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*Proceedings Of The 23rd  
International Affairs Symposium*

*01-03 December 1982.*

*Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307*

*International  
Affairs Symposium  
(3rd. 1982 Fort  
Bragg)*



**FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COURSE**

**2-82**

**SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
INSTITUTE FOR  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE**



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER  
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

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
4 MAY 1983

SUBJECT: Proceedings for the Twenty-Third International  
Affairs Symposium

Commandant  
U. S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

1. Enclosed are the "Proceedings" for the Twenty-Third International Affairs Symposium conducted by the School of International Studies at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. Such Symposia are held twice annually as the culminating exercise of the Center's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Course. Complete background information on these Symposia is contained in Appendix A to the enclosed booklet.
2. The Symposium addressed the theme, "The Utility and Future of Security Alliances." Following the Keynote Address by Professor George Quester, Chairman, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, five workshops convened to discuss the specific issues outlined by the Symposium. These issues were: Alliances in the Context of Strategies; The Structure of Alliances; Domestic Factors in the Alliance Process; Current Alternatives to the Alliance Theme; and The Future of the Alliance System. The workshops produced some excellent, thought-provoking ideas, conclusions and recommendations. The "Proceedings" are provided to share the efforts of this Symposium with individuals and agencies dealing in national security affairs.
3. We hope these "Proceedings" will be of interest and use to you.

1 Enclosure  
as

  
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1982  
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The views recorded in the Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Affairs Symposium are not intended to represent the policy of the United States Government nor any department or agency thereof. The purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a record for the participants and other interested persons.

These Proceedings were compiled and edited by Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Kromer. Questions regarding the Symposium or the Proceedings should be directed to:

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
OF THE  
TWENTY-THIRD INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM  
OF THE  
FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COURSE 2-82  
UNITED STATES ARMY INSTITUTE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

The theme of the Twenty-Third International Affairs Symposium was "The Utility and Future of Security Alliances." Background information concerning the general conduct of the symposium is contained in Appendix A to this report. The symposium was convened from 1 through 3 December 1982 at the United States Army Institute for Military Assistance. Events began with the registration of guest participants and subsequently followed the schedule as shown in Appendix B. The first plenary session was opened by the Commandant, Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, who introduced the Symposium keynote speaker, Professor George H. Quester. Following Professor Quester's enlightening address, all participants adjourned to the Fort Bragg Officer's Club for a get-acquainted social hour. A roster of the Symposium participants is at Appendix C.

In an increasingly interdependent world, with the clear emergence of non-traditional forms of power and the rise of regionally influential states, the utility and very existence of security alliances has been called into question. Many of the alliances which were forged in the aftermath of World War II have become sources of friction between the participants and have fallen into disuse or worse. The challenge facing the participants of the Symposium was to examine the present complex of alliances in the context of world realities and develop recommendations for policies/actions concerning the issues.

For the purpose of the Symposium, security alliances involved all those intergovernmental arrangements, bilateral or multilateral, that are thought to enhance the (military) viability of participating countries. Considerations included formal instruments such as treaties, executive agreements, declarations, protocol and other legal documents having security as their objective; informal methods can range from a historical relationship, a mutually acceptable cooperation and coordination, a diplomatic understanding, to publicly declared policies. Security was interpreted in its broader meaning to refer to such militarily related subjects as raw materials, social and economic conditions, and infrastructure.

On 2 December and the morning of 3 December, students and guest participants met in five workshop groups which were formed to examine specific aspects of the theme. The workshops had maximum flexibility for determining content and dimension of their topics. Discussions did not necessarily focus upon situations which involved the United States as a principal participant, but a direct American security perspective did exist.

Pertinent issues discussed by each workshop initially adhered to the following general frame of reference. As the Symposium progressed, the scope of the discussion broadened.

