion, additional instructions were received on 31 January 1946, to allow a grudgingly small amount of domestic intelligence activity along the following lines:

1. Because evaluation and analysis of the domestic situation as carried out during the war is no longer necessary, required information of that nature will be obtained from appropriate civilian agencies.

2. Permissible coverage of the domestic situation outside the Army, for intelligence purposes, is as follows:

a. The development of intelligence of a background nature concerning matters which have a specific bearing on the control of espionage, sabotage, subversion and disaffection within the Army. Liaison with appropriate civilian agencies will be utilized to the maximum for this purpose. Investigative activities in this connection by military agencies will be limited to cases of persons over whom the Army has investigative jurisdiction.

b. The analysis, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence obtained from other agencies bearing on domestic situations will be limited to specific cases in which there is a definite indication that the Army may become involved. The collection of information for this purpose will be limited to the specific cases mentioned and will consist of the receipt of information from appropriate agencies.

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3. Dissemination of this authorized intelligence will be limited strictly to those having a specific need for it.

4. Under MID supervision, ASF is charged with the collection of information within the domestic field outside the Army but MID retains responsibility for ^{the} final evaluation of such information.*

* See: File (S), "Domestic Intelligence," 17 May 48, Tab B (S), CSGID 350.C97, 17 May 48 (7 Dec 45). DRB TAB.

This manifestly impractical solution to the domestic intelligence question failed, of course, to satisfy the military security officials themselves, ^{but} ~~while~~ other major developments were already in the offing which promised to alter the postwar counterintelligence picture even further. The findings of the second Lovett Committee, demanding a thorough rehabilitation of Army intelligence, had recently been accepted by the Secretary of War and those of the Simpson Board on postwar reorganization were also approved for planning purposes by the Chief of Staff. Since the latter board had chosen to recommend the elimination of ASF and the appointment of a Director of Intelligence instead of an ACoS G-2 for the WDGS, the departmental intelligence organization would undoubtedly undergo a number of additional changes in the near future. On 6 March 1946, therefore, General

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Vandenberg created a Special Board to survey the existing organization of MID (MIS) in view of modifications in the War Department Basic Plan for Post-War Military Organization recently caused by the Lovett Committee and Simpson Board reports. One month later, as a result of this survey, he then ordered the trial of an organization for the departmental intelligence agency without any separate or distinct MIS and ^{to include} including a regular Security Branch (Group) under Colonel Forney, the former Chief of Group III, G-2 Policy Staff. *

* See: "General Plan, Organization of Intelligence Division, War Departmental General Staff," p. 2, ACSI, 020. G-2, 15 May 46, f/w (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

The problems facing Colonel Forney at this time to form a new Security Group were both complicated and unique, in that he literally had to start from scratch. While MID was still officially charged only with so-called general staff responsibilities for counterintelligence, if the Simpson Board recommendations were put into effect eliminating ASF the departmental military intelligence agency, ^{then probably} stood to regain ^{probably} all the counterintelligence functions it had lost during the war to the Intelligence Division, ASF. ^{Hence,} The indicated goal was ~~thus~~ to plan for a Security Group which could actually supervise secur-

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ity activities throughout the Army and even conduct counterintelli-
gence operations ^{*} whenever necessary at the War Department level.

His recommended solution to the problem was a noticeably large Secur-
ity Group ^{Totalling} ~~consisting of~~ 182 officers, 35 enlisted men and 96 civil-
ians, ^{which} ~~this included, though,~~ an Army Courier Service Unit of 37 of-
ficers and 7 civilians in Washington plus 97 officers and 23 enlisted
men in the field. ^{*} Neither Colonel Forney nor anyone else in MID de-

* File (C), "Security Group," MID 020. G-2, undated 46, f/w
(11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

sired to take over control of the Army Courier Service but because
it was currently under the Director of Intelligence, ASF, the chances
appeared good that ^{*} the new Security Group would inherit it.

* The Army Courier Service was discontinued effective 30 Nov 46
and simultaneously replaced by a similar AGO Security Courier Service
operating through the Chief of the Army Postal Service. See: Ltr AGO
(C), to CG's AAF, AGF and MDW, MID 311.4, 21 Nov 46 (12 Sep 42). DRB
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The new ID Security Group, as finally recommended by the Spec-
ial G-2 Planning Board and officially approved on 16 May 1946, was in-
tended to be "the agency of the Director of Intelligence for safeguard-

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ing military information and preserving the secrecy of military plans and operations." The Chief of the Security Group was thus held responsible for "planning and supervising the execution of measures necessary to insure the security of War Department operations and intelligence activities and the nullification of the efforts of potentially unfriendly nations to gain useful information of the capabilities and possible plans of the United States." He was also authorized to act for the Director of Intelligence, WDGS, in the following closely related matters:

- a. Formulates and promulgates counterintelligence programs pertaining to the Army.
- b. Formulates, promulgates, and assures proper performance of War Department measures within the Army for safeguarding military information and for the appropriate security classification of documents.
- c. Plans and supervises all countersubversive activities within the Army.
- d. In coordination with the Chief of the Combat Intelligence and Training Group, prescribes Counterintelligence Corps training doctrine; supervises the procurement and allocation of Counterintelligence Corps personnel.
- e. Formulates, promulgates and supervises the execution of policies concerning "Top Secret" control.
- f. Prescribes and supervises the execution of Military Censorship and Civilian Censorship as it affects the War Department; makes available all information obtained from censorship desired by the Chief of the Collection Group.
- g. Maintains close liaison with all government agencies concerned with security and counterintelligence matters affecting the Army.
- h. In coordination with the Chief of the Army Security Agency, insures the security of signal communications and signal intelligence. *

* "General Plan, Organization of Intelligence Division, War De-

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partment General Staff," p. 8, ^{ACSI} 020. G-2, 15 May 46 f/w (11 Jun 46).

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In order to accomplish these ^{varied} various tasks, the ID Security Group was initially organized with a small Planning and Administrative Unit functioning directly under the Deputy Group Chief plus three main branches designed to handle Information Control, Operations and CIC. This arrangement gave both the military censorship and release of information functions to the Information Control Branch but centered all activities concerning investigations on loyalty, disaffection, espionage, subversion and sabotage within the Operations Branch. The Operations Branch further held the function of developing means and methods of escape or evasion by American military personnel ^{in the field}. The CIC Branch was called upon to perform "the administration of the CIC, the formulation of CIC training doctrine and the supervision of the procurement and the allocation of CIC personnel," which turned it practically into a CIC headquarters. Especially noteworthy is the fact that the new ID Security Group did not carry any responsibility for the production of domestic intelligence. This function was new assigned to a Domestic Branch of the Intelligence Group, with the Chief of that Group also required to disseminate "information and intelligence relating to the activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the preservation of the military

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establishment." * Future argument between the ID Security and Intel-

* Ibid., pp. 9-11. The Domestic Branch of the Intelligence Group was renamed the United States Branch, on 11 Jul 46.

ligence Groups over the detailed conduct of this domestic intelligence function could thus be expected.

On 1 April 1946, the ID Security Group was accorded a tentative personnel allotment of 65 officers and 100 civilians. * These opti-

* Memo, Forney for Exec Director MID, 2 May 46, MID 320.2, 2 May 46 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG. Although not specifically mentioned, this tentative allotment probably included personnel for an Army Courier Service element.

mistic totals were never reached, however, as ID itself kept getting more and more additional strength cuts under the terms of ^a the general postwar readjustment. This, ^{situation,} coupled with the fact that the status of a number of important counterintelligence activities continued to remain badly unsettled, handicapped the group severely in the performance of its full military security mission. During the latter part of May 1946, therefore, while protesting against another ^{scheduled} personnel reduction for

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his group, down to 30 officers and 44 civilians exclusive of the Army Courier Service, Colonel Forney felt ^{compelled} constrained to report in writing that ^{the unit} it would then be able to execute only the following ^{curtailed} limited functions:

- a. (1) Administrative supervision suitable for the reduced functions of the group.
(2) Formulation of general policies and plans relating to counterintelligence.
- b. Administration of the Counter Intelligence Corps.
- c. Administration of censorship in occupied areas.
- d. (1) Top Secret control measures for the Intelligence Division.
(2) Cryptographic security supervision for the Army.
- e. (1) Handle matters relating to the security of military information at the War Department level such as arise under AR 380-5.
(2) Handle problems of the release of military information at the War Department level.
(3) Provide the Security Officer for the Intelligence Division.
- f. (1) Provide minimum service in checking on loyalty and integrity of Intelligence Division personnel.
(2) Attempt to continue the program of clearing private plants for classified War Department contracts. Only experience will tell whether this activity can be continued with the available personnel. *

* Memo, Forney for Exec Director ID, 24 May 46, MID 320.2, 24 May 46 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG.

Because it was primarily concerned with foreign intelligence matters, the ^{new} NIA-IAB-CIG system, as organized early in 1946, had little real effect upon the operations of the ID Security Group. The principal coordinating body within the domestic or internal security field was still

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the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), which had been set up in compliance with a Presidential order dated 26 June 1939 and included the Directors of ID, ONI and FBI. Several significant developments bearing upon the military counterintelligence mission did occur, though, between the formal reestablishment of the Security Group on 15 May 1946 and 26 July 1947, when the National Security Act of 1947 was passed not only ^{to create} creating the NSC and CIA but also the Department of Defense with a separate Department of the Air Force. These developments, in brief, were as follows:

1. The military security functions and files that had been held by the Who's Who Branch of the Intelligence Group during World War II were finally returned to the ID Security Group, effective 10 June 1946. The functions involved in this transfer related mostly to "P.L. 808 cases," personnel loyalty checks, and issuing clearances for industrial plants to engage in classified military production.*

* IOM (C), Chief ^{Sec} Group to G-2, O20. ID, 31 May 46 f/w (11 Jun 46). DRG TAG. Sec 3, PL 808, 77th Cong., 17 Dec 42, was specifically designed to facilitate the speedy removal of War and Navy Department employees who were considered dangerous to national security.

2. Shortly before ASF was ^{slated} scheduled to pass out of existence, the WDGS planners decided that some sort of interim instructions would

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be needed to replace the old Emergency Plan White for use in domestic disturbances. Such instructions, ^{originally prepared} prepared at first by the Plans and Operations (P & O) Division without any consultation with MID, were circulated within the War Department for comment or concurrence early in June 1946 and then promptly issued to the field with only minor G-2 changes as requested.

* See: Ltr (C) TAG to CG's AAF, AGF and ASF, sub: Control of Domestic Emergencies (Interim Instructions), MID 350.097, 5 Jun 46 (7 Dec 45). DRB TAG. These G-2 changes were suggested by the Collection Group and concurred in by the Intelligence Group, with the Security Group ^{of fecine} ~~having offered~~ ^{of any sort on the} no comment at all.

3. On 30 January 1946, in accordance with a recent ^{JCS} recommendation from the JCS, SWNCC adopted an expanded policy statement devised by its Technical Intelligence Sub-Committee (TISC) to control the disclosure of classified military information to foreign nations for any reason whatsoever. After this new statement had been duly approved by the President, the name of the TISC was changed to the more fitting State-War-Navy Coordinating Sub-Committee for Military Information Control (SWNCC-MIC).^{*} When ASF was abolished in June 1946, Col.

* SANAC Memorandum for Information No. 113, 21 Jan 48, Appendix "E", Special SMI Branch File. ACSI Rec Sec.

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Charles C. Blakeney of the ID Security Group ^{then} became the Army representative on the SWNCC-MIC and it was through his personal efforts that a registered War Department document, commonly known as WD-DCMI, was prepared and distributed among appropriate Army agencies to spell out in precise detail which foreign nations should receive what military information under ^{the} established SWNCC-MIC policies. The latest WD-DCMI could thus be ^{conveniently} utilized by personnel of AGF, AAF, the Technical Services, ID Foreign Liaison Section and American Military Attache Offices for their needed assistance in releasing this type of information to foreign governments. *

* See: Registered Document (S), AG 350.05, 2 Jan 47, GSA FRC WD-DCMI-46 (Short Title). DRB TAG.

4. The Assistant Secretary of War, on 30 December 1944, had dictated a more liberal ^{and considerate} policy for the ACofS G-2, WDGS, to observe in connection with the handling of subversive or disaffected Army personnel. During February 1945, the highly classified letter announcing this new policy was exactly reproduced in a Washington newspaper and its content proceeded to raise a heated storm of Congressional protest. It was not until approximately one year later, though, well after V-J Day, that the problem of dealing with suspect personnel could be successfully opened up again for reconsideration in the War Department. On 27 Feb-

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ruary 1946, Secretary of War Patterson finally did approve a proposed revision of the earlier instructions which had been submitted to him by General Vandenberg. He even went so far as to advise that the ACofS G-2, WDGS, should take "control over the administration in order to insure uniformity and fairness in the application of policies."^{*}

* Memo (C), Sec War for CofS, 27 Feb 46, MID 000.244, 27 Feb 46 (15 Apr 43). DRB TAG.

These instructions, as implemented effective 9 August 1946, not only rescinded all previous policies inconsistent with them but also called for the immediate preparation of files on known or suspected subversive military personnel so ^{that} appropriate action might be taken in the event of an emergency. Furthermore, ID, GSUSA, was to comprise the central office of record for such files and the ACofS G-2's within each major command were required to maintain a similar central record ^{covering} ~~regarding~~ their own military installations and units.^{*}

* See: Memo (S) Chief Sec Div to Brig Gen McClure, 10 Feb 54, sub: Army policy regarding Communists 1944-45, G-2 000.244, 10 Feb 54 (15 Apr 43). DRB TAG.

5. A potentially dangerous situation had been building up in several ^{American} coal mining areas ever since 21 May 1946, when, to counter the

threat of a nationwide strike on the part of the United Mine Workers led by John L. Lewis, the Government had seized and started to operate the mines. With the dispute coming to a head late in the fall, the War Department, on 19 November 1946, announced that it stood ready "to guard the mines if needed." * This was actually a most op-

* See: Facts on File, VI, p. 373J.

timistic statement because the departmental intelligence agency, by order, still remained totally dependent upon such unsatisfactory outside sources as the FBI, Bureau of Mines, daily press etc., to guide any realistic ^{military} planning in the matter. There was a distinct lack of factual or timely information on which to base military operations and no provision ^{at all} for collecting information to support the preparation of local estimates of the situation. General Chamberlin, therefore, again requested permission from the Chief of Staff for his agency to make long-range studies of conditions which might involve the War Department in domestic disturbances and to initiate the collection of necessary information in the field whenever an involvement of that nature seemed imminent. This request was once more "not favorably considered" * by the Chief of Staff" but the need continued to be strongly felt.

* Memo (S), Chief Sec Group for DI, 13 Dec 46, sub: Intelligence Regarding the Coal Strike, MID 350.097, 13 Dec 46 (7 Dec 45). DRB TAG.

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Hence, on 4 March 1947, at the insistence of the Commanding General, AGF, the major field commands were carefully notified that "within the limitations of present War Department policy, timely reports are desired by ID, WDGS, concerning":

. . . trends and conditions relating to strikes, racial disturbances or other disorders potentially or actually dangerous to the peaceful conduct of internal affairs whenever there is a definite indication that the armed forces of the United States may become involved. Such reports will contain information of a background nature on individuals and organizations, and factual information on events and developments that may require armed intervention. They will include an estimate of the capabilities of dissident elements. *

* Ltr (S) Headquarters AGF, Fort Monroe, Va., to DI, WDGS, 3 Jan 47, and Ltr (S) DI to AGO, Domestic Intelligence Reports, 4 Mar 47; MID 350.097 (7 Dec 45). DRB TAG.

6. An Executive Order, dated 25 November 1946, appointed a "President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty" to inquire into the standards, procedures and organizational provisions needed in investigating civilian employees of the government or applicants for such employment and for removing or disqualifying from government employment any disloyal or subversive person. Chairnened by Mr. A. Devitt Vanech of the Department of Justice and including appropriate representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, War (Under Secretary Kenneth C. Royall), Navy and the Civil Service Commission (CSC), this high level

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body promptly designated a Working Committee to prepare a detailed report on the subject for its subsequent consideration. * The Commis-

* Lt. Col. Innes Randolph, Chief of the Operations Branch, Security Group, ID, was the Military Advisor for this President's Commission.

sion's final report led to the issuance of another Executive Order (9835), on 21 March 1947, which ^{filed} served as basic instructions for the handling of civilian employee loyalty matters during the rest of the Cold War period. The full demands of this new national security program soon proved to be so extensive for the departmental military intelligence agency that, in April 1947, the Chief of the ID Security Group notified the DI, WDGS, there was a requirement for "an estimated 25 military and 52 civilian spaces in the Security Group and 534 military and 337 civilian spaces in the field." * He was unable to secure

* IOM (C), Chief Sec Group to D/I, 2 Apr 47, MID 320.2, 2 Apr 47 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG.

any appreciable personnel increases for ^{that} the purpose, however, so that a tremendous backlog of cases commenced to build up and plague all the counterintelligence officials ^{thereafter.} ~~from then on.~~

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7. When the Office of War Information (OWI) was abolished, effective 31 October 1945, its Security Advisory Board went out right along with it. Since this board had been filling an important national security need, the JCS suggested that the Department of State should assume the function. The State Department authorities, though, questioned the advisability of such action and recommended the creation of a SWNCC subcommittee to accomplish it. On 3 April 1946, SWNCC did appoint a Subcommittee for Security Control, ^{to be} known as the Security Advisory Board (SAB), and, two days later, the War Department designated Col. Charles C. Blakeney from Group III of the G-2 Policy Staff ^{as its} ~~to be the~~ Army member, thereof. Under the terms of reference given to this new SAB, it was called upon to coordinate with other Federal agencies in the development of training programs and procedures for promoting the security of classified information throughout the United States Government. It was thus most logical for EO 9835 ^{later} to direct ~~later~~ that the SAB should draft a set of rules "applicable to the handling and transmission of confidential or other classified documents and information which ought not to be publicly disclosed and, following approval by the President, to constitute minimum security standards for all departments and agencies of the executive branch."^{*}

* SANAC Memorandum for Information No. 113, 21 Jan 48, Appendix "H", Special SMI Branch Files. ACSI Rec Sec.

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8. Brig. Gen. George V. Keyser took over command of the CIC Center, Holabird Signal Depot, Baltimore, Md., from Col. Meredith C. Noble, on 18 April 1947. At that time, General Chamberlin, the DI, WDGS, still held the title of Chief, CIC, but ^{exercised} ~~was exercising~~ his command ^{of the} mainly through the ID Security Group. With the need for changing this indirect command system having become increasingly clear, orders were published to consolidate all activities of the CIC Branch, ID Security Group, at Camp Holabird, effective 1 June 1947. Five days later, General Keyser was appointed ^{to be the} Chief, CIC, and assigned specific responsibility for:

a. The formulation of plans and policies for the efficient utilization of the CIC in its assigned mission as approved by the Director of Intelligence.

b. The formulation and implementation of plans for the CIC Center and its development and operation as approved by the Director of Intelligence. *

* See: ID Cir No 100-9, 10 Jun 47, MID 300.5 (1 Jan 47) and Memo 29, ID WDGS, 10 Jun 47, MID 300.6 (1947-48). ACSI Rec Sec. Head of the CIC Branch at this time was Lt Col (later Col) Charles E. Leydecker, who had come to ID from the Int Div, ASF, in ^{that} ~~the~~ same capacity and now moved on to Camp Holabird to act as Gen Keyser's executive and principal advisor for putting the recently ordered CIC consolidation into effect.

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Passage of the National Security Act, on 26 July 1947, posed a ^{wide} ~~brand new~~ ^{set} ~~series~~ of problems for the ID officials to solve in connection with the transfer of counterintelligence activities and related personnel spaces to the Department of the Air Force. This process was made even more difficult by the fact that the higher Air Force staff organization not only continued to remain in a state of flux but also failed to parallel in any important way the ^{existing} ~~Army~~ general ^{system.} ~~staff.~~ The top Air Force intelligence agency, for example, was placed directly under a Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, while control of the departmental security investigative agency, called the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), was given to an Inspector General personally representing the Chief of Staff, USAF. * Nevertheless, a

* Mr. (later Lt Gen, USAF) Joseph F. Carroll, currently on loan to the AF from the FBI, was assigned to its Inspector General's Office and ^{designated as the} ~~named to be the~~ Director of Special Investigations, in Dec 47. Sec: Dept of Defense, OPI, Press Br, Maj Gen Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, up to date as of Aug 55.

separation agreement was finally reached, on 16 September 1947, between the Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, and Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2 *

* The A-2 at this time was Maj Gen George C. McDonald, USAF, for-

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mer Director of Intelligence, US Air Forces in Europe. His title was changed in Oct 47 to Director of Intelligence, USAF, and he was succeeded, effective 15 May 48, by Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Charles P. Cabell, USAF.

covering CIC operations within the Zone of the Interior, as follows:

(1) Personnel - AF officers on duty with the CIC and CIC officers on duty with AF units will be reassigned to their own departments on a schedule as mutually agreed upon. CIC enlisted men, subject to their own consent, will be transferred to the department in which they are now serving.

(2) Training - The CIC Center at Camp Holabird will continue to train AF personnel until further notice, with the AF furnishing a proportionate share of staff, instructional and civilian personnel therein.

(3) Units - Control, administration, supply and policy direction of the 700th CIC Det. passes to the AF prior to 31 Dec 47.

(4) Supply - No material change until further orders but basic annual requirements ^{are} to be submitted separately by the CIC's of the Departments of the Army and Department of the Air Force for FY 1950.

(5) Investigations -

(a) AF to assume the following functions before 31 Dec 47:
Investigating AF personnel (not including special

investigations called for under EO 9835).

Review of AF P.L. 808 cases.

(b) AF to assume the following functions before 1 Jul 48:

Investigating newly integrated AF officers and USMA graduates.

Clearances of AF commercial facilities, both for plants and personnel.

Maintenance of records in AF cases.

All phases of safeguarding AF information.

Control of the release of classified and unclassified AF information to foreign governments.*

* OCS Memo (S), for Directors WDGS, Chiefs WDSS, etc., 16 Sep 47, sub: Separation of the Air Force from the U. S. Army, CSGID O40. Armed Forces, 16 Sep 47 (22 Oct 45). DRB TAG. These initial agreements were later confirmed in greater detail by appropriate JAAFAR's.

After a series of notably partisan negotiations and conferences at all staff levels, separation agreements for most of the security functions to be transferred from the Army to the Air Force were concluded by the end of ^{1948.} ~~1938.~~ On the other hand, the ID situation with reference to such important matters as military participation in domestic intelligence operations, detection and control of espionage or subver-

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sion ^{within} the field, and security procedures for industrial plants holding classified production contracts still remained badly unsettled. Not only were relations between the Army counterintelligence officials and the FBI becoming increasingly strained under the Delimitations Agreement of 9 February 1942 but also the new National Security Act, ^{by} forming the NSC, Department of Defense, CIA etc., had served to complicate the existing personnel security system to a ^{high} ~~marked~~ degree. One result of this complication was to confront the Army counterintelligence agencies with an ever-mounting load of investigative cases of the following standard types:

- a. Local Agency Check. In this case an Army checks its own files, the files of the appropriate field office of the FBI, the appropriate Naval District, and the local police.
- b. General Agency Check. In this case the matter is referred to the Security Group and a check is made of ID files, national FBI files, ONI files, and often the files of the Un-American Affairs Committee.
- c. Partial Background Investigation. This includes a local or national agency check and the check of a limited number of references or local informers.
- d. Complete Background Investigation. This includes a local or national agency check, a check of a number of references, and a verification of the entire personal history of the individual.
- e. Complaint. This includes a complete background investigation plus varying degrees of surveillance. *

* Memo (C), Chief Sec Group for Gen Bolling, G-2 020. Sec Group, 30 Jul 48. ACSI Rec Sec. A recent check of case backlogs ^{within} at the various Armies and MDW ~~had~~ revealed that some of them ^{had} were "trebled during the past eighteen months."

