

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0300

20.5.96

DAPE-ZA

17 May 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR CSA *DR*

SUBJECT: Proposed FAO Brief to USA

Recommend the attached FAO brief, previously given to you and the VCSA -- now updated, be given to the USA as mentioned in the attached e-mail.

V.A.
17.5.96

Encls

1. e-mail
2. FAO briefing

THEODORE G. STROUP, JR.
LTG, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel

*Good idea - He just
wants to make sure we
are properly caring for the
FAOs - He has seen them in
Action + is very high on
what they do. I agree.*

From: DENNISRE--CMSNAMES Date and time 04/24/96 18:10:18
Received: from us.army.mil by PENTAGON-HQDADSS.ARMY.MIL (IBM VM SMTP V2R3)
with TCP; Wed, 24 Apr 96 18:10:18 EDT
Received: by us.army.mil with Microsoft Exchange (IMC 4.1.611)
!id <01BB3209.9083C5B0@us.army.mil>; Wed, 24 Apr 1996 18:12:14 -0400
Message-ID:
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From: "Reimer, Dennis J." <Dennis.Reimer@US.ARMY.MIL>
To: "LTG T.G. STROUP, DAP" <STROUP@PENTAGON-HQDADSS.ARMY.MIL>
Subject: RE: Foreign Area Officer Program
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 1996 18:12:11 -0400
X-Mailer: Microsoft Exchange Server Internet Mail Connector Version 4.1.611
Encoding: 208 TEXT, 207 UUENCODE
X-MS-Attachment: WINMAIL.DAT 0 00-00-1980 00:00

AGREE WITH PAPER AND UR PROPOSAL FOR BRIEF---ALSO TOLD HIM WE WILL LOOK AT
IT IN OPMS

From: !LTG T.G. STROUP, DAPYSMTP:STROUP@PENTAGON-HQDADSS.ARMY.MIL"
Sent: !Wednesday, April 24, 1996 8:04 AM
To: !GEN REIMER
Subject: !FW: Foreign Area Officer Program

Subject: FW: Foreign Area Officer Program

what we will do is give you the stats on paper for promotion and school
reading the note i believe it would be better on paper
also after that believe ops and per should give him laydown at your
call
recall we intend to look at fao in opms XXI cheers

* Be all you can be *

-----Original message-----
Received: from us.army.mil by PENTAGON-HQDADSS.ARMY.MIL (IBM VM SMTP V2R3)
with TCP; Wed, 24 Apr 96 07:02:41 EDT
Received: by us.army.mil with Microsoft Exchange (IMC 4.1.611)
id <01BB31AC.70BAD910@us.army.mil>; Wed, 24 Apr 1996 07:05:37 -0400
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<c=US%a=%p=Department_of_De%l=GEN_MAILROOM960424070531HK004900@us.a
From: "Reimer, Dennis J." <Dennis.Reimer@US.ARMY.MIL>
To: STROUP <STROUP@PENTAGON-HQDADSS.ARMY.MIL>
Subject: FW: Foreign Area Officer Program
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 1996 07:05:36 -0400
X-Mailer: Microsoft Exchange Server Internet Mail Connector Version
4.1.611
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X-MS-Attachment: WINMAIL.DAT 0 00-00-1980 00:00

PLS GIVE ME PROMOTION STATS ON FAOs

From: Reeder, Joe R.YSMTP:JRR@USAPO.army.mil"
Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 1996 12:36 PM
To: Reimer, GEN Dennis ;
Cc: Kicklighter, LTG(R) Mick
Subject: Foreign Area Officer Program

KICKLIGHTER, CLAUDE M.

From: Reeder, Joe R.
To: Reimer, GEN Dennis
Cc: Kicklighter, LTG(R) Mick
Subject: Foreign Area Officer Program
Date: Tuesday, April 23, 1996 12:46PM

Denny-

I share what I understand to be your belief in the enormous value of a healthy Army FAO corps. For the last two years whenever I've travelled overseas, I've met with our FAO contingent in each country, often in an informal setting. In these sessions, FAO's very often express concerns and puzzlement about the Army's treatment of FAO's. I'd like to share with you their recurring comments, which doubtless will not be revelations to you, but may be useful as one more set of data points.

