



FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROPONENT DIVISION



**CSA FAO PROGRAM REVIEW
GENERAL REIMER**

3 Jan 96

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

1

PURPOSE

Review the Status of the FAO Program

Background: In a Letter to the DCSOPS (24 July 95), You Requested a Top-to-Bottom Assessment of the FAO Program to Ensure the Army is Properly Structured for the 21st Century.

Your Concerns Included: Accessions, Training, Placement, Authorizations, "Where the Program is Headed," Plus the Joint-FAO Program.

BRIEFING AGENDA

- **The FAO Program (Background)**
- **Program Status**
- **Current / On-Going Initiatives**
- **Issues**
- **Conclusions**
- **Recommendations**

THE FAO PROGRAM (BACKGROUND)

- **History**
- **Founding Principles & 21st Century Vision**
- **Accessions**
- **Training Phases**
- **FAO Authorizations**
- **Forward Presence**

HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM


- 1947 Language and Area Training Program (LATP)
- 1953 Foreign Area Specialist (FAS)
- 1969 Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP)
- 1973 Foreign Area Officer Program (FAO)
- 1984 Enhanced FAO Program
- 1992 Realignment of Russian and European AOC

FOUNDING PRINCIPLES:

Create a First Class Program:
Army Officers who are **SOLDIERS**
and Linguists, Regional Experts,
Political-Military Officers.

FAO VISION:




Use FAOs in Key Army, Joint,
DoD and Inter-Agency Positions
to Formulate and Execute U.S.
Politico-Military Policy.



STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY


THE CHANGING FORCE

The Changing Force Distribution is Moving America's Army to a Power Projection Force in the 21st Century.



We Must Ensure that Today's FAO Program is Properly Structured to Support Army Requirements in the 21st Century.

FAOs IN THE 21st CENTURY:

- 
- ➔ **Will Make Their Greatest Contribution Between Wars Rather than During Wars.**
 - ➔ **Will Provide the Ability to Predict and Influence Events.**
 - ➔ **Will Serve as a Forward Presence Surrogate to Conventional Force Projection.**

A FAO IN THE 21st CENTURY:

- ➔ **Must Have a Solid Professional Background.**
- ➔ **Must Be Proficient in FAO Skills - Language, Regional Expertise, U.S. Politico-Military Policy.**
- ➔ **Must Be Broad-Gauged, Technically and Tactically Competent.**
- ➔ **Must Provide the Army the Value-Added Benefit of Enhancing Interactions with Foreign Armies.**

ACCESSIONS

CRITERIA FOR SELECTION:

- Volunteer
- Not Promotion Risk to O-4
- Language Aptitude
- Baccalaureate Degree
- Solid GRE Scores
- Security Clearance
- Assignable World-Wide

CURRENT MIX:


- Combat Arms: 62.1%
- Combat Support: 28.7%
- Combat Service Support: 9.2%

TREND:

Increasing Accessions

<u>1990</u>		<u>1995</u>
141		208

TRAINING PHASES



STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

UNIQUENESS

- 9 Separate Areas of Concentration (AOCs).

48B - Latin America	48G - North Africa / Middle East
48C - Europe	48H - Northeast Asia
48D - South Asia	48 I - Southeast Asia
48E - Eurasia	48J - Sub-Saharan Africa
48F - China	

- Extremely Low Density within Subspecialties.