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Secret instructions were disseminated throughout the Zone of Interior during March 1948, describing Department of the Army responsibilities for the production of domestic intelligence and requesting all field intelligence agencies to forward pertinent reports to the DI, GSUSA, on trends or conditions whenever there was any likelihood that ^{the} armed forces of the United States might have to be employed in "disorders potentially dangerous to the peaceful conduct of internal affairs." These same ^{classified} instructions also presented the recipients with official definitions of the key terms of "Domestic Intelligence," "Strategic Vulnerability Intelligence" and "Foreign Intelligence Information," and stressed the need for ^{complete} full collaboration among the local agencies engaged in internal security activities. There is no evidence, ^{however,} though, ~~to the effect~~ that the ID production authorities ever consulted the FBI before issuing these ^{far-reaching} instructions.*

* Ltr (S), TAG to D/I GSUSA, CG's Z/I Armies and MDW, and Chiefs of Tech Services, 29 Mar 48, sub: Zone of Interior Intelligence, CSGID 350.097, 6 May 48 (7 Dec 45). DRB TAG.

Effective 6 April 1948, against the expressed wishes of both the Chief of the U. S. Branch, Intelligence Group, and Chief of the Security Group, the entire domestic intelligence function, including production, was concentrated under the latter group.* In view of these

Memo (C) No. 13, 6 Apr 48, MID 300.6, Adm Memos 1948. ACSI Rec
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added responsibilities, ¹¹⁰⁰⁰ Colonel Forney was able to prevail upon Maj.
Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) A. R. Bolling, the Acting Director of Intelli-
gence, ^{GSUSA,} to reopen again the question of restrictions being imposed
from above on ID activities within the domestic intelligence field. *

* SS (S) Acting D/I to Deputy CofS, 17 May 48, sub: Domestic
Intelligence, CSGID 350.097, 17 May 48 (7 Dec 45). DRB TAG. Gen
Bolling did not become the ACofS G-2, GSUSA, until 23 Aug 50.

While this latest attempt to remove any of the ^{current} restrictions was not
successful in itself, it did serve to focus fresh attention on the
basic problem and to point directly toward the desirability of seek-
ing some sort of a major revision in the existing MID-ONI-FBI Delimita-
tions Agreement without further delay.

The domestic intelligence problem had recently come to the per-
sonal attention of the Chief of Staff from another source. Early in
April 1948, with the Department of the Army having become gravely
disturbed over the safety of AEC installations throughout the United
States, the Commanding General, Sixth Army, was given a pri-

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mary mission of protecting one such installation located at Hanford, Washington. The ^{ACofS}G-2 of that Army soon found, however, that he was unable to obtain the detailed intelligence coverage he felt was necessary for planning a tactical defense of the Hanford area. While the local AEC Security Officer had readily concurred in this ^{type of} planning, the Special Agent in Charge, Seattle Field Division, FBI, not only refused to agree to any alteration in the current system for collecting subversive information but also took formal note that a proposed temporary use of CIC agents to supplement Army coverage therein would encroach upon the assigned jurisdiction of the FBI under the 1942 Delimitations Agreement. On 29 April 1948, therefore, General Mark W. Clark, Commanding General, Sixth Army, addressed a letter to the Chief of Staff requesting a change in policy so as to permit Army intelligence agencies "to collect subversive information essential to the proper accomplishment of the Army Mission." Forwarded along with ^{this} ~~the~~ letter was a memorandum for General Clark from Brig. Gen. R. B. Pape, the ACofS G-2, Sixth Army, which contained an extremely lucid summarization of the problem. ~~and was~~ ^{it had been} ~~discussed~~ ^{discussed} by the following comment:

It is believed that the cause of these recurring jurisdictional difficulties is deepseated, and springs from a basic difference in concept of subversive intelligence. Federal Bureau of Investigation's responsibility is primarily for accumulation of admissible evidence to provide the basis for legal action against individuals or organizations, usually for acts which are already completed. To the extent that the Army has responsibilities with regard to subversive elements among the civilian population, the aim is primarily to forestall acts of violence or to prevent the spread of disorder; anticipatory planning is essential and advance information on trends

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and developments must be continuously available. With such divergent orientation, difficulties are inevitable if either agency holds an exclusive jurisdiction that impairs the other's mission. *

* Incl to Ltr (S), Headquarters Sixth Army to CofS, USA, 29 Apr 48, sub: Jurisdiction for Subversive Intelligence, G-2 310.11, 29 Apr 48 (5 Aug 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

The domestic intelligence dispute soon grew to reach the point where Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall and Attorney General Thomas C. Clark were corresponding directly with each other in an attempt to settle it. By 12 July 1948, though, when it had become plainly apparent that ^{this} high level correspondence was not going to help the immediate matter of protecting AEC field installations, the Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, obtained authority from Secretary Royall to have the Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, try to arrange informally with the Director, FBI, for the Army Commander "to make such reconnaissance and to contact such law enforcement agencies in the area as he deems necessary to discover any assemblage of persons which may offer the threat of an attack against such installation." ^{* No twitting standing} Never-

* Memo (S) for the Secretary of the Army initialed OMB, 12 Jul 48, incl 2 to SS (S) D/I to CofS and Secy of Army, 27 Aug 48, sub: Domestic Intelligence, G-2 310.11, 27 Aug 48 (5 Aug 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

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theless, the problem continued to resist any satisfactory solution *and*
~~and~~ ^{so} it was simply held in abeyance pending future developments.

Back in September 1947, the IIC had appointed an ad hoc committee for the specific purpose of looking into the need of a further revision in the wartime Delimitations Agreement ^{*} but its members could

* One postwar revision had been made during Mar 46, when the Navy agreed to restore sole responsibility to the FBI for uncovering Japanese espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage in American territory. See: Ltr TAG B-C-B-M 383.4 (5 Mar 46), 19 Mar 46, f/w MID 310.11, 19 Mar 46 (5 Aug 41). ACSI Rec Sec.

never come to any firm decisions on the subject. There was always the stubborn question of whether or not to permit the Army to increase its domestic intelligence activities. In this same connection, the Attorney General ^{proceeded to raise} ~~soon raised~~ a great furore by interpreting a provision of EO 9835 to mean that the FBI alone was responsible for the conduct of all investigations of civilians which revealed any derogatory information. Also, on 30 October 1947, President Truman announced at a Cabinet meeting that the FBI was the only department of the government authorized to make loyalty investigations and there would be no exceptions *permitted*. This constituted a complete reversal of the 1942 Delimitations Agreement because the military security agencies could ^{now} no longer investi-

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gate their own civilian employees. The problem ^{then} ~~soon~~ ^{thus} became promptly acute overseas, where the responsibility of the military commander for maintaining security within his entire command had always been accepted as being supreme. To make matters worse, although the FBI admittedly held the total investigative function for civilians, it had neither the personnel nor the facilities available overseas to perform it. New procedures, therefore, were eventually agreed upon to specify that, following a request from the FBI, the Services could investigate their own civilians if they resided outside ^{of} the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico or ~~the~~ Virgin Islands.

* See: File (S), MID 000.24, 7 Oct 47 (16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

During July 1948, with the IIC ad hoc committee still in disagreement about revising the Delimitations Agreement and the situation relative to loyalty investigations for civilian employees of the Army getting constantly more and more involved, Colonel Forney persuaded Mr. W. G. McNeil, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, to address a letter to Mr. Donald S. Dawson in the White House, requesting return of the personnel security system as it had existed before the issuance of EO 9835. ^{*} A meeting of all interested parties was then held at the

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* See: CSGID 000.24, 8 Jul 48 (16 Dec 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

White House but no changes stemmed therefrom. Finally, based upon direct negotiations among the IIC members themselves, a new Delimitations Agreement was signed, effective 23 February 1949, by S. LeRoy Irwin, Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army; Thos. B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence; J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General, U. S. Air Force. Published to the Army in the form of a Special Regulation, ^{dated} on 5 April 1949, this new agreement showed no appreciable gain in ^{regard} respect to the domestic intelligence problem but it did straighten out some of the more difficult questions concerning loyalty investigations for civilians. ^{Accordingly, ID was} ~~ID~~ was thus now held responsible for cases falling under a category of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage, as follows:

1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.
2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the United States, the territories of Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in areas other than the United States, the territories of Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have ramifications in the United States, the territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands or Alaska.

4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein, including possessions of the United States other than the territories of Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any important developments.

6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts. *

* DA SR 380-320-1, 5 Apr 49, "Military Security, Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies," par 3 III.

While the signing of this new Delimitations Agreement was undoubtedly the most significant military security development occurring between the passage of the National Security Act in July 1947 and the sudden opening of the Korean War some three years later, several other noteworthy events also took place during that same period. Listed chronologically, these events were, as follows:

8 November 1947 - In compliance with EO 9835, the Civil Service Commission appointed a twenty member Loyalty Review Board headed by Mr. Seth W. Richardson, prominent D. C. attorney. This board then *functioned as* ~~comprised~~ the highest administrative panel of the Government in acting upon cases of civilian employees recommended for discharge on grounds connected with disloyalty. *

* See: Facts on File, VII, p. 354B.

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30 August 1948 - Mr. William H. Draper, Under Secretary of the Army, ruled that the CIC would be responsible for investigating all persons in Germany and Austria who applied to come to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.*

* Memo for Record, signed Barlow, 20 Aug 48, MID 322.999, 30 Aug 48. DRB TAG.

10 November 1948 - A Special Regulation was published prescribing in detail how subversive or disaffected personnel might be discharged from the Army. Its main paragraph called attention to the fact that anyone who had been associated with a. Sabotage or espionage; b. Treason or sedition; c. Advocacy of revolution; d. Intentional unauthorized disclosure of classified matter; e. Acts in the interest of another government; f. Membership in or sympathetic association with groups or people who wish to overthrow the government or had been designated by the Attorney General as subversive, could be summarily discharged by order of the Secretary of the Army. Each enlistee, therefore, was required to note on his enlistment papers that he had read this particular paragraph and to certify ^{that} he had never engaged in any _A disloyal or subversive activities.*

* SR 600-220-1, 10 Nov 48.

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9 December 1948 - Under direct pressure from General Irwin, the new DI, GSUSA, another attempt was made to settle the controversial question of where the domestic intelligence production function belonged within the ID organization by returning the entire Domestic Security Branch from the Security Group to the Intelligence Group. The next day an agreement was reached in conference relative to re-
connected therewith,
responsibility for specific activities, as follows:

a. Security Group will deal with the FBI and other national security agencies on all counterintelligence matters involving investigations and exchange of information about personnel who are or have been in the Army, and commercial concerns holding classified contracts.

b. Eurasian Branch, Intelligence Group, will cover actions of the Soviet Union, including its satellites, agencies and individuals working toward Soviet objectives, wherever such actions may happen. This Branch will also arrange for direct liaison with the FBI *to assist in* ~~in respect to~~ the production of domestic subversive intelligence.

c. Advance Planning Section, Intelligence Group, will produce all intelligence bearing upon the strategic vulnerability
*
of the United States.

* Memo for Record (C), O20. ID, Domestic Security Branch, 10 Dec 48 (9 Dec 48). ACSI Rec Sec.

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20 December 1948 - In an effort to reduce the total number of key subordinates ^{operating} ~~functioning~~ directly under his immediate authority, General Irwin ordered the adoption of ~~a completely unrealistic or~~ ^{an impractical, overly simplistic} organization for the departmental military intelligence agency which, among other things, forced the Security Group and Training Group with their entirely disparate functions to combine into a single Security and Training Group.*

* Corrected Copy Memo #27, GSUSA ID, 20 Dec 48, MID 300.6 (1948-47). ACSI Rec Sec.

17 February 1949 - ID concurred in a P&O comment declaring that primary responsibility for the Escape and Evasion (MIS-X) function should rest with the latter division instead of the departmental military intelligence agency. This proposition was further complicated, though, by the fact that the function also held important training implications, which brought the O&T Division ~~directly~~ into the picture. The eventual result was that no conclusive action was taken to improve escape and evasion techniques or procedures by any of the Army general staff divisions before the opening of the Korean ^{Conflict} ~~war~~.

* See: BATED (S) 319.1, 17 Feb 49 (1 May 46) and DF (TS) G-3 to G-2, 235.6, 17 Oct 50 (10 Oct 50). ACSI Rec Sec.

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28 March 1949 - The SMI Branch of the Security and Training Group finally managed to gain departmental approval for a Censorship Plan ~~that~~ it had been working on ^{during} for the past several years. A SECRET letter was ~~then~~ ^{this} dispatched to the field commanders directing them to initiate planning for Army control of postal censorship in the event of an emergency.*

* BATED (S), 319.1, 28 Mar 49 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

6 June 1949 - With the President having approved a NSC recommendation to the effect that SANACC should be dissolved on 30 June 1949, the Security Advisory Board (SAB) of SANACC was officially permitted to disband ^{and} ~~and~~ SANACC-MIC ^{then} ~~then~~ simply ceased to exist. The latter sub-committee was soon replaced, however, by a new State-Defense Military Information Control Committee capable of performing the same function.*

* SANACC 12/16, 6 Jun 49, p. 38 and SANACC Memo for Information #161, undated; SMI Br File. ACSI Rec Sec.

18 July 1949 - NSC announced a formal charter for the IIC, with Army, Navy, Air Force and FBI membership, and also created a new Interdepartmental Committee of Internal Security (ICIS) to be composed of "representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury and Justice and the National Military Establishment."*

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* NSC 17/6 (C), 18 Jul 49, ~~18 Jul 49~~, f/w 380.01, 18 Jul 49
(19 Oct 48). DRB TAG.

3 August 1949 - The Secretary of Defense having recently expressed a desire to centralize all industrial and personnel security clearances under an Army-Navy-Air Force Personnel Security Board which would be subject to review by ^{his own} the Industrial Employment Board, ID was forced to transfer certain industrial clearance functions from its Security and Training Group to the Office of the Provost Marshal General. Shortly afterwards, Mr. Gordon Gray, the Acting Secretary of the Army, named the Provost Marshal General to represent him in handling these particular matters. ^{*} *the same*

* See: Special File G-2 380.01, Transfer of Industrial Security Functions from ID to OPMG, 29 Apr and 3 Aug 49. DRB TAG.

29 August 1949 - The Secretary of Defense issued an official policy statement covering personnel clearances "at the Seat of Government." This statement was then promptly disseminated throughout the Army for the purpose of notifying what types of investigation should be satisfactorily completed on personnel seeking access to classified information within the Washington, D. C. area. ^{*}

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* D/A Memo 380-160-1, 29 Aug 49.

31 October 1949 - A widely attended conference of CIC detachment commanders and key military security officials was opened at Fort Holabird under personal auspices of the new Chief, CIC, Brig. Gen. John K. Rice. Full discussion was encouraged at this conference with reference to all aspects of current CIC problems, including ~~the~~ ^{that} positive steps ought to be taken to control subversion in the Army establishment.

* Report (S), CIC Detachment Commanders Conference, 31 Oct 49-9 Nov 1949, MID 337, 2 Feb 50 (3 Sep 47). Gen Rice was assigned to the CIC Center effective 6 Jun 49 but did not receive his appointment as Chief, CIC, until after his predecessor, Brig Gen Edwin A. Zundel, had departed on 18 Aug 49.

7 April 1950 - A Central Personality Index was established at Fort Holabird in order to speed up clearance procedures on military and former military personnel, and Army civilian employees. This new facility could ~~thus~~ be first consulted for ^{information about} any person who had been investigated since 1 September 1939, prior to continuing any

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further searches in the field files as indicated.

* Ltr, TAG to CG's etc., 000.24, 7 Apr 50 (16 Dec 46). ACSI
Rec Sec.

The sudden outbreak of war in Korea on 25 June 1950, therefore, found the departmental intelligence agency not only performing typical general staff functions within the military security field but also actually executing a considerable number of counterintelligence operations. This ^{happened} despite the fact that under a major Department of the Army reorganization in April 1950, the Director of Intelligence had again become an ACoS G-2, ^{GSUSA, merely} and was just charged with rendering advice on counterintelligence matters and supervising counterintelligence activities. * While steps had been duly taken right after this reor-

* SR 10-5-1, 11 Apr 50, par 37.

ganization to devise a new Special Regulation for the organization and functions of the Office of the ACoS G-2, GSUSA, it was not finally published until October 1951, * so the current Special Regulation, dated

* SR 10-¹²⁰~~2~~-1, 10 Oct 51.

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14 September 1949, still applied. It called for a combined Security
*
and Training Group (Division) to accomplish the following counterin-

* In Mar 50, the designation of the ~~Z~~ Security and Training Group was changed to the Security and Training Division.

telligence tasks:

- a. Formulates, promulgates, and supervises counterintelligence programs pertaining to the Army.
- b. Establishes counter-measures against efforts to gain unauthorized access to classified information pertaining to plans, operations, and capabilities of the Army.
- c. Initiates, controls, reviews, and recommends final action on certain types of security investigations of military and civilian personnel connected with the Army.
- d. Promulgates and interprets policy on the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and their nationals, the United States Government, nongovernmental agencies, industry, and private individuals.
- e. Monitors release of classified information to foreign governments.
- f. Formulates, promulgates, and exercises supervision over measures for safeguarding classified military information and over plans for Army participation in military, civil, national, and prisoner of war censorship.
- g. Reviews and recommends Army policy on legislation affecting the security of military information.
- h. Reviews action taken on investigations of security violation in accordance with paragraph 17, AR 380-5.
- i. Provides staff consultation on security policy and practices. *

* SR 10-120-1, 14 Sep 49, par 20.

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Although military security operations of every type had expanded enormously during this Cold War period, the authorized strength of the ID Security Group (~~DIVISION~~) failed to show any proportionate increase. The group was given a tentative personnel allotment of 65 officers and 100 civilians when it was reestablished in April 1946, which included provision for an Army Courier Service Unit, but this optimistic goal could never be reached. ^{As a matter of fact,} ~~The~~ *the* very next month, its Chief received instructions to effect a strength reduction down to 30 officers and 44 civilians without the Army Courier Service Unit. By the end of January 1950, with departmental security activities at a brand new peak in intensity, the personnel allocations for the two counterintelligence branches of the ^{combined} ID Security and Training Group came to only 36 officers and 41 civilians. They were then distributed, as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Civilians</u>
Operations Branch --	29	36
SMI Branch --	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTALS	36	41 *

* Chart giving Mission, Strength and Major Functions of ID, GSUSA, ^{G-2} 020. G-2, 31 Jan 50. ACSI Rec Sec.

Even though the basic Army security function had ^{finally} ~~eventually~~ been



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restored to the ACoS G-2, WDGS, following World War II, he still remained seriously handicapped in its proper performance by crippling restrictions placed on activities of that nature from above. The two main areas where such handicaps were most strongly felt lay in his continued inability to produce domestic intelligence for supporting the possible use of federal troops in an emergency and the lack of any fitting control over the formulation of effective policies or procedures designed to uncover subversion throughout the military establishment. Thus, the Army was not only prevented from undertaking the anticipatory planning which normally forms an essential part of successful military operations but also blocked in maintaining suitable safeguards in order to protect itself against sabotage from within. It seems most difficult to accept the true necessity for these imposed restraints, especially as under the unusual conditions of Cold War. American lives were plainly at stake.

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CHAPTER VII

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

The Basic Plan for the Postwar Military Establishment, as originally forwarded to the Chief of Staff by the Special Planning Division (SPD) in April 1945, called for a separate and distinct Military Intelligence School. Even though this part of the plan had been fully coordinated within the WDGS prior to its submission, General Thomas T. Handy, the Deputy Chief of Staff, contended that intelligence training should be done in the troop schools rather than on a centralized basis. With the Chief of Staff concurring "generally" in the comments ^{made} expressed on the plan by his Deputy, SPD proceeded to prepare a revised draft which, among other things, eliminated the provision for a Military Intelligence School. Protesting against this action, General Bissell, the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, on 27 July 1945, dispatched another memorandum to SPD through OPD, not only to point out once more the ^{great} ~~dire~~ need for a postwar Military Intelligence School but also to present an altered course of instruction for it that was designed to meet several earlier stated objections. Nevertheless, when the Basic Plan was finally published during November 1945, the only reference to such a school could be found in the section devoted to explaining the new ^{Army} school system, ~~for the Army~~, which read as follows:

For planning, it may be assumed that each school now operating will continue to be operated in the postwar Army (except that decision to continue a separate military intelligence school in the postwar system will be made after a complete study has been submitted by G-2). *

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* "The War Department Basic Plan for the Post War Military Establishment, November 1945" (S), MID 320, 9 Nov 45 (27 Aug 45), p. 68. ACSI Rec Sec.

Meanwhile, with the advent of V-J Day in August 1945, it had become promptly necessary for General Bissell to take some sort of positive action regarding the future status of intelligence training at the Military Intelligence Training Center (MITC), Camp Ritchie, Md., especially in ^{view}light of the recent failure of higher authority to endorse the proposed plan for a postwar Military Intelligence School. On 11 September 1945, therefore, after ^{holding}a representative conference *in within* MID on the subject, he formally notified the Commandant, MITC, of the following decisions in the matter:

1. CIC training will be transferred to the CIC Center (ASF) at Fort Meade, Md., upon completion of the class beginning 17 September 1945.

2. AGF training at MITC will be discontinued on or about 15 October 1945, with the instructor personnel and training aids transferred as requested by AGF so that photo interpreter and order of battle training may still be carried out in other schools.

3. Russian linguists now at the MITC will remain there pending reassignment, which should be completed before 1 November 1945.

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4. It is planned to activate a Foreign Liaison Detachment at Camp Ritchie, composed of the Spanish and Portuguese linguistic personnel currently stationed therein.

5. PACMIRS and GERMAN MIRS^(GMD'S) are to be concentrated at Camp Ritchie in the near future. It is estimated that they will then have a combined strength of ^{about} 400 persons.

6. The Commandant, MITC, should take immediate steps to reduce the number of administrative and service personnel stationed at Camp Ritchie, in line with his changed mission.

7. Care must be taken to preserve the wealth of training aids, equipment, materiel and records of the MITC.*

* "Camp Ritchie History, Supplement for the Period 1 Jan 45 - 15 Oct 45," II (S), Appendix IV. ACSI Rec Sec. Col Mercer C. Walter ~~had~~ replaced Brig Gen Charles Y. Banfill as Commandant, MITC, on 2 Jan 45. ASF ~~had~~ directed the opening of a CIC Center at Fort George G. Meade, Md., effective 13 Jul 45, but, when this location proved to be unsuitable, it was moved to Camp Holabird, Baltimore, Md., in Nov 45.