FAO's have repeatedly expressed to me their concern that, year after year, FAO's are selected for resident CGSC -- perceived as the all-important "cut" -- at a percentage significantly below the Army average. FAO's also point out to me their selection rates for battalion command and promotion to colonel are lower than average. Junior FAO's tell me "they learned the facts too late" or became FAO's even though basic branch mentors warned them pursuing the FAO track was hazardous. (I'm also often told anecdotes about "promising young officers" who heeded the advice and "got out of FAO.") Many of the FAO's with whom I've spoken cite as gospel that "CGSC selection boards penalize FAO's because they've spent too much time away from basic branch assignments." FAO's also tell me they have less opportunity to serve in branch-qualifying jobs as XO's and S-3's.

I suspect these problems do not have a simple or single fix. But they seem to be systemic, so any fixes will have to be "top down." Perhaps the one fix that would yield the most significant results in the near term would be to issue to selection boards instructions which tend to move FAO selection rates closer to Armywide averages. There are downsides to that approach, of course. I realize full well there are many legitimate, competing demands for quality officers.

But FAO's provide enormous return on investment in terms of securing national policy objectives. The recurring message I get from ambassadors and country teams is that FAO's are an invaluable asset to them because FAO's furnish an essential bridge to the host nation's military. In my view, FAO's are a significant part of what Dr. Perry has referred to as "defense by other means." Their in-country presence gives us access to and influence on host nation militaries on a day-to-day basis.

That leads me to a second issue. FAO's also greatly influence ambassadors and country teams. Since the Army presently has the only large FAO corps among the Services, the Army has something approaching a monopoly in these influential positions. As you know, a draft DoD directive is now being staffed which would require the other Services to develop expanded FAO programs. My understanding is that Dr. White will almost certainly approve the directive.

While this will have the welcome effect of increasing the number of FAO's at a time when they are needed most, the long-term effect will be an end to the Army's dominance in these key positions. It would be prudent to ensure Army FAO representation, if possible, in those countries most important to the Army. It would also seem to me perfectly legitimate (and efficient), given its preeminent involvement in this field, for the Army to

continue to oversee whatever program Dr. White signs off on. (Do we have anyone closely monitoring this process?)

I'd appreciate discussing this with you, and how we might make the Army FAO corps as viable as possible.

Kind regards -

Joe



FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROPONENT DIVISION



CSA FAO PROGRAM REVIEW GENERAL REIMER

3 Jan 96

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

PURPOSE

Review the Status of the FAO Program

Background: In a Letter to the DCSOPS (24 July 95), You Requested a Top-to-Bottom Assessment of the FAO Program to Ensure the Army is Properly Structured for the 21st Century.

Your Concerns Included: Accessions, Training, Placement, Authorizations, “Where the Program is Headed,” Plus the Joint-FAO Program.

BRIEFING AGENDA

- **The FAO Program (Background)**
- **Program Status**
- **Current / On-Going Initiatives**
- **Issues**
- **Conclusions**
- **Recommendations**

THE FAO PROGRAM (BACKGROUND)

- **History**
- **Founding Principles & 21st Century Vision**
- **Accessions**
- **Training Phases**
- **FAO Authorizations**
- **Forward Presence**

HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM


- 1947** **Language and Area Training Program (LATP)**
- 1953** **Foreign Area Specialist (FAS)**
- 1969** **Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP)**
- 1973** **Foreign Area Officer Program (FAO)**
- 1984** **Enhanced FAO Program**
- 1992** **Realignment of Russian and European AOC**

FOUNDING PRINCIPLES:

Create a First Class Program:
Army Officers who are SOLDIERS
and Linguists, Regional Experts,
Political-Military Officers.




FAO VISION:

Use FAOs in Key Army, Joint,
DoD and Inter-Agency Positions
to Formulate and Execute U.S.
Politico-Military Policy.




THE CHANGING FORCE

The Changing Force Distribution is Moving America's Army to a Power Projection Force in the 21st Century.




We Must Ensure that Today's FAO Program is Properly Structured to Support Army Requirements in the 21st Century.