- Significant Army Investment:

- Training Time (3-5 Years)

- Training Dollars:

Defense Language Institute	\$10-25,000
Advanced Civil Schooling	\$10-32,000
In-Country Training	\$17-90,000

Avg. \$50,000+
Per FAO for
Training Only

FAO IN-COUNTRY TRAINING SITES

LATIN AMERICA (48B)

ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
GUATEMALA
MEXICO
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA

EUROPE (48C)

AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
HUNGARY
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG-96
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
POLAND
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
SPAIN
CZECH
SWITZERLAND-96
CROATIA - TBD

S ASIA (48D)

BANGLADESH
INDIA
PAKISTAN

EURASIA (48E)

IES (GARMISCH)
AUSTRIA (CFE/CSBM)
RUSSIA - TBD
UKRAINE - TBD
BYELARUS - TBD
KAZAKHSTAN - TBD

CHINA (48F)

HONG KONG-96
BEIJING

MIDDLE EAST / N. AFRICA (48G)

EGYPT, JORDAN, KUWAIT
MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA,
TUNISIA, TURKEY

NE ASIA (48H)

JAPAN
KOREA

SE ASIA (48I)

INDONESIA, MALAYSIA,
SINGAPORE, THAILAND,
PHILIPPINES-96

AFRICA, SUB-SAHARAN (48J)

BOTSWANA, CAMEROON,
IVORY COAST, NIGER,
ZIMBABWE, KENYA - 97

CURRENT
FUTURE
CLOSING

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

FAO AUTHORIZATIONS

FY 87


Army Officers = 82,044 FAO = 853

FAO = 1% Of Army Officer Authorizations

Priority is to Joint Positions at 100% Fill.

FAO Reduction: -12.9%
Army Officer Reduction: -28.7%

JOINT VS. ARMY FAO AUTHORIZATIONS




FY 96

Army Officers = 58,511 FAO = 743

FAO = 1.3% Of Army Officer Authorizations

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

FORWARD PRESENCE



- FAO ICT (50)
- ARMY ATTACHE
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE
- LIAISON OFFICER

**LOW NUMBERS
HIGH PAYOFF**

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

PROGRAM STATUS

- **Year Group Progression**
- **MEL-4 Selection Trends**
- **Personnel vs. Authorizations**
- **Personnel vs. ODP**
- **SERB**
- **Assessment**

YEAR GROUP PROGRESSION

YG	MAJOR			OSC			LTC (Floor Supported)			SSC			COL (Floor Supported)		
	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.
68							71.7	81.0	+9.3				40.5	30.5	-10.0
69	74.1						70.9	71.6	+0.7				37.2	37.7	+0.5
70	74.5						76.4	78.6	+2.2				38.6	40.0	+1.4
71	80.1	85.0	+4.9				69.5	76.9	+7.4	5.9	3.1	-2.8	44.3	46.2	+1.9
72	79.6	84.6	+5.1				65.0	79.0	+14.0	6.5	3.6	-2.9	43.9	38.0	-5.9
73	78.8	81.7	+2.9	48	40.6	-7.4	61.4	77.8	+16.4	6.7	3.6	-3.1	42.8	26.1	-16.7
74	78.0	81.9	+3.9	46	35.0	-11.0	60.5	62.1	+1.6	7.3	5.0	-2.3	44.4	43.7	-0.7
75	76.9	78.2	+1.3	45	39.5	-5.5	61.7	78.1	+16.4						
76	75.4	80.4	+5.0	46	36.5	-9.5	62.9	66.0	+3.1						
77	72.4	79.1	+6.7	44	38.9	-5.1	63.1	63.7	+0.6						
78	64.8	68.4	+3.6	46	38.0	-8.0	65.2	65.0	-0.2						
79	68.7	90.0	+21.3	57	41.2	-15.8	60.9	63.2	+2.3						
80	64.7	83.3	+18.6	54.3	44.5	-9.8									
81	65.0	85.0	+20.0	57.6	44.8	-12.8									
82	71.1	76.1	+5.0	60.4	43.3	-17.1									
83	73.4	73.0	-0.4												
84	77.7	83.3	+5.6												
85	73.2	79.2	+6.0												

MEL-4 SELECTION TRENDS

	(Selected / Eligible)				FAO%	Army Avg	Diff.
	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95			
<u>YG82</u>	16/78	15/73	4/68	4/55	43.3	60.4	-17.1