There still seemed to be some measure of hope for an appropriately centralized Army Intelligence School, ^{when} with the Chief of Staff, on 23 November 1945, ^{announced} announcing the appointment of a War Department Mili-

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tary Education Board under the presidency of Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow. This board was given the mission of "preparing a plan for the postwar education system of the Army" and specifically directed to consider "the recommendations of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 War Department General Staff, for the need of intelligence training." * As a matter of fact, it did ^{endorse} recommend the creation of an "In-

* Ltr, TAG to officers concerned, 23 Nov 45, sub: WD Military Education Board, AG 334 Mil Ed Bd (16 Nov 45). DRB TAG. In addition to its President, this board included members of Maj Gen rank representing AGF, AAF and ASF. Gen Gerow, who commanded the V Corps *in World* War II from its D-Day landing on Omaha Beach until 15 Jan 45 and was then given command of a newly organized Fifteenth Army, had just been assigned as the Commandant, Command and General Staff School, Ft Leavenworth, Kan.

telligence College" of notably broad scope, in order "to insure the most effective over-all organization and operation of intelligence and counterintelligence services." Higher authority again disapproved this provision, ^{*} however, so the postwar military

* "Report of WD Mil Ed Bd, 5 Feb 46," Annex 7, Intelligence College, p. 33, G-2 350 (1 Dec 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

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intelligence effort was deprived of any sort of a centralized training facility ^{for training} during the Cold War right from the start.

One favorable development did occur within the intelligence training field during the immediate postwar period, when the Chief of Staff, early in November 1945, approved a flexible program for training "small groups of Regular Officers (or those temporary officers whose retention is assured) in the Russian and Chinese languages." * A companion plan

* MID WDGS Memo, 5 Nov 45, sub: Processing of Language Officers, MID 300.6 (1945). ACSI Rec Sec.

to give Japanese language training was also under active consideration at the same time, with its approval expected in the near future. *

* This plan was actually approved on 23 Nov 45. See: SS, ACofS G-2 to CofS, 19 Nov 45, G-2 350.03, 27 Nov 45 (1 Nov 45). DRB TAG.

these steps ^{could} formed an opening wedge in reinstituting the prewar language and area training program which had always ^{proved to be} been so extremely valuable in the past, a special coordinating system was promptly devised in MID (MIS) to select students for ^{that type of} such assignments, as follows:

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a. Chief, Training Branch, at the proper time, to request student nominations from the major commands, or from theaters or other agencies, through the Chief of the Personnel Branch.

b. Upon receipt of these nominations, tentative student selection for final ACSI G-2 approval to be made jointly by the:

- (1) Chief, Training Branch (Steering Member)
- (2) Director of Information, MIS
- (3) Appropriate Foreign Specialist, MIS
- (4) Chief, Personnel Branch

c. Chief, Training Branch, to arrange for the necessary courses of instruction at civilian and government institutions, both here and abroad, in close coordination with the Director of Information, MIS.

d. Chief, Training Branch, in cooperation with the Director of Information, MIS, to see that required instructions are issued to the MA's or overseas theaters for governing the conduct of courses abroad.

* MID WDGS Memo, 5 Nov 45, sub: Processing of Language Officers, MID 300.6 (1945). ACSI Rec Sec.

Although the G-3 (O&T) Division ^{had been} ~~was~~ charged with the general staff function of arranging for the training of foreign nationals at

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United States Army schools after World War II, the G-2 (ID) Division continued to remain intimately involved in all such activity both from the military security and foreign liaison standpoint.*

* Basic policy ~~relative to~~^{on} the training of foreign nationals in U. S. Service Schools for the rest of the war and during the initial postwar period was established by the JCS, ~~as~~^{as} approved by SWNCC, in a Statement of Policy #21 (C), published on 9 Jun 45.

In this ^{same} connection, it soon became desirable for the War Department to develop a new set of policies and procedures covering the selection of Latin American students for attendance at Army schools in Panama which were being organized by the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, under the terms of an Executive Order issued in 1938.* One of

*EO 7964, 29 Aug 38, implementing an Act of Congress (52 Stat 1034) which authorized the President to permit citizens of the American Republics to attend government schools in the United States.

these procedures, announced on 16 November 1945, directed the U. S. Military Mission Chief concerned to handle all matters bearing upon training subjects or student quotas and to make an original ten-



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tative selection of individual students. This tentative student list would then be presented to the corresponding U. S. Military Attache and no foreign student sent to Panama unless ^{the latter} ~~that~~ officer had approved of him.

* Ltr (C), Chief of Foreign Br, MIS, to all MA's in Latin America, 16 Nov 45, MID 350.02, 16 Nov 45 (12 Jun 45). DRB TAG.

The question of training foreign military personnel in U. S. Army schools came to the fore again upon termination of the Lend Lease Act, effective 30 June 1946. This act had served to furnish a very handy means for supporting such training but after its expiration the only legal authority remaining available for that purpose applied to Latin Americans or members of the new Philippine Army. ^{*} As an interim meas-

* PL 454, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 26 Jun 46, gave the President authority to provide instruction and training to Philippine military and naval personnel over a period of five years, commencing 4 Jul 46.

ure, pending the passage of further legislation on the subject, Republic of China personnel were still undergoing training in various U. S. Army schools and Canadians would probably soon be authorized special training privileges under a proposed Inter-American Military Cooperation Act ^{*} but that was all. With the War Department continuing



* A provision of that nature was contained in the Army Appropriation Act for FY 1946-47 (PL 515, 79th Cong., 2d sess.), passed on 16 Jul 46.

to receive a great many requests from other foreign nations for permission to send their respective personnel to ^{numerous} certain U. S. Army schools, the Director of Organization and Training, GSUSA, recommended that, for the time being, this type of training should be limited strictly to a token basis and ^{conducted} held at no expense to the American Government. * Nevertheless, by 10 October 1946, foreign nationals with

* SS (S), WDGT for CofS approval, 18 Jul 46, MID 350.2, 18 Jul 46 (12 Jun 45). DRB TAG.

necessary clearances from ID were actually in or committed to attendance at U. S. Army schools, as follows:

Country	AGF	Tech. & Adm. Serv.	AAF	Comd. & Staff Col.	JCS
Bolivia			21		
Brazil		31			
Canada	8	10	3	5	1
Chile	11	3		12	
China	57	159		10	
Colombia	2			4	
Cuba				1	
Ecuador	2	1	12		
El Salvador	6			1	
England	2	1		5	
France				2	



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Guatemala	14	1	10	2	
Haiti				1	
Mexico	13	12	6		
Peru		2		10	
Philippines	18	18		5	
Siam				2	
Turkey			4		
Uruguay	1			3	
Venezuela	2	2	50	1	
	<u>136</u>	<u>240</u>	<u>106</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>1</u> *

* "Compilation of Foreign Nationals Who Are Attending Army Schools, or For Whom Commitments Have Been Made To Attend Schools as of 10 October 1946," MID 350.2, 10 October 1946 (12 Jun 45). DRB TAG. The AAF had also recently agreed to train 233 pilots and 1092 technicians for the Republic of China.

The authorized strength of the MID Training Branch on V-J Day had been reduced to just 4 officers, 1 enlisted man and 2 civilians because most of the G-2 intelligence training responsibilities were then being carried out either at the MITC, Camp Ritchie, Md., or the MIS Language School (MISLS), Fort Snelling, Minn. Furthermore, it was not called upon to execute any general staff-type training functions as they were being performed by Group II of the G-2 Policy Staff. Even after MITC was closed in October 1945, the main duties of the branch (group) ^{were} ~~remained~~ to supervise the affairs of MISLS and foreign language classes at other government institutions, make arrangements for special training in civ-

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ian schools, compile and maintain statistical data on the procurement, availability and assignment of intelligence specialists, and secure training aids and literature as required.

* "Report on Intelligence Matters" (S) to Asst Secty of War for Air from: ACoS G-2, 26 Oct 45, p. 6, MID 350.09, 26 Oct 45 (6 Apr 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

With this decentralized system of responsibility for intelligence training having failed to work out in a satisfactory manner, the special MID board ^{that} which was appointed on 4 March 1946 to survey the G-2 organization in light of the Simpson Report dated 29 November 1945, recommended the establishment of a "strong" Operations Group within ID, WDGS, comprising four large branches, ^{respectively} designed to administer intelligence schools, handle matters pertaining to intelligence training for troops, accomplish training liaison, and supervise map and photo activities. * Hence, ^{thus} an organization along these lines was adopted by Gen-

* "Informal Report of Special Board on G-2 Organization" (S), 19 Mar 46, Tab "I", G-2 020. G-2, 19 Mar 46 (15 Apr 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

eral Vandenberg for the trial run of a non-MIS departmental intelligence agency ~~that~~ he ordered to commence on 6 April 1946. It was not

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officially approved until 16 May 1946, though, under the terms of the MID charter derived from the Simpson Board reorganization of the WDGS and Army ^{which abolished} abolishing the ASF. The new organization called for a large Combat Intelligence and Training Group of 132 persons (57 military and 75 civilian), divided into five functional branches designated ^{respectively} as: Civilian Components, Career Management, Troop and Training, School, and Map and Photography. Because the Chief of this Combat Intelligence and Training Group could ^{now} be both a general staff officer and an operator, he was assigned the following supervisory tasks:

- a. Supervises the activities of the Combat and Intelligence and Training Group.
- b. Supervises combat intelligence activities, and intelligence and counterintelligence training, throughout the Army, including the Military Intelligence Reserve, the National Guard, and the necessary intelligence specialists.
- c. Supervises formulation of policies and issues directives pertaining to intelligence training, the conduct of intelligence and language schools, the arrangements of courses of instruction in civilian educational institutions, and for the special training of intelligence personnel by outside agencies at home and abroad.
- d. Supervises the establishment of and coordinates the activities relating to schools and special courses required for the training of Military Intelligence personnel.
- e. Supervises the formulation of policies relating to the management of intelligence careers for selected Army officers.
- f. Coordinates War Department strategic mapping and photographic programs. *

* "General Plan, Organization of the Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff," pp. 11-15, ACSI 020. G-2, 15 May 46 f/w (11 Jun 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

The most significant change in the intelligence training situation caused by the Simpson Board reorganization of the ^{and Army,} WDCS, effective 11 June 1946, stemmed from the fact that no mention was made whatsoever of the intelligence training function in the mission given to the Director of Intelligence, ^{WDCS.} The deliberate intent had been not only to concentrate all departmental responsibility for training activities under a new Director of Organization and Training, ^{WDCS,} but also, now that the Commanding General, AGF, was going to be an actual troop commander, charge him with supervision over combat intelligence, counterintelligence and reconnaissance training ^{throughout} in the field. A solution of that nature to the intelligence training problem, ^{aimed at} excluding the departmental military intelligence authorities from any direct participation in it, had ~~of course~~ been tried before and found wanting. It completely ignored the necessary training of intelligence specialists as previously accomplished within the MITC and, ~~because~~ since there would not be any high level intelligence college along the lines recommended by the Gerow Board, the net result was a period of confusion and neglect for most phases of intelligence training. Many of the more noteworthy events which did occur in connection with such training, ~~at this time,~~ therefore, were designed to fill serious voids, as follows:

1. During May 1946, approval was obtained from higher authority to initiate a system whereby carefully selected Latin American military personnel could receive training in the "principles of strategic

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intelligence and the organization and operation of a type Military Intelligence Service.^{*)} This instruction, which was promptly and successfully applied to Uruguay, Guatemala and Peru, consisted first of having the foreign officers concerned each attend a brief course in ID emphasizing the mechanics of intelligence administration, followed by the assignment of an ID intelligence expert on temporary duty for several months within the foreign country to act as a technical adviser ^{throughout} the early stages of its intelligence reorganization.
*

* See: Special File (S), Organization of Intelligence for Guatemalan Army, MID 353. Intelligence (30 Apr 45); Special File (C), Training of Peruvian Officers in Strategic Intelligence, MID 350.2 Peru (27 May 21); Ltr (C), MA Uruguay to FLO, MID 350.2 Uruguay, 27 Mar 47 (18 Jun 41). IRB TAG.

2. With pressures constantly mounting for the Army to release Fort Snelling, Minn. to the Veterans Administration and consequent efforts to shift MISLS to the Far East Command (FEC) continuing to encounter ^{determined} strong resistance from the ^{top} ~~occupation~~ officials thereof, it was finally considered advisable, despite Sixth Army opposition, to move the school to the Presidio of Monterey, Calif., effective 11 June 1946. At the time of this transfer, MISLS carried an authorized strength of 57 officers, 290 enlisted men and 148 civilians,

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while functioning primarily as a Japanese language school in order
to train personnel for FEC assignment.*

* See: Staff Study, MID 320.2, 3 May 46 f/w (24 Aug 46). ACSI
Rec Sec.

3. The Deputy Chief of Staff, on 12 June 1946, approved a G-3-
sponsored proposal to have ID train several groups of not more than
"25 officers at any one time," ^{commencing} starting about 15 August 1946, for the
purpose of developing some 20 instructors for the recently created
School of Intelligence, Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kan.* A temporary instructional staff consisting of 9 additional

* SS G-3 for DCofS, 5 Jun 46, sub: Strategic Intelligence In-
structors, incl G-2 Memo for CofS, 3 Jun 46, MID 353. Int C&GSS,
5 Jun 46 f/w (11 May 46). DRB TAG. Head of this School of Intel-
ligence, ~~at the~~ Command and Staff College, was Col Horton V. White,
ACofS G-2 of the Sixth Army during World War II.

officers with needed clerical help was thus assigned to ID, not only
to assist the Intelligence Group in presenting a ten-week course for
that special purpose but also to continue training "officer and civ-
ilian replacements for the Intelligence Division, WDGS, and for

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orientation and training of Military Attaches" which had been going on in the form of four-week strategic intelligence classes since October 1945.* Called at first the War Department Intelligence School,

* Memo, D/I for CofS, 2 Jul 46, sub: Training of Instructional Staff, School of Intelligence, Command and Staff College, MID 353. Int C&GSS, 2 Jul 46 f/w (11 May 46) and "WD Strategic Intelligence School Course #1" (S), ID 352.11 SIS undated (29 Jul 46). DRB TAG. Commandant (Class Director) of these four-week strategic intelligence classes in MIS was Canadian Col C. A. Krug, an Order of Battle research specialist.

this expanded training course was often referred to as the Strategic Intelligence School (SIS) and, on 30 December 1946, it became officially accepted under the latter name by the Chief of Staff as constituting one of the Army's Special Service Schools.* A War Department Cir-

* SS D/I to CofS through D O&T, sub: Designation of Special Service School, MID 352 SIS, 18 Dec 46. DRB TAG.

cular, dated 11 January 1947, then formally announced the establishment of a Strategic Intelligence School in The Pentagon, Washington, D. C., under direct supervision of the Director of Intelligence, WDGS, "to train and instruct intelligence officers in the aspects of strategic intelligence."*

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* WD Cir No. 10, 11 Jan 47. See also: AR 350-150, 20 Jan 47, Military Education - Strategic Intelligence School. Commandant of the SIS at this time was Lt Col (later Col) Frederick H. Gaston, Jr.

4. While MITC itself had been closed down in October 1945, there were several intelligence activities still being conducted at Camp Ritchie, Md. With the ordered phase-out gradually continuing, *though* ~~though~~, a Foreign Liaison Interpreters Detachment was transferred from there to Fort Hunt, Va. during March 1946 and the ~~following~~ *next following* month both PACMIRS and the GMIS were moved to Washington, D. C. The ACoFS G-2, WDGS, *then notified* ~~could thus notify~~ the Commanding General, ASF, that he would not need Camp Ritchie after 1 May 1946 and the final morning report for Camp Ritchie was dated 19 June 1946.*

* See: File, MID 323.11 Camp Ritchie, 29 Mar - 21 Aug 47 (29 Mar 46). DRB TAG. Confirmatory orders shutting down Camp Ritchie were not actually published by TAG, however, until 21 Aug 47.

5. The JCS, on 28 June 1946, established an Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) at Norfolk, Va., and charged the Chief of Naval Operations with ~~responsibility for~~ operating it. As one of its six main

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faculty divisions was planning to cover the general subject of intelligence and "in the interest of coordinating instruction," the DI, GSUSA, agreed to accept three officer instructors from the AFSC as students ^{during} at the next course of the War Department Intelligence School (SIS). *

* See: File, ID 210.6 SIS, 18 Oct 46. DRE TAG. The original Commandant of this AFSC was Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons, USAF. He was replaced, effective 30 Jun 48, by Brig Gen Charles Y. Banfill, USAF, the former wartime head of MITC.

6. Based upon a recommendation submitted to him by the intelligence training officials, the Chief of the Collection Group, ID, who was at that time held responsible for maintaining the American Military Attache system abroad, on 16 July 1946, approved the establishment of an 80 hour course for enlisted men and a 16 hour course for officers in photography at the CIC School, Camp Holabird, Md., to orient personnel ^{with} ~~with~~ ^{attache} assignments. *

* IOM (C), Orientation and Instruction Branch to Chief, Collection Group, 16 Jul 46, MID 062 SIS. ACSI Rec Sec.

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7. In view of the added ^{mission} responsibilities recently given to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, for supervising combat intelligence training, the ID Combat Intelligence and Training Group was redesignated, effective 23 July 1946, simply as the Training Group. *

* Memo 83, G-2 WDGS, 23 Jul 46, MID 300.6 (1 Jan 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

8. With the newly developed Army Language and Area Training program progressing ^{very} most favorably for its Far Eastern students, steps were taken, in July 1946, to increase the number of Russian language students at Columbia University by ten more officers. * Great

* See: BATED, 319.1, 26 Jul 46 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

difficulty was ^{still} being experienced, though, in finding a suitable place for these Russian language students to pursue their final area training because of persistent refusal by the U.S.S.R. authorities to allow them any entry into Russia or the satellite countries. * Never-

* Ibid., 29 Sep - 11 Oct 46 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

theless, a WD Circular dated

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17 August 1946, not only officially established special Language and Area Training courses for Russia, Japan and China but also set up intensive courses in the Russian, Portuguese and Spanish languages. It further held out the possibility of initiating similar language courses in Arabic, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Persian and Turkish, if certain conditions could be met in the future.

* WD Cir 250, 17 Aug 46.

9. The ACoFS G-2, WDGS, on 9 September 1946, notified the MA, China, that a War Department Language School would soon be established at Peiping, China, in connection with the Army Language and Area Training program. This school was to have an American staff and faculty consisting of a Colonel (Commandant), Major (Assistant Commandant), Master Sergeant (Chief Clerk), Technical Sergeant (Clerk) and Technical Sergeant (Technician), who would all be assigned to the MA Office but remain solely occupied with their school duties. The plan also called for the first group of students to arrive in Peiping about 1 December 1946.

* Ltr, ACoFS G-2 to MA, China, 9 Sep 46, G-2 350.03, Chinese, 9 Sep 46 (25 Sep 45). DRB TAG. The Peiping Language School, which utilized Chinese personnel as instructors, actually opened in January 1947. See: "Language Training in the United States Army," Annex D, G-2 314.7, undated (30 Oct 42). ACSI Rec Sec.

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10. Climaxing a ten month effort on the part of the DI (ACofS G-2), WDGS, current War Department instructions were amended, effective 3 December 1946, in order to add an Army Security (AS) Reserve to the list of Sections of the Active Reserve, U. S. Army.*

* WD Cir 356, 3 Dec 46, amending WD 61, 2 Mar 46.

These more or less scattered actions, though, did not really serve to fill the training gap in any satisfactory manner that had been created by closing the MITC and failing to replace it with an appropriate Military Intelligence School. There was still no proper facility available to devote its main effort to training such non-CIC or *ASA* specialists as photo interpreters, prisoner of war interrogators, uncommon linguists, experts in air-ground intelligence procedures, etc. Because this type of training was being noticeably neglected within the various Army service schools and the AGF Intelligence School, *was had been* formed at Fort Riley, Kan., in December 1945, primarily to conduct combat intelligence training, ID recommended to O&T, on 19 September 1946, that the Commanding General, AGF, should be specifically called upon to perform these additional training functions.* Argument over

* BATED, 319.1, 19 Sep 46 (1 May 46). AGSI Rec Sec.

this recommendation soon led to another pro-

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posal to consolidate the CIC Center, WD Language School (MISLS) and AGF Intelligence School all together at Fort Riley but that idea eventually fell through when the CIC officials surveyed the planned site for their training operations and reported ^{that it was} ~~it~~ unsuitable. Mean- *

* See: File 323.70, WD Int Tng Cent (Fort Riley, Kan), 1 Nov 46-14 Mar 47. DRB TAG.

while, AGF had decided to terminate the existing Cavalry and Intelligence Schools at Fort Riley and to activate there instead a Ground General School, effective 1 November 1946. *

* The Army Almanac, op. cit., pp. 377-78. The passing of this famous Cavalry School, which, except for a period between 1871 and 1892, had been in operation at Fort Riley under several different names ever since 1869, was of important interest to the departmental intelligence authorities because of the part it had always played in developing basic doctrine on reconnaissance and other related subjects. The ^{General} Ground School became ^{renamed as} The Army General School, on 1 Jan 50.

The ^{opening} ~~opening~~ of 1947, thus found the Army intelligence training effort generally in an unsettled state but with a number of special activities commencing to show every sign of rapid and continued growth. In furthering this latter trend, favorable steps were promptly taken to im-

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prove certain individual training situations, as follows:

1. On 2 January 1947, the DI announced a fixed policy to the effect that all Military Attaches "must complete a course at the SIS School" before departing for their overseas stations.*

* BATED, 319.1, 2 Jan 47 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

2. Instructions were issued to the Commanding Officer of the CIC Center early in January 1947, setting up a new 9-week course to cover the training of CIC agents and directing that ^{upon} after its completion:

a. Students scheduled for Z/I assignment would be sent directly to their new detachments.

b. Students going overseas could be granted leave but *only* with their movement orders ^{so} _{as} timed to allow for an extra period of 120 hours advanced instruction (mostly language and area familiarization) before they reported to their respective ports of ^{embarkation} ~~debarcation~~.*

* Memo, Chief Sec Gp to CO CIC Center, 8 Jan 47, MID 352.11 CIC Training School, 8 Jan 47 (12 Sep 46). DRB TAG.

Eight months later, the training course at the CIC School for Counter Intelligence Investigators (MOS 1301) was increased to 14 weeks and ap-

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licants for that particular course were required to possess the following qualifications:

6 months prior service

high school graduate

U. S. citizen

satisfactory intelligence file

AGCT score - 110 *

* WD Memo 615-515-1, 12 Sep 47. A 4-week course for training CIC Administration Clerk-Typists (MOS 1405) was also established under this same authority.

3. Despite strenuous efforts being made to place all the Russian Language and Area Training students ^{such} in peripheral countries such as Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, etc., the results were most discouraging. On 10 February 1947, therefore, ID dispatched a cable to Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces European Theater (USFET), ^{requesting} ~~calling for~~ the preparation of a plan to accomplish Russian language and area training within Western Germany. * This soon resulted in the formation of a special ID

* BATED, 319.1, 10 Feb 47 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

Detachment "R" at Oberammergau, where USFET (later EUCOM) was already

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operating a theater intelligence school. Finally, a new WD Circular, dated 17 September 1947, proceeded to establish the entire Language and Language and Area Training ^{program} on a much sounder basis, with the following agencies ^{now} involved in contributing directly to it:

Army Language School, Presidio of Monterey

Yale University (Chinese language)

Columbia University (Russian language)

Princeton University (Turkish, Persian and Arabic languages)

Detachment "S", FEC (Tokyo)

Detachment "R", EUCOM (Oberammergau)

WD Language School, Peiping, China

American University, Beirut, Lebanon *

* WD Cir 260, 17 Sep 47.