FAOs IN THE 21st CENTURY:



- ➔ **Will Make Their Greatest Contribution Between Wars Rather than During Wars.**
- ➔ **Will Provide the Ability to Predict and Influence Events.**
- ➔ **Will Serve as a Forward Presence Surrogate to Conventional Force Projection.**

A FAO IN THE 21st CENTURY:



- ➔ **Must Have a Solid Professional Background.**
- ➔ **Must Be Proficient in FAO Skills - Language, Regional Expertise, U.S. Politico-Military Policy.**
- ➔ **Must Be Broad-Gauged, Technically and Tactically Competent.**
- ➔ **Must Provide the Army the Value-Added Benefit of Enhancing Interactions with Foreign Armies.**

ACCESSIONS

CRITERIA FOR SELECTION:

Volunteer

Not Promotion Risk to O-4

Language Aptitude

Baccalaureate Degree

Solid GRE Scores

Security Clearance

Assignable World-Wide

CURRENT MIX:

Combat Arms: 62.1%

Combat Support: 28.7%

Combat Service Support: 9.2%

TREND:

Increasing Accessions

1990


141

1995

208



TRAINING PHASES



UNIQUENESS

- 9 Separate Areas of Concentration (AOCs).

48B - Latin America

48C - Europe

48D - South Asia

48E - Eurasia

48F - China

48G - North Africa / Middle East

48H - Northeast Asia

48 I - Southeast Asia

48J - Sub-Saharan Africa

- Extremely Low Density within Subspecialties.

- Significant Army Investment:

- Training Time (3-5 Years)

- Training Dollars:

Defense Language Institute	\$10-25,000
Advanced Civil Schooling	\$10-32,000
In-Country Training	\$17-90,000

**Avg. \$50,000+
Per FAO for
Training Only**

FAO IN-COUNTRY TRAINING SITES

LATIN AMERICA (48B)

ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
GUATEMALA
MEXICO
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA

EUROPE (48C)

AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
HUNGARY
ITALY
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
POLAND
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
SPAIN
CZECH
SWITZERLAND-96
LUXEMBOURG-96
CROATIA - TBD

S ASIA (48D)

BANGLADESH
INDIA
PAKISTAN

EURASIA (48E)

IES (GARMISCH)
AUSTRIA (CFE/CSBM)
RUSSIA - TBD
UKRAINE - TBD
BYELARUS - TBD
KAZAKHSTAN - TBD

CHINA (48F)

HONG KONG-96
BEIJING

MIDDLE EAST / N. AFRICA (48G)

EGYPT, JORDAN, KUWAIT
MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA,
TUNISIA, TURKEY

NE ASIA (48H)

JAPAN
KOREA

SE ASIA (48I)

INDONESIA, MALAYSIA,
SINGAPORE, THAILAND,
PHILIPPINES-96

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN (48J)

BOTSWANA, CAMEROON,
IVORY COAST, NIGER,
ZIMBABWE, KENYA - 97

CURRENT
FUTURE
CLOSING

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

FAO AUTHORIZATIONS

FY 87


Army Officers = 82,044 FAO = 853

FAO = 1% Of Army Officer Authorizations

Priority is to Joint Positions at 100% Fill.

FAO Reduction: -12.9%
Army Officer Reduction: -28.7%

JOINT VS. ARMY FAO AUTHORIZATIONS



FY 96

Army Officers = 58,511 FAO = 743

FAO = 1.3% Of Army Officer Authorizations

FORWARD PRESENCE



- FAO ICT (50)
- ARMY ATTACHE
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE
- LIAISON OFFICER

**LOW NUMBERS
HIGH PAYOFF**

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

PROGRAM STATUS

- **Year Group Progression**
- **MEL-4 Selection Trends**
- **Personnel vs. Authorizations**
- **Personnel vs. ODP**
- **SERB**
- **Assessment**

