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COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE: THE UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
IN EAST GERMANY 1947 - 1990

by

Timothy Alan Seman

submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of


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
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
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ABSTRACT

The monolithic interpretation of the Cold War as a period void of constructive inter-adversary communication is shattered by an examination of one of the key military intelligence instruments used by US decision-makers: the United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM). The only comprehensive study available in the public forum, this thesis examines USMLM structure, function, and significance. The text is supported by an unprecedented body of evidence collected by the author; which includes several volumes of declassified USMLM Unit Histories, unpublished memoirs, declassified government analyses, and interviews with veterans of the USMLM and members of US agencies.

Like its counterpart—the Soviet Military Liaison Mission operating in the American zone (West Germany)—the USMLM was designed, initiated, staffed, and supplied to observe overtly the Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces and equipment located in the Soviet zone (East Germany). In the absence of arms control monitoring systems, this mutual intelligence collection was a prototypical "confidence building measure" and served as a model during arms control negotiations. Overall, the USMLM and the entire MLM system provided valuable early warning and transparency in a region of extraordinary military, security, and political importance. Elements of the USMLM model may serve as a basis for intelligence regimes in the future, but inventive solutions to current security problems can only be found through a more adroit examination of Cold War history and improved access to key documents.

To Uncle Joseph E. Kozicki
Killed In Combat At Anzio, Italy
26 January 1944

I know who stole your bike

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A project of this design, with its unique data requirements, could not have been undertaken much less completed without the support of academicians, librarians, archivists, military professionals, employees of federal agencies, family, and friends. Quotable and notable, or just sturdy sounding boards for the author's verbal buckshot, all persons cannot be adequately acknowledged here. Certain individuals, however, always stand out in my heart and mind as I reflect upon an extraordinary journey of nearly four years.

First, my sincere gratitude to Mr. George Caldwell of the Library of Congress. His timely response to one very important phone inquiry back in mid-June 1990 helped me to locate key personalities and develop a network that lasts to the present day.

My appreciation to Professor Marc Catudal of Saint John's University, College of Saint Benedict in Collegeville, Minnesota; who provided by mail one crucial, unclassified, and unpublished text written by Thomas S. Lough regarding the background of the United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM). The first class postage did not go unnoticed.

Here, special thanks to Thomas S. Lough, for his genuine commitment to research and scholarship concerning USMLM. He "filled in the blanks" created by an all-too-sterile declassification review by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of a manuscript he prepared while at that agency in 1964.

Many thanks as well to John J. Slonaker, Chief, Historical Reference Branch, at the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Mr. Slonaker located and made available the Schanze papers; a rare memoir of a former Chief, USMLM (CUSMLM) that provided valuable information and enhanced my research effort. Mr. Slonaker's assistance exemplifies the quality of service that can result from a thorough knowledge of a manuscript collection.

In this regard, I also want to thank Mr. J. Zylman of the Department of State for locating and furnishing a file copy of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement; the US-Soviet military document that established the USMLM and the Soviet Military Liaison Mission (SMLM). Special thanks to Richard Boylen of the National Archives Records Administration, Modern Military Records Section, for his encouragement and the long afternoons of reference assistance.

Regarding the Freedom of Information (FOI) process, correspondence with the Freedom of Information/Privacy Office of the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) was of the highest professional manner during several months of contact. I want to thank Mr. Richard Wake of INSCOM for his efforts on my behalf.

To Mr. Bruce H. Siemon, Historian, USAREUR & 7th Army who responded to some of my earliest inquiries and informed me of the existence of the USMLM Unit Histories, a core resource. My thanks as well to Ms. Sharin Jones, the staff assistant at USMLM HQ, West Berlin who updated my list of CUSMLM. Lastly, to Hannah M. Zeidlik of the Historical Services Division, United States Army Center of Military History (USACMH), who located the Unit Histories at the Center and rushed them off to INSCOM for declassification review.

Information from professional soldiers proved to be invaluable in my research of the USMLM. What better source than a former CUSMLM who dedicated years of service to the USMLM and Army Intelligence training. Colonel Don O. Stovall (USA Ret.) provided interesting personal reflections regarding his dynamic career.

To Colonel Richard M. Naab, the last CUSMLM, whose return letter in the Winter of 1991 specified the USACMH as the recipient of the USMLM Unit Histories. My gratitude to Mr. John A. Fahey, former Naval officer assigned to the USMLM. Mr. Fahey corrected inaccurate accounts regarding USMLM activities during the Berlin Wall Crisis with details of his own service as Tour Officer at that time.

To former CUSMLM Brigadier General Roland Lajoie. General Lajoie's comments were extremely helpful, particularly his personal impressions regarding the 1985 shooting death of

Major Arthur D. Nicholson. At that time, (Colonel) Lajoie was CUSMLM and directly involved in the aftermath of the incident. His ruminations of this incident brought to my attention the importance to reflect for a moment on 24 March each year.

Sincere thanks to chairman Professor John Macartney and committee member Professor William Kincade; for their comments, suggestions, interest, encouragement and patience. Special thanks to SIS adjunct professor Dr. James H. Wolfe, a gentleman and friend. Few can match his professional manner, integrity, and spirit of inquiry. He will always be held in highest esteem; for his appreciation of my seemingly unbridled intensity concerning the field of International Relations, his genuine concern for my well-being as a working graduate student, and his thoughtful words of encouragement when I contemplated the economic noose wrapped around my academic neck.

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Here, special thanks to my friend and colleague Shahid Tirmazi. By double-checking my single-mindedness, easing my 9am-5pm frustrations with bench bound comic relief, and maintaining extraordinary integrity when absurdity ruled the pulpit, Shahid has turned our shared challenge into a common victory. My every best wish.

To G. M. (Sonny) Lewis and Randa El-Rashidi, whose true friendship brought me through some very rough waters; and the rest of the gang at Davenport Coffee Lounge, that special phenomenon at the School of International Service. Coffee and conversation provided the perfect release from the rigors of research and writing.

To my family; Roberta, Ted, Theo, Sharon, Mark, Christopher, and David Benjamin, well, they all know how I feel.

The author takes note of his sole responsibility for errors in the composition.

PREFACE

During the Spring of 1990 the proposed thesis topic was inter-military contact between US and Soviet senior officers. However, an important article by Kurt M. Campbell, "The Soldier's Summit,"¹ led to a topic change. He discusses superpower military contacts and describes a post World War II exchange of US and Soviet Military Liaison Missions in occupied Germany, USMLM and SMLM, respectively. For the student of international affairs, this hitherto unknown topic warranted further examination.

The USMLM was a quasi-diplomatic military group of 14 American military officers and enlisted personnel accredited to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in the Soviet zone of occupied Germany. It was established on 5 April 1947 and given an official headquarters at Potsdam, near Berlin. Its stated purpose was to maintain inter-zonal "liaison" or communication between the US and Soviet Commanders-in-Chief. The counterpart SMLM was based in Frankfurt in the American zone of occupation.²

The MLMs were given diplomatic privileges and immunities as well as the right to unencumbered travel by vehicle or on foot in the zone where accredited, except in restricted areas. MLM officers and enlisted personnel traveling in this manner were known as tour teams and this function was known as touring. This arrangement continued without significant interruption until German unification in October 1990 with the formal termination of Allied Control Machinery.

Campbell's article emphasizes the USMLM as an important conduit for communication between American and Soviet military authorities in Germany, and by extension, between the

¹Kurt M. Campbell, "The Soldier's Summit," *Foreign Policy* No. 75 (Summer 1989): 76-91.

²Great Britain and France also exchanged MLMs with the Soviet Union in occupied Germany, BRIXMIS and FMLM, respectively. Conditions of operation as negotiated with the Soviet CinC were roughly equivalent to the USMLM. The Four Power exchange of military liaison missions will be referred to as the MLM system throughout this study. It includes the USMLM, BRIXMIS, FMLM and three SMLMs.

governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. Campbell omits any citation that would facilitate further inquiry.

After an audit of the Library of Congress, and expeditions to the National War College, National Archives Records Administration, US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, US Army Center for Military History, various "think tanks," university libraries, the Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and lastly, several exchanges of correspondence with the Army History Offices, two key reasons for the missing footnote were evident. First, the absence of any major treatise on the topic of military liaison missions; and, second, the secrecy that shrouds the subject and protects the documents that do exist.³

Several months of research and FOIA requests for declassification of documents were required to begin the thesis.⁴ After digesting these materials and returning to Kurt Campbell's 1989 article, it was apparent that his characterization of the role of military liaison missions as "a vital conduit for communications" between military representatives is a euphemism and understatement. The USMLM was designed, initiated, staffed, and supplied to collect information on activities and conditions in the Soviet zone of occupied Germany; a key region of national security interest for the United States since the end of World War II.

³This secrecy, common to intelligence instruments, limited American public awareness of a most unusual instrument of US foreign policy. The USMLM was mentioned in the US press throughout the cold war only when an incident involving Soviet activity against USMLM personnel was considered sufficiently serious to become "newsworthy." The most ominous case, which immediately brought the USMLM front and center to the public's attention, involved the killing of US Army Major Arthur D. Nicholson Jr. by a Soviet sentry in the late afternoon of 24 March 1985. Shot while surveying a Soviet military installation near Ludwigslust, East Germany, Nicholson, a member of the USMLM, was the only known fatality to occur as a result of USMLM activities.

The incident would have been routine if not for the aim of the Soviet soldier. USMLM officers had been fired upon, and shootings were not uncommon (see Appendix C for a complete listing). But the Nicholson incident, as it came to be called, brought a sudden (and in the US Army's view unwanted) examination of the USMLM function.

⁴The main difficulty with researching and writing about the USMLM was the lack of a public record. Declassification was therefore an absolute necessity if the study was to proceed. The author filed over 23 FOIA requests that have so far led to the release of several volumes of USMLM Unit Histories. Unpublished or declassified analyses produced by former government analysts were also obtained. Material from references in the public domain were used as supplemental information. Also, the author sought additional information and clarification through interviews. Persons contacted were former USMLM officers, government analysts, and interested scholars.

As a contribution to the study of the cold war era, this thesis will examine the structure and function of the USMLM; entering into the public forum the operations of an extraordinary intelligence unit that was part of an obscure system of MLMs in post-World War II Germany.

ACRONYMS

ACC	Allied Control Council
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
BDU	Battle Dress Uniform
BRIXMIS	British Military Liaison Mission
CBM	Confidence-Building Measure
CDE	Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CinC	Commander-in-Chief
COSSAC	Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
CSERB	Chief, Soviet External Relations Branch
CUSMLM	Chief, United States Military Liaison Mission
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DCUSMLM	Deputy Chief, United States Military Liaison Mission
EAC	European Advisory Commission
EUCOM	European Command
FMLM	French Military Liaison Mission
FOI	Freedom of Information
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
HQ	Headquarters

HUMINT	Human Intelligence
INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
MBFR	Mutual Balanced Force Reductions
MLM	Military Liaison Mission
MRS	Mission Restriction Sign
OMGUS	Office of the Military Government, United States
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
PRA	Permanent Restricted Area
SERB	Soviet External Relations Branch
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SMLM	Soviet Military Liaison Mission
SRM	Soviet Repatriation Mission
SRR	Search Rescue Recovery
TRA	Temporary Restricted Area
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USAREUR	United States Army, Europe
USFET	United States Forces, European Theater
USMLM	United States Military Liaison Mission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to lift the veil on a very important but hitherto little known cold war intelligence structure, the United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM).⁵ Two functions of USMLM operations contain the core of data: *Touring* and *Liaison*. Both involved a variety of events and facts indicative of an intelligence instrument at work.

Touring was the primary means of intelligence collection by the USMLM. Evidence includes: (1) operating procedures in surveillance activity; (2) statistics of mileage on tours; (3) time spent on touring; (4) references to the USMLM "product;" and (5) the quality and quantity of logistical support provided in the form of tour vehicle modifications and upgrades, photo lab facilities, and film processing statistics. Soviet surveillance and counterintelligence activity in response to USMLM operations is also examined.

Liaison, the only *officially* recognized USMLM function, included representing American interests in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) prior to, as well as supplemental to, formal diplomatic recognition, rescuing American citizens lost or injured in the Soviet zone, assisting Allied administration of occupied Germany, and engaging in official meetings and informal social activities with Soviet and Warsaw Pact personnel. Liaison also included intelligence collection, illustrated by the manner in which liaison was carried out. Rescue operations were used as a pretext to penetrate restricted areas in the Soviet zone. Official meetings, daily contacts, and social gatherings provided opportunities to collect biographical intelligence on Soviet and Warsaw Pact military personnel, as well as information on their

⁵Because this thesis contains many military acronyms, readers will find a list of acronyms at page x.

military organization and training. Overall, the USMLM served important "arms control" measures.⁶

Despite some limitations on access, the USMLM tour teams were able to observe Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces over a 44 year period, fulfilling the roles of a military intelligence unit. According to one authority, the roles of military intelligence in general are

- 1) "To assess the threat capability of military weapons of potential adversaries."⁷
- 2) Detection of military preparations and mobilization as a form of early warning of possible surprise attack or the political use of force.⁸
- 3) "To assess the military strategy, military deployments, military operations, and military tactics of our primary adversaries."⁹

The MLM intelligence system continued to function long after other World War II agreements became defunct, even though MLM operations were fraught with tension and conflict. The mutual benefits of an arranged intelligence collection system, such as providing both sides with valuable early warning, help to explain why the MLM system not only lasted but thrived and evolved during the cold war. Yet there are other reasons for the longevity of the USMLM and the system of MLMs in occupied Germany.

For one, the text of the 1947 agreement that laid the basis for the US and Soviet MLM exchange was somewhat ambiguous, providing flexibility in the interpretation and use of its provisions and making it advantageous to continue intelligence operations made possible by that flexibility.

⁶A full examination of this issue is beyond the scope of the present thesis. A responsible examination requires data that is classified as of this writing.

⁷Bobby R. Inman, "The Military Perspective," in Intelligence and Arms Control: A Marriage of Convenience, ed. Thomas J. Hirschfeld (Austin, Texas: Texas Monthly Press, 1987), 46.

⁸This was a key role for the USMLM. Daily tours of the Soviet zone by vehicle or on foot provided over time a familiarity with terrain, roads, communication systems, and the movements of Soviet/Warsaw Pact military forces. The USMLM personnel were uniquely poised to provide important early warning by "monitoring" the region, and this role was the USMLM's primary responsibility.

⁹Ibid.

For example, USMLM tour teams adjusted vehicles to improve performance and carried infrared cameras and other equipment in vehicles while touring East Germany. Also, USMLM personnel coordinated operations with members of the British and French MLM tour teams also roving throughout the region. The USMLM personnel lodged at East German hotels while on extended tours and communicated freely with East German civilians, at times receiving assistance from them.

But these actions were neither permitted nor prohibited in the text of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, and Soviet rejections of these activities could be dismissed. Of course, members of the Soviet MLMs in the American, British and French zones of occupation practiced the same techniques and defended their actions on the same grounds. Whether deliberately crafted or not, the agreement was susceptible to multiple interpretation.

A final explanation for MLM longevity is that personnel enjoyed diplomatic rights and privileges.¹⁰ Instances of Persona Non Grata (PNG) were few, and there was a political cost associated with excessive recriminations. The operational costs were also high, since dismissal of MLM personnel often led to retaliation by the other state in the removal of counterpart MLM personnel. The net effect was the possible loss of valuable resources on both sides, and a level of tension that hindered the intelligence collection process.

Interestingly, disbanding the MLMs by one side might have been regarded as a provocative act. The removal of an important intelligence instrument could have seemed like a prelude to mobilization and war. Indeed, the very act of interfering with or terminating such

¹⁰Diplomatic privileges and immunities was key to the success of the USMLM. The origin of diplomatic immunity can be traced back to ancient civilizations that established diplomatic protections "to protect an agent whose functions were of great social importance to both the sending and receiving groups." [Montell Ogdon, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity: A Study of the Origin, Growth and Purpose of the Law (Washington, D.C.: John Byrne & Co., 1936), 10.] The contemporary practice of diplomatic privileges and immunities has been qualified due largely to the actions of intelligence collectors serving as diplomats, attaches, mission personnel, etc.. Under the theory of reciprocal functionalism, "diplomatic personnel, including intelligence agents in the guise of diplomats, [must] reciprocate for the receiving of personal immunities by avoiding actions which would impinge upon state security." [Clifton E. Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities. (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1967), 25.] Violation of this tenet resulted in a designation of persona non grata (PNG, or "unwelcome person") for the diplomat and his removal from the visited state.

an instrument is potentially de-stabilizing. This can be explained in part by examining the literature on intelligence and the valuable role of the intelligence collector.

Intelligence and the Intelligence Collector

Intelligence, as a "dedicated information support service for government policy makers," is a dynamic concept that denotes the specialized activities, accumulated knowledge and bureaucratic organizations that combine to aid in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.¹¹ Intelligence is "the collection and processing of information as well as the product itself, [including] actions done to influence events in a non-attributable or surreptitious manner."¹²

In the broadest terms, the "collection and processing of information" is performed by an intelligence *agency*; which in intelligence jargon means "an organization or individual engaged in collecting and/or processing information."¹³ There are generally two categories of information that are of concern to intelligence agencies: tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence. Tactical intelligence is information "required by a commander in the field engaged in tactical operations."¹⁴ Strategic intelligence is:

Information regarding the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of foreign nations required by planners in establishing the basis for an adequate national security policy in time of peace. It includes both long-range forecasts of political, economic, and military trends and early warning of impending political or military actions. It also provides the basis for projected over-all military operations in time of war.¹⁵

¹¹John Macartney, "Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2 (Winter 1988): 458; Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Intelligence and Policy (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986), 11.

¹²Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence: The Secret Side of American History (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms (New York: ARCO, 1988), 183.

¹³Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9. Due to the usual conceptualization of an agency as being a government or political organization, for reasons of clarity the USMLM will be hereafter described as an intelligence instrument.

¹⁴Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), 14.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 13.

As an instrument primarily concerned with intelligence collection, the USMLM function is geared more to strategic intelligence, particularly regarding early warning.

Intelligence collection instruments can be associated with one or more of the major collection disciplines: Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).¹⁶ The collection method which best characterizes USMLM operations is HUMINT.

Like "intelligence" the term HUMINT describes both the process or manner of the collection effort, as well as the gathered data itself.¹⁷ In other words, HUMINT is an intelligence category "derived from information collected and provided by human sources;" and is descriptive of many individuals and groups that collect the information. The term "Human Resources Intelligence" is an additional expression often used to describe the "intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline [HUMINT] that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument."¹⁸ Although the US, more than any other country, relies increasingly on spy satellites and other hi-tech sensors, (referred to as NTM, or National Technical Means in arms control treaties), HUMINT continues to be crucial for obtaining intelligence that cannot be acquired by such methods of observation.

Basically, there are two types of HUMINT collection activities. The first of these is *overt*, and the second is *clandestine*. Overt or open forms of intelligence collection exist when the data sought resides in the public domain of the target state, or when authorities of the target state from which the information is being procured are cognizant of the presence of the HUMINT actor, and are aware that the actor's behavior is in fact an attempt at foreign

¹⁶Macartney, 462-464.

¹⁷Jack E. Thomas, "Human Source Intelligence," in The Military Intelligence Community, ed. Gerald W. Hoppole and Bruce W. Watson (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986), 55.

¹⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, 170.

intelligence collection and reportage.¹⁹ Clandestine collection involves the surreptitious acquisition (theft) of information without the state's knowledge or authorization, and is often in conflict to its national interest.²⁰ If a clandestine operation is discovered by the visited state, it is often if not always in violation of said state's laws and therefore constitutes the crime of *espionage*. Generally, espionage involves the recruitment of foreigners (spies) to betray their country by providing information to an intelligence officer.

Today, most military HUMINT involves overt collection by the Defense Attachés assigned to embassies around the world. Also, elements of the US Army, Navy and Air Force are engaged in the overt acquisition of foreign documented material and debriefing refugees, defectors, émigrés, ex-hostages and US citizens traveling abroad. Military HUMINT may also complement technical collection through covert placement of sensors.²¹

Historical Precedents

The overt (and clandestine) collection of intelligence has a long tradition. The non-accredited military observer touring through foreign lands, the military attaché assigned to legations abroad, and foreign area officers with intelligence specialties stationed in military missions are examples. In many ways, the USMLM was akin to these instruments.

Non-accredited Military Observer

Even before the formal institutionalization of Army Intelligence, US military personnel were proving their value in the peace-time collection of a wide array of badly needed data.²²

¹⁹Thomas, 56-57.

²⁰Macartney, 464.

²¹HUMINT also supports Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) by placing antennas by hand and other sensors close to foreign emitters or sources. It is possible, even likely, that USMLM personnel were called on to perform this service from time to time, although the author has not yet uncovered written evidence or corroboration from interviews with former USMLM officers. This kind of activity, however, if indeed performed, would have been clandestine and illegal, therefore constituting espionage.

²²For a wealth of intriguing historical examples, see Edward F. Sayle, "The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence Community," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1 (Spring 1986). For a practitioners view, see: Kemp Tolly, Caviar and Commissars: The Experiences of a U.S. Naval Officer in Stalin's Russia (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1983), 261-271, Appendix D, "Intelligence Report of a Visit to the Soviet Destroyer *Razumnyy*," and Appendix E, "Tolley Report to ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence]: Discussion of Situation in the Soviet Union."

Sanctioned in US Army Regulations until 1928, and termed "hunting and fishing leave," non-accredited military observers "could be dispatched to conduct terrain reconnaissance, yet provide some degree of official deniability."²³ Note the use of diplomatic and political cover to shield governments or cloak intelligence collection in the artifice of "official deniability." This is fundamental to HUMINT processes and the USMLM.