4. By May 1947, Lt. Col. Carlos F. Melick, the ID officer in charge of training Latin American military personnel in strategic intelligence, was able to report that "it has been completed or is now going on for Guatemala, Uruguay and Peru, and about to start for Mexico." While he recommended against attempting to conduct the same type of training within any of the comparatively unstable or smaller Latin American countries, he was in favor of notifying Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Cuba, as well as Argentina when the political situ-

ation cleared up, that this instruction could be given to them in
the near future if they so desired.

* IOM (S), Melick to Chief Training Gp, MID 350.2, 24 May 47
(13 Aug 46). DRB TAG. Strategic intelligence training had also
been given on a less formal basis to both Siam and Turkey. See: Memo
(C), War Member SWNCC-MIC to Chairman, MID 350.2, 5 May 47 (13 Aug 46).
DRB TAG.

5. Based upon a series of conferences ^{held} between ^{the appropriate} ID and State De-
partment security officials, an agreement was reached to present a
new course at the CIC Center, commencing 12 May 1947, designed to
train Special Security Officers of the State Department for field
assignment.

* Memo (C), Chief Sec Gp to D/I, 21 Apr 47, MID 323.70 CIC,
7 Apr 47 (undated). DRB TAG. The inter-departmental conferees in
this instance were Col. Charles C. Blakeney, Exec of the ID Sec Gp,
and Mr. Robert L. Bannerman, Security Officer for the Department of
State.

6. On 11 July 1947, in connection with a recently developed De-
partment of the Army Affiliation Plan for sponsoring reserve elements,

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letters were sent from ID to fifteen different colleges and universities requesting an appointment for a training representative to discuss the possibility of organizing M-I Reserve Strategic Intelligence or Language units at their respective schools. This type of affiliation soon led to a marked improvement in specialist training ^{throughout} within the M-I Reserve program.

* BATED, 319.1, 11 Jul 47 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec. Among the ^{earliest} first schools choosing to form such affiliated M-I Reserve units were Williams College and Syracuse University, effective 1 Dec 47.

7. With relations between the MISLS and Sixth Army officials at the Presidio of Monterey growing consistently worse, the question of moving the language training facility away from that post kept recurring. Also, since MISLS ^{was} still ^{concentrating} concentrated mainly on teaching the Japanese language to personnel scheduled for assignment in the Far East, the departmental training authorities felt that its mission should be broadened ^{in order} to encompass more of the total language training problem. Two conferences were held in Washington, D. C., during April 1947, therefore, attended by representatives from ID, AGF, AAF, O&T, P&A and other interested agencies, for the express purpose of examining into all aspects of foreign language training. Accordingly, on 1 September 1947, MISLS was renamed the Army Language School and

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shortly thereafter designated as an Army Specialist School, ^{but} ~~on the~~
other hand, it continued to remain located at the Presidio of Monte-
rey, Calif. and to operate under ^{direct} ~~general~~ control of the Director of
Intelligence, GSUSA.*

* See: WD Cir 261, 17 Sep 47 and File, MID 352 Army Language School, Oct 46 - Sep 47. DRB TAG. The chief disagreement between the MISLS and Sixth Army officials seems to have been concerned with command authority over the assignment of living quarters at the Presidio of Monterey.

8. One of the most significant developments bearing upon Army intelligence training at this time was an official acceptance of the Aggressor Force concept for use in field maneuvers and training exercises. Although the idea of inventing such a force to render the military intelligence aspects of such exercises more realistic had been under wide experimentation ever since World War II, the project received its greatest forward impetus from Maj. Gen. (later ^{G-eri.} Willard G. Wyman, while he was the ACoS G-2, AGF, from September 1945 to September 1947.* After close

* See: Department of Defense, OPI News Branch, General Willard Gordon Wyman, to include Mar 45. Headquarters AGF moved from Ft McNair, D. C. to Ft Monroe, Va., effective 1 Oct 46.

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study and ^{most} careful design in every possible detail at the Ground General School, Fort Riley, the new Aggressor Force put on a ^{very} ~~most~~ convincing demonstration during an AGF Intelligence Conference held there in June 1947. This conference not only enjoyed Army-wide intelligence representation but also found the military high command in full attendance. * It was promptly followed by the issuance of three ^{basic} Aggressor

* "Report of the Army Ground Force Intelligence Conference," vol I, MID 337. Army General School, 16 - 20 June 1947 (12 Feb 47). DRB TAG. Gen Chamberlin, in company with Col (later Maj Gen) Eugene W. Ridings, Chief of the Training Group, and a number of other key ID officers, attended this conference.

Field Manuals that had been prepared at the Ground General School under G-2, AGF, direction and in appropriate coordination with the WDGS, as follows:

FM 30-101, 30 June 1947, "The Maneuver Enemy" - Announcing ^{that} ~~& the~~ three-fold purpose of the Aggressor concept, ^{was as before} to depict enemy forces with realism, to employ intelligence personnel in their proper role, and to spread the doctrine that enemy forces will be organized and operated differently from our own, It further offered a general orientation on Aggressor and his uniforms, insignia, etc.

FM 30-102, 30 June 1947, "Handbook on Aggressor Military Forces" - Covering the fictitious history, population, language, religion, government, industry, armed forces of Aggressor, along

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with his conventional signs and symbols, and a glossary of his military terms in five languages (including English).

FM 30-103, 28 June 1947, "Aggressor Order of Battle Book" - Made up exactly like the World War II German and Japan Order of Battle Books, it even went so far as to rescind them.*

* See: "Report of Activities, Army Field Forces, 1945 - 1949," to Co'S USA from Chief AFF, 30 Sep 49, p. 31. Gen Ref Off OCMH.

9. The program of training foreign military personnel at United States Army schools was expanding rapidly but continuing to run into serious difficulties. In the first place, the problem of coordinating it effectively had become almost an impossibility with the P&O Division called upon to establish national quotas, the O&T Division to grant specific authorizations, the local Military Mission Chiefs to recommend individual students to the Military Attaches for security clearance and then all subsequent actions having to be handled through the Foreign Liaison Officer of ID. The various service schools concerned also kept complaining that many of their foreign students were unable to absorb the courses being given to them because of lack of required ability in the English language. The program remained a very popular one, though, as seems well evidenced by the following quotas which were announced on 4 June 1947 to govern the attendance of foreign personnel at mili-

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tary schools in the United States for the period from 1 July to
31 December 1947:

<u>School</u>	<u>Total Foreign Quotas (Officer & Enlisted Men) For Period</u>
AGF - C&GSC	50
The Infantry School	194
The Artillery School	89
The Armored School	44
Ground General School	16
Physical Training School	18
AAF - Flying Training Schools	50
Flying Instructor Instrument School	5
Air University	
Tactical School	25
School of Aviation Medicine	10
Technical Training	123
Technical and Administrative Schools	
The Adjutant Generals School	90
The Chaplain School	6
The Engineer School	172
The Finance School	12
The Medical Field Service School	285
Meat and Dairy Hygiene (Chicago QM Depot)	7
Medical Depot (St Louis)	3
Military Police School	169
The Ordnance School	337
The Ordnance Automotive School	174
The Quartermaster School	337
The Subsistence School	4
The Signal School	350
Transportation School	161
Army Information School	40
Grand Total -	2771 *

* See: Incl to Memo (C) from Director O&T, sub: Training of
Foreign Nationals, 4 Jun 47, MID 350.2, 4 Jun 47 (12 Jun 45). DRB
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During the latter part of 1947, the ID Training Group was charged with performing a notably large number and wide variety of different tasks but it only carried an authorized strength of 21 officers. To

* See: ID Memo, 1 Oct 47, MID 320.2, 1 Oct 47 (24 Aug 43).
DRB TAG. Its actual strength at that particular time was just 19 officers.

make matters worse, it had recently ^{been given} ~~received~~ all the SIS functions from the Intelligence Group and the entire Orientation and Instruction Section from the Attache Branch, Office of the Assistant Executive for Personnel and Administration. * Since its chief was still

* Draft of Staff Study No IV (S), Status of the Army Intelligence System, App B, Annex A, p. 3, G-2 322.4 Field Intelligence, 15 Dec 53 (6 Feb 53). ACSI Rec Sec.

held responsible for "plans, policies and the supervision of intelligence training pertaining to the War Department, major commands, Technical and Administrative Services, and the Military Intelligence Reserve," as well as staff supervision over Army mapping, charting and aerial photography, the group was divided into three functional branches which were assigned specific missions,

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as follows:

Civilian Components Branch -

(1) Formulates plans and policies, prepares implementing directives, and exercises staff coordination and supervision of training of the Military Intelligence Reserve and of intelligence training in the National Guard and Reserve Officers' Training Corps.

(2) Makes recommendations to and acts for the Director of Intelligence in connection with the latter's responsibilities as general supervisor of the Military Intelligence Reserve.

(3) Maintains liaison with Army and War Department organizations on matters pertaining to the training of the Military Intelligence Reserve and to the intelligence training of other reserve components.

(4) Makes recommendations on mobilization assignments and active duty of Military Intelligence Reserve officers.

(5) Makes recommendations on all questions of troop basis for Military Intelligence Reserve.

(6) Formulates, in coordination with the Director of Personnel and Administration, plans and policies concerning career management of training careers of members of the Military Intelligence Reserve.

Combat and Strategic Branch -

(1) Formulates plans and policies, prepares implementing directives, and exercises staff coordination and supervision of intelligence training, including the intelligence training conducted at Army schools, War Department schools, civilian and special schools employed by the War Department for intelligence training, and Military Intelligence Division Language School.

(2) Exercises War Department General Staff supervision over the preparation of minimum standards of proficiency for intelligence training and tests to maintain them.

(3) Conducts training inspections of Major Commands and Army components to determine if the approved standards of intelligence training are maintained.

(4) Exercises staff supervision over the preparation of Tables of Organization and Equipment and training literature as these relate to intelligence.

(5) Formulates, in coordination with the Director of Personnel and Administration, plans and policies relating to career management for intelligence officers of the Army Ground Forces, (except Military Intelligence Reserve).

(6) Determines War Department requirements for foreign language personnel and recommends allocation and assignment of personnel so trained.

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Map and Photo Branch -

- (1) Plans, initiates, and supervises execution of War Department strategic mapping and photographic plans.
- (2) Maintains liaison with all map and photo producing agencies of the United States Government.
- (3) Provides technical advice to the War Department General Staff on map and chart compilation, reproduction, and supply.
- (4) Maintains general information on existing map, chart, photographic, and geodetic coverage of the War Department.
- (5) Prepares recommendations on classification and release of maps and aerial photography.
- (6) Controls release of aerial photography of foreign areas and classified domestic areas under established War Department policies and assures that State Department clearance is obtained when foreign nations are involved.
- (7) Operates map library for War Department General and Special Staffs.
- (8) Chief of Branch is ex officio Chairman of the Aerial Mapping Committee. (Functions are outlined in paragraph 2, AR 300-15). *

* WDGS Cir No. 5-2, 19 Apr 47.

It thus ^{seems} ~~becomes~~ readily apparent that during the early part of this Cold War period ID was deeply involved in many different phases of military intelligence training, not only from the strict general staff standpoint but also through actually conducting it in the field. Yet there was no mention whatsoever of the intelligence training function within the basic mission given to the DI, GSUSA under the Circular 138 reorganization of 14 May 1946. This continued to hold true even when the Department of the Army, on 10 March 1948, underwent another

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major reorganization which abolished the AGF and replaced it with an Army Field Forces (AFF). The new AFF did not hold any direct authority over troops but was essentially a training command, designed to execute "general supervision, coordination and inspection of all individuals and units utilized in a field army." At the same time, the DO&T, GSUSA, remained charged with general staff supervision over the "training of all components of the Army of the United States" and no intelligence training responsibility^{at all} was indicated at all for the DI, GSUSA.*

* DA Cir 64, 10 Mar 48.

This anomaly, of course, was not to the liking of the intelligence authorities themselves, who knew from previous experience they would receive full blame for any failures in military intelligence performance that might occur during future combat. As a matter of fact, the situation was merely the latest manifestation of a continuing G-2 versus G-3 dispute over intelligence training responsibilities which had been going on ever since World War I. The principal trouble was that although training and intelligence were both accepted separate functions of command they could not really be disassociated from each other because the intelligence effort always^{stood in need of} needed^{special} training and even presented a number of^{special} technical training problems of its own. Appar-

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ently the only practicable solution was to try to devise some sort of a cooperative system calling for joint G-2 and G-3 participation which could meet all special ^{the} intelligence training requirements but not infringe in any manner upon the commander's fundamental responsibility for training his own troops. The DI, GSUSA, therefore, proceeded to open negotiations along these lines within the Department of the Army General Staff and soon achieved a significant success. Accordingly, on 29 July 1948, Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, the Acting DO&T, GSUSA, instructed TAG to publish an amendment to paragraph 10, Circular 64, 10 March 1948, ^{that contained} containing the following statement:

The Director of Intelligence supervises counterintelligence activities and military intelligence and counterintelligence training matters, and prepares training policies and plans in this field in accordance with the overall training policies established by the Director of Organization and Training. *

* Comment No. 6, Acting DO&T to TAG, 29 Jul 48, to DF CSGID to CSGOT, 19 May 48, sub: Amendment of D/A Cir 64, 1948, AG 020 (19 May 48). DRB TAG. The amendment was actually disseminated to the Army by sec IV, DA Cir 240, 10 Aug 48.

^{Certain} Several individual phases of the military intelligence training program also continued to demonstrate important progress during 1948, as follows:

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1. Affiliation agreements were signed, in January 1948, ^{to form} forming Strategic Intelligence (Research and Analysis) M-I Reserve Units at the Universities of Chicago, Pennsylvania, Yale, Denver and Middlebury College. Similarly, the San Francisco Police Department undertook to establish a CIC Reserve Unit under the same program.*

* BATED, 319.1, 6-26 Jan 48 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

2. On 6 February 1948, arrangements were completed with the appropriate authorities to have M-I Reserve officers who were fluent in the Russian language gain inactive duty training credits by translating Russian technical documents for intelligence use.*

* BATED, 319.1, 6 Feb 48 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

3. Approval was obtained from the Chief of Staff, in March 1948, to initiate a project at selected MA offices for providing needed foreign language instruction locally to both military personnel and civilian employees ^{assigned thereto.} thereof. A fund allocation of \$20,000 was already on hand for such purpose applicable to FY 1948 and it was believed that a corresponding amount could be found ^{so as} in order to continue the project through FY 1949.*

* BATED, 319.1, 24 Mar 48 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

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4. It was announced during April 1948, that nine new language courses would soon be available for military students at the ALS. Hence, When new Army and Air Force Circulars were published on the subject two months later, ^{therefore,} ~~the~~ they could point out that the school was now prepared to furnish intensive instruction in a total of twenty different foreign languages, as follows:

Russian	Spanish
Chinese	Czechoslovakian
Japanese	Polish
Turkish	Hungarian
Greek	Serbo-Croat
Arabic	Bulgarian
Persian	Norwegian
Korean	Swedish
Portuguese	Danish
French	Rumanian *

* DA Cir 180 and AFL 50-51, 14 Jun 48.

5. ID furnished the necessary instructors for an interim course in base censorship ^{which} ~~that~~ was conducted at Camp Holabird during June 1948, with some 21 students from the Zone of Interior Armies attending. *

* See: Ltr, ID to C CIC, CSGID 352.11, 22 Apr 48, f/w MID 323.70 CIC, 22 Apr 48. DRB TAG.

6. Lt. Col. Melick, currently assigned as a member of the U. S. Military Mission to Iran, reported from Teheran, on 15 November 1948,

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that he had already "set up a good intelligence school, introduced them to combat intelligence, organized the division G-2 section and had it all approved by the Iranian Chief of Staff." Hence, he felt that his work in Iran ought to be completed "within the next sixty days." On the other hand, Lt. Col. Frederick B. Judson, who was performing a similar military intelligence training mission in Argentina, declared that he had been able to accomplish practically nothing because the G-2 authorities there would not allow him to see their system or even view their files.*

* See: Ltr, Lt Col Carlos F. Melick to Col Francis Graling, ID FLO, 201 Melick, Carlos F., 15 Nov 48. ACSI Rec Sec.

With ID, O&T and AFF now enjoying more clearly defined responsibilities in respect to the military intelligence training program, arguments over specific functions appeared to be on the wane but personnel and fund economies were already commencing to pose major obstacles to its favorable development. This was especially true after the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act early in October 1949, as that legislative enactment promised to increase greatly the demands for training foreign officers at U. S. Army schools. On 14 October 1949, therefore, the DI, GSUSA, for-

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warded a memorandum to ^{the} DO&T, ^{CSUSA} first calling his attention to a recent decision by the Chief of Staff which gave the CG, AFF, sole "control of personnel and funds necessary in the conduct of instruction in the schools" ^{*} and then recommending a decentralization of the intelligence

* Ltr, CofS to Commands, sub: Change in Responsibilities of Chief, Army Field Forces, 29 Sep 49, copy in; CSGID 323.361, 26 Jan 50 (29 Sep 49). DRB TAG. This letter was signed by the Chief of Staff, Gen J. Lawton Collins, himself.

training effort in order to give AFF the following duties:

- a. The over-all responsibility for training, now and upon mobilization, of combat and service support intelligence specialist and censorship units, of individuals, but excluding ASA, CIC and SI (R&A), Type A, Class A units.
- b. Operation and supervision of training at the Army Language School, Presidio of Monterey, California to include control of personnel and funds necessary in the conduct of instruction.
- c. The Language and Area training program, including only operation and supervision of those phases of the four-year program accomplished in the ZI.
- d. Responsibility for the following T/O&E's pertaining to intelligence specialist and censorship units:
 - (1) 30-17T - Documents Unit.
 - (2) 30-30T - Order of Battle and Photo Interpreter Teams.
 - (3) 30-510 - Military Censorship Organization.
 - (4) 30-600 - Military Intelligence Service Organization.
 - (5) 30-600T- Intelligence Service Organization. *

* DF, CSGID to CSGOT, 14 Oct 49, CSGID 323.361, 14 Oct 49 (29 Sep 49). DRB TAG.

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O&T agreed to the recommended transfer of training responsibilities as described in paragraphs a and d of this ID memorandum but took exception to the other two. ^{It was believed} ~~The belief was~~ that the DI, GSUSA, should continue to hold full authority over the Army Language School and the Language and Area Training program, despite the recent pronouncement by the Chief of Staff. Eventually, though, on 23 February 1950, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration did approve a transfer of the ALS to the Sixth Army after such action had been duly concurred in by all concerned. * Even then, the problem of working out

* DF, DI to DCofS thru DO&T, 26 Jan 50, CSGID 326.61, 26 Jan 50 (29 Sep 49). DRB TAG.

precise details for this transfer proved to be so troublesome that final arrangements were not completed until May 1950, with the actual transfer date set for 1 July 1950. *

* Sec: File (C), CSGID 323.361, (29 Sep 49). DRB TAG.

ID had no intention under any circumstances of voluntarily relinquishing direct control over the CIC School, ASA School or the SIS. O&T and AFF also agreed that these three schools should be excepted from the plan ^{which was} under current development for implementing the Chief of

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Staff's decision in the matter, so it was formally accomplished, on 9 March 1950. * Neither ~~the~~ ^{and} CIC ~~nor~~ ^{and} the ASA Schools ^{did not} present a very

* See: Ltr, TAG to Commands, AGAO-S (3 Mar 50), CSGOT, 9 Mar 50 GSA. DRB TAG.

serious problem to ID in point of expending scarce resources because they were field installations with their own assigned personnel and separate budgets. The SIS, however, had grown up as an integral part of the departmental intelligence agency and derived its entire administrative support from ID proper. Thus, ^{thus} the question of personnel and funds for that school soon became of important interest. At the same time, there were ^{constantly} ~~ever~~ mounting pressures from above to make more and more floor space in the Pentagon available for the Departments of Defense, Navy and Air Force.

During May 1949, to lessen the impact of an ordered reduction in its Pentagon floor space, ID was given a compensating allotment of floor space within the Main Navy Building, Washington, D. C., for use by the SIS. The Army intelligence authorities hoped that these new quarters might be ready for full SIS occupancy prior to 24 July 1949, the date when a special reserve class was scheduled to start. Actually, this special class had to utilize an assembly room in the Pentagon but the

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next regular SIS course was able to open at the Main Navy Building,
on 8 August 1949, without too much inconvenience. * Forceful argu-

* See: File, CSGID 680.341 (22 Mar 42). DRB TAG.

ments were then advanced both for and against changing the school
into an ID field activity, with a decision finally, ^{being} reached that it
would continue to remain an integral part of the General Staff organi-
zation. * Effective 17 August 1949, though, it was transferred away

* See: Study, G-2 352 SIS, 8 Aug 49 (15 Jan 49). DRB TAG.

from the ID Security and Training Group and placed directly under the
Deputy Director of Intelligence. * The plan at that time was for ^{the} SIS

* ID Memo No. 37, CSGID 300.6, 17 Aug 49 (17 Jan 49). DRB TAG.

to hold four regular courses in 1950, each consisting of approximately
85 students and based upon the following tentative quotas:

MA Designates - 3	Marine Corps - 1
USAF - 25	Canada - 5
ZI Armies (4 each) - 24	C Sig O - 2
CIC - 3	P&A Div - 5
CIA - 3	State - 5
ASA - 3	Total - 79 *

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* Memo, SIS to ID Exec, 12 Dec 49, G-2 352.11/T SIS, 12 Dec 49 (29 Jul 46). DRB TAG. Quota spaces were ^{also} subsequently allocated to the Munitions Board (Petroleum Committee) - 1, P&O Div - 2 and Navy - 1.

Although the USAF had continued to utilize and render administrative support to the SIS, ^{*} it officially informed the Army early in

* See: Memo, Acting Chief, Collection Div, Directorate of Int USAF for Asst Cmdnt SIS, 2 Jun 50, G-2 352 SIS, 2 Jun 50. DRB TAG.

1949 of its desire to terminate the training of AF CIC personnel at Camp Holabird as soon as proper arrangements could be effected. On 11 February 1949, therefore, ID announced the discontinuance of such training at the CIC School and directed the release therefrom of all AF officers, including both students and instructors, by 15 March 1949.

* BATED, 319.1, 11 Feb 49 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

Other noteworthy events ^{that} which took place within the intelligence

training field toward the end of this Cold War period were, as follows:

1. Mainly to conserve manpower, the Regular Components and Civilian Components Branches of the ID Security and Training Group were combined into a single Training Branch, effective 25 January 1949.*

* ID Memo No. 2, CSGID 300.6, 25 Jan 49 (17 Jan 49). ACSI Rec Sec.