Workshop #1: Alliances in the Context of Strategies

What contributions have alliances made to the realization of strategies?  
What are the historical lessons learned (e.g., NATO, SEATO, CENTO)?  
What are the philosophical and political implications?  
What distinctions are there between bilateralism and multilateralism?

Workshop #2: The Structure of Alliances

Is there an organization, coordination, decision-making unit?  
What has been the evolution of objectives?  
Can commitments and costs be equated?  
How are alliance provisions implemented?  
What are possible requisites, e.g., physical presence, bases, nuclear storage?  
Is there a similarity in charter documents?

Workshop #3: Domestic Factors in the Alliance Process

To what extent can domestic sentiments influence implementation of alliance provisions?  
How effective are religious or ethnic pressure groups in asserting their views?  
Does the anti-war movement have any relevance to alliance policies?  
If Congress is representing public opinion, should it be involved not only in formulation but also in abrogation of treaties?

Workshop #4: Current Alternatives to the Alliance Theme

Have the attitudes of governments changed with respect to the positive contributions of alliances? Why?  
The impact of credibility--the Soviet "Friendship" treaties--the creation of neutral zones--the role of U.N. peacekeeping--the non-aligned movement--the debilitating effects of the Guam doctrine.

Workshop #5: The Future of the Alliance System

Do alliances have a significant military utility?  
Should the "World Policeman" image be subject to revision?  
Should alliances be limited to nuclear assistance?  
Can regional organizations ultimately substitute for American involvement?  
Can one envision a universal system that can obviate the need for alliances?

## OPENING REMARKS

### TWENTY-THIRD INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM

(Named Dignitaries), Ladies and Gentlemen, Good Afternoon. I am Brigadier General Lutz, Commandant of the United States Army Institute for Military Assistance. I extend to all of you a warm welcome to the Twenty-Third International Affairs Symposium of the Foreign Area Officer Course.

The theme of this Symposium, "The Utility and Future of Security Alliances," is quite broad and thought-provoking. Recent events, including war in the South Atlantic, Syrian-Israeli tensions, continued fighting in El Salvador, labor unrest in Poland, prolonged Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, increased anti-American terrorist activity, and the conflict over the modernization of theater nuclear forces in Europe, have raised questions here and abroad about American ability and willingness to influence world events on behalf of its own and its allies' interests and security.

President Reagan's national security advisors are seeking to answer the challenge of these complex issues by, in part, calling for increased military strength to reestablish our international posture and prestige. However, there exists growing domestic opposition to increased spending on military budgets, especially if military adjustments are at the expense of social programs. This will certainly be the subject of intensive debate in Congress in the coming weeks.

While we as military people are heartened by actions toward an enhanced military posture, as foreign area officers and, moreover, as politico-military analysts, we recognize that there are many nonmilitary implements of foreign policy and even more ways and means of using those implements. The thrust of our FAO Course, culminated by this Symposium, is to impart an awareness of the diverse "ways and means" of foreign policy and to teach the skills required to analyze a broad spectrum of situations from local to international in scope using interdisciplinary methods.

We have focused this Symposium on five topics selected by the students of this class as areas where the nature and utility of security alliances may be examined most intensively. These five topics are:

- (1) Alliances in the Context of Strategies.
- (2) The Structure of Alliances.
- (3) Domestic Factors in the Alliance Process.
- (4) Current Alternatives to the Alliance Theme.
- (5) The Future of the Alliance System.

The FAO students have performed extensive research in preparation for workshop discussions of these topics. However, to examine these subjects in detail with a view toward policy relevance, we have invited scholars and analysts from throughout our nation. Sitting among you are academicians and civilian government officials who will join our students, faculty and other military personnel in investigating these subjects. Each of our guest participants was carefully selected for his unique expertise and scholastic talents. We are most fortunate and grateful for their attendance.