YEAR GROUP PROGRESSION

YG	MAJOR			CSC			LTC (Floor Supported)			SSC			COL (Floor Supported)		
	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.
68							71.7	81.0	+9.3				40.5	30.5	-10.0
69	74.1						70.9	71.6	+0.7				37.2	37.7	+0.5
70	74.5						76.4	78.6	+2.2				38.6	40.0	+1.4
71	80.1	85.0	+4.9				69.5	76.9	+7.4	5.9	3.1	-2.8	44.3	46.2	+1.9
72	79.6	84.6	+5.1				65.0	79.0	+14.0	6.5	3.6	-2.9	43.9	38.0	-5.9
73	78.8	81.7	+2.9	48	40.6	-7.4	61.4	77.8	+16.4	6.7	3.6	-3.1	42.8	26.1	-16.7
74	78.0	81.9	+3.9	46	35.0	-11.0	60.5	62.1	+1.6	7.3	5.0	-2.3	44.4	43.7	-0.7
75	76.9	78.2	+1.3	45	39.5	-5.5	61.7	78.1	+16.4						
76	75.4	80.4	+5.0	46	36.5	-9.5	62.9	66.0	+3.1						
77	72.4	79.1	+6.7	44	38.9	-5.1	63.1	63.7	+0.6						
78	64.8	68.4	+3.6	46	38.0	-8.0	65.2	65.0	-0.2						
79	68.7	90.0	+21.3	57	41.2	-15.8	60.9	63.2	+2.3						
80	64.7	83.3	+18.6	54.3	44.5	-9.8									
81	65.0	85.0	+20.0	57.6	44.8	-12.8									
82	71.1	76.1	+5.0	60.4	43.3	-17.1									
83	73.4	73.0	-0.4												
84	77.7	83.3	+5.6												
85	73.2	79.2	+6.0												

MEL-4 SELECTION TRENDS

	(Selected / Eligible)				FAO%	Army Avg	Diff.
	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95			
<u>YG82</u>	16/78	15/73	4/68	4/55	43.3	60.4	-17.1

	(Selected / Eligible)				FAO%	To Date YG Ave	Diff.
	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95			
<u>YG83</u>		13/76	17/63	4/51	41.9	56.1	-14.2
<u>YG84</u>			12/87	12/75	27.6	44.2	-16.6
<u>YG85</u>				14/86	16.3	26.2	-9.9

PERSONNEL vs. AUTHORIZATIONS

INVENTORY / AUTHORIZATIONS				
REGION	MAJ	LTC	COL	TOTAL
OBJECTIVE RATIO	2.5	2.2	2.0	
GENERAL FAO (48A)	(10/16)	(23/32)	(11/23)	(44/71)
LATIN AMERICA	2.7 (136/50)	2.1 (100/47)	1.4 (41/30)	(277/127)
EUROPE	2.9 (130/45)	2.0 (92/47)	1.1 (37/35)	(259/127)
SOUTH ASIA	2.1 (23/11)	1.7 (12/7)	2.0 (6/3)	(41/21)
EURASIA	1.9 (127/68)	1.5 (78/53)	3.6 (32/9)	(237/130)
CHINA	1.8 (24/13)	2.6 (21/8)	1.5 (6/4)	(51/25)
MIDDLE EAST	2.1 (97/46)	1.5 (66/45)	1.4 (32/23)	(195/114)
N.E. ASIA	1.8 (46/25)	1.3 (27/21)	2.3 (14/6)	(87/52)
S.E. ASIA	3.2 (32/10)	2.2 (18/8)	0.7 (8/12)	(58/30)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	2.4 (36/15)	1.4 (33/24)	1.8 (11/6)	(80/45)
TOTAL	2.2 (661/299)	1.6 (470/292)	1.2 (198/151)	(1329/743)

AUTHORIZATIONS / FILL		
MAJ	LTC	COL
78% (299/234)	96% (292/279)	94% (151/142)

One Auth. at O-3

79%

120 (6 Not AOC, 16 not FAOs)

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

PERSONNEL vs. ODP

INVENTORY / ODP				
REGION	MAJ	LTC	COL	TOTAL
OBJECTIVE RATIO	2.5	2.2	2.0	
GENERAL FAO (48A)	(10/10)	(23/32)	(11/26)	(44/68)
LATIN AMERICA	2.8 (136/48)	2.4 (100/41)	1.3 (41/31)	(277/120)
EUROPE	2.7 (130/48)	2.4 (92/39)	1.2 (37/30)	(259/117)
SOUTH ASIA	2.3 (23/10)	2.0 (12/6)	1.5 (6/4)	(41/20)
EURASIA	2.6 (127/48)	1.7 (78/47)	2.3 (32/14)	(237/109)
CHINA	1.8 (24/13)	3.0 (21/7)	3.0 (6/2)	(51/22)
MIDDLE EAST	2.0 (97/48)	1.7 (66/40)	1.4 (32/23)	(195/111)
N.E. ASIA	2.1 (46/22)	1.4 (27/20)	2.0 (14/7)	(87/49)
S.E. ASIA	4.0 (32/8)	2.3 (18/8)	1.6 (8/5)	(58/21)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	2.8 (36/13)	1.4 (33/23)	1.8 (11/7)	(80/43)
TOTAL	2.5 (661/268)	1.8 (470/263)	1.3 (198/149)	(1329/680)