2. During March 1949, the DI^{G-SUSA} approved and forwarded to the DP&A, ^{G-SUSA} for his information, a study recently concluded by the ID training officials on the strength of the M-I Reserve. The original purpose of this study had been to "authorize a target strength, regularize appointment and rejection policies, provide policies for personnel procurement and provide a basis for procurement" but it also plainly revealed that there was "an inordinate surplus of field grade officers and shortage of company officers" existing in the M-I Reserve. A ^{separate} recommendation was thus included to establish an upper limit of 13,112 officers for the M-I Reserve, which would then be permitted by normal attrition to shrink to a total of 10,000 officers.*

* DF (S), CSGID to CSGPA, 326.2 MI-T, 22 Mar 49 (19 Feb 47). DRB TAG. One year later, the strength of the M-I Reserve was re-

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ported as being only 10,343. See: Memo, Training Branch to Chief, Sec and Training Div, ID 319.1 Briefings, 17 Mar 50. DRB TAG.

3. Following a lengthy discussion among the departmental training authorities regarding the length and scope of the courses that ought to be given at the CIC School, the DI gave his general assent

* See: File MID 352.11 CIC Training School, 5 Dec 47 - 29 Feb 49. DRB TAG.

to a plan proposed by the Chief, CIC, for initiating a new Advanced Course there on or about 1 April 1950. This course was ^{intended} designed to train comparatively senior officers who might be called upon either to command large CIC units or become Staff Counterintelligence Officers, as described in a ^{new} newly-adopted MOS {9307}. *

* Memo, Chief Sec and Training Gp to Chief CIC, 4 Mar 49, MID 322.999 (4 Mar 49). DRB TAG. CIC Officers Advanced Course No. 1 actually commenced on 6 May 50.

4. In order to facilitate the administrative handling of students who were undergoing language and area training, it was decided to form an ID Language Training Detachment, effective 7 April 1949,

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as a Special Foreign Activity of the Director of Intelligence. These students could then be attached for administration to an appropriate MA Office while they were engaged in their overseas training.*

* ID Memo No. 14, CSGID 300.6, 7 Apr 49 (17 Jan 49). ACSI Rec Sec.

5. On 15 June 1949, a Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers, headed by Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, submitted a very critical report to the Chief of Staff concerning the inadequacy of "specialized instruction" being given at the Command and General Staff College (C&GSC).^{*} Although readily admitting that

* The Command and Staff College had been renamed as the Command and General Staff College by GO 41, 25 Apr 47.

its Departments of Personnel, Intelligence, Organization and Training, and Logistics had succeeded in developing excellent 10-week courses for their respective specialties, the board believed ^{such a} ~~this~~ decentralized system tended to neglect the "broad problems of the commander and the entire general staff at the higher Army echelons."^{*} With

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* "Report of the Department of the Army Board on Educational System for Officers, 15 June 1949," pp. 37-38, CSGID 334, 13 Jul 49.
DRB TAG.

the recommendations of the Eddy Board ^{being} approved on 11 October 1949, by order of the Secretary of the Army, the last class to receive the special intelligence course at the C&GSC was graduated early in 1950.*

* Draft, Staff Study (S), Field Intelligence Service, Annex B, App B, pp. 12-18, MID 322.4 Field Intelligence, 15 Dec 53 (6 Feb 53).
ACSI Rec Sec.

6. The growing magnitude and complexity of the program for training foreign nationals in U. S. Army schools or installations was well illustrated by a summary prepared within the ID Foreign Liaison Branch, on 15 June 1949, ^{showing} ~~to show~~ the current number of such students under several different categories, as follows:

Number of students taking instruction on attachment orders and for which academic reports have been received	- - - - - 423
Number of students taking instruction on attachment orders and for which academic reports have not been received	- - - <u>458</u>
Total number of individuals attached to training by AGF attachment orders as students or observers at Army installations	- - - - - 891

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Number of matriculations for periods of training (all types)	
FY 1949 - - - - -	1096
Number of students taking more than one course - - - - -	205
Number of students taking courses extending beyond 1 July 1949 - - - - -	87 *

* Memo for Record, FL Branch, Lt Col Frederick B. Judson, 21 Jun 49, Tab A, CSGID 350.2, 15 Jun 49 (12 Jun 45). DRB TAG.

7. The ID Security and Training Group reported, on 30 June 1949, that it would require 179 officers, 1 warrant officer and 4 enlisted men in the event of a general mobilization. * This compared with an

* DF (S), DI to DO&T, 320.2, 30 Jun 49 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG.

authorized strength for the group at that particular time of 71 officers and 1 enlisted man. *

* See: T/D 400-1108, 29 Jul 49, MID 320.2, 30 Jun 49 (24 Aug 43). DRB TAG. Only 13 of the 71 officers, however, were in the Training Branch of the Security and Training Group.

8. A Special Course was held at the SIS from 25 July to 5 August 1949, for 75 Reserve Officers ^{with} having ID mobilization assignments. Since

the course was designed to bring these key reserve officers up to date on ~~the~~ ^{the} latest military intelligence developments, all major elements of ID were called upon to participate actively in it. *

* BATED, 319.1 (C), 15-18 Jul 49 (1 May 46) and File, ID 353 Intelligence, (23 Dec 48). ACSI Rec Sec.

9. During August 1949, language orientation classes in French, German, Russian and Spanish were started at the SIS for students having an assignment that indicated a definite need for them to brush up on any ^{one} of those languages. *

* Unnumbered SIS Memo, CSGID 300.6, 24 Aug 49 (17 Jan 49). ACSI Rec Sec.

10. Announcement was made, on 22 November 1949, that the Army Language School at Peiping, China, had been closed as of 1 June 1949. *

* ID Memo No. 47, CSGID 300.6, 22 Nov 49 (17 Jan 49). ACSI Rec Sec.

This step was taken most reluctantly only because of unfavorable developments in the Chinese Civil War.

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11. The Aggressor Force concept reached a new peak in military acceptance when an especially trained Aggressor detachment of 31 officers and 298 enlisted men from Fort Riley, Fort Bragg, Fort Monmouth and Fort George G. Meade formed a part of the Army Defense Forces during the large scale Army-Navy Joint Exercise MIKI that was held in Hawaii during late 1949. The ^{fine} performance of this detachment was not only the subject of much laudatory comment by the Army commanders concerned but also on the part of a number of high ranking Navy, Marine and Air Force officers who were witnessing Aggressor operations for the first time. Additionally, the final report of the Maneuver Commander contained a specific conclusion that: "Intelligence play using Aggressor Forces during the planning phase, followed by an actual Aggressor enemy during the operational phase, affords excellent intelligence training."

* "Final Report, Maneuver Commander Army-Navy Joint Exercise MIKI, 1950," G-2 354.2-T Hawaii, undated (1 Dec 47). DRB TAG. Lt Col (later Col) R. G. Fergusson from ID served on the staff of the First Task Fleet and Capt Ray W. Hodgson from the CIC Center functioned as an official observer, during this field exercise.

12. The elimination of SANACC and its subcommittees, effective 30 June 1949, had left a serious gap in the program for coordinating

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the training of foreign nationals at U.S. military schools. When the JCS attempted to fill this gap by appointing a representative committee to "consider the problems, collate existing policy and formulate new basic policy" in the ^{Program} ~~matter~~*, the Secretary of Defense

* JCS 962/109, 12 Aug 49. Records of the JCS.

ruled that these tasks could be better handled by the Deputy Under Secretary of State working in cooperation with his own Office of Military Affairs and, as appropriate, Special Assistant for Military Assistance ^{*} ~~Matters~~. It then fell mainly upon the ID Foreign Liaison

* Ltr, Sec Def to Sec State (TS but U when separated from inclosures), 29 Sep 49, copy in: ID 350.2, 26 Oct 49 (12 Jun 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

Officer to furnish the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a series of cumulative monthly statistical and fiscal reports on the subject which were far beyond the capabilities of his small unit to accomplish without considerable outside help. ^{*} In a new regulation,

* See: Memo (S), Exec Secty Office Sec Def to Sectys Army, Navy and Air Force, 13 Dec 49, G-2 350.2, 13 Dec 49 (12 Jun 45). DRB TAG.

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therefore, dated 30 January, and titled "Liaison Channels of Communication Between Foreign Nationals and the Department of the Army," the duties of the ID Foreign Liaison Officer with reference to foreign students attending U.S. military schools were spelled out in ^{full} precise detail, as follows:

The Foreign Liaison Officer only will make commitments to foreign governments to receive foreign military personnel at Army service schools as students, observers, and liaison officers. After vacancies have been made available and allotments to the various countries have been established by the appropriate General Staff divisions, the Foreign Liaison Officer will notify the Army attaches or military missions concerned of such allotments, for appropriate action (including issuance of invitational travel orders when appropriate) in accordance with existing policies and procedures. The Foreign Liaison Officer will, at the proper time, secure the necessary orders from The Adjutant General attaching foreign personnel to appropriate Army units, and, after their arrival in the United States, will accomplish other administrative details in connection with their attendance at Army service schools. He also will report the results of student's training to the foreign government concerned, using the Army attache in the foreign capital as the channel of communication. *

* SR 550-10-10, 30 Jan 50, par 4.

It thus seems clearly evident that a large amount of widely varied activity did take place within the intelligence training field during the closing phase of the Cold War period. Nevertheless, because much of this activity was pointed directly toward the production of intelligence specialists, the critical question as to whether or not basic intelligence training received proper emphasis throughout the Army before Korea ^{continues} must continue to remain largely unanswered. The chief ob-

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stacle standing in the way of achieving that essential training goal apparently stemmed from a lack of specific responsibility being given to the several different field agencies concerned with carrying out unit or combat intelligence training according to plans and policies announced by the Department of the Army General Staff. For a brief time, the delineation of responsibility between the DI, GSUSA, and DO&T, GSUSA, in respect to intelligence training remained favorably fixed on a cooperative basis but this desirable situation was soon upset when the Chief of Staff insisted upon an absolute centralization of the Army training function under the AFF. Moreover, the Department of the Army was reorganized again early in March 1950 and the General Staff Directors were changed back into Assistant Chiefs of Staff. The ACoFS G-2, GSUSA, then lost his recently ^{acquired} amended mission to supervise intelligence training and prepare plans or policies on such training within the framework of those already established by the ACoFS G-3, GSUSA. *

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the ACoFS G-3, GSUSA. This was most certainly a step in the wrong

* See: DA Cir 12, 28 Feb 50 and SR 10-5-1, 11 Apr 50.

direction for improving the military intelligence training effort and it occurred just prior to the sudden outbreak of the Korean War.

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CHAPTER VIII

MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

Three other matters appear to warrant special ^{mention} attention in connection with operations of the departmental intelligence agency during this Cold War period, namely; the loss of its traditional military history function, creation of an ID Inspectorate, and gaining of official approval to enter into the intelligence career specialization field for Regular Army officers. Taking them up in chronological order, the first matter to be considered, therefore, concerns postwar changes in the status of the MID Historical Branch which eventually led to the formation of a new Historical Division, WDSS, effective 17 November 1945.

HISTORICAL BRANCH

Mainly because the MID Historical Branch had been established in such an irregular manner during the midst of World War II, the arrival of V-J Day found it functioning largely in a general staff vacuum and unable to exhibit any truly effective leadership. Since it was originally placed under the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, in April 1943, against the expressed wishes of General Strong himself and then given a vaguely indeterminate mission through a combined civilian-military committee appointed by the Assistant Secretary of War, its activities were bound to suffer from lack of coordination. As a result, even though the MID

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historical officials had held an almost unlimited authority within their own ^{Technical} field and enjoyed a more or less accepted direct channel of communication with higher authority outside the WDGS, they could claim little real progress to date. It was not expected, of course, that much historical writing would be accomplished while the war was going on but no definite historical objectives had as yet been announced nor was there any suitable historical program for the Army actually in existence.*

* See: History OCMH, Misc 314.7 HDSS, Tab 9, passim. Gen Ref Off, OCMH.

Along with the rest of MID (MIS), the Historical Branch had recently been called upon to prepare a detailed V-J Day Plan covering its postwar activities. This plan, which received General Bissell's personal approval on 29 August 1945, was intended "to insure completion of the historical programs presently underway in all Theaters of Operation and in the United States and to initiate work on the post-hostilities program of the Army" by ^{taking} ~~means of~~ the following actions:

1. Direct the Theaters of Operation having occupational duties to prepare separate histories of their occupation forces.
2. Provide for the compilation of histories on demobilization by the three major commands (AGF, AAF and ASF).

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3. Inform all Theaters of Operation of the great importance for them to complete their own histories without delay.

4. Define more clearly the exact responsibilities of the Historical Branch to review and approve historical manuscripts ^{received} ~~forwarded~~ from the field.

5. Obtain an increase in authorized strength for the Historical Branch to help out with the added work load of reviewing manuscripts.

6. Promote the collection and preservation of war records.

7. Arrange to have selected historians detailed with the Historical Branch for completing certain histories in light of departmental records that were not previously available overseas.

8. Insure that histories of the War Department General and Special Staff Sections are promptly recorded.

9. Take further steps to solve the critical problem of official historians being granted full access to all pertinent records.

10. Accomplish the progressive replacement by Regular Army personnel of the many experienced historians scheduled for return to civil life under demobilization procedures.

11. Study the peacetime mission of the Historical Branch in order to determine where it should be placed within the departmental organization and whether or not its functions ought to be

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integrated with those of the Historical Section, Army War
College.*

* "V-J Day Intelligence Plan" (TS), 12 Aug 45, Plan 17 (U),
revised 29 Aug 45, pp. 1-4. ACSI Rec Sec.

Although these were certainly most desirable postwar goals to pursue, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Allen F. Clark, Jr., who had received his appointment as Chief of the Historical Branch during the latter part of February 1945, felt that the most pressing problem right after V-J Day was to get a sizable personnel cut restored which had already been ordered for his branch by the ^{authoritative} War Department Manpower Board. He also remained strongly convinced that the sooner the Army historical function was removed from the departmental military intelligence agency the better it would be for all concerned.*

* "Clark Report," pp. 16-17 and 24. Gen Ref Off OCHH.

Colonel Clark's plan was to attack the personnel reduction problem simultaneously in two different directions, first through Prof. James P. Baxter, Chairman of the Historical Advisory Committee, in seeking aid from Mr. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, and secondly

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by having a memorandum of protest forwarded under General Bissell's signature to the Deputy Chief of Staff. This memorandum, as actually presented, pointed out that the postwar demands on the Historical Branch were not only fast increasing but also had not yet reached a maximum, so the immediate effect of any severe personnel loss for the branch would be to nullify much of the effort already expended and might even endanger the whole historical program. It was ~~thus~~ recommended ^{therefore,} that the branch should carry an allotment of 19 officers plus 39 enlisted and civilian persons, or slightly more than ^{its} ~~the~~ total strength had been before the ordered reduction.*

* File, History OCMH, Misc 314.7 HDSS, Tab 4, p. 5 (7). Gen Ref Off OCMH.

Professor Baxter, meanwhile, had won Mr. McCloy's personal support against the threatened personnel cut and scheduled a meeting of the Advisory Committee for 21 August 1945, to discuss that particular situation as well as several other important historical matters. The report from this meeting, which was submitted the next day directly to the Assistant Secretary of War, asserted that the Army historical program was currently in excellent shape with over 800 first draft narratives either completed or in ~~the~~ advanced stages of preparation, ^{thus} ~~as~~ to provide a sound basis for an official history of the war. Neverthe-

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less, the Historical Branch would still have to accomplish the following principal tasks:

1. The review of the first draft narratives.
2. The writing of such operational and administrative history as had not yet been undertaken.
3. The completion of the American Forces in Action Series.
4. The establishment of a Service and Reference Group to answer questions on historical matters. *

* Ibid., p. 6 (8).

Although the Advisory Committee recognized that the Historical Branch would need additional personnel to perform these immediate duties, it also believed the time had come to give more careful attention to devising a favorable historical program for the future. One appropriate step in that direction might be to take the departmental historical function away from MID and put it "in a position which corresponds more closely with its assigned responsibilities", since the work of the Historical Branch and other MID elements was not in any sense related. As a matter of fact, it now seemed clear to the members that this merger had been a mistake in the first place and had merely imposed an unnecessary burden upon the ACOFS G-2, WDGS. To guarantee a "fair unbiased treatment" of all historical subjects, the committee considered that the military history function should be performed as part of the Secretariat of the General Staff or by a separate agency established on the WDSS level. Moreover, to avoid duplication, the

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MID Historical Branch and the Historical Section, AWC, should be consolidated without further delay. *

* Ibid., pp. 6(8) - 7(9).

Mr. McCloy agreed with most of the Advisory Committee recommendations but chose to forward the full report to General Marshall accompanied by a note ^{merely} expressing his own fear that "in the plans for rapid demobilization the personnel needs of this unit /Historical Branch/ may not be properly evaluated and, in consequence, a failure to provide adequate personnel may jeopardize the entire program." He did not, though, offer any comment at all either upon the proposal to transfer the departmental historical function from MID or the one to combine the Historical Branch with the Historical Section, AWC. *

* Ibid., pp. 7(9) - 8(10).

Because General Bissell had always paid so little personal attention to the Army historical effort, Colonel Clark erroneously assumed that the ACofS G-2, ^{WGS,} "would be delighted to get rid of us." It thus came as a distinct shock to him when, on 10 September 1945, General Bissell declared in no uncertain terms that Colonel Clark had been completely wrong in contriving to have the Historical Branch transferred

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away from MID. ^{Furthermore,} ~~Moreover,~~ during a pre-arranged meeting held four days later between General Bissell and Doctor Baxter, with Colonel Clark also present, the ACoS G-2, ^{WDGS,} continued to manifest such ^a strong disapproval in the matter that the Chairman of the Advisory Committee "felt constrained to withdraw the original proposal" for separation he had earlier forwarded to Mr. McCloy. General Bissell, though, in turn, finally ^{did} agree ~~to~~ to provide the additional personnel for the Historical Branch that had been recommended by the recent Advisory Committee report.
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* Ibid., pp. 13(15) - 15(17); "Clark Report," pp. 25-26.

In the meantime, Col. C. C. Benson, Brig. Gen. Oliver L. Spaulding's successor as Chief of the Historical Section, AWC, had addressed a letter to the Chief of Staff describing the numerous and varied historical projects that were ^{currently} ~~already~~ underway throughout the military establishment and calling ~~his~~ attention to the need for their effective consolidation. His basic idea was to expand the American Battle Monuments Commission, which had been formed by ~~an~~ Act of Congress, into an "American Battle Monuments and Military History Commission" composed of representatives from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, House and Senate. This powerful body would then constitute the legal custodian for all official military records and collect, arrange, index and publish them


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but only prepare historical studies on appropriate subjects if requested to do so by one of the services. ^{Also,} ~~Furthermore,~~ pending the actual organization of such a commission, the Army historical effort could be centered under the Historical Section, AWC, and its chief held responsible for directing the work in compliance with War Department instructions. *

* File, History OCMH, Misc 314.7 HDSS, Tab 4, pp. 15(17) - 16(18).
Gen Ref Off OCMH. Col Benson's letter was dated 12 Sep 45.

When this letter arrived in MID it was naturally referred to the Chief of the Historical Branch for comment and Colonel Clark arranged to discuss the future of the military history effort at considerable length with Colonel Benson, on 18 September 1945. The latter's thoughts were based primarily upon the Newton D. Baker thesis that the Army should limit its historical activity "to the collection, indexing and preservation of records and the preparation of such monographs as are purely military in character" while Colonel Clark was a firm believer in the principle of having the Army write its own war history, so the two men failed to reach any material agreement. Colonel Clark was willing to concede that the MID Historical Branch and the Historical Section, AWC, eventually ought to be combined but not in the specific manner proposed by Colonel Benson. ^{thus} He _A recommended disapproval of the plan, therefore, with an added statement to the effect that if the agencies were ever

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consolidated, responsibility for the Army historical program should *continue to* remain within the WDGS rather than go to the AWC. His recommendation was ^{then} _A duly adopted by the ACoS G-2, ^{WDGS,} and forwarded to the Deputy Chief of Staff in the form of a second indorsement to the original ^{Benson} _A letter.*

* Ibid., p. 18 (20).

During this period of uncertainty on the ultimate status of the Historical Branch, little real progress could be made toward developing a definite program for ^a the history of the Army in World War II. Actually, no firm decision had as yet been announced relative to the exact type of coverage which should receive immediate attention, for example; operational monographs, official histories, publication of documents, or theater and campaign studies. The matter of scope was ^{remained} also notably troublesome, with Colonel Clark realizing that a mere summary of the war would serve to eliminate much essential information but a more extensive program might well lead to "an unwieldy mass of books which could not hope to have wide distribution." Although both he and Dr. Walter Livingston Wright, the Chief Historian, continued to aim for a history of reasonable size, "somewhere between 10 and 15 volumes," there was considerable doubt that it would ever be possible to boil the hundreds of tons of available documents down into such a small number of books without first writing a series of intermediate studies.



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It did seem obvious to them, however, that preparation of the history should not be undertaken by officers because "the officer was generally untrained, far too frequently was not interested in historical work . . . and, most important, was ordered out of town just as he became productive."

* "Clark Report," pp. 21 - 22. Gen Ref Off OCH.

On 24 September 1945, General Bissell showed Colonel Clark a copy of a limited distribution cable he was ^{about to send} sending to Italy requesting the return of Col. John M. Kemper, Colonel Clark's predecessor, to "direct the historical program of the War Department." Although the ACoS G-2, ^{WDGS,} gave him an entirely different reason for taking this action, it struck Colonel Clark that the real intention was to have Colonel Kemper replace him as ^{the} Chief of the Historical Branch. * Meanwhile, spurred by

* Ibid., p. 26. Col Clark was senior to Col Kemper by three years on the Regular Army list but junior to him at this particular time ^{because} as the latter had received his temporary promotion to full colonel two months ahead of Col Clark.

the knowledge that Mr. McCloy would soon leave office, the Advisory Committee had met again to discuss the historical program and to con-

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sider the question of reassigning the MID Historical Branch. Its report derived from this meeting, ^{which was} dated 24 October 1945, recommended placing the Army historical agency within the Office of the Secretary of War and further urged the appointment of a "distinguished general officer" to head it in order "to assure harmonious co-operation with all Army agencies." As an alternative to that ^{particular} location, the Committee even advanced the proposition of forming a separate Historical Division, General Staff.*

* Ibid., p. 27; File, History OCMH, Misc 314.7 HDSS, Tab 4, pp. 22(24) - 25(27). Gen Ref Off OCMH.

This latest report of the Advisory Committee arrived in Mr. McCloy's office while he was temporarily absent therefrom but the way had already been paved to have it forwarded at once to the Secretary of War accompanied by his personal recommendation for its approval. Likewise, G-2 notification of the committee findings was deliberately held up until after General Bissell had left on a scheduled inspection trip to South America. With Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson voicing considerable doubt, though, as to the wisdom of the Historical Branch being located either within his own or the Assistant Secretary of War's Office and indicating a marked preference for the creation of a special staff division to handle the problem, the latter solution

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was promptly agreed upon by all concerned. * A formal memorandum was

* "Clark Report," pp. 25 - 27 and File, History OCMH, Misc 314.7 HDSS, Tab 4, pp. 27(29) - 28(30). Gen Ref Off OCMH.

then issued on 17 November 1945, announcing the establishment of the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, and appointment of Maj. Gen. Edwin F. Harding ^{as} ~~to be~~ its Director. This memorandum also prescribed that the "functions, records, personnel, office space, and equipment previously assigned to the Historical Branch, Military Intelligence Division, G-2" would be transferred to the new Historical Division effective that same date. *

* See: Memo, WDOSA 314.8 (17 Nov 45), sub: Establishment of Historical Division, War Department Special Staff and Memo 82, ID WDGS, 20 Nov 45, MID 300.6 (1 Jan 45). ACSI Rec Sec. Gen Harding had recently been assigned ^{to be the} ~~as~~ Chief of the JCS Historical Section.