	(Selected / Eligible)				FAO%	To Date YG Ave	Diff.
	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95			
<u>YG83</u>		13/76	17/63	4/51	41.9	56.1	-14.2
<u>YG84</u>			12/87	12/75	27.6	44.2	-16.6
<u>YG85</u>				14/86	16.3	26.2	-9.9

PERSONNEL vs. AUTHORIZATIONS

INVENTORY / AUTHORIZATIONS				
REGION	MAJ	LTC	COL	TOTAL
OBJECTIVE RATIO	2.5	2.2	2.0	
GENERAL FAO (48A)	(10/16)	(23/32)	(11/23)	(44/71)
LATIN AMERICA	2.7 (136/50)	2.1 (100/47)	1.4 (41/30)	(277/127)
EUROPE	2.9 (130/45)	2.0 (92/47)	1.1 (37/35)	(259/127)
SOUTH ASIA	2.1 (23/11)	1.7 (12/7)	2.0 (6/3)	(41/21)
EURASIA	1.9 (127/68)	1.5 (78/53)	3.6 (32/9)	(237/130)
CHINA	1.8 (24/13)	2.6 (21/8)	1.5 (6/4)	(51/25)
MIDDLE EAST	2.1 (97/46)	1.5 (66/45)	1.4 (32/23)	(195/114)
N.E. ASIA	1.8 (46/25)	1.3 (27/21)	2.3 (14/6)	(87/52)
S.E. ASIA	3.2 (32/10)	2.2 (18/8)	0.7 (8/12)	(58/30)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	2.4 (36/15)	1.4 (33/24)	1.8 (11/6)	(80/45)
TOTAL	2.2 (661/299)	1.6 (470/292)	1.2 (198/151)	(1329/743)

AUTHORIZATIONS / FILL		
MAJ	LTC	COL
78% (299/234)	96% (292/279)	94% (151/142)

One Auth. at O-3

79%

120 (6 Not AOC, 16 not FAOs)

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

PERSONNEL vs. ODP

INVENTORY / ODP				
REGION	MAJ	LTC	COL	TOTAL
OBJECTIVE RATIO	2.5	2.2	2.0	
GENERAL FAO (48A)	(10/10)	(23/32)	(11/26)	(44/68)
LATIN AMERICA	2.5 (136/48)	2.4 (100/41)	1.3 (41/31)	(277/120)
EUROPE	2.7 (130/48)	2.4 (92/39)	1.2 (37/30)	(259/117)
SOUTH ASIA	2.3 (23/10)	2.0 (12/6)	1.5 (6/4)	(41/20)
EURASIA	2.6 (127/48)	1.7 (78/47)	2.3 (32/14)	(237/109)
CHINA	1.8 (24/13)	3.0 (21/7)	3.0 (6/2)	(51/22)
MIDDLE EAST	2.0 (97/48)	1.7 (66/40)	1.4 (32/23)	(195/111)
N.E. ASIA	2.1 (46/22)	1.4 (27/20)	2.0 (14/7)	(87/49)
S.E. ASIA	4.0 (32/8)	2.3 (13/8)	1.6 (8/5)	(58/21)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	2.8 (36/13)	1.4 (33/23)	1.8 (11/7)	(80/43)
TOTAL	2.5 (661/268)	1.8 (470/263)	1.3 (198/149)	(1329/680)

ODP / FILL		
MAJ	LTC	COL
87% (268/234)	106% (263/279)	95% (149/142)

81% 120 (6 Not AOC, 16 not FAOs)

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

SERB

(% Selected of Those Eligible for Early Retirement)
 ((Target / Goal: Be Below Army Average))

FY	MAJ			LTC			COL		
	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.	Army	FAO	Diff.
95				11.5	12.0	+0.5	9.7	15.4	+5.7
94	35.5	13.3	-22.2	13.1	16.3	+3.2	14.1	17.1	+3.0
93	29.4	29.4	0	6.4	5.9	-0.5	20.6	15.4	-5.2
92	29.6	12.1	-17.5	25.9	22.0	-3.9	28.4	35.9	+7.5