ODP / FILL		
MAJ	LTC	COL
87% (268/234)	106% (263/279)	95% (149/142)

81% 120 (6 Not AOC, 16 not FAOs)

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

SERB

(% Selected of Those Eligible for Early Retirement)
 ((Target / Goal: Be Below Army Average))

FY	MAJ			LTC			COL		
	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.
95				11.5	12.0	+0.5	9.7	15.4	+5.7
94	35.5	13.3	-22.2	13.1	16.3	+3.2	14.1	17.1	+3.0
93	29.4	29.4	0	6.4	5.9	-0.5	20.6	15.4	-5.2
92	29.6	12.1	-17.5	25.9	22.0	-3.9	28.4	35.9	+7.5

ASSESSMENT

ACCESSIONS	Train Officers Not At Risk for Promotion to O-4
TRAINING	Quality Training Programs of 2.5 to 4.0 Years
PROMOTIONS	Above Army Average to MAJ / LTC
SERB	Worse than Army Average at COL
POSITION FILLS	Below ODP
SCH/CMD SELECTION	Below Army Average for CGSC, SSC, Bn Cmd
PROMOTIONS	Below Army Average to COL

OVERALL PROGRAM STATUS: AMBER

CURRENT / ON-GOING INITIATIVES

- **On-Going Initiatives**
- **Quality Assurance**
- **Since January 95**
- **New Initiatives**
- **Development Model
(Dual vs Single Track)**

ON-GOING INITIATIVES

- **Accessions**

- Increased Quality Accessions.
- Increased Number of Accessions (1991: 145; 1994: 188; 1995: 208).
- Post-Company Command Quality Cut (Drops Officers Not Competitive for MAJ).
- Recruiting Efforts: Getting the Word Out About the Program.

- **Training / Career Management**

- Continuing to Adjust and Reduce Training Time.
(Korean and Russian Training Cycles Reducing to 3 Years)
- Realign ICT Sites to Meet Future Needs.
- OPMD Policy: FAOs Do Not Serve in Branch Immaterial Assignments.
- FAO Qualification Scrubs (QVR Prior to LTC / COL Promotion Boards).
- Mid / Late-Career Accession Recruiting.
- New Administrative Information to Boards.

QUALITY ASSURANCE

- **Qualification, Validation and Reclassification (QVR):
Prior to O-5 and O-6 Promotion Boards.**
- **Evaluation Requirements in DA Pam 600-3.**
- **Results:**
 - **FY 94 QVR Board Resulted in 4 Reclassifications.**
 - **FY 95 QVR Board Resulted in 7 MAJ and 10 LTC
Reclassifications.**

SINCE JANUARY 95

- **CSA Approved Addition of Single Track Model (25 Jan 95).**
- **Published FAO Chapter in New DA Pam 600-3 (8 Jun 95).**
- **Increased Accessions:**
 - FY 95 - 208 (+20).**
 - Working for Higher Accession Targets in FY 96.**
- **Review of Qualification, Verification and Reclassification (QVR) Board Standards and Goals.**

NEW INITIATIVES

To Ensure that We Are Doing Everything We Can to Improve the FAO Program, Have Already Agreed to:

- **Conduct a Joint PERSCOM - DCSPER - DCSOPS Scrub of all FAO Authorizations, to Ensure the Requirements Are Valid.**
- **Review the Process and Intent of the Qualification, Verification and Reclassification (QVR) System.**

DUAL TRACK vs. SINGLE TRACK

● Why Dual Track?

- To Keep the *SOLDIER* in Soldier-Statesman.
- Keep the Promise of Possibility for Battalion Command to Entering Population in Order to Attract the Kind of Officers the FAO Program Needs.
- We Need More Soldiers with FAO Skills in the 21st Century Army.

● Why Single Track?

- Single Tracking Allows the Greatest Return on Investment in FAOs and the Best Use of a Shortage Specialty.
- Single Tracking Allows Development of Greater Depth in Regional Expertise, Including Valuable Personal Contacts with Key Foreign Civilian and Military Decision Makers.
- We Already Do It Now -- Army Requirements Drive the System:
 - > 25% of FAO Majors Already are De Facto Single Tracked upon Completion of Non-Resident MEL 4.
 - > Most FAO LTCs Single Track.