To all intents and purposes, this 17 November 1945 memorandum *on the subject* served to divest the departmental intelligence agency entirely of its military history mission. Although there was still an acknowledged

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G-2 interest in historical matters from the security of information standpoint, the intelligence officials could not now exercise any authoritative control over plans and policies developed by the Historical Division, WDSS, ^{to govern} concerning the Army historical program nor did they attempt to do so. Besides, the actual independence of WDSS divisions from supervision by the WDGS was later confirmed under the Army reorganization of 11 June 1946 (Simpson Board), which specifically stated that such divisions would "report direct to the Deputy Chief of Staff."
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* WD Cir 138, 14 May 46, par 17.

ID INSPECTORATE

The problem of devising an appropriate inspection system for the ID field offices, especially the MA Offices, was a long standing one. From time to time, various Inspector Generals of the Army had expressed either formally or informally a desire to conduct regular IG inspections of these offices in accordance with their assigned missions. This

* See: AR 20-5 and AR 20-10, 22 Apr 48.

was seldom accomplished, however, not only because the ACoFS G-2's, ^{WDGS,} con-

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sistently held that IG's had no business delving into classified intelligence operations but also due to the unalterable fact that the offices were scattered all over the world and located in so many comparatively inaccessible places. While a few MA Offices adjacent to overseas theaters had been inspected by IG officers, these inspections were limited mainly to the auditing of non-confidential funds. On the other hand, although ID personnel often paid visits to the field for a great number of different reasons, the ACofS G-2's ^{WDGS,} themselves had failed to establish any general inspection system as specified in Army regulations for the purpose of keeping suitably informed on conditions existing within their own far flung commands.

This matter was brought to a head early in August 1946, by Maj. Gen. Louis A. Craig, the newly appointed Inspector General, U. S. Army. *

* Gen Craig served as The Inspector General from 1 Jul 48 to 31 May 52, the date of his retirement.

After first discussing it personally with General Bolling, the Deputy DI, ^(SUSA) he decided to address an official letter to that officer on the subject in order to emphasize the following points:

1. Reports coming to the attention of the Inspector General indicate a need for adequate inspections of Military Attache Offices and certain other activities under direct control of the

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Intelligence Division, GSUSA.

2. Since irregularities develop very easily within isolated groups, the absence of well thought out command inspection procedures facilitates neglect and causes irregularities of a more serious nature.

3. There have been no inspections of Military Attache Offices by ^{an} the Inspector General, except for disbursing accounts.

4. It is believed that the Intelligence Division should form some kind of an Inspectorate, with the Office of the Inspector General ^{U.S.A., remaining} standing ready to assist in the preparation of a satisfactory check list for guiding the full scope of its inspections.

5. This ID Inspectorate ought to be composed of officers who have had some IG experience and possess the character and rank qualifications befitting such an assignment.

6. The ID Inspectorate should be granted sufficient officer strength to inspect all required stations within a period of about two years.

7. Note particularly that this ID Inspectorate would be called upon to perform purely a command function and one which could not be properly delegated to the Inspector General's Department.

8. It seems most desirable that the Inspector General's Department should also inspect the Military Attache Offices but

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with so many practical difficulties now standing in the way of this, I am inclined to think the matter can be remedied through an agreement between the Department and Military Intelligence. Creating the ID Inspectorate, as suggested, should ^{also} make it possible to reach trouble points in time to correct them before before they get out of hand.*

* Ltr, Maj Gen Louis A. Craig, ^{IGD,} ~~IG~~, to Maj Gen A. R. Bolling, ^{GSUSA,} Deputy DI, 11 Aug 48, sub: Corrective Inspections, CSGID 333.1 (14 Jan 47). DRB TAG.

Five days later, more to block the Inspector General from taking further official action which might lead to IG inspections of MA Offices rather than any actual recognition of the necessity for devising a general inspection system to satisfy the responsibilities of command, an ID Inspectorate was hastily formed with Col. Bruce W. Bidwell, the Assistant Division Executive, placed in charge.* The announced plan

* Selected for this duty not only because he had recently conducted several special investigations for the DI but also in view of the fact he was not married and could thus be expected to remain away from home most of the time, as demanded by such a stiff inspection schedule.

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was for it to have three inspection teams, each consisting of one officer, one warrant officer and one enlisted man, so as to "complete regular command inspections of each overseas field agency of the Intelligence Division at least once during every two-year period."

* ID Cir No 100-10, 16 Aug 48, CSGID 300.5 (1 Jan 47). ACSI
Rec Sec.

Despite this formal pronouncement regarding the ID Inspectorate, it soon became plainly apparent that there was considerable confusion and misunderstanding among the subordinate intelligence officials concerned about who the new Inspector really represented or what specific functions he should be permitted to inspect in the field. The idea of an unlimited inspection for the purpose of informing the commander himself had not been fully accepted on that lower level nor did it ever receive a great deal of active support, ^{even} from the top. Nevertheless, Colonel Bidwell went ahead to prepare an all-inclusive check sheet for guiding his inspection coverage, which was personally approved by General Bolling and noted by General Craig. Armed with this rather indirect authority he then took off early in January 1949, accompanied by a warrant officer administrative specialist and an enlisted clerk-linguist, ^{*} to initiate the first regular command inspec-

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* CWO Wallace W. Bixby and Cpl John B. Parslow, Jr.

tion of the field for the Director of Intelligence, GSUSA. Lasting only about two months but visiting ID installations located within the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Miami, Florida, *

* During ^{this} the same trip Col Bidwell also attended a Western Hemisphere Attache Conference that was held at Fort Amador, Canal Zone, and presided over by Gen Bolling.

this team proceeded to examine into every aspect of the following widely varied matters:

1. Letters of accreditation and diplomatic privileges.
2. SOP or other ^{standing} instructions in case of MA absence from the country.
3. Language qualifications.
4. Misconduct cases, disciplinary records and violations of U. S. conflict of interest laws.
5. Relations with:
 - Chief and other members of the Diplomatic Mission.
 - Officials of the host country.
 - U. S. Navy and Air Attache personnel.

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U. S. Military Missions and other local or nearby U. S.
military commands.

Civil agencies of the U. S. Government, including CIA and FBI.

Foreign Military Attaches.

American commercial firms.

6. Procedures established to handle requests from foreign military personages ^{regarding} for official invitations ^{for them} to visit the U. S.

7. Methods adopted for selecting and clearing foreign military personnel to undergo training at U. S. schools or other installations.

8. Actions bearing upon U. S. military awards and decorations for citizens of the host country.

9. Military personnel matters:

Tours of duty.

Marriage to foreign nationals.

Replacements.

General Staff assignment.

Promotions.

Travel orders.

Leaves of absence.

Physical examinations.

Pay and allowances.

Wearing of uniforms.

Efficiency reports.

Awards and citations.

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10. Civilian personnel matters:

CPR and CFC files.

Tours of service.

Employment agreements.

Number and adequacy of civilian personnel.

Alien employees.

Marriage of U. S. employees to foreign nationals.

Allowances, per diem and return transportation.

Working hours and overtime pay.

Quarters and cost of living.

Uniforms for custodial personnel.

Civilian payroll accounts (audit).

11. Security:

Periodic reading of AR 380-5.

Records of security clearances and investigations.

Safeguarding classified information and material.

Vigilance and countermeasures with reference to wire taps, dictaphones, eavesdropping etc.

Emergency plans for destruction of classified material.

MA personnel keeping diaries or writing articles for publication.

Storage of Document DA-DCMI covering the release of classified information to foreign governments.

Exchange of information with other agencies of the U. S. Government.

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Distribution list for classified ID publications.

Violations of delimitations agreement or third agency rule.

Crypto security.

12. Correspondence:

Use of "Eyes Only" channel of communication.

Writing personal letters dealing with official business.

"R" Series reports.

Cable utilization.

Filing system.

Disposition of obsolete records.

13. Mail:

Security violations.

Mail invoices and registration slips.

Misuse of diplomatic pouch.

Address records.

14. Finance:

Accounting methods.

Over-obligation of funds.

Promptness in forwarding vouchers.

Local currency exchange.

Building leases.

Allotment for maintenance.

Allotment for representation.

Confidential vouchers.

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15. Reports:

Military and civilian personnel reports.

Station Report.

Language Instruction Report.

Annual Physical Inventory and Transfer of Property Reports.

16. Property and Supply:

Property accounts (audit)

Private use of government property.

Property clearance system for ^{departing} personnel.

Government vehicles, including maintenance records, condition, adequacy and accident reports.

Local purchase of supplies.

Post exchange or other similar facilities.

Commissary privileges.

17. Intelligence Activities:

Organization for collecting and reporting.

Sources and contacts.

Funds.

Areas of responsibility.

Means for reporting.

Reproduction and photographic equipment.

Dissemination lists.

18. Miscellaneous:

Local press relations.

Subscriptions to U. S. periodicals and newspapers.

Purchase of foreign books, maps and periodicals.

U. S. Army reserves.

Customs regulations. *

* See: File, CSGID 333.1, 12 Jan 49 (14 Jan 47). DRB TAG.

Shortly after his return from this Latin American inspection trip and while still in the midst of rewriting the ID standing administrative instructions (STADIN) to bring them more up-to-date, Colonel Bidwell received word that he had become due for foreign service. On 1 April 1949, therefore, he was ordered to attend the next SIS class *

* Col Bidwell assumed command of the MA Office, Netherlands, effective 16 Oct 49.

and Colonel Joseph S. Dougherty named to replace him as the ID Inspector. *

* Col Dougherty, an Inf Officer, had been detailed in the Inspector General's Department from 24 Sep 36 to 28 Aug 43.

At the same time, an initial step was taken in the direction of compro-

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mising the essential independent status of the ID Inspectorate ^{directly} under
the DI by making it an integral part of the Executive Staff. Six months
*

* See: ID Memo, 14 Apr 49, sub: Changes to Top Secret Control
Lists, CSGID 300.6, 14 Apr 49 (19 Jan 49). ACSI Rec Sec.

later, with Colonel Dougherty having completed a second general inspec-
tion swing throughout most of western Europe, the ID Inspectorate was
abruptly discontinued, effective 15 October 1949, and its total func-
tion transferred to the Chief, Administrative and Liaison Group.
*

* ID Memo No. 44, 18 Oct 49, CSGID 300.6, 18 Oct 49 (17 Jan 49).
ACSI Rec Sec.

The chief reason advanced in justification of doing away with a
separate ID Inspectorate was that the move was rendered necessary be-
cause of recent ID strength reductions. While the personnel situation
within the departmental intelligence agency was admittedly ^{difficult} ~~poor~~, it
also remains clear that the concept of establishing a true command
inspection system for the ID field offices had never been completely
understood or accepted by all concerned, including even the DI, ^(GSUSA) himself.
As a matter of fact, although the special regulation outlining the ID
duties and organization ~~still~~ continued to call for the Administrative
and Liaison Group to make "regular inspections of each overseas field

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activity of the Intelligence Division at least once every two years,"*

* See: SR 10-120-1, 14 Sep 49, as changed by ID Memo No. 44, dated 18 Oct 49.

this was not accomplished. In May 1950, inquiries on the subject were again received from the Office of the Inspector General but no further

* See: Memo for Record, Lt Col Michelet, 18 May 50, MID 333.1, 18 May 50 (14 Jan 47). DRB TAG.

action could then be taken prior to 25 June 1950, the date of the sudden opening of the Korean War.

CAREER SPECIALIZATION

The question of whether or not there should be some form of intelligence career specialization established within the United States Army had been under active discussion for many years but still remained a highly controversial one. The constant reappearance of the very same handicaps to the military intelligence effort before, during and after World War II had convinced a large body of authoritative military opinion that the only possible solution to the intelligence personnel problem would be to form an Intelligence Corps and install it on a coequal basis with all the other Army branches. While this proposition did seem to offer several important advantages over the existing detail system, it was always much easier to envision in broad outline than when specif-

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ically applied. Impartial judges, therefore, usually ended up by recommending against its full implementation but, as an alternative, substituting some type of career management for selected intelligence specialists. They were also generally found to be in close agreement that staff direction of the military intelligence effort should continue to remain in the hands of officers possessing a well-rounded service background and not given over to those who had pursued a more narrow course of intelligence specialization.

The War Department Plan for the Post War Military Establishment, approved in November 1945, not only ^{had} retained the MIS concept but also instructed the departmental intelligence authorities to formulate plans and policies for "such Military Intelligence Corps or similar organizations as may be established." * In contrast, the findings of the second

* "The War Department Basic Plan for the Post War Military Establishment, November 1945" (S), pp. 57-58, MID 320, 9 Nov 45 (27 Aug 45).
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Lovett Board, which were accepted by the Secretary of War a month later, declared that although officers must be encouraged to make intelligence a career, the disadvantages of having an Intelligence Corps within the Regular Army "appear to outweigh its advantages." The board did, however, recommend the creation of an Intelligence Corps for reserve officers who were interested in keeping intel-

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ligence mobilization assignments, so a reserve organization of that
*
nature was eventually adopted.

* Memo (S) for Sec War, 5 Dec 45, sub: Report of Committee Appointed by the Secretary of War to Study War Department Intelligence Activities, f/w SD 30375-A. ACSI Doc Br.

Despite this major setback, the idea of adopting some kind of intelligence career specialization for the U. S. Army, persisted. During September 1946, therefore, the DI requested a newly formed Chief of Staff's Advisory Council to list as one of its recommended long range projects the "development of a Career Management Program for selected Regular Officers of the General Staff type to fit them for intelligence duty in the WDGS, MA system, Theater and Task Force Headquarters." * At the same time, a board of five senior MID officers

* BATED, 319.1 (item 2), 19 Sep 46 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

demonstrated conclusively what a difficult problem it was to gain suitable recognition for military intelligence without the benefit of any branch status, when, after screening several thousand applications, they could only approve a total of 32 wartime officers for integration into the Regular Army under a given restricted category of "Branch Immaterial assignments." * Actually, these applicants were those who had

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* BATED, 319.1 (Item 2), 9 Oct 46 (1 May 46). ACSI Rec Sec.

already failed of selection by any branch of their own choice. *

* See: Ltr (S), Col F. M. Hinshaw, AGC, to Col Warren H. Hoover, Acting CMH, 29 Jul 59, p. 2. Author's File.

Congress also chose to inquire into the matter of intelligence career specialization, ^{when} ~~with~~ the House Military Affairs Committee ^{ported} reporting in December 1946, that the Army should "be requested sympathetically to examine further the question of the establishment of an Intelligence Corps for the training, development and assignment of especially qualified officers." * This promptly led to a directive

* Report, Committee on Military Affairs, H. R., 79th Cong., 2d Sess. pursuant to H. Res. 20, 17 Dec 46.

from the Office of the Chief of Staff for the DI to have a study prepared on the subject, in coordination with the "Directors of Organization & Training, Plans & Operations, Personnel & Administration, the two major commands, and other interested agencies," along the following lines:

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Recommendations should include whether or not an Intelligence Corps should be established in the Army, showing the reasons for and against. If an Intelligence Corps is recommended, its detailed organization, composition, size, functions, and other related subjects should be included. Information is also desired as to what the Navy has and intends to do about a similar organization. *

* Memo, Asst Deputy CofS for DI, WDOSA 350.09 (26 Dec 46), copy in: "Report of Board of Officers Appointed to Consider the Creation of a Military Intelligence Corps" (S), Appendix B, G-2 322.4 Intelligence, 9 Jan 47 (23 Aug 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

General Chamberlin, on 27 December 1946, appointed a representative six-man board of ID officers headed by Col. L. R. Forney to accomplish this ^{direct} particular task. Its overall mission was to prepare a staff study for the Chief of Staff with reference to the "Procurement of Intelligence Officers in the Army" but it was further instructed to consider that complicated subject from the standpoint of three different possibilities, as follows:

- a. The establishment of an Intelligence Corps to which officers would be permanently assigned.
- b. The establishment of an Intelligence Corps in which officers would be procured by detail.
- c. The establishment of an Intelligence Corps in which officers would be procured partly by assignment and partly by detail. *

* Ltr, ID Exec for Personnel and Administration to Board of Officers and others, Tab "C", MID 322.4 Intelligence, 27 Dec 46 (23 Aug 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

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The so-called Forney Board not only examined all available source material bearing upon an Intelligence Corps but also consulted freely with other interested general staff divisions, major commands and outside agencies. While these ^{varied} ~~various~~ groups were in ready agreement that some sort of positive action was now indicated to insure qualified intelligence officers for the Army, most of them felt the objective could better be accomplished through career management rather than the creation of an Intelligence Corps. This, despite the fact that the career management system in current use by the Central Officers Assignment Group (COAG) of the P&A Division, ^{WDGS)} was obviously ill-designed to promote specialist careers and had already run into serious difficulties caused by compelling demands for certain classes of officers regardless of any career management considerations. The Board unanimously recommended, therefore, the immediate formation of a Military Intelligence Corps made up of "both permanently assigned and detailed members." *

* "Report of Board of Officers Appointed to Consider the Creation of a Military Intelligence Corps," (S), pp. 4 & 11, G-2 322.4 Intelligence, 9 Jan 47 (23 Aug 45). ACSI Rec Sec.

General Chamberlin himself, though, was not entirely convinced that this recommendation by the Forney Board for a Military Intelligence Corps ^{would} really provide the best possible answer to the problem. He believed the board's members ^{may have} had placed undue emphasis on the "difficulties of" estab-

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lishing some system of career management which might attain a higher degree of specialization without the sacrifice of general all-around proficiency," especially in ^{regard} respect to the more senior intelligence positions. After conferring with Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Willard S. Paul, Director of the P&A Division, ^{WDG-S,} GSUSA, who agreed there was no insuperable obstacle to developing a career management system aimed at specialization instead of diversification, he concluded that some attempt should first be made to devise such a system before authorizing an Intelligence Corps. Hence, although forwarding the Forney Board report along with it as an inclosure, he addressed a personally signed memorandum for the Chief of Staff on the subject recommending that:

- a. A general Intelligence Corps not now be created.
- b. The Director of Personnel and Administration and the Director of Intelligence be directed to evolve a system of career management and place it in operation which will be effective in the development of officers to meet the special requirements of intelligence. *

* Memorandum for the Chief of Staff (S) from Maj Gen S. J. Chamberlin, 24 Jan 47, sub: Establishment of an Intelligence Corps, MID 334 Intelligence, 24 Jan 47 (24 Aug 45). ACSI Rec Sec. This memorandum was not only signed personally by Gen Chamberlin but also carried the personal concurrences of the Directors of P&A, O&T and P&O, ^{WDG-S,} GSUSA,

The Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, approved this recommendation from the DI, ^{WDG-S,} GSUSA, on 30 January 1947, but it was then more

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* Ibid.

than a year before any further progress in the matter could be reported. Finally, during February 1948, a general staff agreement was reached to form an intelligence section within the Staff and Administrative Assignments Branch, Career Management Group, P&A Division, GSUSA. Composed of 3 officers and 2 CAF-3 assistants, it was officially called upon to "coordinate the assignment and reassignment" of regular officers to ID GSUSA, the MA System, Army Language School, CIC and ASA, as well as to assist in the "career monitoring of all MI, CIC and ASA reserve officers." * Because the section functioned so far down the

* DF, ID to Army Comptroller thru P&A Div, CSGID 020. Personnel and Administration, 15 Mar 48. DRB TAG. Chief of this new intelligence career management section under the P&A was Lt Col (later Col) George T. Adair, Inf.

career management ladder, ^{however,} though, in comparison with those representing the Army branches and technical or administrative services, these twin tasks could seldom if ever be properly accomplished.

This unsatisfactory situation regarding the career management of Army intelligence personnel was then permitted to drift without any formal protest until 27 December 1948. On that date, General Irwin, the

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new DI, GSUSA, authorized the dispatch of a staff communication to the P&A Division, GSUSA, not only to point out that the career management program as approved by the Chief of Staff in January 1947 was still non-existent but also to recommend another representative conference for the purpose of doing something about it.* Such a con-

* DF, ID GSUSA to P&A Div GSUSA, 27 Dec 48, CSGID 320, 27 Dec 48, (15 Oct 48). DRB TAG.

ference was soon held and conclusion reached that the establishment of a separate Intelligence Career Management Branch within the Career Management Group, P&A Division, GSUSA, would be both feasible and desirable provided the DI, GSUSA, concurred in the following procedures:

- a. CIC, ASA, MI and all other intelligence agencies of the Intelligence Division are handled by this branch as far as procurement, assignment and career management are concerned.
- b. That personnel records or transcripts thereof are kept by this branch on all intelligence reserve officers, whose mobilization assignments are controlled by the D/I and all Regular Army or Reserve officers on extended active duty doing duty with the Intelligence Division.
- c. That such personnel as is needed to set up this Branch be provided from Intelligence personnel now engaged in this work. *

* Ibid., Comment No. 2, P&A Div to D/I, 14 Feb 48.

Meanwhile, on 25 February 1949, before an answer had been made to

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this latest career management proposal, General Irwin attended a high level presentation prepared under the direction of the Vice Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, for Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, covering the "State of Readiness in Class II Installations and Activities." As part of ^{an internal} ~~a~~-detailed discussion which followed, General Collins announced that "the CIC, the ASA and ID ought to be given considerable priority in the assignment of competent officers and enlisted men." ^{*} With this welcome declaration

* See: "State of Readiness in Class II Installations and Activities, Department of the Army" and attached transcript of Discussion (S), 25 Feb 49, G-2 381.01, 25 Feb 49 (10 Dec 48). DRB TAG.

promising to signal the end of any ^{continuing} further delay in the matter, General Irwin, on 29 March 1949, agreed to the establishment of an "Intelligence Career Management Branch in P&A Division for the control of intelligence personnel." He carefully cautioned, however, that it should plan to operate in very close coordination with ID and also suggested a joint ID-P&A study "to determine the additional spaces ^{*} for this Branch."

* DF, ID GSUSA to P&A Div GSUSA, 27 Dec 48, CSGID 320, 27 Dec 48 (15 Oct 48), Comment No. 3, CSGID to CSGPA, signed S. LeRoy Irwin, 29 Mar 49. DRB TAG.

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Having thus concurred in the establishment of an Intelligence Career Management Branch within the P&A Division, General Irwin then sought to put the companion project of forming a Military Intelligence Corps to rest by forwarding a complete study of the intelligence personnel procurement problem to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, which contained the following specific conclusions:

5. That the establishment of a Corps is not the solution to the present personnel problem.
6. That (1) a system of career management, and (2) an increase in the proportion of Regular Army officers in CIC and ASA can provide for the existing personnel deficiencies. *

* SS (S), ID to DCofS for Adm, 29 Mar 49, G-2, 320. 29 Mar 49 (15 Mar 48). DRB TAG.