By 1885 a broadened role was outlined by the US War Department and charged to non-accredited observers of the US Army's intelligence branch.²⁴

1. The collection and classification of military information of our own and foreign countries, especially with respect to armed, reserved, and available strength, material and artificial means of communication (rivers, canals, highways, and railroads); the manufacture of arms, ammunition, and other war material; supplies of food, horses, draft animals, etc.

2. The preparation of instructions for the guidance of officers of the Army serving or traveling abroad, or acting as military attachés, and the arrangement and digest of information contained in their reports.²⁵

In 1920 the provisions of the National Defense Act stipulated perhaps the most concise listing of responsibilities to non-accredited observers:

- a. Formulation of policies with reference to military topographical surveys and maps, including their reproduction and distribution.
- b. Supervision and training of military attachés, observers and foreign language students.
- c. Formulation of policies affecting and the supervision of intelligence personnel for all units.
- d. Use of codes and ciphers.
- e. Translation of foreign documents.
- f. Establishment and maintenance of contact with other intelligence agencies of the government and with duly accredited foreign military attachés and military missions.

²³Sayle, 19-20.

²⁴The Military Intelligence Division, founded in 1885.

²⁵Maj. Gen. Ralph H. Van Deman, The Final Memoranda: Major General Ralph H. Van Deman, USA Ret. 1865-1952, Father of U.S. Military Intelligence, ed. Ralph E. Weber (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1988), 124.

g. Construction and reproduction of special maps required for intelligence purposes, including the procuring of maps from foreign sources.²⁶

In 1889, the US Congress passed into law the required legal machinery whereby Army officers could be sent abroad "to collect such information as would be useful in the event of our Government being called to war with any other nation."²⁷ This marked the beginning of the US Military Defense Attaché System, a landmark event that emphasized the key role of military intelligence. This was also an important development in the evolution of US HUMINT concepts and, accordingly, the USMLM.

Defense Attaché

Unlike the non-accredited intelligence officer, military attachés represent a developed, institutionalized expression of the need for and acquisition of intelligence of military importance during peace time and war. Assigned to the official staff of an ambassador, consul general or minister to a foreign country, the defense attaché's function includes liaison with the foreign armed forces, as well as a wide variety of intelligence services as a diplomatic observer of foreign military organization; to ferret out either targeted or collateral information on any pertinent military or non-military object.²⁸ The objective is to collect, process and report findings to central command; and to render aid to the ambassadorial staff by providing immediate information of a military nature pursuant to and during state-state negotiations.²⁹ With respect to war preparations—assessing an opponents military strength and resources—the process of intelligence collection, (which had been the responsibility of ambassadors and diplomats), fell under the purview of military attachés selected for this function.³⁰

²⁶Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff: 1775-1941, (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1986), 251.

²⁷Marc B. Powe, "A Sketch of a Man and His Times," in Ralph H. Van Deman, The Final Memoranda: Major General Ralph H. Van Deman, USA Ret. 1865-1952; Father of U.S. Military Intelligence, ed. Ralph E. Weber (Wilmington, Delaware: SR Books, 1988), ix-x; Van Deman, 4.

²⁸Meaning, defense attachés enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

²⁹Bidwell, 159; Edmund Jan Osmańczyk, The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements (Philadelphia, London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 59.

³⁰Alfred Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 9.

As the modernization of armaments and tactics complicated the process of assessing military power in the 19th century, defense attachés became essential for collecting accurate and precise military intelligence regarding the adversary's capabilities and intentions. The attaché's expertise on weaponry and tactics served to supplement if not replace the efforts of civilian diplomats in their reportage, which, as viewed by the military, was largely deficient due to the civilian diplomat's scant knowledge of military matters.³¹ A broad array of objects or categories of targets to be observed by the defense attaché includes:³²

1. Scientific intelligence, capabilities to support industry, R & D.
2. Geography, weather, climate.
3. Transportation, roads, telecommunications.
4. Economic intelligence, industry, finance, employment.
5. Military intelligence.
6. Sociological intelligence, population, religion, education, tradition; attitude of masses.
7. Political intelligence, parties, foreign policy.
8. Biographical intelligence.

This comprehensive list underscores the fact that the primary function of defense attachés, those of the US as well as other governments, is intelligence collection.³³ Diplomacy, liaison, representation, arms sales, military assistance, embassy security, Congressional escort and other miscellaneous defense attaché roles, although important, are secondary. The personal narrative of Colonel T. Bentley Mott, who held a 20-year appointment as defense attaché to France beginning in 1900, provides a first-hand perspective on the function and influence of such military intelligence experts. Mott was one of many who monitored advances in armaments as part of the competitive arms race underway during the years prior to World War I:

It can be seen that one of their duties in highly developed military countries is to ferret out those things in which our service may be lacking or inferior and, by suitable presentation, lead the War Department to institute research with a view to improvement.

³¹Ibid., 3, 9; idem, Defense and Diplomacy, 65.

³²Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 9.

³³See Vagts, Military Attaché, 11-13; Robert R. Glass and Phillip B. Davidson, Intelligence is For Commanders (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1948), 26-27. See also Major-General Richard Hilton, Military Attaché in Moscow (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951), 8; and John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 48.

. . . the German Army has been busy since the War, as it always was busy before the War, in developing new weapons or new applications of old ones, new tactics and new methods of training. All of these subjects constitute a field of study for our attaché in Berlin which makes that post a most important one.³⁴

Predominant attention was given to order-of-battle capabilities that included analysis of training methods, observing and even purchasing small arms, locating the position of munitions storehouses and lines of supply, and monitoring the numbers and types of heavy guns.

Concerning the last of these, Mott again details his own account of collecting such intelligence while on attaché duty:

When I arrived in Paris in 1900 the most interesting single fact then occupying the military world was the recent adoption by France of the seventy-five millimetre field gun, the famous *soixante-quinze* of the World War. Eighteen batteries had been given exhaustive tests in every combination on the Chalons plain, and all that could be learned about this gun went to indicate that a vast step forward had been made in field artillery. Naturally, it was my duty to learn all that I could about it. . . . I bought every publication that had anything to say about it or its tactical use.³⁵

In a recent study, analyst Jeffrey Richelson offers a listing that describes current US defense attaché functions that mirror the traditional methods and objects of intelligence of nearly two centuries. Here, present functions differ only in terminology and the exploitation of modern technologies. The basic intelligence modes are the same:

- identifying and gaining cooperation of human sources believed to possess the ability to furnish intelligence information;
- identifying and capturing collection opportunities presented by trade fairs, military demonstrations, parades, symposia, convocations, conferences, meetings, etc.;
- traveling to identified geographic target areas to observe and report information specifically needed by consumers/users;
- identifying and establishing contact, and maintaining liaison with foreign military officers who by virtue of their rank, position or assignment, can furnish potential intelligence information or are considered to be future leaders;
- gaining and maintaining area reality to observe and report political, sociological, psychological, and economic developments of potential value in gauging the military

³⁴Colonel T. Bentley Mott, *Twenty Years as Military Attaché* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), 113, 102-103.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 103-104.

plans, capabilities, and intentions of foreign governments, their military forces and their stability; and

- identifying and gaining access to assist in the acquisition and exploitation of foreign military equipment and material.³⁶

And finally, the very fact that the US defense attachés are trained and organized under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), rather than some other element of the Department of Defense (DoD), or the Department of State, confirms the primacy of their intelligence mission.

In sum, the defense attaché is a HUMINT collection instrument. As an appendage of an ambassadorial entourage, military intelligence enters the diplomatic forum with the attaché enjoying rights and privileges that facilitate the goal of intelligence collection.

By definition, military attachés seek knowledge with the intent of rendering some level of transparency in the matters and conduct of the host state. But to obtain greater legitimacy and access under diplomatic protection, a higher form on the evolutionary ladder of military HUMINT collection instruments had to be devised. The defense attachés were given a cadre of associates and their own address.

Military Mission

The military mission is a military organization dispatched reciprocally by states to facilitate specified tasks that generally include advisory assistance and control or mediatory functions.³⁷ While the defense attaché is most often accredited to his own government's foreign legation, the military mission is a self-contained collection of military representatives which, as a specialized state institution, is accredited to a foreign government, is established through intergovernmental negotiation and enjoys the privileges and immunities that accompany its diplomatic status. Examples are the arms assistance missions that the US maintains in many allied countries and that some allies maintain in the United States. Mission officers and

³⁶Jeffrey Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 2d ed., (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1989), 235.

³⁷Osmanczyk, 514.

support staff have specialized roles to maintain in-house mission administration, surveille the visited state with the intent of enhancing its transparency, and establish liaison with representatives of the accreditor state.

The liaison function is defined in the following manner, and is applicable as much during peacetime as it is during open hostilities.

To facilitate communication and coordination between two headquarters engaged in a common operation or project against a common enemy, or in reference to other control functions identified with the specified goal. This includes the dissemination and reciprocal acquisition of information regarding general military dispositions, the position of specialized units, the intention of the military commanders, the general situation, and the progress of combat operations (if any).³⁸

Military missions are conduits for interstate communication. Military officers serving in missions collect biographical intelligence as they interact professionally and socially with counterparts of the visited state's military organization. Personnel of a military mission establish close and consistent relations with select representatives of the accreditor state, and with a considerable degree of autonomy facilitate overt and, in some cases, clandestine intelligence collection as a recognized diplomatic entity.

Representatives of military missions enjoy a level of inviolability and their mission headquarters full rights of extra-territoriality. For the most part mission personnel travel freely in the visited country. The value of a military mission as an intelligence instrument is often based on this ability of mission personnel to access and assess. The provision is present in longstanding diplomatic literature, and is restated and even reinforced from time to time. For instance, the 1961 *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, lists the functions of a diplomatic mission.

- a. representing the sending State in the receiving State;
- b. protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals within the limits permitted by international law;

³⁸John Robert Beishline, *Military Management for National Defense* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), 211. See also G. A. Wade, *Intelligence and Liaison* (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Limited, 1942), 22-23.

- c. negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
- d. *ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State;*
- e. promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.³⁹

In sum, the preceding overview of traditional intelligence instruments provides a framework for understanding the USMLM. Each instrument was described in terms of its role as an intelligence collector based on assigned responsibilities to observe foreign states and collect information. Historical development, the degree of organizational and institutional complexity, the character of intelligence collection, and the utility of diplomatic status as a means to augment the intelligence collection effort have been explored. Diplomatic representatives always have been and are explicitly recognized by the 1961 Vienna Convention as intelligence collectors. The same is true for military missions. The USMLM was a composite of the aforementioned traditional intelligence instruments. The existence of the USMLM, however, was a direct response to the requirements of war---a product of the very suspicions which launched the cold war. Here, further examination of the USMLM intelligence role is appropriately found in the background negotiations and security conditions in Germany which gave rise to the MLM system.

³⁹Department of State, "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations," 1972, TIAS, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 23, 3231-3232, emphasis added.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

Postwar US Intelligence Needs and the Origin of the USMLM

World War II planning for the final military assault against Germany and subsequent occupation laid the foundation for the USMLM. Design of both OVERLORD, the amphibious invasion of Europe, and RANKIN, the emergency plan to occupy Germany and enforce unconditional surrender in the event of its sudden collapse, stipulated locations of the Allied advance into Germany. Placement of respective military forces raised the question of occupation of Germany by separate zones or mixed forces. British, Soviet and American proposals put forth at meetings of the European Advisory Commission (EAC) favored separate zones of occupation, with each Power maintaining predominant control in its zone.

With the issue of occupation by zones settled, the need for inter-zonal liaison was expressed in the EAC's concluding document: the November 1944 Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany.⁴⁰ Article 2 of this document became the legal foundation for a future exchange of military liaison missions.

The political, diplomatic and military situation at the end of World War II generated rising tensions between East and West regarding the future of Germany, reparations, denazification, and demilitarization. Efforts to facilitate a cooperative occupation failed, as did attempts to gain an accurate accounting from Soviet sources of reparations extracted to date. Stalemate resulted over the issue to institute an inspection system to survey all occupational

⁴⁰See Appendix A. It remains to be determined the degree to which expected postwar intelligence needs affected or perhaps directed the negotiations leading to the November 1944 Agreement. Additional research through archival records of the period via FOIA will be necessary to make a determination.

zones and monitor compliance with the terms of postwar agreements. Conflict and competition surrounding these matters engendered a gradual movement toward zonal closure.⁴¹

Eventually, the concept of liaison present in the November 1944 Agreement was redefined. US authorities used liaison as an expedient to gain access to and collect information about the Soviet zone.⁴² The key point is that "intelligence" as a function of the USMLM (and the other MLMs as well) began to supplant "liaison" before inception of the USMLM.

Memoranda between US and Soviet military representatives pursuant to the exchange of MLMs reflected this shift. Preliminary instructions to a future Chief of USMLM specified that in contrast to an earlier directive, mission personnel would obtain information on the Soviet zone, rather than channel information regarding the US zone to Soviet headquarters.⁴³ In the

⁴¹Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), 112. The failure to develop a common policy toward Germany kept the MLM question alive. The MLMs were a product of failed quadripartite administration of Germany reflecting zonal closure and associate needs for mutual observation and intelligence collection. Summarizing Allied efforts to administer Germany with unity of purpose, and to lay the foundation for the actual unification of an occupied and dismembered Germany, General Clay identified the essential contradictions between the presumed benevolence of Soviet rhetoric on one hand, and Soviet behavior on the other:

The difference between Soviet expression of a desire for a unified Germany and Soviet actions to exclude the Western Allies from east Germany were being evidenced with increasing frequency. For months we tried to obtain permission for our Graves Registration teams to enter the Soviet Zone to locate and remove our dead. We estimated that this task, properly done, could be completed in six months. We were never able to secure free entry for this purpose and in April I gave up efforts to do so in the Co-ordinating Committee. Shortly afterward I made a direct personal appeal to Sokolovsky which did result in our teams being permitted to enter the Soviet Zone, although under such restrictions as to numbers, locations to be visited, and routes to be followed that three years later many of our dead still remained buried in the Soviet Zone. (Clay, 119)

⁴²At the time access did not mean "control," but merely the ability to travel in another zone; an activity which was previously understood to be part of the joint administration of occupied Germany.

⁴³Clear evidence of the shifting US attitude regarding this issue of access and intelligence and the advantageous implementation of Article 2 appears most vividly in the draft set of instructions issued on 2 April 1946 to a "hypothetical" Chief, United States Military Liaison Mission (CUSMLM). [Thomas S. Lough, *The Origins of the Military Liaison Missions in Germany*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1965), 72.] The text details several privileges and procedures that made explicit reference to what had become a fully grown emphasis on monitoring and reporting events and conditions then existing in the Soviet zone of occupation. The instruction to a future CUSMLM was, in a manner of speaking, an admission of empiricism. For the first time regarding the issue of reciprocal liaison per Article 2, military representatives at OMGUS sought to formulate policies that reflected the waning confidence in a positive US-Soviet relationship, and recognized the need to acknowledge this cool association as it was experienced, rather than as it was hoped to have developed. A future USMLM would "assist any US agency in its dealing with the Soviet Headquarters, and to follow-up Soviet execution of quadripartite agreements, reporting to this [US] Headquarters any failure on the part of the Soviets to enforce such agreements." (Ibid., 73). This quasi-constabulary role was clearly directed toward monitoring events and conditions in the Soviet zone. Given the reports of Soviet espionage and questionable methods of repatriation and extracting reparations, the USMLM would probe within all aspects of agreed postwar occupational measures, with expanded duties to include graves registration, establishing civilian travel rights in areas controlled by the Soviets, "protecting U.S. trains from pilferage while crossing the Soviet zone, and assisting in the inter-zone transfer of prisoners of war." (Ibid).

emerging cold war strategy, the USMLM became a useful intelligence unit for observing the peacetime military activities of a new adversary.

USMLM Organization

On 5 April 1947 the Huebner-Malinin Agreement was signed by Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the US European Command, and Colonel-General Sergeyeovich Malinin, Deputy Commander-in-Chief to the Chief of Staff of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. The USMLM was subsequently established by a succession of official Army memoranda. General Order (GO) 17, Headquarters, European Command (EUCOM), dated 8 April 1947, assigned USMLM to Headquarters EUCOM, attached it to the Office of the Military Government for Germany (OMGUS), and accredited it to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany. On 27 February 1948, HQ EUCOM issued GO 23 which re-designated USMLM as the 7893 U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Zone of Germany. The final specification to soon follow dropped the numerical prefix and replaced the accreditor phrase "Soviet Occupation Zone" with "Group of Soviet Forces." The final title became "United States Military Liaison Mission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [CINC GSFG]."⁴⁴ The USMLM range of operation was limited to eastern Germany, (the Soviet Zone, or what was to become the German Democratic Republic).⁴⁵ Early attachment to intelligence offices is evidenced by a file notation which specified "OMGUS Intelligence Division" as that repository for USMLM touring and intelligence data immediately following inception.⁴⁶

⁴⁴United States Department of the Army, Unit History, United States Military Liaison Mission to the Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, formerly Classified SECRET, (Fort George G. Meade, Maryland: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, 1974), 2. All Annual Unit Reports hereafter cited as Unit History, with reference to corresponding year (s) and page number (s).

⁴⁵Restrictions on USMLM operations in terms of geographical area and access to Soviet military, economic and occupational/governmental facilities in the eastern zone of occupied Germany will be described in a forthcoming section.

⁴⁶Lough, (1965), 86.

A 20 May 1949 EUCOM Regulation placed USMLM under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAREUR (DCSI, USAREUR).⁴⁷ This relationship with intelligence offices was a key element regarding operations. Constant and direct communication was sustained by reciprocal visits between USMLM and the intelligence staff at USAREUR HQ.⁴⁸ Since USMLM was an important resource in the Soviet zone, other related US intelligence organizations maintained a regular schedule of visits to its Potsdam headquarters.

There was also regular communication and coordination with "counterpart missions"—the British Military Liaison Mission (BRXMIS) and the French Military Liaison Mission (FMLM). Activities included coordinated touring and intelligence collection.⁴⁹ Since all of these Western MLMs operated in the Soviet zone, communication reduced duplication of effort while raising the overall level of efficiency and range of coverage. Comparing and improving collection techniques and collating findings were regular procedures among the Western MLMs.⁵⁰

The fourteen personnel of the USMLM comprised the Chief, USMLM (CUSMLM) a US Army officer of the rank of colonel, who was appointed by CinC USAREUR and maintained operational command authority over the other officers and enlisted personnel, Army, Navy and Air Force. Tri-service representation was sanctioned by provision 2 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. The Army element of the USMLM comprised the largest contingent of personnel (usually 7-9). The position of Deputy Chief, USMLM (DCUSMLM) was held by the senior Air Force officer, usually a colonel or lieutenant colonel, while a Marine Corps officer often represented the Navy component.⁵¹ The seven officers assigned to "operations" (touring, or

⁴⁷Unit History 1974, 2. DCSI is the senior-most intelligence officer in the US Army, and is responsible for nearly all Army Intelligence elements.

⁴⁸Unit History 1964, 19.

⁴⁹Private source. The author has interviewed a number of veterans of the USMLM and members of US agencies. These personnel have requested anonymity, and will hereafter be referred to as "private source" or "confidential source."

⁵⁰ibid.

⁵¹Unit History 1974, 2.

ground intelligence collection), usually included a lieutenant colonel, four majors and two captains.

The USMLM was organized into two divisions, Administrative and Operations.⁵² The Administrative Division was charged with the procurement of supplies, vehicle preparation, repairs and maintenance, civil affairs, USMLM personnel matters, and language instruction for USMLM tour officers. The Operations Division managed various sub-divisions directly involved with touring and intelligence. These included: Plans and Production, data collection requirements and analysis, briefing and debriefing USMLM tour officers prior to and after ground operations, and the maintenance and operation of a photo lab for the processing and generating of printed matter based on information collected during those ground operations.⁵³

In sum, since 1947 the USMLM grew from a skeletal organizational framework into a considerably more complex integration of parts, all connected in this network through various command and operational channels for the primary purpose of exploiting conditions in the Soviet zone to establish, protect, and augment a sophisticated intelligence collection system. As an organization, the USMLM consisted of various administrative and operational regulations that ordered and adjusted the distribution of duties and responsibilities among USMLM elements and sections. This system of specialized functions performed by component parts, and the collective purpose of gathering intelligence, is merely the reflection of those roles and actions exacted by the USMLM personnel. Their training, development and use are reminders of the traditional skills maintained by the professional ancestors of USMLM personnel.

⁵²Unit History 1965, 95. Due to current classification of and inaccessibility to Unit Histories written before 1964, the author is unable to construct an accurate timeline of USMLM organizational development, e.g., the onset of the Administrative and Operations divisions.

⁵³Ibid.

Personnel

The USMLM personnel were by all accounts highly skilled and specifically trained for an intelligence role. Tour officers attended a special US Army training facility and photography school, were skilled in the Russian and German languages, expert in Soviet and Warsaw Pact order-of-battle, and engaged in joint training with British and French MLM personnel which was conducted at both US and British intelligence training facilities.⁵⁴ Enlisted personnel assigned as tour drivers became proficient in the high-speed operation of tour vehicles, and were responsible for ensuring that vehicles were properly equipped and maintained. The tour officer and tour driver comprised the *tour team*.⁵⁵

Tour Officer

Literally on the front line of the US-Soviet struggle, the USMLM tour officer was the quintessential cold warrior. Combining battlefield maneuver and reconnaissance stealth with professionalism and the substance of a college classroom, the tour officer was, like the USMLM, sui generis among elements of the US national security establishment. At the USMLM a highly trained American officer could practice his Russian language skills, collect important intelligence data, engage in "James Bond" style cat and mouse auto chases, and test his diplomatic skills, sometimes while looking down the barrel of a young Soviet soldier's AK-47.⁵⁶ Engaged in hazardous activity, service as a USMLM tour officer required a unique officer--referred colloquially at the USMLM as the "tour type."