As we begin this Twenty-Third Symposium, I believe all of you should know a little more about our FAO students since it is because of them we have convened today. The officers in this class are men and women the Army has selected to prepare for politico-military assignments. By virtue of their prior experience, advanced civil schooling and language abilities, these FAOs have become knowledgeable in area studies and other related fields. The class of 70 Army officers ranges in grade from Captain to Colonel. They have from 5 to 32 years of military service and 47% have advanced degrees. Their sources of commission cover the spectrum: Direct, OCS, ROTC and the Military Academy. They speak 13 languages and several are multilingual. This particular class also has one spouse taking the course for credit.

We are also pleased to have 23 Reserve Component FAO students with the regular class. These officers are with us for the last two weeks of their training as members of the Foreign Area Officer Reserve Component Program. The caliber of these officers is the very best. They bring a wealth of civilian and military experience to our discussions as they participate fully in this Symposium and other classes during the final two weeks of the FAO Course.

We are indeed privileged today to have a very distinguished academician to deliver our Symposium Keynote Address. George H. Quester is currently the Chairman of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland.

Professor Quester graduated from Columbia College in 1958 where he majored in History. He studied Meteorology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1958-1959 while on active duty with the US Air Force, and did his graduate studies in Political Science at Harvard University where he earned his Ph.D. in 1965. Professor Quester has been teaching Government ever since, initially as Professor of Government at Harvard and Cornell Universities and as Chairman of the Department of Government at Cornell University. He served as a professor in the Department of Military Strategy at the National War College just prior to accepting his present post as the Chairman of the Department of Government and Politics at Maryland earlier this year.

Professor Quester has also served as a consultant for the Rand Corporation, and is a most prolific writer. He has authored more than 100 articles and monographs on subjects as diverse as nuclear policy, international terrorism and women in combat. He has edited four books and is the author of six other works.

On various occasions he has been asked to testify before committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate on topics concerning our nuclear policy.

Because of the depth and breadth of his knowledge and experience, Professor Quester is eminently qualified to kick off our Symposium and to evoke your thoughts on workshop topics bearing on "The Utility and Future of Security Alliances."

Ladies and Gentlemen, please join me in a warm welcome for Professor George Quester.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

TWENTY-THIRD INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

THE UTILITY AND FUTURE OF SECURITY ALLIANCES

George H. Quester  
University of Maryland  
1 December 1982

If an American is asked to think about the future utility of security alliances, he probably turns first to the example of NATO, the most prominent and important of any such mutual security agreement. Yet there are ways in which NATO may be very special, so much so that it would be a misleading model for alliance structures anywhere else. It is even possible that NATO is not an "alliance," in the strict sense of what this term has meant for international relations in the past. The problem of keeping Western Europe from being invaded is a very special one, with solutions which continually tax our strategic planning and which defy attempts to make this relevant to other corners of the world.

The Special Problem of NATO

Western Europe is a most valuable piece of land, but unfortunately also a territory geopolitically very vulnerable to the conventional attack of forces emerging from the Eurasian land mass. One hardly has to reread Mackinder to perceive some of the Soviet Union's inherent advantages in bringing forces to bear here. While American reinforcements for the defense of the West European peninsula would have to come by sea or air, Soviet forces merely have to come by train or truck, or by air, leaving the USSR's rapid mobilization and force augmentation an inherent worry for the NATO alliance.

Similar problems apply to one other such peninsula, the Republic of Korea, sitting south of the 1953 truce line, also burdened with the possibility of larger forces being brought down upon it from the interior of Eurasia. South Korea has grown very much in industrial value due to its internal energies and substantial economic growth since the Korean War, but its "value" to the United States is still very different in nature from that of Western Europe. In the Korean case, we mainly remember that American lives were lost in resisting Communist aggression in 1950, so that the precedent of tolerating any repetition of this aggression would seem unbearable. By contrast, our attachment to Europe derives from centuries of cultural, political and philosophical tradition, and a blood kinship affecting most of our citizens, in addition to the vast economic power of Western Europe.