Nevertheless, the intelligence career management problem continued to remain badly unsettled. One of the immediate obstacles still standing in the way of its favorable solution was the matter of obtaining ~~the~~ additional military and civilian personnel spaces required for ^{the} ~~a~~ new Intelligence Career Management Branch within P&A. Because of recent departmental strength cuts, neither ID nor the P&A Division wanted to have these spaces charged against them and just as soon as they did happen to agree on a definite personnel authorization another ordered reduction would come along to cancel it. On 21 February 1950, however, Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, the Director of P&A, ^{GSUSA} finally accepted an ID-sponsored charter for ^{this} ~~the~~ Intelligence Career Management Branch that had already

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been approved by the Comptroller of the Army and it was duly put into
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effect.

* See: File (S), G-1 210.31 (21 Mar 49), Establishment of an
Intelligence Career Management Branch. DRB TAG.

The intelligence career specialization problem came to the fore
again in April 1950, when the ACoFS G-1, GSUSA, commenced to implement
a previous order from the Chief of Staff for him to decentralize his
Career Management Division to the Office of the Adjutant General. * It

* See: Memo, DCoFS for Adm to DA Staff, 320., 10 Jul 50 (11 Oct
49), confirming verbal orders of the ACoFS G-1 issued 26 Apr 50. DRB TAG.

was not until 8 June 1950, though, that the ACoFS G-2, GSUSA, prepared
and forwarded a detailed "Department of the Army Intelligence Career
Plan" to the ACoFS G-1, GSUSA, for approval, which was designed to in-
cover
clude the following classes of personnel:

- a. General Strategic Intelligence Specialists.
 - (1) Office, AC/S, G-2, GSUSA.
 - (2) Theater G-2 Staffs.
 - (3) Army G-2 Staffs.
 - (4) Army Attaches and Assistants, including Army
Attache Career Warrant Officers, MOS 2122.
- b. Language and Area Specialists.
- c. M-I Reserves (specialty and mobilization requirements).
- d. Army Security Agency Specialists. *

[REDACTED]

* DF (S), ACoFS G-2 to ACoFS G-1, sub: Intelligence Career Plan, 8 Jun 50, G-2 320., 8 Jun 50 (15 Oct 48). DRB TAG.

Inter-staff discussions between the G-1 and G-2 officials relative to this initial intelligence career specialization plan were proceeding but at a snail's pace when the Korean Conflict suddenly broke out on 25 June 1950. Its arrival not only threatened to postpone any conclusive action in the matter for an indefinite time but also served to emphasize the fact that the entire project had been characterized by a monumental amount of stalling and confusion on the part of both sides right from the start. While the G-2 authorities were prompt in recognizing that there was a distinct need for improving the intelligence personnel procurement system, they could never reach full agreement even among themselves as to exactly what steps should be taken to remedy it. The G-1 authorities, on the other hand, remained solidly against the idea of having an Intelligence Corps and kept intelligence specialization relegated to such a low position in their career management structure that it soon amounted to practically nothing. With continued strong backing from higher authority, the departmental intelligence officials might well hope for more progress along such lines in the future but they could certainly claim little gain within this important field during the Cold War period which was abruptly terminated by the opening of the Korean Conflict.



CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite the fact that World War II had plainly brought about an increased awareness both within the U. S. Army and throughout the nation at large of the vital importance of intelligence to military operations, there was still an inadequate appreciation after V-J Day of the huge amount of resources it would entail during peacetime. Many of our national leaders and even a considerable number of the military authorities themselves remained firmly convinced that the departmental intelligence effort should be able to shrink quickly into its previous prewar pattern right along with the rest of the Army following a brief occupation period in Germany, Italy and Japan. This type of thinking blandly ignored the new conditions of Cold War, which kept calling for more and more intelligence activity in order to protect against the dangerous threat of surprise from an aggressively led U.S.S.R. combined with a potentially powerful group of satellite countries and international Communist conspiracy functioning on a worldwide basis. Thus, although the Cold War was in reality an intelligence war, it never came to be completely recognized or accepted as such by all concerned.

The intelligence system left over from World War II stood in obvious need of a thorough overhaul, not only to meet the occupation demands but also due to the recently altered balance of power among

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the major nations of the world. With combat intelligence bearing upon Axis military capabilities no longer of paramount interest, activities designed to satisfy that particular purpose would have to be reoriented without further delay and there was already a marked requirement for a greatly expanded counterintelligence effort designed to uncover subversion or sabotage directed against the U. S. Army both at home and abroad. Likewise, since scientific advances in the conduct of modern warfare were progressing so rapidly, it was essential for military intelligence to ^{stay properly} remain fully abreast at all times of the latest developments occurring within that complex field. Even though these indicated functional changes promised to involve a number of difficult shifts in organization and emphasis, they were ^{all} promptly undertaken by the departmental intelligence officials with the limited means still at hand following a rapid demobilization.

The Army intelligence system also came under several strong outside pressures during this early postwar period. First and foremost among these was a full scale resurgence of the drive aimed at concentrating all governmental intelligence operations under one central agency, headed preferably by a member of the small but influential group of zealots who had been pushing such centralization ever since before World War II. This drive reached a new peak in intensity when President Truman ordered the wartime OSS abolished, effective 1 October 1945, and thereby left a critical gap in American intelligence coverage especially with reference to secret activities overseas. Gen-

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eral Donovan, ^{the} ex-Chief of the OSS, then became the most prominent spokesman for this dedicated group and managed to keep the project alive even after ~~the~~ establishment of the CIG in January 1946 and until Congress could be persuaded to replace that original agency with a completely independent CIA some eighteen months later.

It looked for awhile as if the departmental military intelligence effort might enjoy a real measure of solid support from higher authority during the initial stages of the Cold War. Spurred by the constructive findings of a Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack and widespread recognition that there was actually considerable room for improvement, a determined attempt was made to correct the disadvantageous personnel policies and other adverse factors which had long surrounded this effort so that intelligence might truly attain a co-equal status with the other principal functions of military command. Recommendations along such lines, therefore, were submitted to the Secretary of War by the second Lovett Board during December 1945, not only to receive formal approval but also prompt dissemination throughout the Army. Unfortunately, though, most of these recommendations remained badly neglected when they ran up against the stern realities of the crippling personnel and fund cuts which were being applied generally on a proportionate basis within the War Department. While this method may have seemed the fairest way of distributing these cuts and certainly it was the least upsetting for the administrative authorities themselves, it served patently to deny or limit many needed improvements in the military intel-

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ligence system, particularly during the crucial year preceding the sudden outbreak of the Korean Conflict.

The most important military intelligence event during 1946 stemmed from the findings of the Simpson Board on reorganizing the Army and War Department. In line with ^{this} the board's thesis that the WDGS should actually operate, the departmental intelligence agency finally succeeded in shedding the separate MIS concept which had twice been imposed on it from above during World War II. Moreover, with the Army Service Forces ~~also~~ scheduled for elimination, the new Director of Intelligence (DI), WDGS, could ^{also} anticipate an eventual return of the basic counterintelligence responsibilities that had been removed from his agency during and right after World War II. Although he soon did regain most of these responsibilities, no change or modification was authorized in the previously announced decision by higher authority to the effect that the agency would have to rely entirely upon outside sources in the production of domestic intelligence. The result was ^{that} the DI, WDGS, remained unable to keep either the Chief of Staff or the Army properly informed on domestic security developments calling for the possible use of federal troops in an emergency.

Creation of the more or less stop-gap CIG in January 1946 filled an obvious void in American intelligence coverage within the foreign field and brought to a close the incongruous situation of having the

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SSU function under the Assistant Secretary of War independently of MID but it also generated a number of difficult problems of its own. As a matter of fact, being solely dependent upon the regular departmental agencies for personnel and fund support, it could scarcely be expected to work out in a satisfactory manner. Besides, the centralization enthusiasts who had so ardently pushed its formation from the start considered it merely a step in the right direction and kept pressing the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to assume an aggressive position relative to his authority over the other intelligence agencies. This attitude, coupled with the lack of any practicable definition for the oft-used term of "national security information," caused constant friction and ^{plainly served to delay} ~~delayed~~ the effective growth of a well coordinated central intelligence system. In contrast, the newly established NIA and IAB were ^{most} ~~very~~ favorably designed to achieve a maximum coordination of effort for American intelligence operations. If these committees had been permitted to remain untouched, therefore, the chances are that many of the more difficult intelligence problems might have been duly resolved and the entire effort ^{soon} placed on a firmer basis in every ^{important} ~~possible~~ respect.

A carefully planned intelligence training program for the post-war Army was fatally compromised during June 1946, when the MITC at Camp Ritchie, Md., was ordered abolished without any suitable replacement. It should have been clearly evident to all concerned from their World War II experience that some form of centralized facility would be needed

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to train the numerous intelligence specialists, other than CIC, ASA and linguists, demanded by modern warfare. Either through ignorance or misunderstanding, or both, this important requirement first became mixed up in a heated argument about whether there should be an Intelligence College and then heavily embroiled in the even more controversial question of command responsibility for unit intelligence training. The net result was a serious gap in the ^{military} intelligence training program and repeated disagreement among the departmental intelligence and training authorities over the proper ^{handling} ~~status~~ of such training throughout the Army. Similarly, the departmental intelligence authorities continued to remain thoroughly dissatisfied with the lack of emphasis being given to ^{military} intelligence subjects by Headquarters, Army Field Forces, after it had received the full Army training mission in March 1948.

Another strong outside pressure brought to bear against the departmental intelligence agency during the early postwar period came from an erroneous conclusion that was reached in mid-1947 by the authoritative Haislip Board. This board, which had been formed for the announced purpose of reviewing current War Department policies and programs, chose to delve more deeply than might be reasonably expected into the detailed conduct of military intelligence operations. It thus claimed that Army intelligence was "scattering its shots" too much and should be instructed to center "an undivided attention" upon Russia and the satellite countries because they represented the only

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^{important}
~~real~~ threat to American security within the foreseeable future. In reality, the departmental ^{military} intelligence officials were ^{duly} ~~duly~~ aware of this direct ^{challenge} ~~military threat~~ from the U.S.S.R. and had designed their collection organization with that thought foremost in mind. They further recognized, however, the dire necessity of following Communist Party activities throughout the world in order to be able to estimate the capabilities of this possibly even more dangerous arm of the total Russian threat. They had even taken appropriate steps right after V-J Day to expand and reorient the American Military Attache system with a view to collecting such information from every corner of the globe for that particular purpose.

While the military intelligence authorities were most certainly on the right track in, ^{initially} organizing their worldwide collection effort, ^{that way,} they accepted the approved findings of the Haislip Board, as published during August 1947, without any notable show of protest. The basic Essential Elements of Information (EEI's) for the Army were promptly revised ~~so as~~ to reflect the new intelligence doctrine and strength ^{were} increases authorized for the U.S.S.R. and satellite MA offices, principally at the expense of those in Latin America. A steady procession of Communist Party subversive successes within such strategically ^{ally} ~~ally~~ important countries as Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, China, Bolivia, Guatemala, and the Netherlands East Indies should then have demonstrated beyond any question the fallacy of the doctrine but no strenuous objections were apparently ever registered against it. This, despite

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the fact that because of ever-growing local security restrictions being placed upon the activities of American Military Attache personnel stationed in the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries, it was ^{often} actually ~~often~~ more practicable for ID to obtain badly needed information on these critical areas from sources outside of rather than behind the Iron Curtain.

Reorientation of the Army intelligence effort in accordance with the Haislip Board theory that it should be centered mainly upon covering a direct military threat from Russia and its satellites, ^{served to} marked the close of the postwar reorganization phase of the Cold War period. At the same time, ^{an entirely} ~~a brand~~ new situation had just opened up for that effort with the passage of the National Security Act on 26 July 1947. This act not only created a Department of Defense consisting of separate Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force but also eliminated the NIA-IAB-CIG intelligence coordinating system and established an independent CIA to function under a top level National Security Council (NSC). In summation, therefore, the most significant military intelligence events ^{that} which did take place during the early part of the Cold War period may be listed chronologically, as follows:

2 September 1945 - Termination of military censorship within the U. S. Army both at home and abroad.

20 September 1945 - Issuance of EO 9621 by President Truman, which abolished the OSS, effective 1 October 1945, and resulted in the assignment to the War Department of a residual SSU group operating under ~~the~~ direct supervision of the Assistant Secretary of War.

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15 October 45 - Closing down of the MITC at Camp Ritchie, Md. and subsequent notification to appropriate authority that Camp Ritchie itself would become surplus after 1 May 1946.

6 November 1945 - Approval by the Secretary of War of the preliminary report of the first Lovett Board, thereby adopting an official War Department position in favor of ^{having} a central intelligence agency to function within the espionage and counterespionage fields.

9 November 1945 - Publication of a War Department "Basic Plan for the Post War Military Establishment," in order to guide postwar reorganization.


17 November 1945 - Creation of the Historical Division, WDSS, as a replacement for the wartime Historical Branch, MID.

7 December 1945 - Receipt in MID of a remarkably terse communication from the Office of the Chief of Staff declaring that "no evaluation or analysis of the domestic situation by G-2 or by the intelligence agencies of the major commands is considered necessary."

13 December 1945 - Approval of the second Lovett Board findings recommending a number of specific steps that should be taken to attain the "complete rehabilitation of intelligence in the Army."

22 January 1946 - Dispatch by President Truman of a joint directive to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, designating them, along with another person to be named as his own representative, to constitute a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) for assuring "the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission relating to national

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security." This same directive also established a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) ~~to be~~ supported jointly by the State, War and Navy Departments, and an Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB) composed of the heads or their representatives of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the government.

25-26 January 1946 - Replacement of Maj. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell as the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, by Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg.

5 February 1946 - Disapproval by higher authority of a War Department Military Education (Gerow) Board recommendation that there should be an Intelligence College in the postwar Army.

22 February 1946 - Secretary of War approval of revisions, ^{as} proposed by the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, in the current instructions for handling subversive and disaffected Army personnel. These new instructions not only directed the preparation of files on known or suspected subversives but also designated MID ^{to be} as the central office of record for such files and ordered the ACoFS G-2 of each major field command to maintain a similar control record covering his own military installations and units.

4 March 1946 - Agreement among the national authorities concerned ^{in regard} ~~with reference~~ to a government policy aimed at facilitating the entry of selected foreign scientific or technical specialists into the United States, thus forming a workable basis for the ACoFS G-2, WDGS, to utilize in supervising and coordinating project PAPERCLIP under the direction of a Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA).

3 April 1946 - Appointment by SWNCC of a Security Advisory Board



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(SAB), which promptly proceeded to draft a new set of rules establishing "minimum security standards for all departments and agencies of the executive branch."

14 May 1946 - Publication of WD Circular 138, announcing a War Department and Army reorganization along Simpson Board lines, effective 11 June 1946. Among other things, this important reorganization recognized the fact that the WDGS would have to operate, changed the title of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff to Directors and abolished the Army Service Forces.

16 May 1946 - Formal announcement by the DI, WDGS, of a non-MIS organization for the departmental military agency, in accordance with the Simpson Board recommendations, that had actually been functioning on a trial basis since 6 April 1946.

10 June 1946 - Appointment of Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to become ^{the} Director of Central Intelligence and his replacement the next day as ^{the} DI, WDGS, by Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin.

11 June 1946 - Transfer, despite Sixth Army opposition, of MISLS from Ft. Snelling, Minn. to the Presidio of Monterey, Calif.

1 August 1946 - Creation of an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Military Liaison Committee (MLC) to assist it, ^{which} eventually resulted ^{designated} in the AEC Director of Intelligence and Security being ^{appointed} ^{as} a regular member of the IAB.

15 August 1946 - Elimination of the Security Intelligence Corps (SIC) that had been operating only within the Zone of the Interior and consequent concentration of the ^{complete} ~~total~~ Army counterintelligence mission under the CIC.

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17 August 1946 - Establishment, by WD Circular 250, of special Army Language and Area Training Courses for Russia, Japan and China, as well as intensive Language Courses in Russian, Portuguese and Spanish.

3 December 1946 - Addition of an Army Security (AS) Reserve to the approved list of sections comprising the Active Reserve, U.S. Army.

30 December 1946 - Chief of Staff acceptance of the ID Strategic Intelligence School (SIS) as an Army Special Service School, ^{followed by an} ~~and later~~ official announcement that it would function under direct supervision of the DI, WDGS, to train and instruct intelligence officers in all aspects of strategic intelligence.

2 January 1947 - Initial allocation by the NIA of primary agency responsibility for collecting ^{specified} ~~certain~~ broad categories of information in the field.

30 January 1947 - Chief of Staff approval of a recommendation by the DI, ^{WDGS} against creating an Intelligence Corps at that particular time but, instead, having him work out in close collaboration with the DP&A, WDGS, the details of a career management system for military intelligence officers.

5 March 1947 - Receipt of long awaited permission for ID to notify the major field commands that, within the limitations of present War Department policy, reports were desired on "trends and conditions relating to strikes, racial disturbances or other disorders potentially or actually dangerous to the peaceful conduct of internal affairs" if they gave any definite indication ^{United States} ~~the armed forces of the United States~~ might become involved.

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21 March 1947 - Issuance of EO 9835, for the purpose of providing standard instructions on handling civilian employee loyalty matters throughout the ^{United States} ~~U.S.~~ Government.

1 June 1947 - Transfer of the CIC Branch, Security Group, ID, to Ft. Holabird, Md. and appointment five days later of Brig. Gen. George V. Keyser, Commanding General of the CIC Center there, ^{as} ~~to be~~ the Chief, CIC.

28-30 June 1947 - Publication of three new Army field manuals, ^{in order to} ~~to~~ encourage and guide the employment of an Aggressor Force during the conduct of all large-scale maneuvers or field exercises.

The National Security Act of 1947, which was passed on 26 July 1947 but did not become fully effective until 18 September 1947, had been deliberately designed to alter the entire national defense structure. One of its key provisions, for example, created a new Department of Defense to include three separate Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Although this step alone held wide military intelligence implications, especially in connection with the difficult problem of dividing up intelligence means and responsibilities between the Army and the Air Force, the act also chose to enter directly into the military intelligence field. ~~Thus,~~ ^{It thus} did away with the existing NIA-IAB-CIG coordinating system and formed an independent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to operate under a National Security Council (NSC) presided over by the President of the United States. The new system soon

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proved to be faulty, however, because the NSC was not an effective substitute for the NIA in establishing ^{detailed} intelligence policies or procedures and there had been no replacement provided at all for the badly needed IAB.

Despite this ^{difficult} unsettled period of departmental reorganization, the Army intelligence authorities ^{went} had gone right ahead in seeking to improve their ^{own} production capabilities. Based upon the approved Haislip Board recommendations, new EEI's were duly prepared to guide the field intelligence agencies and a representative ID committee was appointed for the express purpose of studying current collection operations "with special emphasis on the U.S.S.R." The big problem now, though, was ^{how} ~~how~~ to make further progress in the face of the severe personnel and fund cuts which were being constantly applied throughout the military intelligence effort. These cuts plainly meant either a ^{major} ~~serious~~ reduction in efficiency for that effort or some form of functional elimination within ID itself. Economy considerations, therefore, gradually forced a succession of retrenchment measures along the following lines:

1. Abolishing the Collection Group as a separate entity and distributing its principal functions among other ID units.
2. Curtailing intelligence coverage of the foreign language press.
3. Transferring all ID activities connected with the Washington Document Center, as well as its own Special Document and German Military Document Sections, to CIG.

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4. Agreeing to support a proposed allocation plan wherein the State, War and Navy Departments would each be held primarily responsible for collecting certain specified classes of information for use by the others.

5. Ending the procurement of foreign scientists and technicians under project PAPERCLIP.

6. Relying upon Consular Officers of the State Department to forward military information from areas in which the Army remained unrepresented.

7. Giving up the idea of full participation with CIG (CIA) in a program aimed at exploiting domestic sources of "foreign positive" information.

8. Reducing MA strength in Latin America and the Far East, for the purpose of increasing the strength of MA Offices in the U.S.S.R., China, Greece and satellite countries.

9. Abandoning all original research on political, economic, sociological, biographical (except military and scientific) factors, and reducing ^{such} research considerably within both the subversive and topographic fields.

10. Instructing major occupation headquarters to take over the preparation of Strategic Intelligence Digests (SID's) ^{for} covering their respectively assigned areas.

11. Transferring the JANIS project to CIG and the Army Courier Service to TAG.

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12. Allowing a huge backlog of personnel clearance cases to develop with reference to the Army part of the national security program.

13. Failing to provide adequately for the centralized training of intelligence specialists, other than CIC or ASA, such as photo interpreters, prisoner of war interrogators, special linguists, etc.

These were all significant straws in the wind pointing directly toward even graver functional losses for the departmental intelligence agency if the military economy drive continued without abatement, in the future. The immediate goal, however, was to remedy the unfavorable situation which had been created by the absence of any authoritative coordinating committee within the new NSC-CIA system corresponding to the previous IAB. The need for such action was already so apparent that the DCI himself, on 19 September 1947, recommended the formation of an Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) made up essentially of the same membership as the IAB. It soon became clear, however, that his ^{proffered} ~~proposed~~ committee was intended to function chiefly in an advisory capacity for the DCI and to remain under strict CIA control. While the departmental intelligence officials realized that this type of committee would not provide a satisfactory solution to the growing coordination problem and protested vehemently in the matter, when the NSC did establish the IAC, effective 12 December 1947, it ^{was given} ~~held~~ only an advisory mission and could be by-passed practically at will by the DCI.

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Another difficult hurdle confronting the departmental military intelligence authorities at this time was to accomplish a proper division of intelligence means and responsibilities between the Army and Air Force in compliance with a series of inflexible directives issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. With pressures for military economy continuing to mount, the struggle over each individual budget item and personnel space was bound to be carried out in a highly partisan manner rather than from the standpoint of any real consideration of intelligence efficiency. The division was further complicated by the fact that in adopting its new intelligence organization the Air Force had chosen to deviate considerably from the established Army organization. There was, therefore, no functional parallel on hand to facilitate the detailed separation of duties. The net result was that agreements in ^{respect} regard to separating such important responsibilities as, for example, the Army and Air Force Attache systems, did not go into actual effect until 1 January 1949.

The military economy drive reached a ^{decisive} conclusive climax shortly after Mr. Johnson became the new Secretary of Defense at the end of March 1949. Its disabling effects were naturally felt throughout the entire Army establishment but particularly so for the departmental intelligence agency because the exigencies of the Cold War kept demanding increased intelligence coverage and most of the personnel cuts were still being distributed among the departmental activities mainly on a proportionate basis. Mr. Johnson also seems to have possessed a strong personal prejudice against military attaches

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and remained firmly convinced that large-scale economies could be obtained through an enforced unification of the separate service attache systems despite fundamental differences in their legislative antecedents or assigned missions.