ASSESSMENT

ACCESSIONS	Train Officers Not At Risk for Promotion to O-4
TRAINING	Quality Training Programs of 2.5 to 4.0 Years
PROMOTIONS	Above Army Average to MAJ / LTC
SERB	Worse than Army Average at COL
POSITION FILLS	Below ODP
SCH/CMD SELECTION	Below Army Average for CGSC, SSC, Bn Cmd
PROMOTIONS	Below Army Average to COL

OVERALL PROGRAM STATUS: **AMBER**

CURRENT / ON-GOING INITIATIVES

- On-Going Initiatives
- Quality Assurance
- Since January 95
- New Initiatives
- Development Model
(Dual vs Single Track)

ON-GOING INITIATIVES

- **Accessions**

- Increased Quality Accessions.
- Increased Number of Accessions (1991: 145; 1994: 188; 1995: 208).
- Post-Company Command Quality Cut (Drops Officers Not Competitive for MAJ).
- Recruiting Efforts: Getting the Word Out About the Program.

- **Training / Career Management**

- Continuing to Adjust and Reduce Training Time.
(Korean and Russian Training Cycles Reducing to 3 Years)
- Realign ICT Sites to Meet Future Needs.
- OPMD Policy: FAOs Do Not Serve in Branch Immaterial Assignments.
- FAO Qualification Scrubs (QVR Prior to LTC / COL Promotion Boards).
- Mid / Late-Career Accession Recruiting.
- New Administrative Information to Boards.

QUALITY ASSURANCE

- **Qualification, Validation and Reclassification (QVR):**
Prior to O-5 and O-6 Promotion Boards.
- **Evaluation Requirements in DA Pam 600-3.**
- **Results:**
 - FY 94 QVR Board Resulted in 4 Reclassifications.
 - FY 95 QVR Board Resulted in 7 MAJ and 10 LTC Reclassifications.

SINCE JANUARY 95

- **CSA Approved Addition of Single Track Model (25 Jan 95).**
- **Published FAO Chapter in New DA Pam 600-3 (8 Jun 95).**
- **Increased Accessions:**
 - FY 95 - 208 (+20).**
 - Working for Higher Accession Targets in FY 96.**
- **Review of Qualification, Verification and Reclassification (QVR) Board Standards and Goals.**

NEW INITIATIVES

To Ensure that We Are Doing Everything We Can to Improve the FAO Program, Have Already Agreed to:

- **Conduct a Joint PERSCOM - DCSPER - DCSOPS Scrub of all FAO Authorizations, to Ensure the Requirements Are Valid.**
- **Review the Process and Intent of the Qualification, Verification and Reclassification (QVR) System.**

DUAL TRACK vs. SINGLE TRACK

● Why Dual Track?

- To Keep the *SOLDIER* in Soldier-Statesman.
- Keep the Promise of Possibility for Battalion Command to Entering Population in Order to Attract the Kind of Officers the FAO Program Needs.
- We Need More Soldiers with FAO Skills in the 21st Century Army.

● Why Single Track?

- Single Tracking Allows the Greatest Return on Investment in FAOs and the Best Use of a Shortage Specialty.
- Single Tracking Allows Development of Greater Depth in Regional Expertise, Including Valuable Personal Contacts with Key Foreign Civilian and Military Decision Makers.
- We Already Do It Now -- Army Requirements Drive the System:
 - > 25% of FAO Majors Already are De Facto Single Tracked upon Completion of Non-Resident MEL 4.
 - > Most FAO LTCs Single Track.