⁵⁴Confidential source. Order-of-battle refers to the "identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force." Trevor N. Dupuy. Dictionary of Military Terms (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1986), 164.

⁵⁵The "tour team" refers to the mobile USMLM units that surveyed throughout the Soviet zone (East Germany). Tour teams usually included two officers and one enlisted man as driver, but as Lough notes, the number and arrangement varied. Often, only two men went out on tour; two officers, or one officer and an enlisted man. Apparently, all tour officers and drivers were men. Thomas S. Lough, The Military Liaison Missions in Germany, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Political Research and Analysis, International Relations Bureau, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, March 1964), 30. Formerly classified SECRET/NOFORN, declassified at ACDA. Released to author 17 July 1991.

⁵⁶Don Stovall, Colonel USA Ret., former USMLM Tour Officer 1969-1971, and CUSMLM June 1977-July 1981. Interview by author, March 1991, Pentagon.

The Unit History of 1978 begins with a dedication to the USMLM tour officer, and describes in deceptively glib manner what is actually an earnest depiction of a dynamic and revealing role:

The tour officer is a "one-man band." He is a . . . reporter, con-artist, resource manager, . . . teacher, perennial student, and military representative of US interests in Communist East Germany. The tour officer must address these various roles creatively. He must be at once innovative and aggressive. His stamina, coolness, and patience must be high. . . . Last of all, a tour officer must be lucky. With a little bit of luck, your "average good man" will be in the right place at the right time . . .

There are few assignments in the military service where an officer can personally contribute so much to US defense efforts and few jobs where a man must be such a jack-of-all-trades and master of each.⁵⁷

Soon after the inception of the USMLM in 1947, the US Army started a modest "Russian specialist program." For all tour officers, language skills were crucial for the liaison role, intelligence collection by touring, and day-to-day interaction with the Soviet External Relations Branch (SERB), (which was part of USMLM's logistical support). According to a former tour officer, "by the mid-1950s most officers assigned to the USMLM were qualified Russian specialists, able to use their language fluency to talk their way out of difficult situations and to make meaningful assessments of what they observed in the Soviet zone."⁵⁸

The emphasis on language skills is indicated in Unit History 1967.

The current model Army tour officer . . . is generally a Major or Lieutenant Colonel of about any branch of service. Air Team members and the Navy Representative are generally Captains or Majors of the USAF and USMC, respectively. These officers normally have about ten to fifteen years commissioned service, [and] are fluent in Russian and/or German. Assignments to USMLM are the result of rather careful screening, to provide the most capable and adaptable personnel available. The average newly-assigned tour officer is probably quite normal for his branch and service, with the exception of his language training.⁵⁹

⁵⁷Unit History 1978, i.

⁵⁸Paul G. Skowronek, "U.S.-Soviet Military Liaison in Germany Since 1947" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, Denver, 1976), 57. Paul G. Skowronek was CUSMLM June 1963-May 1967.

⁵⁹Unit History 1967, 38.

The USMLM officers also received training in various photographic techniques. De-classified records indicate that at least as early as 1964, all new tour officers had acquired instruction at the Leica Photography School at Wetzlar, West Germany prior to service at the USMLM.⁶⁰

By the late 1960s, many officers to be assigned to the USMLM received specialized instruction at the US Army Russian Institute of the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) at Garmisch, West Germany.⁶¹ In a few years this installation had become a key source of USMLM officer personnel.

Assignment to the USMLM was selective. According to Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, a former CUSMLM, only three of the 25 yearly graduates of the Russian Institute's two year program were taken to USMLM Berlin Headquarters and evaluated for service as tour officers.⁶² For the career foreign area officer (FAO) with a Soviet specialty, a 2-4 year assignment to the USMLM was highly prized and engendered a certain kind of "élan." By the late 1970s, repeat tours were normal occurrences.

USMLM tour officers, particularly CUSMLM, also came from G-2 (military intelligence) units or assignments as defense attachés. Colonel Thomas F. McCord, CUSMLM May 1967 - July 1968, was head of the US Army's 513 Military Intelligence Group stationed in Berlin in 1961. At that time (Lt. Colonel) McCord was also a member of the secret interagency "Berlin Watch Committee" that was formed to monitor East Berlin and, in keeping with the early warning role of military intelligence, was "charged with sounding the alarm at the first indication of hostile military action."⁶³ Colonel Ernest von Pawel, CUSMLM June 1960 - June 1963, served as an Army attaché in Poland from 1957 - 1959 and was also a member of the Berlin Watch

⁶⁰Unit History 1964, 3.

⁶¹Unit History 1969, 3; Unit History 1979, II-25, II-26.

⁶²Roland Lajoie, Brigadier General, former CUSMLM June 1983-May 1986. Interview by author, March 1991, Pentagon. The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) was the primary military occupational specialty (MOS) for USMLM officer personnel. It was also usual for these tour officers to have earned graduate-level college degrees in Soviet studies to complement their training at Garmisch.

⁶³Honore M. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making (Berlin: Verlag, 1980), 229.

Committee during the Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961.⁶⁴ A more recent example is Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, CUSMLM June 1983 - May 1986, who served as Army attaché in Moscow prior to the USMLM assignment.

Also of note here is the post obtained by a CUSMLM after he completes his assignment to the USMLM. In the previous case, for example, Brigadier General Lajoie left the USMLM to become the first director of the On-Site Inspection Agency in 1988; an arms control measure that monitored Soviet compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In arms control jargon, monitoring is essentially an intelligence function. After leaving the OSIA, General Lajoie was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency.

In addition to a keen awareness of intelligence methods, some former USMLM officers developed a concentrated interest in Soviet military sociology and became Soviet specialists. For example, William E. Odom (Lieutenant General, USA, Ret.) was a career military intelligence officer who further honed his knowledge of Soviet military organization while serving at the USMLM. A scholar and one of the US Army's foremost Soviet experts, General Odom was also a former Deputy Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence and Director of the National Security Agency before retiring from the US Army in 1988.

In sum, the tour officer was the key member of the USMLM staff. His professionalism, diplomatic skill, academic and language training, and ability to manage stressful situations indicated a new and unique kind of intelligence officer. Yet, the tour officer could not have functioned or completed the assigned missions without the service of the USMLM's "transportation specialist"---the tour driver.

Tour Driver

Since most of the USMLM intelligence gathering was done by touring, the enlisted tour driver's responsibilities as one half of the observation team were as pronounced as they were comprehensive.

⁶⁴Ibid., 234.

USMLM drivers were chosen primarily for alertness and skill in handling the powerful American automobiles which were used for liaison touring.⁶⁵ Their driving skills helped to prevent traffic accidents and, more importantly, these expert and confident young soldiers were able to prevent East German attempts to escort or surveil mission sedans. Even though the GDR did equip some of their secret police units with expensive West German automobiles, their less motivated drivers were never a serious challenge to the Americans in their large-engined, speed-tuned, specially equipped vehicles. USMLM driver proficiency and daring made any chase an unequal match, and the East German police learned to avoid becoming involved in these potentially dangerous encounters.⁶⁶

Like the tour officer, the tour driver was a representative of the US military in the Soviet zone (and East Germany) and an intelligence specialist in his own right. Language skills were of paramount importance, as was the ability to maintain coolness under the pressure of stressful and even dangerous situations encountered while touring. Here, stamina was required as much as technical skills. A brief vignette from USMLM records sums-up the nature of the tour driver's craft:

First, and foremost, he must be alert. Driving skills, linguistic prowess, . . . and an intimate knowledge of East Germany are no substitute for a keen and sensitive awareness. Tour driving is an ordeal; much of the time is spent patiently traversing East German roads and terrain—boredom sets in; fatigue. But, the arrival of the unexpected must always be anticipated.

There is much to be derived as a tour driver. Aside from the feeling of accomplishment, there is also the element of danger and adventure. Events take place which whet the imagination and challenge resourcefulness and driving skills.⁶⁷

In conclusion, the USMLM was a unique organization. Its intelligence role was linked to historical predecessors, and was reflected in the structure of its organization and the training of its personnel.

⁶⁵American vehicles would be replaced completely in the early 1980s.

⁶⁶Skowronek, 59-60.

⁶⁷Unit History 1967, 40-41.

CHAPTER 3

TOURING

Touring was the sine qua non of USMLM intelligence operations. According to two former CUSMLM, touring was basically un-structured. While in the Soviet zone the tour team was free to roam in an ad hoc fashion, becoming "opportunists" and not necessarily traveling to targets established by the USMLM Berlin HQ.⁶⁸ Flexibility was important because uncertainty was prevalent in the Soviet zone.

Operating Procedures⁶⁹

Targets

It is perhaps no overstatement that everything present in the Soviet zone was or had potential to become an object for intelligence collection—a target. Tour teams observed planned targets and responded to opportunities as they presented themselves.

The USMLM tour teams had an extraordinarily comprehensive area of responsibility and range of specific targets to photograph and surveil in the Soviet zone; but surveillance was focused primarily on Soviet order-of-battle. According to Skowronek, who recalled touring in the 1960s:

The twenty Soviet mechanized and armored divisions and supporting air units were of primary interest, but the GDR's new army was also worth some observation effort, especially because the East German divisions used Russian tanks, artillery and armored cars.⁷⁰

Targets that were of interest to US weapon system developers included specific data regarding radar and communication facilities, thickness of armor plating and its ability to resist armor-

⁶⁸Lajoie and Stovall interviews.

⁶⁹See Appendix E for details on USMLM pre-tour preparations, the distance and duration of tours, mileage covered, and vehicles used and modified.

⁷⁰Skowronek, 96.

piercing munitions, and aircraft design and performance.⁷¹ Concerning the last of these, the USMLM records indicate several occasions, mostly involving detentions by or incidents with Soviet patrols, whereby Soviet aircraft and bases were photographed.⁷²

Procedures

The USMLM tour team's observation techniques included the liberal use of forest trails and East German ferries to cross waterways.⁷³ Not limited to the tour car, tour team members also traveled on foot to investigate areas inaccessible by vehicle. Recalling the pretext of "hunting and fishing leave" made famous by 19th century non-accredited military observers, similar tactics were employed by the USMLM tour personnel. Here, former tour officer Paul G. Skowronek recalls one example.

Keeping Russian military activity under observation without stirring up East German suspicions and police interference was a constant challenge to liaison officer ingenuity and resourcefulness. Probing the allowable limits helped to define the kind of activities which could be pursued without strong objection, and possible violent confrontations. One activity, cross-country skiing, if it had been permitted in the Soviet Zone, would have added somewhat to coverage of remote areas. Since it was not specifically mentioned in the liaison agreement, a young mission officer and his wife were sent on an exploratory trip into the Hartz Mountains to test the feasibility of using this sport for expanding observation capabilities.

The Soviet reaction was immediate. The local Russian commandant appeared at the resort hotel within a few hours and ordered the hotel manager to cancel the Americans' accommodations and the liaison officer was told that his skiing outfit was not considered properly identifiable military uniform. The commandant waited to escort the would-be skiers out of the mountains. The incident was not considered of sufficient importance to lodge an official protest, but cross-country skiing did not become an accepted observation activity.⁷⁴

The USMLM tour teams developed, adjusted and improved observation techniques and equipment. These techniques were not outright violations of Huebner-Malinin or Soviet

⁷¹Jack E. Thomas, 65.

⁷²See Appendix C.

⁷³Skowronek, 161.

⁷⁴Ibid., 179-180.

restrictions, but they did illustrate an opportunistic enterprise that was in part a response to those regulations and restrictions.

Here, intelligence of one level of significance or another was obtained from nothing more than being keenly aware of the conditions which existed in the field. The USMLM tour officers were trained to detect and observe seemingly irrelevant sources of information. Citing A. E. Schanze, CUSMLM 1952 - 1954:

Two officers in one of our cars were driving through the wooded area after the [Soviet] maneuvers were over. A paper blew across the road. The driver stopped and picked it up.

It was obvious: That toilet paper was not issued to troops in the field. That any kind of paper—letters from home, newspapers, etc., was used by the troops for toilet purposes, that Soviet soldiers did not cover up their straddle trenches. Wind blew the paper around.⁷⁵

Another example was the "25 mile per hour fence," as it was known at the USMLM. This technique was derived from the Soviet penchant for installing wooden fences around everything of possible military interest in their zone of occupation. This included equipment, barracks and even junk yards. During the spring thaw, the wooden boards shrank, causing fairly regular and even intervals of space to occur between them. Since peering through the openings while stationary drew Soviet and East German attention, the USMLM tour officers discovered through trial and error that if one drove along such a fence at approximately 25 mph, the cracks between the boards merged into a homogeneous space that gave the USMLM tour officers a clear view of what existed behind the fence.⁷⁶

The USMLM tour teams developed techniques of saturating the perimeter of a restricted area. Three or four tour teams were mobilized and sent to draw attention away from a single team chosen to penetrate the restricted area in an effort to collect intelligence.⁷⁷ Such intrusion gave rise to even more intrusive and hazardous exploits. Writing for the New York Times,

⁷⁵A. E. Schanze, "This Was the Army" (Unpublished memoir, Archives, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, n.d.), 118.

⁷⁶Confidential source.

⁷⁷Confidential source.

James Markham reported in a 24 April 1985 article of a disclosure made by a "Western intelligence source" that a USMLM tour officer had taken advantage of "the drunken revelry of Soviet troops on New Year's Eve," and infiltrated a tank enclosure to photograph the interiors and exteriors of armored vehicles.⁷⁸

Soviet counterintelligence efforts against the USMLM tour teams required the latter to develop, adjust and improve a variety of techniques to avoid and evade the Soviet measures. These techniques accompanied those involving infiltration as a matter of course.

The USMLM tour vehicles were equipped with toggle switches for independent control of brake lights.⁷⁹ During night operations, these controls were used to simulate braking and turning in an effort to throw-off Soviet or East German "tails." Independent switches to control the lights around license plates were also used to cloak the tour team's presence as much as possible.⁸⁰ Routinely, the USMLM teams used the method of high-speed ingress and egress while touring, and were aware of the value of carefully timed operations. Teams drove at speeds of approximately 90 miles per hour penetrating restricted areas during late evening and early morning to minimize Soviet or East German surveillance.⁸¹

These techniques of evasion and cloaking, perhaps more than any other method previously noted, highlight the issue of Soviet and East German surveillance of the USMLM tour teams. This leads us to an examination of the more active Soviet counterintelligence measures, which included restrictions, harassment, incidents of force, detention of tour personnel, and the potentially lethal shooting or car ramming incident.

⁷⁸James M. Markham, "G.I. Photo Mission In East Germany," New York Times, 24 April 1985, 47. This article is a report on the shooting of Major Arthur Nicholson on 24 March 1985.

⁷⁹This "adjustment" was made to USMLM tour vehicles and, of course, was neither permitted nor prohibited by the provisions in Huebner-Malinin. Concerning SERB/GSFG authorities, it was also non-negotiable. Reciprocity dictates that the Soviet tour vehicles were similarly "adjusted," although the author has not found evidence to support this assertion.

⁸⁰Confidential source.

⁸¹George C. Wilson and James R. Dickenson, "Slain Officer Described As Talented Specialist," New York Times, 26 March 1985, A12.

Restrictions

Strictly speaking, both US and Soviet MLM touring operations were constrained to some degree by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.⁸² Also, there developed by 1951⁸³ a series of restrictions⁸⁴ which, for all intents and purposes, constituted part of a counterintelligence effort undertaken bilaterally to further control intelligence activities in the US and Soviet occupational zones.⁸⁵ These restrictions were the Permanent Restricted Area (PRA), Temporary Restricted Area (TRA), and Mission Restriction Sign (MRS). When in effect concurrently (and honored by USMLM personnel), restrictions were formidable barriers to intelligence collection in the Soviet zone. In many ways restrictions not only shaped USMLM tour routes, but were often imposed in direct response to aggressive USMLM touring. An understanding of the origin and use of these restrictions is essential, since their enforcement was obstructive to intelligence collection.

⁸²See Appendix B.

⁸³The record is indeterminate regarding "who started the restrictions" since both US and Soviet records remain classified.

⁸⁴Before proceeding to an analysis of these restrictions, a determination of a cause for their initial usage is in order. To begin, it is important to note that in the first few months of USMLM operations, many "liaison" services, i.e., German demilitarization, POWs, graves registration and return of deserters were a major concern and restrictions on travel throughout the Soviet zone "were negligible." [Lough, (1964), 46.] Thus, one premise may be that restrictions came into being as immediate postwar "liaison" services diminished, while practicing normal operations for the sake of touring became conspicuous. Tour teams began using the right to travel throughout the Soviet zone in a manner inconsistent with provision 10; either by pushing the limit of Huebner-Malinin or through outright violation of and intrusion into prohibited areas.

In other words, where provision 10 was designed when intrusive touring was expected, additional restrictions came into being as a result of experience. Provision 10 was an insufficient restriction, and intrusive measures and manner of touring were a stimulus for a more active response when dealing with opportunistic intelligence collectors. One final explanation for the onset of restrictions beyond provision 10 appears in a 1962 DCSI, USAREUR study, which claims that the issue was due to the "Soviet" perspective:

Although the Huebner-Malinin Agreement is silent on the matter of authority to establish restrictive areas and signs, such authority is considered by the Soviets to represent settled practices and is inherent in the authority of the Commanders in Chief, as reflected in their long exercise thereof. Since the Huebner-Malinin Agreement excludes from freedom of travel places of disposition of military units the Soviets interpret this to mean that the [Soviet] Commanders have the *prerogative* of restricting these areas to USMLM travel. (Ibid).

⁸⁵Counterintelligence is: "All security measures, both active and passive, designed to insure the safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment and installations against the espionage, sabotage or subversive activities of foreign powers and their agencies, and of disaffected or dissident groups or individuals which constitute a threat to the national security or to an agency of the legally constituted government." [As quoted in Leo D. Carl International Dictionary of Intelligence (McLean, Virginia: International Defense Consultant Services, Inc.) 1990; 83.]

Permanent Restricted Area (PRA)

According to available sources, the first of what developed into a regular imposition of restrictions came in October 1951, with the Soviet presentation of a map which identified in geographical terms an area off-limits to USMLM tours.⁸⁶ This map specified "permanent restricted areas" that prohibited USMLM tours from traveling to within approximately 3 miles of the border all around the periphery of the Soviet zone.⁸⁷

Generally, PRAs were issued by GSFG and submitted by representatives of SERB to the USMLM Potsdam facility. PRA maps were not entirely "permanent," since they were often superseded by new issues that reapportioned restricted areas and lifted restrictions on areas formerly prohibited.⁸⁸ Rather than duration or even the frequency of new submissions, perhaps the most important factor was the location of imposed PRAs. Depicted as oval patches (gaining the nickname "goose eggs") PRAs were also used to cordon-off places of military installations, assembly areas, maneuver and training areas, and cantonment. PRAs restricted hundreds of square miles.⁸⁹

Although a PRA often "straddled important highway routes, causing effective blocks for the Western MLM," it did not prohibit travel on autobahns in the Soviet zone. USMLM tour teams were permitted to travel on autobahns in a PRA and were "allowed to stop and make observations *from* the autobahn even though in a restricted area."⁹⁰ Many of these conditions applied to the second form of restriction---the Temporary Restricted Area (TRA).

⁸⁶Lough, (1964), 46; Unit Histories 1979, E-10; 1980, E-5. Lough notes in passing that the US response was almost immediate, when in 1952 USAREUR "supposedly retaliated by imposing restrictions on the Soviet MLM in the US Zone." [Lough, (1964), 47.]

⁸⁷Lough, (1964), 46, 47.

⁸⁸Lough, (1964), 45. The PRA affecting the extent of the Soviet zonal border is one exception. This restriction was permanent throughout the entire period of USMLM operations.

⁸⁹According to Lough, the total area of the Soviet zone restricted in this manner approached 50% of the land at the height of PRA implementation during the early 1960s. [Lough, (1964), 51.]

⁹⁰Lough, (1964), 50, 51. Emphasis in original.

Temporary Restricted Area (TRA)

Like the PRA, the TRA was submitted in map form by SERB representatives to the USMLM Potsdam facility. According to Lough, a specific time interval to be in effect was noted on the TRA map. TRAs for USMLM were generally in effect for a few days up to several weeks.⁹¹ While the TRA retained protection of fixed and permanent installations, it often expanded a secured zone on an ad hoc basis, permitting flexibility.⁹²

Restricting areas similar to and often exceeding the scope of some PRAs, the TRA was normally used to link two or more PRAs for the purpose of cordoning-off large areas prior to the periodic maneuvers of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces. Further, TRAs were at times perceived by US and NATO authorities as a possible prelude to Brezhnev Doctrine type military action against a Warsaw Pact member or even the prelude to possible war against NATO:

In 1980, HQ GSFG levied four TRA for a total of 46 days. TRA were announced in March, June, August and November. The longest, lasting from 22 August through 14 September, was called to protect cantonment areas of Warsaw Pact nations during WAFFENBRUEDERSCHAFT-80. The TRA causing most concern was TRA-004, effective dates 30 November-09 December. The timing of the TRA and the location, covering virtually the entire GDR-Polish border, gave rise to speculation that its purpose was to cover movement of forces into Poland. In the event, no such movement occurred—much to the relief of all concerned.⁹³

Apart from the PRA and TRA, and their respective applications, the third and final restriction, the Mission Restriction Sign (MRS), was an ad hoc attempt to more or less "fill in the blanks."

⁹¹Lough, (1964), 45. In his memoirs, Colonel A.E. Schanze, CUSMLM 1952-1954, noted a much longer period of Soviet restriction for a TRA:

Several times a year the Russians would have field maneuvers. When this happened the Russians would furnish us with a marked map showing an area of maybe two hundred fifty square miles that would be prohibited to us and the dates, usually thirty to sixty days, of the prohibition. We carefully observed the restriction. (Schanze, 118.)

⁹²Unit Histories 1978, II-61; 1979, I-1.