Even though there were admittedly some obvious advantages in accomplishing a reasonable program designed to centralize administrative procedures for the three service attache systems, the monetary savings that might accrue from imposing a complete attache office merger were infinitesimal in comparison with the total expenditures for national defense. At the same time, the production of military intelligence to guide essential Cold War decisions had ~~now~~ become more dependent upon military attache reports than ever before. It thus appears very difficult to understand the heavy emphasis that was consistently placed upon achieving reductions in attache office expenses while there were so many other much more fertile fields available to serve as primary defense economy targets. To make matters worse, this reduction drive gained its greatest momentum during late 1949 and early 1950, just when the non-intelligence burdens of the MA personnel were at a new high, due to such demanding new developments as the Marshall Aid Plan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). Most of the key MA's, therefore, were literally swamped with ~~these duties~~ ^{non-intelligence duties right} after they had ~~already~~ suffered sharp losses in staff help, which ~~is~~ ^{soon}

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Xentuated their collection and reporting problems to an almost intolerable degree.

One of the chief arguments advanced in favor of having a central intelligence agency for the United States Government had been that it would promote better coordination for the national intelligence effort. Actually, however, the advent of CIA, along with the creation of the Department of Defense, separation of the Air Force from the Army and the fact that the IAC remained a poor substitute for the IAB, ^{served to compli-}
~~cate~~d intelligence coordination procedures enormously. This became clearly evident when the DCI undertook to obtain an inter-agency agreement on revising the current NIA directives for adoption by the NSC. Even after the new directives were issued, many of them continued to engender a great deal of controversy. ^(c) NSCID #3, for example, which was dated 13 January 1948 and sought to inaugurate ^{the new National In-}
^{significant} intelligence Survey (NIS), promptly ran into the following difficulties:

1. Due to the growing importance of scientific intelligence, all the participating agencies insisted on retaining full coverage within that particular field.
2. The Navy and Air Force were unable to reach any satisfactory agreement regarding their respective responsibilities for the production of foreign naval air intelligence.
3. Neither the CIA nor the State Department were at first ready to perform their allotted tasks under the new NIS, so the initial surveys had to be based mostly upon JANIS and SID information furnished by the Army or Navy.

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4. It was often very difficult to determine just what particular category of intelligence each individual item of information should come under, especially in respect to the "national intelligence" classification.

5. There was a great deal of duplication of effort observable throughout the ^{new intelligence} production system because many of the agencies concerned, such as the Army technical services, still needed large amounts of foreign information for their own use.

6. Progress in connection with several of the early ^{national} intelligence surveys was so slow that much of the information and data collected for them became out of date before they could be finished.

Nevertheless, plagued as they were by the twin problems of mounting personnel shortages and increasing complexity, the Army intelligence authorities continued to bend every possible effort toward satisfying the military intelligence requirements of the Cold War. That this effort was slowly but surely rewarding ^{seems} ~~becomes~~ clearly apparent from the following list of varied intelligence events which ^{occurred} ~~did occur~~ between 26 July 1947, when the new National Security Act was passed, and the sudden opening of the Korean Conflict, on 25 June 1950:

16 September 1947 - An official separation agreement was finally reached between the DI (General Chamberlin), ^(USAF) and A-2 (Maj. Gen. George C. McDonald), ^(USAF) relative to Army and Air Force responsibilities for conducting CIC operations throughout the Zone of the Interior.

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17 October 1947 - A representative committee of ^{national} intelligence production officials decided to prepare an initial NIS (Tentative) for Turkey, utilizing finished material currently available from ~~the~~ JANIS and SID studies on that same country.

1 January 1948 - There was a marked expansion in the number of MI Reserve units being formed throughout the ^{United States} country under a recently approved Army Affiliation Program.

30 June 1948 - ID issued detailed directives to the Army technical services assigning specific work tasks for each of them in making their contributions to the NIS.

12 August 1948 - The ID Intelligence Group was reorganized in order to improve the production of basic intelligence and ^{to} give its subordinate elements definite responsibilities for preparing certain portions of NIS chapters.

16 August 1948 - An Inspectorate was formed in ID for the avowed purpose of completing regular command inspections of all its field ~~agencies~~ ^{elements} at least once every two years.

14 September 1948 - A new Executive Order was issued setting forth "Rules of Procedure Relating to Officers of the Foreign Service and Other Officers of the United States Government," which ^{It} plainly established the precedence of Military and Naval Attaches over all non-Foreign Service Attaches stationed at the same diplomatic post.

1 November 1948 - Maj. Gen. Stafford LeRoy Irwin replaced General Chamberlin as the DI, GSUSA.

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10 November 1948 - SR 600-221-1 was published to prescribe various methods for discharging Army subversive or disaffected personnel.

24 November 1948 - NSC approved, without change, a proposed NIS production schedule for FY 1949.

3 December 1948 - The Military Attache system was granted a fixed general officer allotment of two major generals and four brigadier generals but this allocation still had to face an impending Army-Air Force agreement for dividing up all such personnel spaces.

9 December 1948 - Under direct pressure from General Irwin himself, the ID Intelligence and Security Groups worked out a specific plan ^{determining} ~~governing~~ the exact duties that each would undertake in the production of domestic intelligence.

23 February 1949 - Based upon preliminary negotiations accomplished by the members of the Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), a new Delimitations Agreement was signed to govern security investigative activities on the part of ^{personnel from} ID, ONI, FBI and the Air Force OSI, ~~PPS~~

28 March 1949 - Departmental approval was obtained for an ID Censorship Plan to become immediately effective in case of emergency.

29 March 1949 - General Irwin agreed to the establishment of an Intelligence Career Management Branch within the P & A Division, GSUSA, "for the control of intelligence personnel."

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18 July 1949 - NSC not only authorized a regular charter for the IIC but also appointed a new Inter-Departmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), composed of appropriate representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury and Justice, and the National Military Establishment, to function within the security field outside of that normally covered by the IIC.

25 July 1949 - A two-week course of instruction was commenced at the SIS for seventy-five MI Reserve Officers holding ID mobilization assignments.

3 August 1949 - The Office of the Provost Marshal General took over from ID the operational function of clearing civilian industrial facilities for work on classified Army projects.

12 August 1949 - By order of the Secretary of Defense, the name of the Military Attache system was changed to the Army Attache system and provision made for a Senior Military Attache to be designated from one of the three services for supervising administration at each jointly occupied ~~service~~ ^{foreign} attache station.

24 August 1949 - Language orientation classes were initiated at the SIS in French, German, Russian and Spanish, for students having an assignment indicating ^a need to brush up on any one of these ^{foreign} languages.

31 October 1949 - Under the auspices of ^{the} new Chief, CIC, a widely attended conference was opened at Camp Holabird, Md., for the

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principal purpose of discussing all aspects of CIC problems and deciding what positive steps should be taken to counter ^{increased} subversion within the United States Army.

30 January 1950 - A ^{new} Special Regulation was published, not only to describe formal channels of communication between foreign nationals and the Department of the Army but also to list the precise duties of the ID Foreign Liaison Officer in connection therewith.

23 February 1950 - The Army Language School at the Presidio of Monterey, Calif., was placed under Sixth Army control. Shortly afterwards, it was officially confirmed, though, that ID still retained direct authority over the CIC School, ASA School and SIS.

7 April 1950 - A Central Personality Index was established at Camp Holabird, Md., for the purpose of speeding up personnel security clearance procedures.

28 April 1950 - The Basic Intelligence Directive (BID) was first thoroughly revised and then reissued in the form of a Special Regulation entitled "Army Intelligence Collection Instructions."

6 May 1950 - An initial CIC Officers Advanced Course was started at Ft. Holabird, Md.

13 June 1950 - The Secretary of Defense was finally persuaded to authorize the transfer to other posts on the "periphery of Eastern Europe and intelligence sections of USFA, EUCOM and TRUST," several Army Attache personnel spaces that had been recently rendered surplus

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by forced ^{strength} reductions in the ~~strength~~ of offices located within the satellite countries.

The Cold War period thus came to its abrupt end for the departmental military agency on a note of difficult but steady progress in the face of severe handicaps being imposed mainly from above. The principal one of these handicaps, of course, was an ever-growing shortage of personnel and funds needed to sustain a suitable collection effort extending into every corner of the globe. Aggravating this same shortage was the fact that the non-intelligence duties of the Army Attaches had been increased notably just when the total strength of the Army Attache system was in the process of undergoing a sharp reduction. The intelligence officials themselves, though, manifestly contributed to their own deficiencies by accepting without serious protest an erroneous Haislip Board conclusion to the effect that they should center their primary attention upon a direct military threat from Russia instead of attempting to cover Communist activities throughout the world. This philosophy soon led to an unbalanced field collection organization which was dedicated to keeping the Army Attache Offices within the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries at maximum strength while cutting down on those located in Latin America and the Far East.

It seems further evident that the new centralized intelligence system, as formed by the National Security Act of 1947, ^{had failed to} ~~did not~~ ^{provide} the best possible answers to all the current military intelli-

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gence problems. Although the previous system, based upon a Presidential directive issued during January 1946, ^{did} include the poorly conceived CIG, it also received much more effective supervision from the NIA and IAB than could ever be expected from the NSC-IAC-CIA system. This became promptly apparent because the NSC was not a satisfactory substitute for the NIA in establishing intelligence policies and procedures, and the authority, if any, that the IAC should hold over the DCI continued to remain in ^{heated} ~~x~~ rigorous dispute. The IAC members thus remained firmly convinced that it was a dangerous practice for the DCI to formulate independent estimates of the situation under crash conditions and then be able to submit them directly to higher authority without first giving the departmental intelligence agencies some opportunity either to concur or register ^a substantial dissent. The DCI, on the other hand, considered that his agency constituted the intelligence facility for the President and NSC, and was entirely exempt from any production limitations whatsoever. One result of this disagreement was that, when an important proposal to create a representative "Watch Committee" for producing vital intelligence estimates became bogged down in seemingly endless argument, the JIC finally chose to appoint a substitute committee to serve the very same purpose.

It may be fairly stated, therefore, that during the critical period preceding the sudden outbreak of the Korean War, the new centralized system for producing intelligence was still in the throes of a

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difficult preliminary adjustment and characterized by ^{a great deal of} heated controversy over detailed agency responsibility. This held especially true for the production of so-called national intelligence, since almost every strategic estimate of the situation prepared by one of the departmental intelligence agencies ^{might} ~~could~~ be considered as falling within the boundaries of its announced definition yet only CIA was supposed to produce intelligence of that special nature. Furthermore, the other four officially defined classes of intelligence, namely; basic, current, staff and departmental, often proved to be of little practical use and the problem of deciding where each individual item of information should go in the new system continued to plague all concerned because the ^{adopted} ~~prescribed~~ functional categories of political, cultural, sociological, military, economic, scientific, and technological intelligence were so completely intermixed.

Nevertheless, if compared with other prewar periods in American history, it must be readily acknowledged that the Cold War period did ^{exhibit} ~~show~~ several noteworthy improvements from the military intelligence standpoint. In the first place, most of the higher authorities of the government paid at least lip service to the proposition that intelligence operations on a major scale must always form an essential adjunct to national defense. The military intelligence officials could likewise ^{usually} ~~normally~~ count upon some measure of ^{firm} ~~solid~~ support for their effort from Congress whenever it became seriously threatened. Such assistance not only had been found badly wanting in the past but also

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was now more necessary than ever, with well organized subversive groups standing constantly on the alert and ready to exploit any attack against military intelligence regardless of its original source. As a matter of fact, it appears extremely doubtful that without this ^{strong} outside support it would have been possible to organize an effective counterintelligence program at all for the Army before Korea.

Another favorable development in connection with the military intelligence effort was ^{the} general acceptance of the thesis that the departmental agency could not avoid becoming directly involved in operational activities. A most welcome corollary thereto was increased recognition that the DI (ACofS G-2), GSUSA, functioned both as a principal member of the general staff and in the capacity of an important military commander both at home and abroad. This unique ^{dual} ~~deal~~ status, ^{stemming} ~~called for~~ ^{from} by his assigned responsibility to supervise the Army Attache system, CIC, ASA and various intelligence schools, had been ^{studiedly} ~~deliberately~~ ignored by higher authority in World War II when a separate MIS concept was twice forced on the departmental intelligence agency from above. Only one unsuccessful attempt was attempt was made during the Cold War period to revive that discredited ^{concept} ~~idea~~ and it rested chiefly upon an administrative desire to gain additional floor space within the Pentagon for Air Force and Navy use. Hence, even after the Department of the Army reorganization of April 1950, which among other things redesignated the DI as an ACofS G-2, GSUSA, the departmental intelligence

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agency continued to remain deeply involved in a considerable number of operational activities.

The principal lesson derived from military intelligence operations during this pre-Korea Cold War period would seem to lie in *the* rapidly changing aspects of modern warfare itself. Never before had there been an extended conflict between two hostile ideologies under theoretical peacetime conditions ^{that reached} reaching into every corner of the globe and ^{demanding} demanding a maximum intelligence effort. Furthermore, ^{this} this type of conflict ^{has} soon became so all-pervading that it called for a completely altered attitude toward military intelligence on the part of our national leaders and the public at large. Many of the authorities directly concerned, however, both civilian and military, refused to acknowledge the grave necessity for such an alteration and kept insisting upon a return to the previous system instead of demonstrating a willingness to face the ^{harsh} ~~atom~~ realities of the present. It was this kind of misguided thinking that plainly served to limit the full accomplishments of the departmental intelligence agency throughout the Cold War period.

Since the Cold War did present an entirely different set of circumstances to the military intelligence effort, it also introduced a number of fresh problems for the departmental authorities to solve. At the same time, it was able to furnish some specific answers to several of the more controversial problems that had been hindering the effort for so many years in the past. Experiences of the departmental

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intelligence agency during this difficult period, therefore, appear to bear out the following ^{pertinent} specific conclusions:

1. Regardless of tradition, the only rightful interest that ID may claim in connection with the departmental historical function ^{is} ~~stems~~ ^{derived} from its security of military information mission. Most certainly the agency should never again become engaged in the actual conduct of an Army historical program the way that it was for a brief time during the early part of this Cold War period.

2. Both the recommendations of the Second Lovett Board and the "twenty-five principles to guard against" as listed by the Joint Congressional Committee Investigating the Pearl Harbor Attack represented a constructive approach to achieving sorely needed improvements in the military intelligence effort. Although they did gain prompt approval from the appropriate higher authorities, nothing ever came of it because the subsequent administrative support needed to put them across was not forthcoming. The end of the Cold War period thus found the effort still troubled with the very same problems that had handicapped its performance during World War II and the announced drive to "rehabilitate intelligence in the Army" was ^{really} ~~in reality~~ a complete failure.

3. The serious misunderstandings which arose in regard to the establishment of the ID Inspectorate seem difficult to comprehend. As a large scale field commander with a worldwide organization, the DI (ACofS G-2), GSUSA, should have been most anxious to remain personally aware at all times of the conditions existing throughout that ^{intricate} or-complex

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ganization in order to satisfy his ^{basic} inherent responsibilities for command. On the other hand, his objections against having outside personnel from the Inspector General's Department delve into sensitive intelligence activities were obviously well taken. By permitting his own Inspectorate, though, to become so buried in an organizational sense that its personnel could no longer directly represent him, he failed to fulfill his basic command responsibilities and ended up with the ID inspection situation just as unsatisfactory as it had been before.

4. One of the most unusual but rewarding Cold War activities supervised by the departmental military intelligence agency was project PAPERCLIP. Operating on a relatively modest budget, this project not only produced results that were impressive from the intelligence collection standpoint but were also of major benefit to the nation within several important scientific and technological fields. A study of its early trials and tribulations, therefore, should serve to furnish ^a an invaluable guide to planning for any similar exploitation program in the future.

5. Although repeated attempts were made to settle the stubborn question of the precise relationship which should apply between a Military (Army) Attache and his Chief of Diplomatic Mission, especially in respect to commenting upon each other's reports, the matter continued to cause embarrassing friction. Closely related problems

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also developed on an even greater scale when the ~~government~~ commenced to establish large numbers of more or less independent missions and advisory groups throughout the world. The Cold War period thus soon became marked by a ^{large} notable amount of conflict over authority and scope among the many different American officials occupied in collecting information abroad. While much of this conflict may well have stemmed from personality clashes, there were also certain fundamental principles involved and the various directives issued from Washington in trying to resolve it often did more harm than good. This was especially true whenever these directives threatened to interfere with the recognized rights of subordinates for keeping their own superiors fully informed. Naturally, none of the organizations concerned would ever assent to any important limitation along those particular lines.

6. Many of the departmental authorities and even some of the military intelligence officials themselves apparently failed to realize the immense number of non-intelligence functions that the Military (Army) Attaches were being called upon to execute during this Cold War period. As senior diplomatically accredited representatives of the United States Army within the host country, they were not only continually involved in an almost endless variety of representation duties but also held personally responsible under Army regulations for performing numerous tasks concerned with American military personnel, supplies and property ^{located} therein. Additionally, their offices formed an

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official link in the accepted channel of communication between the *United States* ~~U.S.~~ Department of Defense and corresponding top military body of the host country for handling inter-Army affairs. All of these non-intelligence activities grew tremendously following the conclusion of World War II and then kept right on multiplying at an even faster rate under the unusual conditions of Cold War.


7. The controversial question of whether ID should adopt a geographical or functional approach to intelligence production was ~~not~~ *definitely* now ~~fully~~ settled in favor of a carefully selected combination of both. In contrast, the problem of deciding exactly what functions should be assigned to the ID Intelligence Group or Security Group for producing domestic intelligence still remained largely unanswered at the end of the Cold War period. Offhand, it had seemed most logical to concentrate the total production mission under the Intelligence Group and thereby restrict the Security Group to active supervision of the counterintelligence effort. This simple solution, though, ignored the fact that the Security Group included the experts who were charged with formulating general staff policies *applicable to their* respective military security specialties and performing necessary liaison, advisory and committee functions which impinged directly upon *all Army* domestic intelligence activities. The result was a badly unsettled area of functional responsibility and constant *dissension* ~~friction~~ between these two major elements of the departmental military intelligence agency.

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8. One of the most noteworthy accomplishments in connection with intelligence production during the Cold War period was the establishment of the NIS, especially ^{because} as an effective program aimed at providing basic intelligence data on a worldwide scale for United States Government use had long been needed. The JANIS and SID programs, of course, were designed to fill ^{that} ~~this~~ void for ^{the} Army ^{and} Navy planners but the information that they contained was always presented strictly from the military viewpoint. With the military, political, economic and other factors rapidly becoming more and more merged, a much broader type of program was patently indicated.

9. One of the more significant developments within the counter-intelligence field during this Cold War period was an enormous expansion in activities bearing upon the security of ^{American} military information. It soon became essential for the numerous agencies of the government concerned with releasing technical information to representatives of foreign governments to obtain suitable guidance on just what information they could furnish them from the military security standpoint. Such guidance had been most difficult to ^{obtain} ~~secure~~ until the Army member of the military information committee of SWNCC personally supervised the preparation and publication of a registered War Department document (WD-DCMI) for that special purpose. Maintained under continuous review and promptly revised in light of changing conditions, this new document then helped materially to reduce the mounting guidance ^{problem} while still preserving ^{the} security of the military information as ^{required} ~~needed~~.



10. Both the situation and status of the CIC were considerably improved during the Cold War period. ^{For example,} With deactivation of the artificially created SIC, ^{in April 1946,} ~~for example,~~ the CIC managed to shed the last of its wartime restrictions and to recover the entire Army security investigative mission. Being established at Fort Holabird, Md., also gave the organization a base of operations located conveniently near the departmental military intelligence agency and well adapted for agent training. The ultimate step in its gradual emancipation then came during June 1947, when the DI, GSUSA, relinquished his direct control over the CIC and formally appointed the Commanding General of the CIC Center, to be Chief, CIC.

11. Despite the fact that the respective responsibilities of the departmental intelligence and training authorities regarding Army intelligence training continued to remain in bitter dispute, there were several favorable new developments within this important field during the Cold War period. In the first place, full acceptance of the Aggressor Force concept throughout the Army represented an enormous stride in point of providing realistic intelligence play for field exercises and maneuvers. Also, the new Language and Area Training Program, which was an outgrowth of the conspicuously successful pre-World War II Oriental Language Training Program, gave distinct promise of yielding a considerable number of acknowledged experts on certain critical areas of the world who ^{understandingly} were ⁱⁿ very short supply.



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Finally, while the lack of a school designed to train other than CIC or ASA intelligence specialists ^{did} seriously hindered the efficient progress of the intelligence training effort, official designation of the SIS as an Army Special Service School was a most welcome advance in the opposite direction.

12. It would seem incontrovertible that the Army should ~~hold~~ ^{have} the privilege of producing enough domestic intelligence to keep the Chief of Staff and major field commanders properly informed about any threat which might call for the possible use of federal troops in an emergency. Intelligence of that type not only comprises a normal part of anticipatory planning for local self defense but also contributes directly to the ^{fundamental} ~~compelling~~ demands of national security. Nevertheless, outside pressures, often politically inspired, were again permitted to block this badly needed production ^{effort} following World War II, by surrounding the military authorities with such stringent constraints that they could seldom execute their basic responsibilities within the domestic intelligence field in a suitable manner.

13. As in the past, the departmental military agency was constantly undergoing some sort of a reorganization during the Cold War period. Even though personnel and fund reductions may have been mainly at the root of this upsetting habit, the previous pattern of individual authorities putting their own pet organizational theories into effect was still plainly discernible. General Irwin, for example, lost no time in directing a wholesale reorganization of the agency

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shortly after he became the DI, GSUSA, with two of its main provisions turning out to be noticeably ill-advised. These were his attempts to combine the totally different security and training functions under a single head, and to decentralize the foreign liaison activities from ID executive to administrative control.

14. The difficult problem of whether it would be better to seek an Intelligence Corps or ^{follow} adopt a program of career specialization in order to remedy the adverse intelligence personnel situation within the Army still remained unsettled at the end of the Cold War period. It was readily agreed by all concerned that some form of corrective action ought to be taken without further delay but the measures proposed for protecting the careers of intelligence specialists did not properly fit ^{those} the officers who were needed to fill senior command and staff intelligence positions. With military intelligence being unable to compete on equal terms with the Army branches under the existing career management system, it appeared that the formation of an Intelligence Corps would provide the most satisfactory solution to the problem. When it actually came down to detailed planning for such a Corps, however, the practical objections to it were almost unsurmountable.

In final summation, therefore, it becomes amply clear that, even though the departmental intelligence officials themselves had tried hard to overcome the serious handicaps derived from personnel and fund shortages during this Cold War period, ID was gener-

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ally unprepared to cope with several of its more pressing exigencies. Too many of the higher authorities had refused to accept the total consequences of the Cold War, which was essentially an intelligence war and deserved to be treated as such. Defense economy, of course, was a most desirable eventual goal to pursue but to reduce or limit in any way the collection capabilities of the Army intelligence effort under these critical conditions was merely to invite disaster. Sudden disaster did occur on 25 June 1950, when North Korean troops achieved unwarranted surprise and crossed the 38th parallel without encountering any major resistance ^{in order} to attack the Republic of Korea. At that time, the comparatively small amount of money so recently gained through enforced economies in military intelligence operations seemed to represent the poorest kind of saving, especially if weighed against a heavy loss of American life during the early hectic days of the Korean ^{Conflict} ~~Action~~. While the carefully concealed Communist plans for this attack could still have gone undisclosed despite a well-supported American field collection effort functioning on a worldwide basis, then again they might not. Therein lies the priceless military intelligence lesson of the Cold War period which extended from 3 September 1945 to 25 June 1950 (Korean time).

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