THE CHALLENGE

● For Majors:

- Only 5 Years as a Major to Complete Training, CGSC, Branch Qualification (XO / S-3) and FAO Utilization.
- Selection for Resident MEL-4 is the Key to Remaining Competitive in a Dual Track Environment. Only 3.3 % (11 / 338) of FY96 Battalion Command Selectees were Non-Resident MEL-4.
- Current Army Culture Makes XO / S-3 Assignments Difficult for FAOs, and Without these Critical Assignments FAOs are Not Competitive for Battalion Command and Eventual Promotion to Colonel.


● For LTCs:

- Only 6.6% of FAOs are Selected for Battalion Command and Continue to "Dual Track."
- The Majority Single Track but Must Compete for Promotion in a Dual Track System.
- Selection for SSC is Less Than Army Average and Only "Battalion Command FAOs" are Selected.
- Promotion to COL is Below Army Average, Even With Floors.


DUAL TRACK AND SINGLE TRACK

- **Continue to Support Dual Tracking for Those FAOs Who Remain Competitive for Battalion Command.**
- **Support a Viable Single Track Career Path for FAOs Who Elect to Single Track After Completion of MEL 4.**


DEVELOPMENT MODEL



Old Model



Current Model



DUAL TRACK FAO

SINGLE TRACK FAO

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

ISSUES

- **Joint-FAO**
- **The Army Culture**

JOINT-FAO

- **ISSUE:** *Implementation of the Designation of a Single U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) and Creation of a Joint Political-Military Affairs Officer Program.*

Jan 95 - Overseas Presence Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Team Recommendations Finalized.

Mar 95 - VCJCS / Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Recommended Implementation of Enhanced DATT / SAO Program (Co-Chaired OSD / JCS).

Apr 95 - General Officer Steering Group Formed.

- **RESULTS:**

7 Sep 95 - Draft Joint-FAO DoD Directive: Final Coordination.

2 Oct 95 - Director Joint Staff Forwarded Draft Directive With Recommendation to Implement to Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

Bottom Line: Joint Requirements (ACS, Language, Maintain Primary MOS Skills) with Individual Service Implementation.

15 Sep 95 - Draft USDR DoD Directive: Final Coordination.

5 Oct 95 - Formal Joint Staff Response Forwarded to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Note: Single POC for Execution and Coordination of All DoD Interests.

STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY

THE ARMY CULTURE

On One Hand:

Much of the Army Does Not Understand What FAOs Are or Their Value to the Force.

FAOs Perceived as Not Being "Green Enough," Therefore, Less Competitive than Their Peers.

Bn / Bde Commanders Counsel Their Young Captains That Their Careers Will Be "At Risk" if They Become FAOs.



On the Other Hand:

FAOs are Key Members of Country Teams and Will Often Serve as the Senior U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) in a Given Country.

The Army FAO Program is the Benchmark for the Other Services in the Creation of the DoD Directed Joint FAO Program.

FAOs are in Increasing Demand by CINCs and Ambassadors. Senior Leadership Believes "We Must Stop the Hemorrhaging in this Critical Area."

THE ARMY CULTURE (CON'T)

- Fact of Life...and It Has Value.
- Culture Will Change in Response to the Changing Missions of the Military.
- It Is a Function of Education...and Leadership at All Levels.

FAOs Are Warfighters, but With an Added Dimension.

CONCLUSIONS

- The FAO Program Is an Army Success Story -- the Standard for All the Services to Meet.
- In the Changing Strategic Environment, the Importance Of and Demand For FAOs is Increasing.
- Bottom Line:

Accessions, Training, Selection for MAJ / LTC, Individual FAOs

Selection for Colonel, SERB, Position Fills

Selection for Schools, Command, Senior FAOs
Morale, Shortage of FAO Colonels (Next 3-5 years)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Support Continued Programmatic Changes in Accessions, Training and Career Management.
- Support Full Implementation of the Single Track Development Model.
- Lend Personal Support to Educate the Force on the Relevance of FAOs to the Army and Warfighting in the Post-Cold War Era.

FAOs Are the “Pointy End” of the Spear.



FOREIGN AREA OFFICER PROPONENT DIVISION



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