⁹³Unit History 1980, I-1.

Mission Restriction Sign (MRS)

Unlike the PRA and TRA, no notification was given in the form of maps. According to available records, MRS signs began appearing in the Soviet zone in 1951.⁹⁴ They were erected on posts or buildings by Soviet and East German local commanders "to ban travel in the vicinity of or within installations and training areas."⁹⁵ This restriction applied to main roadways (except autobahns), secondary tributaries and off-road paths and terrain.

Initially, MRS signs posted in the Soviet zone were of dissimilar shapes, sizes and wording; and were enforced "sporadically" depending on the particular type of military activities or conditions the Soviets attempted to shield from USMLM surveillance.⁹⁶ In terms of scope, there is no available evidence with which to quantify MRS signs in recent years. However, it is noted in Lough 1964 that an inordinate increase occurred as part of an overall expansion of PRA and TRA restrictions during the period 1958-1961, "when the U.S. and the Soviets in a series of 'retaliations' issued each other's missions more and more restrictive maps."⁹⁷ As quoted in Lough 1964, a DCSI USAREUR study produced evidence of a renewed Soviet and East German effort to bolster counterintelligence against the USMLM:

Many old signs were replaced and new ones were added. Within three months, the USMLM, in conjunction with the British and the French, had plotted accurately 750 restrictive signs and estimated that another 500 existed. The new signs were uniform in size, shape, color and lettering, and obviously the result of centralized planning and execution.⁹⁸

⁹⁴There is presently no available evidence to determine the timing or extent of MRS applied in the US zone. According to Lough, the United States regularly disposed of PRAs, TRAs and records of MRS affecting SMLM when they became outdated. Yet, a record of restrictions placed on USMLM in the Soviet zone was carefully preserved.

⁹⁵Unit History 1967, 79.

⁹⁶Lough, (1964), 47.

⁹⁷Lough, (1964), iii, IV. Lough verified that a "quid pro quo" basis of responding to Soviet restrictions was at the time US policy. This resulted in a level of overall restriction neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wanted. See Lough, (1964), 52.

⁹⁸Lough, (1964), 47. The fact that DCSI, USAREUR prepared this report on behalf of the USMLM is in itself further evidence to suggest USMLM's role and position in the "intelligence community." In fact, as noted previously, DCSI USAREUR was the first step upward for the USMLM in the chain of command.

Taken in sum, the PRA, TRA and MRS measures employed by both the United States and Soviet Union to nullify MLM access and surveillance were effective in so far they were observed. In his often cited 1964 study, Thomas Lough summed-up the restrictions:

Many of the restricted areas imposed on both Soviet and Western MLMs are purely for political purposes and/or to harass them. In particular, the U.S. has long since run out of installations to put restricted areas around, and hence some of the PRAs contain nothing of interest; the situation with the Soviets may be similar in some cases. Then there is the practice of putting a restricted area over a portion of a main thoroughfare which is the only direct route between the points of interest. If a mission tour abides by the restriction it is forced to go many miles out of its way, using secondary roads, in getting from one point to the other. Again, even road construction signs have been used to harass and inconvenience the Western MLMs: normal traffic has been observed to be using the road and only the MLM car turned back.⁹⁹

Nevertheless, these restrictions in some cases actually served the intelligence operation they were designed to thwart. For example, a particular region designated by a TRA as off-limits to USMLM tours tended to "focus the attention of Allied Mission teams."¹⁰⁰ Regarding MRS, John Fahey, USMLM officer from 1960-1962, recalled that "many times new signs were valuable clues to aggressive American officers."¹⁰¹ Restrictions were indicators of activity that enabled USMLM tour teams to concentrate their surveillance efforts, looking for indications of movement of Soviet military forces in and out of the restricted areas. It is also likely that the sudden appearance of new restricted areas triggered heightened surveillance by US reconnaissance satellites and other clandestine intelligence sensors.

It is evident from the record of MLM tour activity that attempts to circumvent restrictions were regularly made by tour teams through direct violation of PRAs, TRAs and MRSs. In time these violations were considered standard operating procedures and were necessary to maintain an effective intelligence collection operation.¹⁰²

⁹⁹Lough, (1964), 52.

¹⁰⁰Unit History 1967, 54.

¹⁰¹John Fahey, "An Emotional Barrier for East Germans," Virginian-Pilot and the Ledger-Star, 24 December 1989, C3.

¹⁰²Confidential source.

According to former USMLM officer John Fahey, in the early 1960s PRAs were "more often than not" violated by US tour officers, as were "the thousands of restricted signs [MRS] which if honored in full, would have restricted tour teams to the immediate vicinity of West Berlin."¹⁰³ A more recent and somewhat remarkable statement made by CUSMLM Colonel Don Stovall in Unit History 1980 admitted to not only open violation of restrictions, but the use of MRS in "on-the-job" training:

The three [Western] Missions pursue a policy of selective violation of signs and of refusal to recognize--or discuss--their validity. MRS have in the past actually served as a training aid. USMLM policy once was that new tour officers were required for the first six months of their tour . . . without violating signs.¹⁰⁴ This exercise improved their knowledge of East German geography . . . as well as instilling in them the necessary traits of perseverance and ingenuity.¹⁰⁵

An indication of the disdain USMLM tour officers maintained toward MRS is found in a humorous but determined practice of "acquisitive touring," as explained by Stovall:

On occasion, the [Western] Missions have actively demonstrated their opposition to MRS. Within the writer's memory, there was a period when every tour was required to bring back a sign, frequently a specific sign. As a result of this and similar actions, MRS have acquired a definite souvenir value within the Mission: Almost every tour type [tour officer], past and present, has an MRS in mint condition displayed prominently somewhere in his home.¹⁰⁶

The PRA, TRA and MRS restrictions were part of the overall effort of both US and Soviet security forces to systematize a counterintelligence response to touring. For USMLM personnel, the occasional circumvention of these restrictions, necessary for the intelligence mission, was often met with a rather malignant (perhaps warranted) Soviet response; ranging from annoying yet somewhat benign harassment, to serious incidents and detention of USMLM personnel. But for the Soviets, this behavior was basic to their approach to MLM activity in East Germany. It

¹⁰³Fahey, "An Emotional Barrier for East Germans," 24 December 1989.

¹⁰⁴The present author regrets that ellipses will have to suffice for this gap in the text; caused by FOI withholding provisions.

¹⁰⁵Unit History 1980, E-8.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.* Perhaps this explains a statement found in Unit History 1976, VI-4, which notes: "while Mission Restriction Signs still abound throughout the GDR, more have disappeared than have been added."

was not only the result of Western violation of Soviet restrictions or the terms of Huebner Malinin. Soviet attempts to disrupt USMLM tour teams was the inimical behavior that would become the overall characterization of US-Soviet liaison in postwar Germany.

Soviet Response to USMLM Touring

Harassment

Soviet and East German efforts included tailing, high speed chases, and road blockades.¹⁰⁷ In general, these forms of harassment occurred with or without cause. Harassment existed for its own sake. But it also should be underscored that these methods of harassment were outright violations of provision 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

In provision 10, escorting MLM teams or forcibly impeding the mobility of a team by road blockades "except in areas of disposition of military units, etc." was prohibited. Here, tailing was viewed by the USMLM as a form of escort, and road blockades a clear hindrance to USMLM free travel "over roads and territory." Of course, harassment enacted against a USMLM team and the subsequent violation of Huebner-Malinin was at times a response to the team's own violation of Huebner-Malinin and Soviet restrictions on intrusive intelligence collection; "pushing the limit of travel rights" and testing the fine line which separated overt collection from espionage.

Other aspects to harassment included the use by the Soviets of unmarked, high performance automobiles and "aggressive surveillance tactics;" both containing elements that cloaked their counterintelligence and reflected their willingness to challenge USMLM intelligence operations. Subsequent protests by CUSMLM to Soviet zonal authorities that such

¹⁰⁷The meaning of this informal term is "to follow and keep under surveillance." Harassment came from Soviet and East German security personnel, although that level of East German involvement was protested by the US and viewed as a direct violation of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. The MLM exchange was strictly US-Soviet. The USMLM tour personnel ignored the East German presence when possible. Yet, both the US and Soviet Union used German security personnel for support functions, i.e., building guards and posts at entry-exit check points; a usage neither permitted nor prohibited by Huebner-Malinin. Before 1974 the GDR was viewed by the US as an illegitimate state and the inherent contradictions were evident concerning the existence of MLMs and German sovereignty. The ramifications to USMLM operations in the GDR were important factors early in the US-Soviet exchange of Missions:

counterintelligence violated Huebner-Malinin were common.¹⁰⁸ The existence of a "behavioral custom"—that USMLM tour teams were harassed by Soviet or East German security personnel, and that the manner of this harassment consisted of the usual intimidation followed by mutual recriminations—was developed over time by the ambiguity of certain provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. It was also intensified by the adversarial postwar relationship focused on Germany; where there was great potential that such activity could lead to a more direct and serious form of routine counterintelligence, referred to in this context as the incident.

Incidents

An "incident" can be defined as an intended or actual use of physical force against a USMLM tour team by Soviet or East German personnel. Incidents became a common, unavoidable part of operations. The incident existed when harassment ceased to be "discreet surveillance."

The most frequent incidents were car ramming and shootings, when Soviet or East German personnel used their vehicle to force a USMLM tour team off of a roadway or fired their

Recognition of German civil authority in the Soviet zone threatened to invalidate the basic concept under which USMLM privileges and responsibilities had been formulated. When political, economic and police powers were granted to Germans it became essential that none of these developments should be interpreted as applying to Allied liaison mission operations. Informal but effective Russian assurances were demanded on every occasion when East Germans, through ignorance or by design, attempted to interfere with the activities of USMLM authorized by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. (Skowronek, 74-75).

The exchange of MLMs as described in Huebner-Malinin was a US-Soviet military matter that had no relationship to German political developments. Throughout MLM operations, every effort was made to exclude official German personnel from any involvement with the postwar occupational liaison arrangement. Soviet attempts to coerce US recognition of the GDR by obstructing or otherwise manipulating rescue operations and the USMLM's performance of the representational role, were only occasional events. And overall, neither the US nor Soviet commanders ever seriously considered relinquishing any control of Mission affairs to German authorities. Noting Skowronek:

The question of whether East Germany was a Soviet military occupation zone or a sovereign state was vital to the very existence of USMLM, inasmuch as the Huebner-Malinin Agreement was an exclusively U.S.-Soviet understanding, with no allowance for East German participation. However, despite Russian pretenses of treating the GDR as an independent national entity, in matters affecting USMLM no obvious changes were made, and mission support and freedom of travel guarantees continued to be a Soviet responsibility. As the only American representation in this unrecognized country, USMLM assumed functions much more significant than that of being a military communication channel. Its daily operations tested the willingness of the Russians to live up to their commitments. (Skowronek, 79-80).

Yet, in some instances the use of the USMLM as a diplomatic representative to the GDR was required due to selective Soviet deferral of their responsibilities to facilitate the representational matters which were legitimate concerns of the USMLM personnel and the US government. Clearly, the USMLM was part of the political competition that centered on postwar Germany.

¹⁰⁸Unit History 1967, 138.

weapons (usually in warning) at a tour team when it penetrated a restricted area or otherwise encroached upon what the Soviets viewed as a sensitive activity.¹⁰⁹

Customarily, an incident occurred in the following three stages: 1) intrusive USMLM intelligence collection in direct or implied violation of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement or Soviet restrictions (real or perceived), followed by; 2) the USMLM tour team's attempt to escape from the scene with collected intelligence, leading to; 3) pursuit by Soviet counterintelligence in an attempt to end USMLM intelligence collection and possibly detain the tour team. In short, a USMLM tour team's catch-as-catch-can operating procedure often led to a kindred catch-if-catch-can challenge to the Soviet pursuer. In the event that a tour team's evasion was unsuccessful, the Soviet security personnel transported the apprehended USMLM tour team to a local Soviet command post for interrogation and accusations of espionage. This variety of Soviet response to USMLM intelligence collection was referred to as detentions.

Detentions

It is recalled that USMLM tour teams were often apprehended while surveying Soviet intelligence targets or when fleeing a scene after being detected by Soviet or GDR personnel. To be detained, one had to be caught and apprehended. This happened as a result of road blockades, being forced off of the road, mechanical breakdown of the tour vehicle, or by being arrested while on foot in the vicinity of an installation or other sensitive intelligence target.¹¹⁰ The natural environment also hindered the movement of tour teams and caused detentions. Inclement weather constrained the mobility of even the most rugged and maneuverable tour vehicles. The USMLM vehicles simply became stuck near Soviet military activities due to

¹⁰⁹See appendix for comprehensive listing of "incidents" as defined at the USMLM. This data, which also explains the occasional detention of a tour team, clearly illustrates the type of intelligence targets pursued by USMLM tour teams, their intrusive intent, and the typical Soviet response which, viewed over an expanse of time, denotes routinization and tacit acceptance of certain "rules of the game." This element to MLM operations will be discussed in the concluding section to this study.

¹¹⁰Unit History 1967, 82.

snow or the added difficulty involved in following tanks and heavy armor which, combined with the snow, tore-up roads and terrain and caused poor trafficability.¹¹¹

Summarizing the issue of detentions, Colonel Paul G. Skowronek offers a revealing overview of intelligence-counterintelligence.¹¹²

Most opportunities to deal with Russians occurred in the course of the two-day observation trips made by mission teams to provide continuous Soviet zone coverage throughout the year.¹¹³ To collect useful information about the status of Russian military activity, liaison teams had to travel close enough to troop concentrations and training exercises for accurate observations.¹¹⁴ Russian guards, military police and traffic control personnel, strictly indoctrinated on security, frequently attempted to halt USMLM vehicles, thereby limiting liaison probing efforts. When mission vehicles were successfully halted, usually by use of a well-conducted road blockade, the USMLM officers would be escorted to the nearest Soviet commandant and accused of unauthorized activity. After a long discussion in Russian about mission travel freedom, as authorized by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, the charge of violating military security was generally dropped, with a warning not to push the agreement provisions too far.¹¹⁵ These discussions could last from an hour to more than twenty-four hours, depending on how seriously involved either side had become. If, for instance, a liaison vehicle had failed to comply with an armed sentry's order to halt, and the sentry had to fire a warning shot, the Russian commandant would take considerable time to justify the shooting. This meant that a detailed investigation of the circumstances would be undertaken to prove the charge of trespassing. However, those instances where the investigation and detention lasted overnight were exceptional. For such occasions, each liaison team carried food for a minimum of two days, to be able to cope with long detentions. When a team was being detained longer than seem justified, they requested the Russian commandant to notify USMLM headquarters, whereupon the Mission Chief would come to the detention site to help negotiate a satisfactory settlement. These incidents, while they were sometimes hazardous, and often exasperating, were nevertheless in themselves useful in gaining personal impressions¹¹⁶ of the Soviet military establishment.

Even though touring became the primary function of the USMLM, the officially stated purpose of USMLM operations---Liaison---was an important activity that also provided opportunities for intelligence collection.

¹¹¹Unit History 1964, 22.

¹¹²Skowronek, 188-189.

¹¹³This is more evidence that "liaison" as officially defined was only peripheral in both frequency and intelligence value.

¹¹⁴Violation of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and Soviet restrictions "unavoidable" as a matter of course.

¹¹⁵Inferred here is a tacit acceptance of USMLM operating procedures.

¹¹⁶Biographical Intelligence.

CHAPTER 4

LIAISON

Liaison services, primarily CinC to CinC communication, were indicative of the USMLM's quasi-diplomatic role as documented and prescribed in the founding agreements. As with most diplomatic elements, some liaison activities were particularly useful for collecting intelligence, and were indeed exploited to the fullest to serve that purpose. They included: (1) the collection of biographical intelligence; (2) communication and coordination with the British and French MLMs; (3) representation of US military personnel or American nationals known to be lost, injured or detained in the Soviet zone; and (4) search-rescue-recovery operations for crashed NATO or Western aircraft.

Biographical Intelligence

Biographical intelligence is "foreign intelligence on the views, traits, habits, skills, importance, relationships, health, and curriculum vitae of those foreign personalities of actual or potential interest to the United States Government."¹¹⁷ A comprehensive listing of the objectives served by the USMLM's "program of representational and liaison social activities" clearly demonstrates the windfalls that were deliberately sought through such contact:

- (1) Enhancement of the spirit of Tri-Mission operational cooperation through the development of binding social associations among members of the U.S., British and French Military Liaison Missions, to include counterpart personnel of all ranks.
- (2) Establishment of an atmosphere of professional respect and social amenity between USMLM liaison personnel and their Soviet counterparts *in order to facilitate conditions that serve USMLM's operational and liaison interests.*
- (3) Provides an opportunity for senior US and Soviet military officers to meet in a social atmosphere . . .¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷Carl, 180.

¹¹⁸The remainder of this objective remains CLASSIFIED and was not released to the author.

(4) Exercise of official rights of access to the official USMLM residence in Potsdam in accordance with established patterns that demonstrate U.S. intentions to make advantageous use of opportunities afforded by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.¹¹⁹

A general synopsis found in Unit History 1975 emphasizes the main activities which, despite short lapses due to Cold War wrangling, characterize the temperament of most biographical intelligence forums at the USMLM:

Several large social functions are held at the Potsdam Mission House each year. These functions include a celebration of the joint anniversaries of the meeting of U.S. and Soviet Forces at Torgau in 1945 and the establishment of USMLM in 1947; an Independence Day picnic; and a Thanksgiving Day dinner. The largest function by far is the Independence Day picnic, hosted by USMLM annually on the third of July. Between 350 and 500 Soviet, French, British, and American guests are invited. An informal atmosphere prevails, and there is opportunity for the guests to become better acquainted through the games [volleyball was the favorite sport, with the Soviet officers taking home the gold most of the time] and festivities planned.¹²⁰

There were also highly valued opportunities to meet with and exchange social amenities with Warsaw Pact military attachés. Citing a 1974 Unit History:

On 4 December, St. Barbara's Day was celebrated with a stag buffet supper. The evening began with toasts to the patron saint of Artillery with Artillery Punch and ended with a showing of a U.S. training film on artillery. For the first time, the Polish and Czech Military Missions in West Berlin were represented at a USMLM function in Potsdam.¹²¹

Warsaw Pact-sponsored social events also provided opportunities. At the Czech Army Day Reception of 1975, DCUSMLM was in attendance and reported on the Soviet officers who also participated in the event. Writing in the Unit History for 1975, CUSMLM Colonel Peter L. Thorsen noted that "the evening was very valuable in obtaining considerable biographic data on the two LTG's [Lieutenant Generals] and their wives and on LTC [Lieutenant Colonel] and Mrs. Shatov, all of whom had previously been unknown to USMLM."¹²²

Impressions regarding strategic issues as viewed by Warsaw Pact representatives were also obtained. Colonel Don Stovall, CUSMLM during 1980, noted such an occasion:

¹¹⁹Unit Histories 1982, 63; 1983, 57. Emphasis added..

¹²⁰Unit History 1975, 76.

¹²¹Unit History 1974, 10.

¹²²Unit History 1975, 67.

CUSMLM attended a luncheon with the Polish Military Attaché to West Berlin, COL Moraczewski, on 11 DEC at 1200A hours, at the KHRAKOV Polish restaurant at 14 Nuerenburger Strass. The purpose of the invitation to CUSMLM was probably so that COL Moraczewski could further dispel any fear in his mind that the Soviets were soon to invade Poland. Several times during the luncheon he remarked that he had been told by several "other Western sources" that, in their opinion, the Soviets would not invade Poland in the foreseeable future. When CUSMLM was asked for his personal opinion, he stated that he also believed that the Soviets would not invade Poland right now, but that an invasion at some time in the future was possible since the Soviet leadership was clearly on the horns of a dilemma—a crack in the Soviet system had developed in Poland and that crack could not be permitted to widen, but that a Soviet invasion would certainly be a tragic course of events for all. At this point, Moraczewski stated that the Polish Army would certainly fight hard, if the Soviets did invade and that if anyone did not understand that, that meant they had no knowledge of the Polish people and of Polish history. The Polish Attaché continues to be outspoken about his belief, and this assignment at USMLM continues to be a unique one.¹²³

The annual "Torgau Party"¹²⁴ was another event which prompted openness and cooperation—a residue of a shared victory in defeating Germany in 1945. Of note:

The senior Soviet officials remarked repeatedly on the importance of good U.S.-Soviet relations and expressed the hope to see a CinC to CinC visit in the near future. With the extremely relaxed and cordial atmosphere, the Soviets proved to be personable and quite willing to trade anecdotes about themselves and military life in general.¹²⁵

Coupled with routine observations throughout East Berlin and the Soviet zone, repeated administrative and social contacts gave USMLM officers the opportunity to form impressions of the "morale supporting activities" in GSFG. This included regulations governing the placement and disposition of Soviet dependents, housing conditions and supply provisions.

Support/recreational facilities to be used by GSFG personnel and their dependents constituted military exchange stores, officers' clubs, enlisted men clubs, recreation centers, dependent schools, a radio network and bus service.¹²⁶

¹²³Unit History 1980, III-51.

¹²⁴This annual social activity commemorates the first meeting of US and Soviet soldiers near the German town of Torgau on the Elbe River during the closing days of World War II.

¹²⁵Unit History 1976, III-8.

¹²⁶Unit History 1970, 38.

It is interesting to speculate to what degree, if at all, the social venue induced discussion of what must have been understood by all as the primary focus of the MLMs--intelligence collection. Indeed, it is one of the seeming oddities of diplomacy that the subterfuge practiced in the field is often matched by pretense rehearsed at the banquet table. Here, the record indicates that on some social occasions Soviet references to ground operations were made, albeit to the discomfort of the addressed USMLM officer. An entry of the USMLM Unit History for 1978 details one humorous instance as experienced by CUSMLM while attending the yearly Soviet Army/Navy Day celebration held at HQ, Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt, West Germany:

At the invitation of COL Gladkov, CSMLM-F, COL Stovall and MAJ Kosevich attended the 23 FEB celebration at the Soviet Mission House in FRANKFURT. MG Groves, MG Dillard and a number of other officers from HEIDELBERG and STUTTGART were also in attendance. COL Gladkov's conversation with CUSMLM did not vary appreciably from those in the past: "Are you satisfied with your progress?" "Are you having good fortune?" "How is the hunting?" Questions requiring neither explanation nor answer!¹²⁷

Allied Communication

A coordinated, more efficient intelligence operation was gained from regular meetings between the Chiefs of USMLM, BRIXMIS and FMLM.¹²⁸ Neither sanctioned nor prohibited under the terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, mutual support from the other Western MLMs was a crucial element of these operations. Of note is the following passage from the Unit History for 1976: "with the continued support of our allied counterpart Missions, our consumers can properly anticipate that the quality of service and responsiveness will not diminish."¹²⁹

¹²⁷Unit History 1978, III-34. Apparently, it was evident to CUSMLM that the Soviet Colonel's inquiry was a specific reference to mobile ground intelligence operations, and that inferences of this kind were not to be acknowledged or discussed at social gatherings.

¹²⁸Unit History 1965, 22. Also corroborated by confidential source.

¹²⁹Unit History 1976, I-3. This is a very telling comment. In Intelligence jargon, "consumers" refers to "intelligence consumers," which means that USMLM was an "intelligence producer."

Also, the USMLM briefed several hundred official visitors each year at USMLM Berlin HQ. These included

major commanders, Congressional committee staff members, theater and national level staff members and working groups. Useful interchanges of information and opinion resulted from these visits; USMLM was advised as to commanders' and senior staffs' needs and requirements and provided an honest and complete appraisal of its capabilities and limitations.¹³⁰

The USMLM officers engaged in two additional categories of liaison that required travel in the Soviet zone. The first of these was the representation of nationals as stipulated in provision 14b of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. The second concerned the use of USMLM personnel as quasi-diplomatic representatives of the United States in East Germany. Interrelated to some degree, both forms of liaison provided intelligence windfalls.

Representation

The text of Huebner-Malinin provided USMLM with the following rights:

to engage in matters protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly, as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.¹³¹

Given the security issues and political disposition of occupied Germany, the job of representing nationals and rendering aid and assistance was no small matter. Simply the number of episodes was daunting, and required a certain level of amiability in the US-Soviet association. As

Colonel A. E. Schanze recalled in his memoir:

There were literally hundreds of occasions when American or European tourists driving the ninety-six miles from Helmstedt to Berlin wandered off the road. They ended up in an East German Police office.

It was very necessary for the Mission to be able to help these people without delay. Friendly access to the Soviet Headquarters day or night was a necessity in the four years that followed the Berlin Air Lift.¹³²

¹³⁰Unit Histories 1978, III-1; 1980, III-1.

¹³¹Huebner-Malinin Agreement, provision 14b.

¹³²Schanze, 109.

Each was an opportunity to gather valuable impressions and information from contact with Soviet and East German officials, military personnel and civilians. Further, any opportunity to travel into the Soviet zone in performance of liaison services accorded to USMLM officers still another opportunity to observe the area and collect information. "Mission personnel were constantly on alert for situations which could be used as a basis for trips into various parts of East Germany."¹³³

In 1965, for example, the CUSMLM visited an American teenager hospitalized in East Germany following a motorcycle accident. The hospital was near a "sensitive army installation," and, consequently, CUSMLM was required to have a Soviet escort.¹³⁴ Nonetheless, the transit provided valuable information regarding roadway patterns and a sense for the general lay of the land, as well as the quality of East German health care to be observed while visiting the patient.

Another occasion involved a young American musician who became ill while performing in Dresden, East Germany.¹³⁵ The original notification of the incident came from a USMLM "reconnaissance officer" who, while lodging at Dresden, was approached by an East German doctor and told of the injured American.¹³⁶ After the matter had been communicated to Potsdam House, each day the CUSMLM traveled unhindered to the Dresden hospital bringing "fresh fruit, American cigarettes and instant coffee."¹³⁷

¹³³Skowronek, 145.

¹³⁴Ibid., 141.

¹³⁵Ibid., 143, 144.

¹³⁶Unit History 1964, 11.

¹³⁷Skowronek, 145; Unit History 1964, 12.

Search, Rescue and Recovery

In conformity with provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, USMLM personnel were dispatched to investigate reports of lost or downed Western aircraft, and render any assistance that may be required concerning the condition and recovery of persons and equipment.

Postwar Germany was characterized by heavy air travel within occupational zones and between airfields in Western zones and West Berlin. Unavoidably, a few military and civilian aircraft crashed or were forced down after crossing over zonal boundaries or straying out of the established air corridors. When that happened, USMLM tour teams were dispatched to investigate, rescue survivors and, of course, exploit any opportunities to collect intelligence.

On 15 November 1966 a Pan American cargo aircraft "crashed in the Soviet Zone in the Dallgow Krampnitz [Soviet military] training area near Potsdam killing the three crewmen."¹³⁸ After receiving a report of the missing aircraft "from a Berlin Command, State Department officer at 0330 hours," CUSMLM organized two Search Rescue and Recovery (SRR) teams. The teams consisted of a driver plus one Army and one Air Force officer, each a trained Russian-German linguist.¹³⁹

In 1964 two SRR teams were immediately dispatched to the crash site of an American RB-66 reconnaissance aircraft; an event that also highlighted the conflict between vying applications of Huebner-Malinin provisions. When CUSMLM contacted the acting CSERB shortly after deploying the two SRR teams, the Soviet Commander "warned that the USMLM officers should not violate the PRA [Permanent Restricted Area] and TRA [Temporary Restricted Area] then in effect in the area in question." To this CUSMLM merely informed CSERB of the dispatched SRR teams and "expected the Soviets to assist those teams in getting to the crash wherever it might be."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸Unit History 1966, 30.

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰Unit History 1964, 15.

This indicates once again the conflict brought on by ambiguous provisions in the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. While provision 14b permitted rights of representation to USMLM in such incidents, provision 10 prohibited their access to places of military disposition. Thus, USMLM had a right to engage in SRR operations, but in the Soviet view, this did not mean *carte blanche* throughout the Soviet zone, especially in sensitive areas. As noted by Colonel Skowronek, both USMLM SRR teams and Soviet counterintelligence personnel were well aware of the intelligence windfalls gained from entering and surveying restricted areas while under the legitimate banner of SRR operations.¹⁴¹

That night the first USMLM search team drove through maneuvering elements of two Soviet Army divisions in the TRA and PRA and recovered samples of chaff dropped from the downed aircraft. The team came to within 300 yards of the crash site at about 0600 hours when it was effectively blocked on a narrow trail and apprehended by Soviet troops in two armored personnel carriers. The team was escorted under armed guard from the area to the Soviet Kommandatura at Gardelegen. The second USMLM search team proceeded to the area and talked with a German national who pointed out the crash site, but the team was stopped at about 0315 hours by a Soviet security detachment in an armored vehicle. The Soviet troops were very angry and aggressive. A Soviet lieutenant colonel ordered his troops to hook a tow bar from a Soviet truck to the USMLM vehicle and towed it to the Kommandatura at Gardelegen. The third search team departed Berlin on the morning of 11 March and arrived at the crash site about noon. The team was pursued and fired upon by Soviet troops and forced to stop. They were then escorted to the Gardelegen Kommandatura . . .

On 12 March at about 0100 hours all three USMLM search teams returned to Berlin after having been ejected from the TRA and surveilled from Gardelegen to Potsdam.¹⁴²

Such obstruction attended SRR operations throughout the span of USMLM service and led to the development of methods to infiltrate restricted areas. During the Pan American cargo aircraft incident, in an effort to penetrate the Dallgow-Krampnitz Soviet training area to reach the point of the suspected crash site, CUSMLM and DCUSMLM "drove along the southern border of the training area to verify Soviet and East German roadblocks and to divert attention from the other [SRR] team."¹⁴³ A similar method of "running interference" was used during the recovery

¹⁴¹Skowronek, 145, 178, 179.

¹⁴²Unit History 1964, 16. This passage is an obvious example of documented intelligence collection by the USMLM personnel.

¹⁴³Unit History 1966, 32.

of a crashed aircraft in 1964, when two SRR teams approached the crash site from different positions in an attempt to split Soviet and East German attention.¹⁴⁴ Then, one of these SRR teams continued to avoid surveillance "by driving three miles cross-country without lights to a location from which the crash site could be observed in the moonlight."¹⁴⁵ This maneuver proved to be effective, as the team photographed Soviet vehicles and many Soviet personnel at the crash site. The success of this surveillance was realized when the photographs were later presented to SERB along with a protest.¹⁴⁶

To summarize USMLM operations, touring the Soviet zone was the main activity and liaison was the secondary function for the USMLM personnel. Although the CUSMLM and his Deputy probably spent most of their time performing liaison with Soviet authorities and generally administering USMLM operations, 90 percent of all activity by the remaining personnel was touring.¹⁴⁷

By all available accounts, an extraordinary process was underway, not long after inception of the US-Soviet MLM exchange in 1947, to collect intelligence on a wide array of both military and non-military targets--an effective effort that was aided by ambiguous language found in the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and indicated by the Soviet counterintelligence response to USMLM touring.

In the process of fulfilling its role, the USMLM administered key services for the United States government. To conclude this thesis, a review of these services--those which fall within the purview of military intelligence, and others that suggest a larger, perhaps influential role--will identify unfamiliar paths to be taken for further research regarding the

¹⁴⁴Unit History 1964, 13.

¹⁴⁵Ibid. Once again the value of provision 10 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement sanctioning travel over roads and *territory* is noted, although a moot point in the Soviet point of view in their zone.

¹⁴⁶Unit History 1964, 14. During SRR operations, Soviet obstruction was viewed by the US as illegitimate and in violation of Huebner-Malinin provisions, just as SRR operations were often viewed by Soviet security elements as inappropriate intelligence gathering in violation of those same provisions.

¹⁴⁷This figure was provided by a confidential source.

USMLM and the MLM system. Findings will likely demonstrate a fundamental role for the USMLM and intelligence during the cold war, and perhaps counsel for an appropriate use of intelligence in the post-cold war conduct of states.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The USMLM was front and center in assessing and managing many of the threats to US national security that were experienced during the cold war. Within or beyond the roles of military intelligence, the USMLM was able to assist in managing to one degree or another various crises and facilitate important initiatives in East-West dialogue.

On 7 June 1958, a routine search-rescue-recovery investigation of a crashed US aircraft in the Soviet zone eventually induced the CUSMLM, Colonel Robert P. McQuail, to become the first official diplomatic contact between the United States and the German Democratic Republic.¹⁴⁸ The affair was an unusually advanced application of the USMLM's quasi-diplomatic role as a military mission.

As Allied aircraft were attempting to break the Berlin Blockade of 1948, USMLM teams "traveled freely to and from Berlin and rendered valuable service in recovering people and equipment from crashed aircraft in the air corridors during the airlift."¹⁴⁹ Also, despite the unwelcome onset of Soviet PRAs, TRAs, and MRSs that were imposed since 1951, USMLM personnel were able to observe conditions and events in East Berlin and throughout East Germany during a significant anti-Communist uprising and subsequent labor riots in June 1953. USMLM teams traveled to the East German city of Halle and "reported seeing fires and heavy Soviet troop concentrations."¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸Harry Gilroy, "East Germans Hold 9 on U.S. Helicopter," New York Times, 9 June 1958, sec. 1, 1. "East German Aide Rebuffs U.S. Move," New York Times, 15 June 1958, sec. 1, 12.

¹⁴⁹Thomas S. Lough, "The Military Liaison Missions in Germany," Journal of Conflict Resolution 11 (1967): 261.

¹⁵⁰"Russians Lay Riots in Berlin to West; U.S. Issues Denial," New York Times, 21 June 1953, sec. 1, p. 1, 20.

Events immediately preceding the Soviet and East German construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 indicate the importance of USMLM intelligence. According to John A. Fahey who was USMLM tour officer at the time, "continuing [military liaison] mission reports were submitted about the increased tightening of East German security around Berlin each weekend in July and August before the Wall's erection on August 13."¹⁵¹ Fahey notes that "mission patrols were practically waiting at the gates" between East and West Berlin. USMLM teams were the first to detect and follow Soviet tank movements to the border during the evening of 12 August 1961 which were designed to secure key locations for the construction of the wall.

The detection and reporting of Soviet preparations for constructing the wall was the responsibility of military intelligence. Given the tension regarding Berlin, this form of early warning information was important and valuable. According to Colonel Ernest von Pawel, CUSMLM during the Berlin Wall Crisis, "it was a high priority of my job as a reporter of raw information gained from overt observation during reconnaissance in East Germany to obtain information confirming or denying evidence of any preparations to build a Wall."¹⁵²

Within a week of the wall's construction, US troop reinforcements were sent through the Soviet zone by convoy along the 110-mile Helmstedt autobahn connecting the US zone with West Berlin. USMLM personnel, among them former tour officer John A. Fahey, were dispatched along the convoy's route with the task of reporting any attempt by the Soviets or East Germans to harass or in any way interfere with the US battle group.¹⁵³ No other US

¹⁵¹John A. Fahey, "An Emotional Barrier for East Germans," review of *Wall*, by Peter Wyden, *Virginian-Pilot and the Ledger-Star*, 24 December 1989, C3.

¹⁵²Honore M. Catudal, *Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis* (Berlin: Verlag, 1980), 126. An attempt to explain the seeming failure of Western intelligence to detect preparations for and the actual building of the wall by the Soviets and East Germans is cited in Catudal's analysis. Material for the wall was not missed by USMLM tour teams during the shipments that were thought to have been made using the autobahns across East Germany into East Berlin. Rather, materials for the wall were cleverly stored at and taken from military barracks and construction sites in East Berlin. Concerning the inability to observe the actual construction, Catudal cites Colonel von Pawel that, as far as the USMLM was concerned, its operations occurred primarily in East Germany rather than in East Berlin. G-2 elements were to survey East Berlin. *Ibid.*, 236.

¹⁵³"U.S. Troops' Trip Is Trouble-Free," *New York Times*, 21 August 1961, sec. 1, p. 3. The battle group arrived in West Berlin without incident.

military, security, or intelligence unit had such open access, much less the legal right enjoyed by the USMLM to travel in the Soviet zone. When not under severe Soviet restrictions, the USMLM tour teams were able to provide "reassuring information at a time when it was critically needed."¹⁵⁴ As noted by Thomas S. Lough, not only the USMLM, but the intelligence function of all Western MLMs and the Soviet MLMs in West Germany was advantageous during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. All MLMs "were active in determining whether or not there would be repercussions in Germany" regarding the US-Soviet stand-off.¹⁵⁵

But unusual restrictions, such as the barring of tour teams to border areas or confining teams to their Mission residence, were often valuable indications of possible military maneuvers or military action for the purpose of invasion or political intimidation. Interference with a military intelligence unit's role of providing early warning is itself a "warning" indicator. Examples are the restrictions placed on the USMLM and other Western MLMs by the Soviets several months prior to the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.¹⁵⁶

Routine surveillance of East Germany by the USMLM tour teams at times served to help verify Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. A news report, for example, stated the following in the Spring of 1990:

U.S. military intelligence agents have photographed Soviet-made SS-23 missiles that were deployed in East Germany in apparent violation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty, Bush administration officials said yesterday.

The Short-range nuclear missiles, bearing East German military markings, were spotted last week by members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, an Army observer team, said officials who spoke on condition of anonymity.

U.S. Army officers touring the area photographed six SS-23 launchers and 12 missiles along a route traveled frequently by MLM officers.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴Lough, (1967), 261.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶"Travel Ban Is Kept By East Germany," New York Times, 21 May 1968, sec. 1, p. 5.

¹⁵⁷Bill Gertz, "Soviet Missiles in East Germany May Violate Treaty," The Washington Times, 6 March 1990, A3.

Use of the USMLM or the other MLMs in this way does not, strictly speaking, make them arms control measures. This "arms control" product of the USMLM, noted in the example above, falls entirely within the roles outlined for military intelligence. Yet, there are similarities and overlapping in the Intelligence/Arms Control relationship worth noting.

Essentially, intelligence provides support for arms control in the manner of collecting information on the military capabilities and intentions of a party to an arms control negotiation. This information is used prior to, during, and following, negotiations. Accurate and precise information on the number and strength of military equipment and forces is basic to the preparation of an arms control proposal. During arms control negotiations, intelligence units are needed to survey the activity of the other party to detect gradual or sudden changes in deployments, the use of current weapons, and the design and deployment of new systems. After an agreement has been reached, information collected by intelligence units is used to assist governments in their policy determinations that there is compliance with the terms of the agreement. In sum, intelligence is used to support the preparation of an arms control proposal and to monitor verification.¹⁵⁸ The elements to intelligence support of arms control include:

- Balancing military capabilities by identifying and assessing weapons systems.
- Assessing command and control, refire capability, and potential for surprise attack.
- Counting order-of-battle and "watching military deployment."¹⁵⁹

Technically, arms control measures are either part of a negotiated arms control agreement, or they are stand-alone devices usually referred to as "confidence building measures" (CBM) and can be formed by separate agreements. Examples of the former include the "associate measures" in the stalled Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks during the 1970s; and verification protocols in the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) treaty, Intermediate-range

¹⁵⁸See Thomas J. Hirschfeld, ed., Intelligence and Arms Control: A Marriage of Convenience (Austin, Texas: Texas Monthly Press, 1987).

¹⁵⁹Inman, 46.

Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) accord, and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.

Examples of confidence building measures are found in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. As noted by analyst Johan Jorgen Holst, CBM can be conceptually arranged in two basic classes: 1) those which inhibit "the political exploitation of military force; and 2) those which "reduce the danger of surprise attack."¹⁶⁰ These include the prior notification of military maneuvers and movements, fixed ground control posts, and mobile ground surveillance teams.

The last of these has been given special attention by many arms control analysts and has been linked to the USMLM. Of note is the statement by Michael Krepon who identifies benefits of an MLM-like CBM:

Routine observation on the ground by foreign military officials can contribute to a stable European environment by increasing the transparency of military activities and by picking up indications of unusual military preparations.¹⁶¹

Observation by mobile ground surveillance teams is termed *monitoring* in arms control literature. Monitoring involves the "collection, exploitation, analysis, and reporting of information on Soviet activities covered by arms control treaty limitations,"¹⁶² Here, the roles of a mobile ground surveillance team and the roles of a military intelligence unit such as the USMLM are more than analogous. Whereas the mobile ground surveillance team has been proposed (and incidentally never fully operationalized) for the role noted above, "monitoring" activity is in fact an ongoing service provided by intelligence instruments, whether or not an arms control agreement exists. Indeed, as the USMLM experience indicates, it is a particularly valuable function in the absence of arms control measures, i.e., mobile ground surveillance teams.

¹⁶⁰Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," 25 Survival (January/February 1983), 3.

¹⁶¹Michael Krepon, "Verification of Conventional Arms Reductions," 30 Survival (November/December 1988): 546.

¹⁶²Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Support to Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 7.

There have been several references in the arms control literature that have singled out the USMLM or the MLM system in occupied Germany as an access measure, i.e., a mobile ground surveillance unit to verify compliance with agreements, or as a channel of communication for East-West dialogue emphasizing the quasi-diplomatic function of the military mission.¹⁶³ These sources suggest that the USMLM as an intelligence instrument could either be *directly* applied as part of an arms control agreement's monitoring protocol, or that a *model* based on the USMLM experience could be developed for use in such a system or as a stand-alone CBM.

All of this suggests that it is more consistent with the facts to inquire about the impact of the MLM system on arms control, rather than construct a banal comparison of the two or attempt to "euphemize" the MLM system by ascertaining the extent to which it was the functional equivalent to certain arms control measures—measures that were devised in the wake of tried and tested intelligence instruments. Accordingly, it can be demonstrated that an arms control measure—the mobile ground surveillance team proposed in the late 1950s as an early warning or "confidence building" measure—was the functional equivalent to the USMLM. In fact, the evidence supports the proposition that, due to its proven effectiveness,

¹⁶³See for example: John Borawski, "Practical Steps for Building Confidence in Europe," *Arms Control Today* 18 (March 1988): 17-18. Kurt M. Campbell, "The Future of 'Military Diplomacy' in US-Soviet Relations," [photocopy]. Provided by Alexander George, meeting with author, The United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., Spring 1990. Kurt M. Campbell, "The Soldiers' Summit," *Foreign Policy* 75 (Summer 1989): 79. Richard E. Darilek, "The Theory of Confidence-Building Measures," in *The De-escalation of Nuclear Crises*, ed. Joseph E. Nation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 16-17. John A. Fahey and Philip S. Gillette, *Military Liaisons Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact* (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1988). John R. Galvin, "The NATO Alliance: A Framework for Security," *The Washington Quarterly* 12 (Winter 1989): 85. Jim E. Hinds, "The Limits of Confidence," in *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability*, ed. John Borawski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 184-185. Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival* 25 (Jan/Feb 1983): 10-11. Fred C. Ikle, *Alternative Approaches to the International Organization of Disarmament* (Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 1962): 4. Michael Krepon, "Verification of Conventional Arms Reductions," *Survival* 30 (Nov/Dec 1988): 546. Christopher J. Makins, "On-Site Observation and Nonnuclear Arms Agreements: Too Short To Sell, Too Long To Throw Away," in *Arms Control Verification and the New Role of On-Site Inspection*, ed. Lewis A. Dunn (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990): 122, 133-134. David T. Twining, "An East-West Center for Military Cooperation," in *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability*, ed. John Borawski (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986): 181. David W. Wainhouse, *Arms Control Agreements: Designs for Verification and Organization* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968): 131-132. Wade J. Williams, "Expanding the U.S.-USSR Military Dialogue," in *Preventing Nuclear War: A Realistic Approach*, ed. Barry M. Blechman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985): 152.

the USMLM was used to a considerable extent as a model for this type of arms control measure.¹⁶⁴

The arms control and disarmament proposals developed and put on the negotiating table in Geneva, Switzerland during the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference are particularly instructive. When the conference commenced on 10 November the participants formed an agenda that included the "exchange of opinions on practical steps that can be taken now with a view to preventing the danger of a surprise attack and on partial disarmament measures to be carried out in conjunction with these steps."¹⁶⁵ The goal was to design mutually agreeable arrangements that were, essentially, confidence building measures. These included systems for aerial inspection, sea surveillance, long-range radar capability, satellite inspection, and ground inspection (or mobile ground surveillance teams).

At this early stage in the negotiations a key difference of opinion was evident: the West viewed mobility as a crucial ingredient of any monitoring system—that mobile ground surveillance teams must have the ability to travel in the affected region, and then with the most freedom of movement possible—whereas the Soviet leadership favored fixed "control posts" at key ingress and egress points of military activity, and under no circumstances carte blanche access to or travel in areas encompassing the military activity. This distinction in views had been expressed three years earlier in discussions at the United Nations concerning

¹⁶⁴Early warning systems that utilized many of the overt intelligence characteristics of the MLMs—most notably vehicular mobility, visual observation, and the size of inspection teams—were evaluated and implemented outside of the European arms control context. During 1968 a field test named "First Look" was part of a series of tests run by ACDA and the British Ministry of Defense. "Working on the problems of developing and testing inspection concepts," the test examined "whether small teams of inspectors, operating completely openly and nonintrusively, could provide adequate assurance that a declared level of forces was being maintained and could provide the necessary degree of knowledge either to assure that there were no treaty violations or substantiate on a timely basis violations which might affect a nation's security." The inspection teams consisted of two or three military personnel traveling in jeep vehicles to the places of disposition of military forces and installations, and augmenting their inspection with unmanned sensors and other technology. The resemblance to MLMs is striking. See: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 8th Annual Report to Congress, January 1, 1968 - December 31, 1968, 30-34. Another interesting example of MLM-type mobile ground surveillance is the US-sponsored early warning system established in the Sinai peninsula for peacekeeping purposes between Egypt and Israel. See: Barry Cherniavsky, "Early Warning Systems and the American Peacekeeping Mission: The Case of the Sinai II Agreement Between Egypt and Israel," (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University), 1982.

¹⁶⁵Department of State, "Draft Agenda Proposed by the Soviet Bloc Delegations at the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference, November 11, 1958," *Documents on Disarmament 1945 - 1959*, vol. 2, 1957 - 1959, (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1960), 1224.

disarmament and safeguards against surprise attack. Disagreements were quite visible, as noted by Henry Cabot Lodge, the Permanent US Representative to the UN General Assembly:

Control posts at major posts, railway junctions, main highways, and aerodromes would certainly have some value. But if they were tied down to fixed locations their utility would be strictly limited in these days of mobile, multidimensional warfare.

The Soviet theory seems to be that surprise attack inevitably requires the massing of large concentrations of troops and planes at very conveniently specified junctions, railroads, and airports. No potential aggressor would be so naive.¹⁶⁶

The US concern for access and mobility appeared in a subsequent working paper prepared pursuant to a comprehensive agreement for disarmament. Ostensibly, it was the first comprehensive arms control and disarmament plan that specified mobility for elements of a monitoring system. Incorporating components of the preceding "Open Skies" concept and control posts discussed to date, the text detailed a control and inspection plan that included "ground control posts and ports, railway terminals, airfields and main highways; aerial survey; mobile units; and an effective communication method."¹⁶⁷

When the Surprise Attack Conference convened three years later, it was not clear if the incorporation of mobile ground surveillance units would be universally accepted. It was evident, however, that characteristics of the American proposal for an early warning measure against surprise attack began to mimic the MLMs that were operating in Germany. As the western experts at the Surprise Attack Conference tabled one explanatory document after another, the similarities became striking; as if their reasoning and inclusion of provisions for mobile ground surveillance teams were directly linked to the MLM model. Note the following:

Ground observers can be the most effective means of ground inspection aimed at reducing the danger of surprise attack. However, their effectiveness is a function of their freedom of movement within or over the area under observation, of the adequacy of their means of transportation and communication, and of their rights and privileges. The use of

¹⁶⁶Department of State, "Statement by the United States Representative (Lodge) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 9, 1955," Documents on Disarmament 1945 - 1959, vol. 1, 1945 - 1956, (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1960), 577.

¹⁶⁷Documents on Disarmament 1945 - 1959, vol. 1, 610.

technological aids can extend the sensory capabilities of observers and thus increase their effectiveness.¹⁶⁸

One month later western experts submitted an even more erudite examination of the proposed system of ground observers, indicating further linkage to the MLM model:

To make aerial search techniques effective they must be complemented by observation on the ground. Ground observers verify the information received from aerial search and provide the best means of critical observation of intentions or indications which in turn would provide warning of any surprise attack.

Ground observers, in order to function effectively, must possess adequate mobility and must have the right of access to locations which may harbor important instruments of surprise attack. Some of these instruments must be kept under constant surveillance. Therefore resident as well as mobile teams of ground observers appear to be an essential part of an integrated system. It appears possible so to define their rights of inspection that the observers do not acquire any detailed information on the military-technology of the inspected country and yet fulfill their functions as required for an inspection system.¹⁶⁹

The statement regarding rights of inspection was not a concession but an attempt to ease Soviet concerns about collateral intelligence that they feared would be collected under the system proposed by the United States. For their part, the Soviets tended to avoid agreements that would "deprive them of the advantages of traditional Russian secrecy;" and they may not have fully understood Western concern for Soviet "cheating" or the distrust that meant that the United States "would not agree to (and observe) limits enforced only by Soviet good faith."¹⁷⁰ But if based on the MLM experience, the Soviet concern over collateral intelligence was warranted because, as a "mobile ground surveillance unit," the USMLM took full advantage of its range and manner of operations to collect just that kind of intelligence in the Soviet zone of Germany (as did the SMLM in the American zone).¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸Documents on Disarmament 1945 - 1959, vol. 2, 1251-52.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 1313.

¹⁷⁰Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, Challenges For U.S. National Security: The Soviet Approach to Arms Control Certification Problems and Prospects, Conclusions, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1983), 27. William C. Foster, Chairman of the US delegation to the Surprise Attack Conference, noted in testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament in January 1959 that the Soviets viewed their "traditional" secrecy as a military asset, and the lessening of it a "unilateral disarmament step." See Documents on Disarmament 1945 - 1959, vol. 2, 1359.

¹⁷¹If warranted it is perhaps no less naive. As aptly noted by analyst Allan S. Krass referring to measures for arms control treaty compliance: "In the real world of military and political competition, all information is valuable, and it

Finally, the strongest evidence indicating the functional equivalency of early warning measures to the MLMs, and the use of the USMLM as a model in US proposals for those measures, appears in two explanatory documents submitted by the western experts at the 1958 conference. These lay out details of mobile surveillance team operations:

- The number of teams and personnel in each team:

Three or four teams (an equal number in reserve), each team consisting of three men in a suitable vehicle, operating from a central headquarters.

- Objects of surveillance (targets).

- The frequency of inspection depending on the target:

High Frequency: One visit by a team on an average of once in three days.

Medium Frequency: Visits by a team at intervals of one to two weeks.

Low Frequency: A visit at irregular intervals varying from two weeks to six months.

- Capability of mobile teams regarding the number of targets observed, miles traveled, and size of area surveyed.
- The use of photographic, optical, and infra-red devices.¹⁷²

William C. Foster, Chairman of the US delegation to the Surprise Attack Conference (and future Director of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency) acclaimed the USMLM and the MLM system not only as the model for any future exchanges of military liaison missions, but specifically advised for the *direct* application of the MLMs in ongoing arms control negotiations.¹⁷³ In an arms control context, the direct use of the USMLM seemed plausible given the growing importance of that intelligence unit during the 1960s and 1970s.

is rare that evidence for a possible violation of a treaty comes only from devices or mechanisms that are devoted specifically to verification. Conversely, it is virtually impossible to design a device for monitoring compliance with a treaty that does not also pick up other information." Allan S. Krass, "The Soviet View of Verification," in William C. Potter ed., Verification and Arms Control, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1985), 37-62, 38-39.

¹⁷²Documents on Disarmament 1945 - 1959, vol. 2, 1250-53, 1296-97.

¹⁷³Thomas S. Lough, phone conversation with author. See also Lough, (1965), 1.

Even though this suggested use of the MLMs was not adopted, by the mid-1980s the ever-expanding role and impact of the USMLM on arms control was obvious. In the category of personnel, for example, three of the four military inspectors that traveled to the Soviet Union in 1986 were former USMLM officers.¹⁷⁴ As sanctioned by inspection protocols in the CDE accord, former CUSMLM Colonel Don Stovall came out of retirement on the request of the US Department of State to lead the inspection team. This is a direct and relevant extension to the MLM model. It also, once again, underscores the significant contribution to arms control that was made by former USMLM personnel.

At the On-site Inspection Agency, established in 1988 to monitor Soviet compliance with the INF treaty, several military specialists who visited sites in the Soviet Union as sanctioned in the treaty were former USMLM tour officers.¹⁷⁵ Service at the USMLM was an ideal training experience for these inspectors, and they were in high demand. Touring in an hostile environment, knowledge of Soviet order-of-battle, and first-hand encounters with Soviet military personnel made the former USMLM tour officer perhaps the most qualified professional to meet the monitoring needs of an arms control agreement. According to both Stovall and Lajoie, as former CUSMLM they assigned as many former USMLM tour officers as they could for on-site inspection duty.¹⁷⁶ USMLM personnel set the standard for an ideal specialist to monitor arms control agreements.

The outgrowth of a particularly sobering and potentially MLM-ending incident that occurred in 1985 is further evidence of the scope of MLM influence. After the shooting of USMLM tour officer Major Arthur Nicholson on 24 March, negotiations were undertaken to establish a new *modus vivendi*. The intent was to form an understanding, in writing, that would be based on nearly 44 years of a conflictual but relatively benign MLM relationship and the

¹⁷⁴Stovall interview. Colonel Stovall was head of the on-site inspection team.

¹⁷⁵Lajoie interview.

¹⁷⁶On-site inspectors were *former* USMLM officers. They did not serve concurrently.

interest of both parties to have it continue. Negotiations led to an agreement between the US and Soviet military commands in Germany regarding the future interaction between their respective MLMs.¹⁷⁷ Establishing new engagement procedures for counterintelligence personnel contacting MLM tour teams and confirming longstanding “rules of the game,” much of the text was applied directly to the more comprehensive Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement signed by the US and Soviet Union four years later.¹⁷⁸

Aloof from public scrutiny mostly by virtue of its security niche, while exalted by those who consumed its product, the USMLM was an important tool with an impressive role and range of influence. Yet, despite its impact on arms control and US-Soviet military and security relations in Europe—the early warning function provided by the USMLM in East Germany as a matter of course, the use of its on-going intelligence role to monitor Soviet compliance with arms control agreements, the exemplary role of the USMLM as a model regarding the basic structure and function of mobile ground surveillance teams for arms control, and former USMLM personnel playing a key role in arms control monitoring—the USMLM was never tabled as a CBM or monitoring measure during any arms control negotiation and, accordingly, never surfaced as a direct component of a subsequent agreement. In ways that prompt important questions regarding intelligence and arms control, the impact of the USMLM *as an arms control measure* was more potential than real. Why was this the apparent limit of USMLM involvement?

First, a conservative observation would note that the USMLM was part of a system of MLMs that originated in and remained linked to the issue of German occupation. As long as Germany remained divided into occupational zones (almost assured given the US-Soviet political struggle over the future of Germany) the MLM system retained a valid administrative and “postwar” role pending German unification.

¹⁷⁷See Stacy, The Nicholson Incident.

¹⁷⁸Lajoie interview.

A more straightforward response is that the direct use of the USMLM as an arms control measure in an agreement would have led to the dissolution of the unit and the MLM system or at least severely reduced its effectiveness. The MLM system would either be completely dissolved with former MLM units adjusted for an arms control agreement's provisions, or changes to the existing MLM system would have been made by amending the original agreements.

As in most arms control talks regarding monitoring protocols, negotiators would have scrutinized USMLM operational procedures to develop and establish mutually agreeable, highly specified terms for the USMLM's monitoring role. In addition to the problem of protecting methods and sources, the infusion of "specificity" into the MLM system would have neutralized the benefits of the ambiguous text of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement; a characteristic of the US-Soviet MLM exchange that aided intelligence collection.

The USMLM was, after all, an intelligence unit, and a thorough examination would have inevitably reduced MLM effectiveness by disclosing methods and making them subject to negotiation. If they had been adopted and used, the mobile ground surveillance teams proposed in the 1950s, for example, would probably not have had the access enjoyed by the MLMs; the ability to travel freely and, circumventing some restrictions on access to military activities and installations, to develop over time and exploit a tacit understanding of mutually acceptable norms characteristic of the MLM system. Much of the "cat and mouse" counter-surveillance and harassment that constituted "normal" MLM operations would probably not have been acceptable in an arms control agreement. Indeed, how does one openly acknowledge in a diplomatic forum and include in the text of an international agreement the idiosyncrasies that in part made the MLM system so effective? Open discussion of methods would have eventually exposed the clandestine role of MLM operations that probably existed.

Lastly, it was imperative to maintain an independent, routine, inclusive, and well-entrenched surveillance capability in East Germany to assess threat and early warning in general. The USMLM was not subject to the unstable and at times indeterminate condition of

arms control negotiations or agreements. The process of arms control negotiations can consume much time and, in the event of a settlement, failure by the US Congress to formally ratify an agreement can further delay the implementation of the agreement's monitoring system. Any agreement can be terminated. If the MLM system or its former elements became an integral part of such an agreement, then important monitoring services would end with the termination of that agreement.

But as described in the preceding study, the USMLM role was not arms control but intelligence collection; to assess the adversary's capabilities and intentions, and provide early warning against possible surprise attack. If any arms control services were rendered by the USMLM, they were a result of this overall role. Note that although the MLM system as a subject for inquiry certainly broadens the conceptual understanding of intelligence and the influence of intelligence instruments on international relations during the Cold War, it does not follow that the MLM system was an arms control or confidence-building arrangement *per se*. This "watering-down" of intelligence is intellectually inappropriate; ascribing to arms control practice what only exists in theory, while dissociating from the study of intelligence what clearly exists in practice, as indicated by the present study. Throughout the Cold War, intelligence instruments, not arms control measures, provided the main strands in the web of communication that fostered and sustained transparency and confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this context, arms control merely gave the relationship a diplomatic tone. These conclusions may well be supported after a full examination of the intelligence-arms control relationship and further study of the MLM system.

The USMLM was never directly placed in an arms control agreement or applied as part of a negotiated system of CBMs because, quite simply, it wasn't necessary. The USMLM not only performed many of the monitoring services earmarked for projected mobile ground surveillance units, it had the capability to operate in a manner consistent with the conditions found in East Germany; a conflictual environment where ambiguous provisions in the Huebner-Malinin

Agreement and tacitly derived understandings permitted latitude during operations. Despite the confidence-dismantling effect of some of these operations, overall the USMLM promoted confidence in the US-Soviet relationship by providing transparency in East Germany. In a very basic sense the USMLM or the MLM system was a "confidence-building measure;" for the MLMs actually existed in a strategic region of the cold war conflict, whereas other overt monitoring instruments were only merited proposals; worthy as they were to be examined for their potential value to arms control and national security.

In spite of all that has been disclosed and examined in the present study, several issues remain for further research. Some of these issues were raised throughout and others logically ensue. All of these issues, however, owe their lives to the secrecy that still shrouds the subject, protects existing data through classification, and inhibits detailed retrospectives of former USMLM personnel from reaching the public forum.

For example, to what extent did USMLM operations make arms control measures for monitoring the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces in Germany irrelevant or unnecessary? Requiring a full examination of the arms control negotiations and access to all text of USMLM Unit Histories, this issue rests on the assumptions that the USMLM was or would have been the most effective of all instruments both on the ground and in the form of NTM, and that East Germany was the most important focal point for these instruments. Further, evidence would have to indicate that the function of the USMLM was *the* reason for ignoring or abandoning an arms control proposal.

Can a model of the MLM system be currently applied in a region of conflict where that manner of intelligence collection could provide transparency between the adversaries and thereby promote confidence? In terms of access, such a system has an advantage over other monitoring measures. As indicated by the specificity built-in to the type and range of operations for on-site inspectors of current agreements, *carte blanche* has never been permitted,

and there have been restrictions concerning the frequency of inspections, limits on observable activities, and in-country duration.

Although under some restrictions, the USMLM, by contrast, was able to conduct surveillance of East Germany at will. No prior authorization had to be obtained from Soviet authorities regarding the number of tours conducted for any period of time, the duration of those tours, or the amount of miles traveled. According to the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, USMLM tour teams were under no restrictions concerning the use of technological aids, such as cameras, listening devices, hand-placed sensors, or any other equipment. As warranted, they often disregarded Soviet PRAs, TRAs, and MRSs and penetrated these restricted areas that were designed to place limits on "observable activities." Soviet dismay over this MLM fact of life was registered in the form of harassment and detentions, but too severe of a reaction led to a reciprocal response from the US military authorities toward the SMLM.

Intelligence is a dynamic that predates the Cold War and, broadly speaking, is likely to remain an important component of international relations. As elegantly stated in 1956 by Henry Cabot Lodge, the Permanent United States Representative to the United Nations: "It is not knowledge that fans fear and suspicion: it is ignorance. It is not disclosure that creates international tension: it is a passion for concealment and secretiveness."

But an application of the MLM model will depend on the intent and level of trust of the parties to an agreement. If the relationship is highly adversarial or similar to a "cold war," then states are unlikely to accept the tacitness of the MLM model or the ambiguity of an enabling instrument modeled after the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Ironically, the qualities that recommend the MLM system may inhibit further application of that system. If the relationship is less conflictual (how much less is uncertain), and if there is already a basic level of trust and transparency in the relationship, then either some characteristics will be applied, or an MLM-type system will be altogether unnecessary.

Any future exchange of intelligence units in the form of the MLMs should be based on the ability of that arrangement to help maintain national security and to some degree improve the overall *relationship* between the states involved. It should not, therefore, be viewed as an irony that such change, brought about in part by the MLM system, led to the dissolution of that system; or that future applications will be designed as temporary measures.

But if there have been substantive changes in the *conduct* of states, then perhaps in the post-cold war period the simultaneous pursuit of national security and mutual confidence will be less of a mutually exclusive enterprise and more of a catalyst to develop international intelligence regimes; to address shared concerns regarding international drug cartels, terrorism, regional stability, ethnic conflict, nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, and others. In many ways the MLM model will serve as a standard for these future arrangements. Their success will be measured against the record of an intelligence system that functioned in a particularly troubled region of the world, at a time when tall fences made curious neighbors.

APPENDIX A¹⁷⁹

AGREEMENT ON CONTROL MACHINERY IN GERMANY
ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION, NOVEMBER 14, 1944

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following Agreement with regard to the organisation of the Allied control machinery in Germany in the period during which Germany will be carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender:--

ARTICLE 1.

Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the supreme organ of control constituted under the present Agreement.

ARTICLE 2.

Each Commander-in-Chief in his zone of occupation will have attached to him military, naval and air representatives of the other two Commanders-in-Chief for liaison duties.

ARTICLE 3.

(a) The three Commanders-in-Chief, acting together as a body, will constitute a supreme organ of control called the Control Council.

(b) The functions of the Control Council will be:--

(i) to ensure appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation:

(ii) to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole, on the basis of instructions received by each Commander-in-Chief from his Government;

(iii) to control the German central administration, which will operate under the direction of the Control Council and will be responsible to it for ensuring compliance with its demands;

¹⁷⁹Documents on Germany 1944 - 1985, US Department of State, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, publication 9446, 1985), 6.

(iv) to direct the administration of "Greater Berlin" through appropriate organs.

(c) The Control Council will meet at least once in ten days; and it will meet at any time upon request of any one of its members. Decisions of the Control Council shall be unanimous. The chairmanship of the Control Council will be held in rotation by each of its three members.

(d) Each member of the Control Council will be assisted by a political adviser, who will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council. Each member of the Control Council may also, when necessary, be assisted at meetings of the Council by naval or air advisers.

ARTICLE 4.

A permanent Co-ordinating Committee will be established under the Control Council, composed of one representative of each of the three Commanders-in-Chief, not below the rank of General Officer or the equivalent rank in the naval or air forces. Members of the Co-ordinating Committee will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council.

ARTICLE 5.

The duties of the Co-ordinating Committee, acting on behalf of the Control Council and through the Control Staff, will include:--

- (a) the carrying out of the decisions of the Control Council;
- (b) the day-to-day supervision and control of the activities of the German central administration and institutions;
- (c) the co-ordination of current problems which call for uniform measures in all three zones;
- (d) the preliminary examination and preparation for the Control Council of all questions submitted by individual Commanders-in-Chief.

ARTICLE 6.

(a) The members of the Control Staff appointed by their respective national authorities, will be organized in the following Divisions:--

Military; Naval; Air; Transport; Political; Economic; Finance; Reparations, Deliveries and Restitution; Internal Affairs and Communications; Legal; Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons; Man-power.

Adjustments in the number and functions of the Divisions may be made in the light of experience.

(b) At the head of each Division there will be three high-ranking officials, one from each Power. The duties of the three heads of each Division, acting jointly, will include:--

- (i) exercising control of the corresponding German Ministries and German central institutions;
- (ii) acting as advisors to the Control Council and, when necessary, attending meetings thereof;
- (iii) transmitting to the German central administration the decisions of the Control Council, communicated through the Co-ordinating Committee.

(c) The three heads of a Division will take part in meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee at which matters affecting the work of their Division are on the agenda.

(d) The staffs of the Divisions may include civilian as well as military personnel. They may also, in special cases, include nationals of other United Nations, appointed in their personal capacity.

ARTICLE 7.

(a) An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Kommandatura) consisting of three Commandments, one from each Power, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" area. Each of the Commandants will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief Commandant, as head of the Inter-Allied Governing Authority.

(b) A Technical Staff, consisting of personnel of each of the three Powers, will be established under the Inter-Allied Governing Authority, and will be organized to serve the purpose of supervising and controlling the activities of the local organs of "Greater Berlin" which are responsible for its municipal services.

(c) The Inter-Allied Governing Authority will operate under the general direction of the Control Council and will receive orders through the Co-ordinating Committee.

ARTICLE 8.

The necessary liaison with the Governments of other United Nations chiefly interested will be ensured by the appointment of such Governments of military missions (which may include civilian members) to the Control Council, having access, through the appropriate channels, to the organs of control.

ARTICLE 9.

United Nations' organisations which may be admitted by the Control Council to operate in Germany will, in respect to their activities in Germany, be subordinate to the Allied control machinery and answerable to it.

ARTICLE 10.

The Allied organs for the control and administration of Germany outlined above will operate during the initial period of the occupation of Germany immediately following surrender, that is, the period when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender.

ARTICLE 11.

The question of the Allied organs required for carrying out the functions of control and administration in Germany in a later period will be the subject of a separate Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The above text of the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 14th November, 1944, and is now submitted to their respective Governments for approval.

For the Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:

PHILIP E. MOSELY

Lancaster House, London, S.W. 1.
14th November, 1944.

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission;

WILLIAM STRANG

Lancaster House, London, S.W. 1.
14th November, 1944.

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:

F T GOUSEV

Lancaster House, London, S.W. 1.
14th November, 1944.

APPENDIX B

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY, APRIL 5, 1947¹⁸⁰

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany," November 14, 1944, the US and the Soviet Commanders-in-Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadri-partite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.

2. Missions will be composed of air, navy, and army representatives. There will be no political representatives.

3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.

4. Each mission will be under the orders of senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission."

5. The Chief of the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States Zone the mission will be accredited to Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet Zone the mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States Zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

7. In the Soviet Zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States Zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G3, United States European Command.

¹⁸⁰Documents on Germany 1944 - 1985, US Department of State, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, publication 9446, 1985), 114.

9. In the Soviet Zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of Commander-in-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of the Soviet or United States mission wants to visit United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories, and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24-72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and headquarters of their respective Commander-in-Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communication through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they also will be given facilities such as mail, telephone, telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of breakdown in the radio installation, the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communication.

12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full right of extra-territoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the mission will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have the right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by Deputy Commanders of United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

C.R. HUEBNER
Lieutenant-General Huebner
Deputy Commander-in-Chief, European Command

Colonel-General Malinin
Deputy Commander-in-Chief
Chief of Staff of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany

APPENDIX C

DETENTIONS 1951 - 1985¹⁸¹

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
17 Apr 51	Lonnewitz Airfield	Details unknown. Tour vehicle was on main highway and was fired upon, one round penetrating the vehicle. No injuries.
3 Mar 55	Fahrland	Tour was photographing artillery pieces. As the vehicle drove off, a Soviet officer drew his pistol and fired three rounds without hitting the vehicle.
18 Apr 55	Jeuterborg Airfield	Tour was photographing aircraft when a Soviet jeep type vehicle approached. Tour personnel got into vehicle and departed. Soviets dismounted and fired several rounds without hitting tour vehicle.
20 Oct 55	Wittstrock Airfield	Tour was photographing aircraft when a sentry appeared. Tour personnel got into vehicle and departed. Sentry and two other Soviets fired several rounds without hitting tour vehicle.
23 Apr 56	Raeglin	Tour was observing and photographing EG Army encampment. A shot was heard. As tour personnel got into vehicle a second shot was heard and bullet passed over the vehicle. Tour departed without the vehicle being hit.
22 May 56	Zerbst	Tour vehicle took a wrong turn and came upon the gate of what appeared to be a deserted driving range. Two Soviet guards appeared. Tour vehicle departed the area and was fired upon but not hit.
24 Jul 56	Gross Dolln Airfield	Tour was photographing aircraft when several

¹⁸¹All text taken from William E. Stacy, The Nicholson Incident: A Case Study of US-Soviet Negotiations, Headquarters, US Army, Europe and 7th Army, Military History Office. Formerly classified SECRET/NOFORN, declassified at US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Released to author 17 July 1991, pp. 439-445.

		Soviets in blue coveralls appeared. Tour departed the area and one shot was fired without hitting the tour vehicle.
21 Jan 57	Elbe River at UT 051517	Tour was traveling on secondary road north of the river and came upon a small Soviet encampment. Tour approached the encampment and took photographs. Soviet officer and enlisted man ran toward tour vehicle, which departed. Several shots were fired without hitting the tour vehicle.
7 Feb 57	Alt Lonnewitz Airfield	Tour was stopped on main road at perimeter of airfield and photographing aircraft. As tour was departing, Soviet guard fired one round. Vehicle stopped, tour personnel dismounted and locked vehicle. Guard fired again, puncturing one tire on tour vehicle, and tour personnel were detained until Chief, USMLM and Chief SERB arrived on the scene some 6 hours later.
13 Oct 59	Fuerstenwalde	EGAF sentry fired one shot without warning -- vehicle hit. Tour did not stop.
20 Mar 60	Hasse	EG civilians stopped USMLM vehicle claiming vehicle in maneuver area (false). Tour vehicle departed for Soviet Kommandatura. Fired upon by shotguns -- vehicle hit. <u>Soviet Kommandant claimed civilians not under Soviet control.</u>
3 Jun 60	Babelsburg	Unknown persons forced USMLM vehicle to halt at gun point; requests for Soviet officer refused; US officers shoved, pushed, and insulted. Soviet officers arrived and released tour.
26 Jul 60	Bornim	"Tail" vehicle almost forced collision. VOPO and Soviets accused USMLM of traffic violation (false). "Tail" personnel threatened with pistol, made insulting and provocative remarks, Soviet Major stated neither Chief SERB nor Potsdam Kommandant could exert control over "tails" or secure adherence to terms of Huebner-Malinin Agreement.
28-29 Sep 61	Brehns	USMLM vehicle tailed Soviet column. Soviets attempted to halt 61 vehicle, firing a warning shot.
10 Oct 61	Luebbenau	USMLM tour passing Soviet column. Soviet fired two warning shots.

20 Nov 61	Klausdorf Wiepersdorf	Tail personnel struck USMLM officer who struck back. Tour moved on with tail following. Slight accident occurred. Tail threatened vehicle with weapon. Soviets stated EG civilians agents of DDR, which is sovereign state, and Soviets had no control over them.
5 Dec 61	Gundow	VOPO vehicles blocked USMLM vehicle; USMLM vehicle escaped but was caught. VOPO drew pistol but USMLM driver disregarded and again escaped. No shots fired.
19 Feb 62	Treuenbrietze	Soviets attempted to halt tour vehicle and fired two warning shots.
20 Mar 62	Gotha	While driving toward Gotha, tour vehicle was stopped at approximately noon by EG police (VOPO) (exact location unknown). Tour demanded Soviet officer, was told one hour later none would come. Tour departed and was fired upon, one round striking the trunk and ricocheting into rear window. En route to Gotha to inform Soviets of shooting incident, one tire went flat. After changing tire and proceeding, tour was immobilized when a second tire went flat. Tour spent the night in the vehicle. USMLM notified of "breakdown" following morning, and vehicle with spare tire reached the detained tour at approximately 1400 hours.
22 Aug 62	Anklam	Tour vehicle vandalized while parked overnight. Vehicle smeared with paint, tires slashed, rear window broken, and vehicle looted.
4 Sep 62	Weichensdorf	Tour was observing train carrying missiles when a guard fired and one round struck the vehicle. No injuries.
2 Apr 64	Brand	Tour was approaching Soviet installation and was observed by a guard. Tour departed the area and was fired upon without the vehicle being hit.
4 Oct 65	Thamsbrueck	While approaching Thamsbrueck, tour observed a Soviet military truck blocking the road. Tour turned around and two warning shots were fired at departing vehicle without hitting it.
7 Jul 66	No location given	Tour vehicle was parked on an overpass observing a passing Soviet train that carried

		missiles. Guard on train fired two shots that missed.
28 Jul 67	Pritzwalk	Tour was observing a radar site when a Soviet guard appeared. Tour departed and three shots were fired without hitting the tour vehicle.
15 Aug 67	Warenberg	As tour vehicle was departing an observation position in a wood, two Soviets appeared and one shot was fired in the air (possibly a blank round).
27 Jul 71	Jueterbog Airfield	Two dismounted tour members seized by Soviet guards, bound, and their equipment confiscated. Tour personnel held several hours (length of time not specified), interrogated by Soviets, and then escorted back to Potsdam Mission House. On 11 August tour personnel were declared persona non grata and Soviets returned some, but not all, of confiscated equipment.
14 Mar 72	Finsterwalde	Tour vehicle on a trail in woods surrounded and fired upon by approximately 10 VOPO personnel, presumably blank rounds, since no damage done.
14 Mar 72	Petkus Range	Same tour as in previous incident was departing an observation post when a Soviet NCO smashed the left rear window with his rifle butt. No injuries.
12 Jul 72	Reinsdorf	Tour was observing airfield when a Soviet soldier fired one round that missed. Tour departed the area.
22 May 73	Jueterbog Airfield	When departing the area after observing aircraft, tour was chased by two Soviet trucks. Three pistol shots were fired without hitting the tour vehicle.
24 Jul 73	Storkow	Tour was photographing a military installation when an East German soldier appeared and fired two pistol shots in the air. Tour departed the area.
16 Sep 73	Wittstock	Tour was photographing a SAM site when a Soviet sentry approached. Tour personnel got into vehicle and departed at high speed as approximately 15-20 rounds were fired without hitting the vehicle.
21 Oct 73	Guterfeld Training Area	Tour was traveling on a dirt road in the training

		area when East German guards fired two rounds without hitting the vehicle.
28 Oct 73	Leipzig area	At an unidentified installation near Leipzig, East German guards fired approximately 20 rounds at the tour vehicle as it departed the area at high speed. One round penetrated the driver's door and passed through the toe of his boot without injuring him.
6 Sep 74	Bretnig	While driving on public road toward Seeligstadt, tour vehicle passed East German sentry who fired one round without hitting the vehicle.
11 Aug 76	Nedlitz	While tour was stopped at a railroad crossing (barrier was down), three Soviet soldiers and one officer attempted to detain. Tour turned vehicle around and proceeded along road away from barrier. Soviets fired two rounds. No damage or injuries incurred.
26 May 78	Gadow-Rossow	Tour was detained by Soviet platoon-size element. Tour equipment was confiscated; vehicle tires were slashed. Tour personnel were forcibly removed from the vehicle and interrogated. Tour vehicle was removed following day. No injuries were incurred.
17 Jul 78	Schoenhausen	Soviet soldier fired a single shot at USMLM tour from railroad troop car at the rear of a train. No damage or injuries were incurred.
15 Aug 78	Karl Marx Stadt	While in process of departing, Soviet foot patrol attempted to stop tour vehicle. At least three warning shots were fired when vehicle failed to stop. No round struck vehicle. No injuries were incurred.
28 Aug 78	Neustadt-Dosse	USMLM tour was fired upon from troop car at rear of train. Tour was approximately 150 yards from rail line. Four rounds struck tour vehicle, one of which missed tour NCO by 20 centimeters. No injuries were incurred.
13 Mar 79	Athenstedt	Tour vehicle was intentionally rammed by an East German TATRA-813 vehicle. Ramming resulted in tour vehicle being thrown off the road and rolling over twice. All tour equipment was confiscated. Vehicle was rendered inoperable. Tour officer sustained injuries which incapacitated him for 4 weeks.

17 Jun 80	Beelitz	Tour vehicle was forced off the road avoiding an intentional ramming attempt by Soviet Kamaz vehicle. Soviet soldiers brandished weapons and looted vehicle. Vehicle remained operable. Tour officer received broken collar bone and shoulder injuries; driver incurred minor injuries.
30 Jun 80	Priort	Tour vehicle was rammed at midpoint on driver's side by Soviet GAZ-53A truck. Soviet soldiers attempted to loot vehicle, but were resisted by noncommissioned officer/driver. Vehicle rendered inoperable. Tour officer and driver incurred minor injuries. Incident appeared to be result of preplanned Soviet ambush/detention.
10 Oct 80	Zerbst	USMLM tour was ambushed/detained by approximately 20 troops. Tour officer pulled from vehicle and thrown to ground. Officer and driver were vigorously manhandled and interrogated. All equipment was confiscated. No serious injuries resulted.
19 May 82	Moellern	Tour ambushed/detained. Two soldiers forced way through vehicle sunroof, beat officer and noncommissioned officer, dragged them from vehicle, tied their hands, and confiscated equipment. No serious, long-term injuries resulted.
28 Feb 83	Borenson	Approximately six aimed shots were fired directly at tour vehicle. No injuries resulted; no rounds struck tour vehicle.
28 May 83	Reitz	Soviet lieutenant fired warning shot from AK-47 rifle at USMLM tour. No injuries resulted.
12 Jan 84	Havelberg	Soviet lieutenant smashed the front windshield of a moving tour vehicle with a shovel. Tour officer stopped vehicle to avoid endangering Soviet soldiers standing on both sides of the road as his driver's vision was impaired. No one was injured.
24 Mar 85	Ludwigslust	Soviet sentry shot and killed USMLM tour officer. Tour NCO detained. Medical attention denied for close to one hour.

APPENDIX D

CHIEFS OF THE USMLM (CUSMLM) 1947 - 1990¹⁸²

BG Walter J. Hess, Jr.	April 1947 - October 1949
MG Truman C. Thorson	January 1950 - August 1950
COL Floyd C. Harding	July 1950 - November 1950
COL John P. Evans	December 1950 - November 1952
COL A.E. Schanze	December 1952 - August 1954
COL John A. Cleveland, Jr.	September 1954 - August 1955
COL Emery E. Bellonby	September 1955 - May 1958
COL Robert P. McQuail	June 1958 - May 1960
COL Ernest Von Pawel	June 1960 - June 1963
COL Paul G. Skowronek	June 1963 - May 1967
COL Thomas F. McCord	May 1967 - July 1968
COL Howard M. Richie	August 1968 - March 1971
COL Frederick C. Turner	April 1971 - June 1974
COL Peter L. Thorsen	July 1974 - June 1977
COL Don O. Stovall	June 1977 - July 1981
COL Randall A. Greenwalt	July 1981 - May 1983
COL Roland Lajoie	June 1983 - May 1986
COL William D. Halloran II	May 1986 - December 1987
COL Gregory G. Govan	January 1988 - June 1989
COL Richard M. Naab	July 1989 - October 1990

¹⁸²List of CUSMLM provided by Ms. Sharin Jones, Staff Assistant, USMLM HQ, West Berlin.

APPENDIX E

PRE-TOUR PROCEDURES, STATISTICS, AND VEHICLES

Pre-tour preparations. According to available sources, tours were planned and designed at USMLM West Berlin HQ. There, a USMLM "operations officer" briefed tour teams to assign targets and lay out a general route to be followed.¹⁸³ It is noted in USMLM Unit History 1964 that "during the week prior to a normal scheduled . . . trip, the [tour] officer receives a schedule which shows the general area in which the tour is to be conducted, names his driver and designates the time . . . [of departure]."¹⁸⁴

After the briefing and planning was completed, the tour team drove approximately 12 miles to the USMLM Potsdam facility (Potsdam House).¹⁸⁵ There, the tour team acquired a supply of food and water; the amount depending on the length of the tour, and augmented in case of detention by Soviet authorities while touring. In 1967, for example, after being accused of illegally photographing an East German town from the height of a tower which was open to tourists, a tour team was detained at the Soviet local headquarters or "Kommandatura."¹⁸⁶ A stalemate followed as the tour team refused to relinquish the film or their camera to the Soviet Commander. For over four days the tour team used their vehicle as a "home away from home," setting up "permanent housekeeping" in the car; using it for sleeping accommodations and relying on "emergency rations and water" which was essential in such instances.¹⁸⁷ This

¹⁸³Lajoie interview.

¹⁸⁴Unit History 1964, 22.

¹⁸⁵Lough, (1964), 25.

¹⁸⁶Unit History 1967, 139.

¹⁸⁷Unit History 1967, 140-141.

highlights the important provision of extra-territoriality that was extended to tour vehicles, prohibiting entry or search by Soviet or East German personnel. In essence, the tour vehicle was a mobile embassy.

Also acquired at Potsdam House were restrictive maps submitted by SERB denoting PRAs and TRAs, sophisticated still and motion cameras, and electronic listening devices—all to be taken on the tour for the purpose of collecting intelligence.¹⁸⁸ Tour teams wore US military camouflage fatigues, (battle dress uniforms, [BDU]), and did not tote weapons. But one accessory carried by the tour officer while touring at times proved to be invaluable and effective, if not intimidating. Referring to the detention of a tour team in Wittenberg, East Germany,¹⁸⁹ Unit History 1967 describes the following:

Denying all charges, the [USMLM] officers protested that the Huebner-Malinin Agreement was being violated by the Soviets. The [Soviet] Commandant made a counter charge by stating that officers had violated the agreement by taking photographs. The officers asked if photography was specifically prohibited by the agreement. Certainly, shouted the Commandant. At this point, the officers produced a copy of the agreement (each tour officer always carries a copy in three languages) and asked the Commandant to point out exactly where this was stated. The Commandant slowly read the entire document, scowled and threw the document on the table.¹⁹⁰

Again, the ambiguity of Huebner-Malinin was instrumental in the intelligence collection effort. In fact, most steps in pre-tour preparations were not sanctioned, prohibited or even specified in Huebner-Malinin. Some of the materials taken on tour, e.g., food, water or extra clothing were obvious requirements that were unlikely to have ever been a point to negotiate during the formation of the agreement. The wearing of uniforms by tour personnel and the clearly marked license plates on tour vehicles "issued by the headquarters to which accredited" were, on the other hand, mutually required by US and Soviet Commands, although not specified in Huebner-

¹⁸⁸See, inter alia, Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Says Slain Major Had Photographed Military Site," New York Times, 28 March 1985, A3; James M. Markham, "G.I. Photo Mission in East Germany," New York Times, 24 April 1985, 47; and James M. Markham, "Patrols in Germany: Postwar Vestige," New York Times, 29 March 1985, 11.

¹⁸⁹In this incident, the USMLM tour team was photographing the town from the height of the Schlosskirche Tower, part of a church made famous by Luther, and a popular tourist attraction.

¹⁹⁰Unit History 1967, 141.

Malinin.¹⁹¹ It was unlikely that such requisites were ever questioned or debated. The author has found no indication that they were a locus of disagreement. But the use of photographic and recording equipment, in addition to the myriad devices that were probably part of USMLM upgrading over the years, was a windfall from the incomplete and vague provisions of Huebner-Malinin, and consequently was most useful from the standpoint of providing for and supporting intelligence collection.

In sum, with a general plan of action, basic necessities such as food and water, Soviet restriction maps, a copy of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and various kinds of equipment, the USMLM was squared away for its regular photo essay tour of the Soviet zone. Perhaps the most important piece of equipment was the tour vehicle. A brief survey of this tool reveals more than the development of logistical support for the USMLM. The attention that the tour vehicle received over the years in terms of the improvement of performance factors, far beyond standard maintenance, is further evidence of the USMLM intelligence role.

Duration, Distance and Mileage. According to available sources, there were four types of tours, classified in terms of duration, distance and mileage. These included: 1) the short local tour; 2) the one-day tour; 3) the two-day tour; and 4) the three and four-day tour.

The short "local coverage" tour was carried-out by one vehicle every day of the week; on Sunday it was completed by the duty officer stationed at Potsdam House.¹⁹² These short tours normally took two hours to complete, and involved surveying the immediate Potsdam/Berlin area. The purpose of these daily tours was most likely to detect any signs of an impending crisis, or of an attack. In short, these were a routine part of "warning intelligence."

The one-day tour typically involved 10-12 hours of surveying; covering a distance on average of 400 miles over roads and territory.¹⁹³ The two-day tour involved two 10-12 hour

¹⁹¹Skowronek, 117.

¹⁹²Lough, (1964), 29.

¹⁹³Ibid.

days and travel of 650 and 800 miles.¹⁹⁴ No statistics have been located by the author to indicate the duration and distance covered by three and four-day tours. Yet, it can be estimated that such operations included work days of 10-12 hours over distances of 900-1,200 and 1,150-1,600 miles respectively.

To facilitate two, three and four-day tours, teams frequently returned to Potsdam House for re-supply. Also, teams often found lodging in East German hotels.¹⁹⁵ On any given day more than one car was sent on touring operations in order to replace a fatigued team, to focus attention on a particular area or target, or widen coverage. Several cars were dispatched to investigate accidents or incidents and insure speedy investigation and recovery. Up to four teams per day would go out during the periodic maneuvers of Soviet/Warsaw Pact military forces.¹⁹⁶

Tour mileage per month averaged approximately 22,000 miles.¹⁹⁷ Yearly statistics provide a more detailed breakdown of touring activity, as noted in USMLM Unit History 1962.¹⁹⁸

Number of USMLM Tours, 1962

One-day (including local)	314
Two-day	267
Three-day	16
Four-day	<u>2</u>

599¹⁹⁹

From this record, it is evident that the vast majority of tours in 1962 were of the one and two-day variety (97%). Possible explanations for this focus are that intelligence targets were well within the range of such tours; that efficiency of three and four-day tours diminished due to

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵Unit History 1964, 11.

¹⁹⁶Lough, (1964), 30.

¹⁹⁷Ibid, 29.

¹⁹⁸As listed in Lough, (1964), 30.

¹⁹⁹Lough's figures go on to reveal that these 599 tours in 1962 required 7,264 hours, (726-605 10-12 hour days), and totaled 207,000 miles of coverage through the Soviet zone. [Lough, (1964), 30.]

fatigue and supply/equipment problems; that longer tours delayed the return of time-sensitive intelligence to HQ; that personnel shortages or limits on available teams warranted shorter tours; and that there evolved over time a belief that multiple, one and two-day tours working simultaneously provided the most effective coverage of a region. Without additional yearly statistics which span the entire service life of the USMLM, it is difficult to make an accurate assessment. A compilation of references taken from de-classified texts of nineteen volumes of Unit Histories reveals that on average, the USMLM vehicles allocated for touring traveled for a combined 250,000 miles²⁰⁰ per year on operational intelligence missions over roads and territory throughout the Soviet zone.²⁰¹

Tour vehicles. Tour vehicles were considered to be the most critical form of equipment employed in the intelligence collection process and defined both the manner and scope of mobility for USMLM personnel.²⁰² It was not unusual, then, that tour vehicles were improved and enhanced over time. The rigors of traveling thousands of miles over East German roads and territory, as well as associate measures to both cloak the USMLM presence and enhance intrusive capabilities, required standard adjustments and constant improvement to ensure high levels of effectiveness.

²⁰⁰A.E. Schanze, former CUSMLM gives operation figures during early 1950's at 100,000 miles. See Schanze, 94.

²⁰¹Unit Histories 1964, 4; 1968, 7; 1971, 3.

²⁰²The time and resources expended at the USMLM and USAREUR in the collection elements of the intelligence process is an extraordinary testament to the continuing recognition of the value of HUMINT operations. The detailed exposition found in the record regarding vehicle types, standardized adjustments prior to service, and those special modifications and equipment used to cloak and strengthen the USMLM's covert qualities supports this emphasis. Colonel Paul G. Skowronek, a former CUSMLM noted the value of mobility:

Travel privileges accorded by the agreement [Huebner-Malinin] gradually became the most important single element of the liaison arrangement. When the Russians sealed their zone to Western Allied military and civilian travel, and later when their zone became the so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR) the only outside observation of conditions there was by the traveling liaison teams. The permission for "complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision" was the most carefully defended provision of the liaison agreement. For instance, [provision] 10 also stated that members of the missions were to be permitted to visit "military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories and enterprises" by request "which must be acted upon within 24-72 hours." In practice such requests were seldom made by either side because these visits would have to be scheduled and would be under supervision, thereby rendered valueless compared to unannounced travel "without escort or supervision." (Skowronek, 49-50).

By mutual agreement with the Soviet Union, the USMLM was accredited 10 vehicle passes for use in the Soviet zone. In other words, only 10 vehicles at any one time would be officially licensed for use, although an average of 25 vehicles were required in the total USMLM fleet so that replacements could be provided immediately in the event of mechanical breakdown or damage to a licensed tour vehicle.²⁰³ The goal was to cancel no intelligence tour due to vehicle maintenance problems.

Tour vehicles were replaced approximately every 25,000-30,000 miles to keep breakdowns or accidents at a minimum during operations.²⁰⁴ Back-up vehicles were held in reserve by USMLM Transportation (Administrative) Division and were stationed at West Berlin Mission Headquarters or in holding garages on the premises of USMLM Headquarters at Potsdam House.²⁰⁵

Despite its facetious tone, it is not inaccurate to state that the relevant sections on vehicles found in the USMLM Unit Histories represent what could be annual supplements to Motortrend magazine. Each year, tour vehicles underwent a performance appraisal. Evaluations were based on handling, maneuverability, speed and endurance both on and off paved surfaces. If a particular make or style of car failed to meet the high standards required for surveillance travel, upgrading or outright replacement with a superior brand immediately followed. It would have been remarkable if such attention to operational effectiveness and equipment upgrades was meant merely to facilitate the liaison role of the USMLM. Clearly, it was not.

The earliest detailed reference to the tour vehicles the author uncovered appears in Lough's 1964 study. In it, Lough noted that at least by 1962, tour vehicle types included late

²⁰³Compiled from the following Unit Histories: 1964, 4; 1965, 10; 1968, 7; 1969, 5; 1970, 4; 1971, 3; 1975, 71-72; 1976, IV-3, IV-4; 1982, 69; and 1983, 63.

²⁰⁴Unit History 1964, 5; Lough, (1964), ii.

²⁰⁵Unit Histories 1966, 10; 1967, 163; 1969, 5; 1971, 3.

model Fords and Chevrolets, but also incorporated West German Opels for use *only* in West Berlin. Noting Lough:

For political reasons the American made cars—Fords or Chevrolets—are always used in touring, even though European cars might be more suitable for the East German roads. (The Fords are really too long, low and wide.) The French and the British MLMs use West German Opels and Mercedes Benzes.²⁰⁶

By 1962, standard modifications of each tour vehicle were made in order to augment ground intelligence operations. These included: standard transmissions for varied terrain; an auxiliary fuel tank for extended intelligence missions; a non-slip differential for the rear wheel drive; and cleated tires. To cloak tour vehicles, most car parts including chrome surfaces were painted olive drab. And perhaps most intriguing were the independent electrical switches connected to brake and license plate lights for night-time driving in order to confuse and mislead Soviet and East German "tails."²⁰⁷

Other standard equipment of the period included a fire extinguisher, two spare wheels with tires, a radio transmitter/receiver, and an all-important winch to be used for extricating tour vehicles from ditches and shallow ravines.²⁰⁸ Regarding the last of these items, the conditions of East German roads due to poor construction and heavy use by Soviet tanks and other armored vehicles made it necessary to equip tour vehicles with winches. There was a need for winches because much touring was cross-country and off of main roads. Modified suspensions of the wide and low-riding American sedans was also a standard adjustment, "so that the observation teams could drive along deeply rutted back roads in search of indications of military activity."²⁰⁹ According to Skowronek, one of the main concerns while touring was to

²⁰⁶Lough, (1964), 26.

²⁰⁷Lough, (1964), ii; Skowronek, 118; Lough Letter.

²⁰⁸Schanze, 98; Lough, (1964), 27; Unit History 1966, 11; Skowronek, 105-106.

²⁰⁹Skowronek, 103.

avoid as much as possible drawing the attention of the Soviet military or East German police; "every effort was made to get unstuck and on the move as rapidly as possible."²¹⁰

Amusingly, a form of "equipment" that did not appear on pre-tour check lists was the East German tractor. Contact with and aid from the friendly East German farmer did not become part of official operating procedures, but it was at times very important. As Skowronek explains, anti-Soviet sentiments gave USMLM tour teams the added leverage they would need until the concept of 4W drive off-road vehicles was adopted in 1974:

In most instances East German tractor drivers, all of whom seemed to hate the Russian system of collectivized farming, would hitch the mired [USMLM] vehicle to their tractors and pull it to solid ground. They usually refused to take money for their helpfulness, but a package or two of American cigarettes was cheerfully accepted.

Ten of the twenty Soviet Army combat divisions which were stationed in East Germany were tank divisions, so there was a large amount of tank unit activity to be observed. However, it was difficult for any sedan, even USMLM's specially modified vehicles, to follow tanks on unimproved trails. In remote regions horses were still used for farm work, and a strong team could usually pull a mission sedan through the worst ditches.²¹¹

Another incident notes the occasion of a friendly contact with an East German and details the typical modus operandi employed by USMLM tours:

During a visit to a Soviet river-crossing area, a USMLM team had to pass through a small town, drive over a dike and out onto a tidal plain along a winding road for about a mile. When the team arrived, the Soviets were busy putting a bridge across the river and constructing ferries, so the team stayed to watch and photograph the proceedings. About a half hour later, as the team was leaving the observation post, it noticed a man on a bicycle approaching across the tidal plain. Starting back toward the dike, the team stopped to see what the man wanted. He was an elderly man carrying an axe and a shovel. He explained that it had been over a half hour since the team had passed through the village and crossed the dike. He knew there was no other way out and was afraid that the vehicle was stuck. Thus, he was on his way to try to "help the Americans so that the Russians would not catch them."²¹²

In 1969, automatic transmissions were installed in three Ford Custom Sedans "to determine their feasibility as tour cars;" with favorable results in off-road handling performance and fewer mechanical breakdowns leading to the installation of automatic transmissions in all tour

²¹⁰Ibid., 105.

²¹¹Ibid., 104-105.

²¹²Unit History 1964, 48.

cars beginning in 1970.²¹³ Also that year there was usage of studded snow and mud tires for all tour vehicles to improve mobility and safety, as well as the introduction of a Ford Bronco as a "special-purpose vehicle to be used. . . where cross-country mobility was essential."²¹⁴

A watershed was reached in 1975 regarding the evaluation of vehicle types, and the political issue surrounding the use of foreign models as the USMLM continued the search for the "perfect tour vehicle." As noted by Lough, the American made Fords and Chevrolets had been viewed at least as early as 1962 as being inferior to the European models that were designed and built for East German roads and terrain. The American vehicles were slung too low and had wide bodies. Furthermore, by 1975 American vehicles traversing East German roads were no doubt easily identified as USMLM vehicles and obviously stood apart from European models.²¹⁵

Accordingly, "after lengthy consideration and coordination" based on the collective experience of tour officers and drivers, CUSMLM requested up to nine West German-made Opel Admirals for use in the USMLM fleet of 22 vehicles. The request was subsequently approved by DCSI USAREUR, with year-end accreditations listing 4 of the permitted 10 vehicles as 1975 model Opels.²¹⁶ By early October 1975, at least two of the Opels had been modified to include 4W drive capability. As in the previous year, these alterations were facilitated by FF Development, Ltd., Coventry, England.²¹⁷

In 1978 specially equipped and "electronically modified" Mercedes-Benz 350 SE's were added to the USMLM fleet:

These vehicles were processed by the Rallye Department of Daimler-Benz. Modifications reflect those which carried Mercedes Benz to the top four places in the 30,000 kilometer

²¹³Unit Histories 1969, 5; 1970, 4.

²¹⁴Unit History 1970, 4.

²¹⁵Stovall phone conversation.

²¹⁶Unit History 1975, 72.

²¹⁷Ibid.

South American Rallye and represent the state of the art for rallye conditions, conditions closely approximating those under which USMLM operates in East Germany.²¹⁸

This process continued until 1981, when the Mercedes 350SE Sedan and Mercedes 280GE replaced all Ford Broncos, Range Rovers, and even Opel models; eliminating American vehicles from the tour fleet and suggesting that the most desirable type of tour vehicle had been found. For example, the Mercedes 280GE was considered to be "rugged," more flexible on irregular terrain, and offered a small turning radius improving its ability to elude Soviet and East German "tails" while engaged in patented USMLM auto chases.²¹⁹ Combined with the other superior characteristics of the Mercedes model and the standard modifications made on all tour vehicles, USMLM personnel at the time believed that they had found the high-performance, on and off-road prowl car sought over the years.

Data from the 1982 and 1983 Unit Histories, (which are the last and most recent de-classified USMLM documents available to the author), reveal that all ten accreditations were allocated to Mercedes models; with five vehicle passes assigned to Mercedes 350SE Sedans and the remaining five to Mercedes 280GE 4W drive station wagons.²²⁰ The latest reference from any source is found in a de-classified document which details the circumstances and negotiations surrounding the shooting death in 1985 of Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr. by a sentry near a Soviet military installation north of Berlin. The vehicle used by Nicholson and his driver at the time of the incident was a Mercedes 280 Gelaendewagen, a photo of which clearly indicates its jeep-like, off-road capabilities.²²¹

²¹⁸Unit History 1978, IV-5; According to Stovall, Rallye events were watched closely by the USMLM to ascertain most effective vehicles and equipment. Despite some reluctance among US military officials to make the investment, the victory of a West German driver during Stovall's tenure gave the argument in favor of Mercedes models some extra support. (Stovall phone conversation with author.)

²¹⁹Unit History 1980, IV-4.

²²⁰Unit Histories 1982, 69; 1983, 64.

²²¹Stacy, 5.

APPENDIX F

FACILITIES

In terms of buildings, USMLM occupied two main structures—Potsdam House and West Berlin Headquarters.²²² Each facility served a particular function supporting USMLM's intelligence collection operations.

Potsdam House

According to provisions 7 and 13 of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, the Soviet CinC was to provide USMLM quarters "at or near Potsdam," with the building to "enjoy full rights of extra-territoriality."²²³ The Soviets procured "Potsdam House," a lake-side country estate in suburban Potsdam for this purpose. Placement of the Mission facility in Potsdam was due almost solely to the needs of "diplomatic" representation and to aid communication between zones during the tenuous period of joint administration of occupied Germany. The Mission house was to be at or near the Headquarters of the US CinC but could not have been placed in Berlin, since technically Berlin was under a separate quadripartite administration and not part of any Power's zone of occupation. Of course, this did not preclude the use of Berlin as a base for support elements. Interestingly, as Lough notes, Potsdam House was merely the "official" residence of CUSMLM, whereas the real headquarters was a three-story brick structure in the US zone of Berlin.²²⁴ Both the need for secrecy and complex intelligence processing system of USMLM required the use of Berlin HQ as the primary installation for USMLM. Further, a 1978 Unit History notes that although officially accredited USMLM tour officers had for a time

²²²Lough, (1964), 24.

²²³Huebner-Malinin Agreement text.

²²⁴Lough, (1964), 24.

resided at Potsdam House with their families, all were moved to West Berlin HQ "because of logistic problems associated with their support."²²⁵

Potsdam Mission House was part of a 4.5 acre estate located on the Lehnitzsee (lake) in Neu Fahrland, a suburb of Potsdam near Berlin.²²⁶ The grounds included a carriage house, gardener's house, two storage buildings, boat house and servant's quarters. The last two of these structures were subsequently returned at the request of Soviet authorities.²²⁷ In the 1950s there was a Soviet plan to move USMLM official residence from Potsdam House to a location in central Potsdam near the British and French MLMs. This effort was unsuccessful due to stern refusals from the United States.²²⁸

Function

Potsdam House was the location for two main types of support functions. These were: 1) forward-based communication and administration outside of Berlin; and 2) collection of biographical intelligence through social and diplomatic liaison.

As a lodger unit, USMLM was served well by Potsdam House facilities. Potsdam House was USMLM's forward operational base as tours departed from and returned to the facility. Tour personnel received food and supplies prior to these ground operations. Especially for overnight or two to three day tours, a substantial outlay would be required. Upon return, tour personnel could clean, eat and rest in the spacious confines of the mansion.²²⁹

Potsdam House also served as a repository for records of tour personnel; their official credentials and accrediting documents. Processing requests for visitor passes also took place at Potsdam House and were subsequently transmitted to Soviet authorities for approval. Here, it

²²⁵Unit History 1978, E-1, Annex E.

²²⁶Unit History 1975, 75.

²²⁷Unit History 1978, E-1.

²²⁸Unit History 1975, 75.

²²⁹Unit History 1978, E-1.

is interesting to note that not all "visitors" to USMLM were processed according to this authorized procedure. It was not unusual for non-accredited military personnel and officials/employees of US government agencies to travel the Berlin Corridor via Glienicke Bridge to and from Potsdam House and West Berlin HQ on forged credentials.²³⁰

Potsdam House was a major base of communication between USMLM and other support elements. Operations required constant contact with USMLM Berlin HQ, and USAREUR HQ. Furthermore, essential communiqués between USMLM and GSFG /SERB were facilitated from Potsdam House. Conferences at the site were important as USMLM embarked on emergency rescue operations for disabled USMLM vehicles. Regarding a diplomatic or representative role, USMLM initiated search-rescue-recovery operations from Potsdam House for US military or civilian personnel who became lost or were otherwise in distress while traveling the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahns.²³¹

Duty Officers were assigned to supervise Potsdam House operations. This included routine administrative and security measures, the supervision of enlisted tour drivers, the management of East German employees provided by SERB, and maintaining routine liaison with SERB on general USMLM matters.²³² The continuous presence of a Duty Officer at Potsdam was crucial to USMLM's intelligence operations. According to Skowronek, USMLM personnel would occupy Potsdam House on a "temporary duty basis so that mission headquarters was always staffed and available for Soviet messages. [Provision] 11 [of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement] allowed each mission to have radio and telephone communication and courier travel privileges to their respective Commander-in-Chief."²³³

²³⁰Confidential source.

²³¹Unit History 1966, 25; Schanze, 109.

²³²Unit History 1966, 25.

²³³Skowronek, 48.

All in all, the Potsdam House facility proved to be invaluable for intelligence operations, both in terms of logistical support as a forward base, and as a location for formal and informal military-military contacts from which important biographical intelligence was collected and exchanged. As an extraterritorial unit, Potsdam House also served as an "embassy" to the GDR in lieu of formal US recognition and inception of diplomatic accord in 1974. USMLM personnel used Potsdam House as a staging point for rescue operations or representation of US citizens or military personnel in distress in the GDR. In keeping with USMLM's dual characterization as both a diplomatic entourage of military attachés and therefore by definition an intelligence collection instrument, the Potsdam House facility provided for a dynamic range of related activity.

USMLM Berlin Headquarters

In as much as USMLM was a comprehensive intelligence instrument, other remaining steps in the overall intelligence cycle, i.e., establishing intelligence requirements, planning, direction, production and dissemination, required an additional facility to provide support. The structure would have to be of sufficient size to house the required equipment and staff, and also be secure and easily accessible.²³⁴

These requirements were well understood by those responsible for setting-up USMLM in the Spring of 1947. A memorandum from HQ EUCOM dated 29 April 1947 issued instruction to CUSMLM that there be designated a "rear echelon" facility in Berlin "for the purpose of preparing and processing documents of a confidential nature."²³⁵

Originally the Berlin facility was located at the "Old Press Club" on Sven Hedin Strasse in West Berlin. In 1957 USMLM Berlin HQ moved to its permanent location at 19/21 Foehrenweg. The compound, planned and built in 1936 by Albert Speer and used by Field

²³⁴According to Skowronek, a secure Berlin HQ was necessary because SERB hired East German workmen to make repairs in Potsdam House, and "it was generally suspected that electronic listening devices could have been installed during these visits." (Skowronek, 72.) Indeed, USMLM personnel would have been disappointed if the Soviets had not tried!

²³⁵Lough, (1965), 85.

Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff (COS) for the German Military Supreme Command, was the location of the Berlin office of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and later by its successor the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947.²³⁶

The compound maintained an area of 2,309 acres and, prior to some renovation and construction of an annex by 1982, consisted of a large four-floor brick structure containing approximately 33 rooms and 8,674 square feet of floor space.²³⁷ Given its original purpose as a German military command installation, this building's lower two floors were built with steel reinforced concrete ceilings, steel doors and window shutters. Essentially bomb proof, the building maintained a concrete lined escape tunnel that lead to a nearby shelter which was equipped with ceramic air ducts.²³⁸

The compound at 19/21 Foehrenweg, termed as USMLM's "real headquarters"²³⁹ was adequate to the task as a rear echelon base of support and administration where data collected by USMLM tour personnel would be analyzed and processed into an intelligence product and disseminated accordingly. Here, the analyses undertaken at USMLM HQ were viewed with special concern, grew in importance and led to "further enhancement of the analytical quality of the USMLM product." High-level analysts in the US government placed much value on the initial "impressions and analyses" of intelligence officers and analysts attached to USMLM.²⁴⁰

The Berlin facility housed USMLM's Operations Division in addition to assorted photo-duplication and word processing equipment.²⁴¹ This store also included a principle element to USMLM's intelligence product in the manner of a photographic laboratory. In addition to film processing, photo-duplication, and the production of several thousand proofs, prints, and

²³⁶Unit History 1978, F-1.

²³⁷Ibid.

²³⁸Ibid.

²³⁹Lough (1964), 24.

²⁴⁰Unit History 1976, 82.

²⁴¹Unit History 1979, IV-1; 1978, IV-2; 1979, IV-3; 1980, IV-1.

intelligence reports per year, photo technicians and other specialists assigned to the laboratory "provided invaluable photographic training to incoming tour personnel."²⁴²

The photolab's function was to evaluate and process the raw intelligence on Soviet and East German order-of-battle etc. collected by tour personnel into a finished intelligence product for issue. Auxiliary services of equal import included the photographing, processing, and printing of materials for liaison and biographical intelligence functions, e.g., the Torgau, Independence Day and Thanksgiving Day festivities; ID cards and photos for personnel rosters, Soviet accreditation documents, intelligence briefing materials, and the reproducing and printing of Mission restriction maps submitted by SERB.²⁴³

A sample of the production statistics generated by photolab operations for 1978 clearly illustrates the extent to which USMLM both collected and processed intelligence data:

<u>Production Statistics</u>	
<u>ROLLS OF FILM PROCESSED</u>	<u>1978</u>
Black and White	5637
Color	1888
Duplicate Black and White	9768
<u>PRINT PRODUCTION</u>	<u>1978</u>
Proofs	194,985
IR Prints	489,832 ²⁴⁴

USMLM Berlin HQ, the photolab, and assorted processing equipment were not specifically sanctioned in the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Again, this illustrates the maneuverability granted to each party due to the Agreement's lack of specificity on several matters.

²⁴²Unit History 1975, 73.

²⁴³Unit History 1979, IV-7. With nearly 90% of USMLM efforts geared toward reconnaissance in the Soviet zone of Germany, the Berlin HQ provided essential services which could not have been adequately maintained via Potsdam House.

²⁴⁴Unit History 1979, IV-7.

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