These two peninsulas may thus be unique in sharing the alliance protection problem we will begin with here. Some other parts of the world are vulnerable to invasion from the Communist portions of Asia, for example -- Thailand, but are not nearly as important to the United States. Still other parts of the world are just as valuable, for example -- Japan and Australia and Great Britain, but these are not at all vulnerable to the tank forces of the Soviet Union, i.e., they are not geopolitically-exposed salients, taxing the ability of a maritime protector to check a potential continental-power aggressor.

Another part of the world which has emerged with increased value for the United States and for the western world in the past decade, also exposed to invasion from the center of the Eurasian land mass, is the oil-rich region around the Persian Gulf. It remains a very open question whether the lessons of the NATO "alliance" can be applied to this region, whether it will have to be shielded by conventional defenses and alliance structures of a more traditional sense, or have to be protected instead by still another form of balance of power mechanism, one which no one would claim was an alliance.

### "Solutions" With "Problems"

What then are the possible solutions to the problem of defending such valuable and exposed real estate? One "solution" is the one which would have been the only solution prior to 1945, to augment the conventional defenses of the exposed promontory, building minefields and pill boxes, and adding tanks and fighter bombers, so as to make it difficult, or impossible, for the Eurasian aggressor to sweep into those areas. This solution is sometimes labeled as defense instead of deterrence, or (in a different kind of analytical distinction formulated by Glenn Synder) as "deterrence by denial" instead of "deterrence by punishment." If the Soviet attack came, on Western Europe or on South Korea, it would simply be pushed back, as the Russians lost a great number of tanks and troops, or were given a battlefield-related "bloody nose." Anticipating such a repulse and defeat in advance, the Russians might never attack, just as they now never try to invade Australia.

This "solution" has always been beset with problems, however. Given the ability of the Soviets to mass larger numbers of troops, 175 divisions or 300 divisions, depending on how one is counting, it might be impossible for a maritime-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization to match such forces. For a time, the "Asian hordes" of the Soviet Union looked like they might be accompanied by the even more numerous hordes of the Communist Chinese. If this kind of nightmare largely faded from view in the 1970's, the inherent possibility of a Sino-Soviet detente later in the 1980's ensures that it can never totally fade from view.

Even if such a defense against the Communist might in Eurasia were not impossible, many critics would regard it as too expensive in economic and human terms, as using up too much of GNP, tying up too many years of too many young men's lives in manning the defensive barricades. Western European (and South Korean) strength has depended on economic vitality, as noted, and this vitality can be drained by too large a defensive burden.

The other "solution" to keeping our particularly valuable alliance partners free of Communist control has come in a very different form, threatening Moscow with nuclear retaliation if its forces launch an aggression. This is a solution with a great deal of appeal for Americans because it applies advanced technology rather than a massing of manpower, and because it is consequently a lot cheaper in the human burdens and economic burdens of peacetime. It is certainly physically attainable, since

there is no way for the Russians to preclude such American nuclear retaliation against their homeland; Moscow and other Russian cities have essentially lain exposed to American retaliation ever since 1945. This would thus be "deterrence" (or "deterrence by punishment" in Synder's terms) For other analytical contexts, it is also referred to as "extended deterrence," and sometimes as the coverage of a "nuclear umbrella."

The difficulties with this solution are not, as noted, so much those of physical capability but rather of credibility and rationality. Since the 1950's the Russians have acquired a nuclear arsenal as well. Pierre Gallois posed the quandary quite starkly in 1961. Why would any American President ever escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, as the retaliation for a Soviet invasion of western Europe, if American cities had not yet been struck by the Soviet nuclear forces? It is only the intact status of Soviet cities that now protects North America; their destruction, as a penalty for a Soviet aggression against one or the other of valuable peninsulas sticking out from the Eurasian land mass, would then bring about the destruction of all of the American cities.