THE CHALLENGE

● For Majors:

- Only 5 Years as a Major to Complete Training, CGSC, Branch Qualification (XO / S-3) and FAO Utilization.
- Selection for Resident MEL-4 is the Key to Remaining Competitive in a Dual Track Environment. Only 3.3 % (11 / 338) of FY96 Battalion Command Selectees were Non-Resident MEL-4.
- Current Army Culture Makes XO / S-3 Assignments Difficult for FAOs, and Without these Critical Assignments FAOs are Not Competitive for Battalion Command and Eventual Promotion to Colonel.


● For LTCs:

- Only 6.6% of FAOs are Selected for Battalion Command and Continue to "Dual Track."
- The Majority Single Track but Must Compete for Promotion in a Dual Track System.
- Selection for SSC is Less Than Army Average and Only "Battalion Command FAOs" are Selected.
- Promotion to COL is Below Army Average, Even With Floors.

DUAL TRACK AND SINGLE TRACK

- **Continue to Support Dual Tracking for Those FAOs Who Remain Competitive for Battalion Command.**
- **Support a Viable Single Track Career Path for FAOs Who Elect to Single Track After Completion of MEL 4.**

DEVELOPMENT MODEL



ISSUES

- Joint-FAO
- The Army Culture

JOINT-FAO

- **ISSUE:** *Implementation of the Designation of a Single U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) and Creation of a Joint Political-Military Affairs Officer Program.*

Jan 95 - Overseas Presence Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Team Recommendations Finalized.

Mar 95 - VCJCS / Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Recommended Implementation of Enhanced DATT / SAO Program (Co-Chaired OSD / JCS).

Apr 95 - General Officer Steering Group Formed.

- **RESULTS:**

7 Sep 95 - Draft Joint-FAO DoD Directive: Final Coordination.

2 Oct 95 - Director Joint Staff Forwarded Draft Directive With Recommendation to Implement to Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

Bottom Line: Joint Requirements (ACS, Language, Maintain Primary MOS Skills) with Individual Service Implementation.

15 Sep 95 - Draft USDR DoD Directive: Final Coordination.

5 Oct 95 - Formal Joint Staff Response Forwarded to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Note: Single POC for Execution and Coordination of All DoD Interests.

THE ARMY CULTURE

On One Hand:

Much of the Army Does Not Understand What FAOs Are or Their Value to the Force.

FAOs Perceived as Not Being “Green Enough,” Therefore, Less Competitive than Their Peers.

Bn / Bde Commanders Counsel Their Young Captains That Their Careers Will Be “At Risk” if They Become FAOs.



On the Other Hand:

FAOs are Key Members of Country Teams and Will Often Serve as the Senior U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) in a Given Country.

The Army FAO Program is the Benchmark for the Other Services in the Creation of the DoD Directed Joint FAO Program.

FAOs are in Increasing Demand by CINCs and Ambassadors. Senior Leadership Believes “We Must Stop the Hemorrhaging in this Critical Area.”

THE ARMY CULTURE (CON'T)

- **Fact of Life...and It Has Value.**
- **Culture Will Change in Response to the Changing Missions of the Military.**
- **It Is a Function of Education...and Leadership at All Levels.**

FAOs Are Warfighters, but With an Added Dimension.

CONCLUSIONS

- The FAO Program Is an Army Success Story -- the Standard for All the Services to Meet.
- In the Changing Strategic Environment, the Importance Of and Demand For FAOs is Increasing.
- Bottom Line:

Accessions, Training, Selection for MAJ / LTC, Individual FAOs

Selection for Colonel, SERB, Position Fills

Selection for Schools, Command, Senior FAOs
Morale, Shortage of FAO Colonels (Next 3-5 years)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Support Continued Programmatic Changes in Accessions, Training and Career Management.**
- **Support Full Implementation of the Single Track Development Model.**
- **Lend Personal Support to Educate the Force on the Relevance of FAOs to the Army and Warfighting in the Post-Cold War Era.**

FAOs Are the “Pointy End” of the Spear.



FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROPONENT DIVISION



CSA FAO PROGRAM REVIEW GENERAL REIMER

3 Jan 96

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY