



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-1001



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

June 28, 1993

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Intelligence

General Gordon R. Sullivan
Chief of Staff, United States Army
The Pentagon, Room 3E668
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200

Dear General Sullivan

CSA HAS SEEN 2/7/93

I am violating my own first rule to keep such communication brief. I am succumbing to the temptation as I depart the service after 36 years to reflect on the qualities of the military profession which make it a calling, a service to the nation, and not just a job. I take great pride in being a part of an institution which has responded responsibly to internal and external challenges, which has never declined a mission, and which has had the moral courage to acknowledge deficiencies and to take heed of ethical and societal issues which affect our values and our readiness. The Army is a significant contributor to what is good about our nation. It goes without saying that we have indeed been there, when called upon for our nation's security.

I feel good about the massive effort we undertook to make the vision of a volunteer Army a reality. The leadership sessions on how to deal with the issues of equal opportunity, drugs and substance abuse, and the turbulence of Vietnam short tours must be a seminal case study in how a high performing institution, responsible to the citizenry, rose to the challenge of mid course corrections.

I am proud to have served in Vietnam and for the idealism, naive though it may have been, which motivated our fighting side by side with our South Vietnamese ally. I am proud to have been part of the generation which provided the steadiness of purpose to hold firm as the Berlin Wall went up and to be there when the Wall came down with open minds to the possibilities provided by the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Communism and the Soviet Union.

The emotion of seeing the rejoining of families and the expressions on the faces of a tide of refugees following the Velvet Revolution was payment enough for the years on duty along Germany's inner border.

That year after the Wall came down, I stood in a cemetery in Budapest with the moon rising over the Danube and witnessed the first ceremony honoring fallen Freedom Fighters of the October

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1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. It was chilling to witness and contemplate the momentous personal and historic occasion for the now free Hungarians present at that ceremony.

If I remember correctly, you were also present at Kelly Barracks, Stuttgart, when the VII US Corps prepared to deploy to Saudi Arabia to reinforce the Desert Shield forces. The symbolism of the Corps, which had helped liberate Europe from the Nazi regime and remain as part of NATO's shield against Communism, being sent off from Germany to fight successfully in Desert Storm, by Field Marshall Rommel's son, the Burgermeister of Stuttgart, was another truly historic moment for those present. The moment was made more poignant by demonstrations at the fence line of those now free in a democratic Germany to express their opposing opinion to the deployment. Their "Kein Blut fuer Oel" demonstrations were more than offset by the thousand kindnesses of German citizens to families who waited for the safe return of soldiers off to war, a war to repulse yet another 20th Century aggressor, Saddam Hussein.

On yet another occasion in Berlin, I stood alone in the center of Glienecke Bruecke on the night in November 1990 watching as a small contingent of Soviet soldiers took down, for the last time, the check point which divided Potsdam and Berlin. I thought about the number of exchanges of personnel made over that bridge, Gary Powers, the U2 pilot, Abel, the Soviet spy, and others. I thought about the daily trips across that bridge which US Military Liaison teams to the Groups of Soviet Forces Germany had made since the end of World War II to keep eyes on target and be a front line of warning to nuanced changes in Soviet and East German forces. I thought of Major Nick Nicholson, the US MLM member, shot and callously left to bleed to death when on one such mission. I looked up in the distance at the Teufelsberg, the SIGINT station which I had commanded as a Colonel, and thought of the worldwide intelligence system which had been on watch 24 hours a day forever to provide the free world maximum warning of potential hostilities, hostilities which might lead to nuclear war.

I rejoiced upon the return of Desert Storm units to Germany and later saluted and unsuccessfully held back tears as units in which I had proudly served folded their colors to await a future calling because the cold war was won, and the public expected a peace dividend and a new world order. Gone are the 8th Mechanized Infantry Division, the VII United States Corps, the 307th Military Intelligence Battalion, the 207th Military Intelligence Brigade, Field Station Berlin, and Detachment Wobeck in which I had served and many, many more proud units.

These feelings, born of service, are payment unto themselves for those who have been a part of history.

I enlisted upon graduation from college. Three years became thirty-six as new opportunities enticed further commitment until an adventure became a career. Six overseas tours (two short) and enough temporary duty to count yet another short tour away from home. Who can count the moves? Spouses count homes moved and reestablished, friendships interrupted, honeymoon, births and graduations missed, jobs given up and career curtailed. Children know the schools attended. High school moves in senior year count most heavily. Dad's absences at significant events are part of their shared experience as are homecomings, promotions, recognition ceremonies, and changes of command. Their own self confidence to look upon moves, new jobs, travel and meeting "foreigners" as adventures turn out to be unique benefits for an Army Brat. Now retirement. A transition to a new chapter. Thanks Chief, for the opportunity I and my family had to serve in a great institution, the United States Army.

Army intelligence has come a long, long way in my experience. We must retain the multi-discipline, all-source career development concept for officers and the CEWI organizational concept for units. The force design update for corps and divisional MI units, which the Intelligence Center and School developed and successfully defended through TRADOC reviews, and which you approved, is on target.

Attention is now being made to readjust the skill mix to optimize new technologies (JSTARS, UAV, Common Ground Stations, Guard Rail Common Sensor, Advance Quick Fix, DTSS, IMET, various TENCAP systems, TROJAN Spirit and ASAS). The common ground station and all source analysis processing and reporting systems will enable multi-sensor processing and require redefinition of enlisted specialties.

We must be careful to retain an MOS system which develops strong technical and functional experts, especially among enlisted and warrant ranks. I think we are doing an excellent job at Fort Huachuca training soldier technicians. Image interpreters, SIGINTers, interrogators, counter intelligence specialists, analysts and electronic warfare specialists are each required. There is a push from above to give single service executive agent proponency for core curriculum development for training image interpreters and targeting. These basic skills are essential to corps and below operations and I believe should be retained within TRADOC. Joint training curricula may be developed for advanced, special purpose requirements.

Digitization of the battlefield for brilliant weapons applications and distributed situational awareness graphics provides great potential for synchronizing fires and maneuver to the depths of the battlefield. However, there is more to collection and pre-processing single source information into all

source intelligence, targeting and IPB products for such battlefield applications than simply understanding key strokes and software applications on high tech work stations.

There are very real limitations on what digits can do in a Bosnia, Somalia, or Vietnam environment. Developing the information to accurately assess an adversary's intent and will; to identify and assess new military technology capabilities; to discover operational security leaks and vulnerabilities; to elicit information from refugees and POW; and, to perform effective liaison with allies and future adversaries are intensive manpower operations requiring highly trained specialists. This is the substance of intelligence, i.e., being predictive, which differentiates it from CNN, after the fact, reporting.

We desperately need a second General Officer assigned to the Intelligence Center and School as the Deputy Commandant.

The US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, the Home of MI, is where we start our soldier professionals on the path to successful performance in corps and below tactical units as well as in INSCOM and national intelligence agencies. The excessive, yet essential, travel requirements on the School Commandant, who is now also responsible for the Post, to participate in all the GO level, combat and training development synchronization meetings at TRADOC, CAC, DA and to the field to visit units take him away from his primary responsibilities of mentoring and forging the future of our corps. He needs a GO deputy.

The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program is a national asset. We do not have sufficient numbers to meet current and future colonel requirements. The other Services are not pulling their share of these joint responsibilities with equivalent quality. Army boards still have difficulty equating repetitive FAO tours with core value command and ops assignments. I'd double the Army investment in FAOs, access top quality, encourage single track from non-command selectees, require proportional selection for resident CGSC and War College, and expect higher than Army average promotion rates. This is an economy of force personnel investment which is particularly important to our nation as we downsize, reduce our forward presence and expect our forces to be ready for any contingency.

The Army Area Handbook Program (Country Studies) is also a national asset. I understand that FY 95 funding may have been cut to zero. As a DAMO-SSM action officer in 1972-75, later as a politico-military officer in OSD, and as a career long intelligence officer and FAO, I cannot recall how frequently I relied on those country studies to prepare myself, military training teams, UN observers, security assistance officers and others for with essential background information to a current

crises or upcoming TDY. There is no equivalent, concise encyclopedic basic data source. DCSOPS action officers are exploring the potential to increase the handbooks usefulness via CD ROM applications. I recommend that funding be restored for the basic program and the CD ROM enhancements evaluated for interagency funding support.

I don't think the Army is adequately represented in the space and imagery business (i.e., National Reconnaissance Office, Central Imagery Office, and Defense Mapping Agency). We do a good job with our TENCAP programs to parasite capabilities for ground force application from systems fielded and planned by staffs manned and led by personnel from other Services and agencies. However, we don't sufficiently influence investment strategies and priorities in a manner to optimize system utility to tactical forces. Investment in the distribution and processing infrastructure, which would get the products of these systems to the tactical user, is underfunded. We need to be developing professionals to operate on the staffs of those agencies, and compete for general officer leadership of same. An Army engineer should head DMA on a rotating basis. We need a Bud Forster quality GO to work in the NRO. An MI colonel, competitive for GO, should be on the CIO staff, but such an assignment would probably kill his chances for selection.

We are working on developing an operationally effective balance between the MI reserves and active duty forces. We have a ways to go before we can claim that a fairly good vision has been implemented. The 200,000 call-up authority needs to be refined by Congress before the strategy of taking risk on active components and placing capability in the reserves is fully acceptable. Intelligence needs to go into battle early. During the pre-crisis stage, we frequently need the services of selected small detachments of linguists and special skill units earlier than the 200,000 call up would normally be a politically viable course of action for the NCA.

Our efforts to realign linguist authorizations to anticipated future requirements is progressing. In my view, we still have too many Spanish and German linguists, particularly in SOF. That's being worked. Language proficiency training, particularly low density languages, remains a problem. If the increase in language proficiency pay passes in this session of Congress, it should be a tremendous motivating factor for the soldier to increase and sustain proficiency levels. The Intelligence Authorization Bill, reported out of the HPSCI, would also pay linguists who are proficient in two languages and would permit equal pay to reservists. The Armed Services Committees are now considering the HPSCI initiative. The proficiency pay increase may be in trouble. I am convinced that this investment will pay dividends in linguistic force readiness and flexibility (i.e., getting us Slavic linguists who are also Serbo-Croatian

linguists, etc). I would hope that you would support increased language proficiency pay, along with substantive command language programs and improved management visibility into linguistic proficiency as an additional measure of MI unit readiness.

Hill and OSD staffers are micro managing how we organize and perform our missions. Despite many efforts to explain, demonstrate, and defend component level intelligence, there is no appreciation or support for these essential capabilities in this town. You saw the outstanding work USAREUR and INSCOM were doing at the USAREUR Combat Intelligence Readiness Facility. That is component level intelligence at its best, providing real intelligence input to joint and subordinate forces. There is a perception in Washington that the J2 can do all that with purple suiters and communication pipes to Washington. Warfighting J2s need intelligence personnel who know their business from each Service component's standpoint, then they can effectively leverage and synchronize the intelligence system for common purpose.

It is in the interest of combat arms generals to get inside the intelligence battlefield operating system. When they do so they will discover how dependent they are for their intelligence on their effectively leveraging national and joint assets and how dependent their subordinates are on the proper mission priorities being placed on their command's assets. The USAREUR Major Leaders' Training Conference on Intelligence was a first rate professional development experience. Such sessions should be institutionalized across the Army. LTG Griffith recommends that Division CGs and ADCs have a PCC-like session at Fort Huachuca. LTG Taylor arranged a professional development session for his GOs at the school to observe a field display of the intelligence BOS backed with presentations and seminars. The word is spreading and should be encouraged.

We need to invest in greater fidelity in the simulation of intelligence systems in distributed wargaming. Connecting TACSIM and NWARS as the intelligence drivers to JESS and BCS in BCTP approaches what is needed. We also need to field a distributed intelligence simulation trainer or IEW Tactical Proficiency Trainer, not just to train the intelligence specialist or MI unit, but to train the commanders and staffs they support in the intellectual effort, staff processes and lead times required to fully synchronize intelligence assets to operational requirements. Properly employed, intelligence is a force multiplier. Currently, we are missing great opportunities to fine tune this essential aspect of training readiness.

The most credible advocates of a strong intelligence capability are our tactical commanders. LTG Griffith has been extraordinarily helpful by providing testimony to the HPSCI and giving speeches at a number of professional symposia. I


sincerely hope that when General Powell retires, he acknowledges the outstanding intelligence support his Armed Services, and the intelligence community at large, is providing to units in the field. Admiral Crowe and General Schwartzkopf both criticized the intelligence community upon their retirements. Some good came of such headlines. CIA and Defense cooperation has never been better since MG Lajoie's A/DDO position and Office of Military Assistance were established. But the headlines of their criticisms ricocheted around the intelligence community, providing a feeding frenzy for staffers and consternation for the intelligence troopers of every service who busted their butts doing the very best they could for US and allied forces in crises and combat.

Generals, coming to Washington on other business, need to help carry the message to OSD and Congress, to help develop a cadre of staffers and Congressmen who understand our business and why we do things the way we do. I recommend offsite seminars for general officers on dealing with Congress and staff. The seminars should include prior and/or serving members of Congress and senior staff.

Finally, the Army needs to develop a stable of young intelligence generals and carefully manage their assignments to make them competitive for J2 JCS, DIRNSA, Director DIA and Deputy Director CIA. Your decision to fill the J2 PACOM position with an Army GO was correct. When I was J2, CENTCOM, the assemblage of Senior Intelligence Officers Conferences chaired by Director, DIA was a sea of blue. Now we have SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM and soon PACOM. I'd suggest targeting EUCOM and downgrading USAREUR for the next GO rotation. An alternative would be to go for J2, LANTCOM.

Sir, it has been a privilege to serve. Best wishes to you as you continue to steer our nation's Army through a challenging present with assurance that we shall never again permit unready forces to be our first line of defense. "No more Task Force Smiths."

Sincerely,



Cloyd H. Pfister
Major General, U.S. Army
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Intelligence