Since no rational American President would launch such retaliation, by this analysis, the threat of such retaliation cannot work to deter Soviet attacks. Seeing that we had to be bluffing, seeing that we had no other means of holding on to the areas we value, the Russians would roll in.

#### Making Alliance Nuclear Deterrence Credible

How real is this concern that rationality and prudence would keep an American government from escalating to the nuclear level if Western Europe were invaded, a rationality which allegedly offers the Soviets such a free ride across the Elbe? It is not nearly as real as the arguments sometimes suggest.

If we were being totally logical, we could in fact raise the same doubts about rationality and credibility even for American retaliation after a Soviet missile strike against North American cities. Would it really make sense to devastate Soviet cities in revenge if our cities had been hit? Would it not rather be to the best interest of surviving Americans for the President of the United States to sue for peace in hopes that this would at least speed the delivery of relief supplies from the Soviet Union?

Revenge and retaliation make rational sense on small issues, where the interactions and transactions will be repeated again and again into the future. By retaliating for the first transgression, we discourage such transgressions afterward. But in a World War III situation, there would be no repetitions of the interchange, no "lessons" to be taught relevant to future conduct. When deterrence had failed here, it would have failed once and for all. When our bluff had been called, we would prove nothing for the future by going through with our threats.

The important point here is that all such speculation will seem rather pointless to Soviet decision planners, for it is still all too likely that any American President would retaliate after American cities had been destroyed, whether or not such retaliation "made sense." The instinct for revenge is strong enough to qualify as a gut reaction, and no Soviet leader could count on getting away with such a transgression.

Similarly abstract and unrealistic estimates of American rationality and moderation are sometimes advanced for the contingency of a Soviet "surgical strike" directed only at our missile silos, during the so-called "window of vulnerability." Amid estimates that such a Soviet strike would "only" kill 800,000 or "only" 20 million Americans, the President of the United States would allegedly be deterred from striking back with his SLBM forces because so much more of the US remained intact. Again, it is a pipe dream for any Soviet planner to count on such restraint in the United States. If even as many as a half million Americans were killed by such a "surgical strike," it remains very likely that the Soviet Union and its cities would be devastated in response, and it is basically very healthy that Soviet leaders know this.

How then does this relate to the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence for Western Europe or for South Korea? If it is credible and plausible that a US President would order his strategic nuclear forces into action, when the Continental United States had been attacked, might it also be credible that he would do so after invasion of the Western European peninsula? A fair number of analysts have argued that the first is credible, but that the second is not. Only the "handle" of the nuclear umbrella gets shielded from the rain, not anything out beyond it. As noted, Pierre Gallois had thus argued that such nuclear umbrellas are irrational and incredible. Henry Kissinger published a best-selling book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, in 1957 arguing basically the same thing, that the threat of American retaliation against the Soviet homeland would have to be held back, reserved only for the deterrence of Soviet attacks on the US homeland.

Kissinger could thus be praised for having seen today's problems already a quarter-century ago, embarking on a path of insightful analysis which ultimately made him Secretary of State. Yet, the tone of his book implies that Western Europe would surely have been invaded by now, since no defenses or "deterrence by denial" were put into place. What should we then make of the fact that this geopolitically vulnerable peninsula was not invaded for these twenty-five years, even in the absence of any significant defenses? The truth is that various ways have been found of making the linkages of nuclear deterrence more credible again, despite the abstract logic of the strategic writers, and we shall now proceed to list and discuss some of these linkages.

One way to maintain our credibility here is, of course, to remain meaningfully superior at the strategic nuclear level, so superior that our cities and people would suffer relatively little in an all-out-war, or at least be so superior that we would "win" such a war. At times, this is what is meant by "escalation dominance," the notion that we would gain militarily or otherwise by moving up to the use of nuclear weapons, with the Soviets thus being impressed and deterred by the advance perception of this.

Such escalation dominance was automatic when we alone had nuclear weapons. Once the Soviets acquired such weapons in 1949, however, the protection of our cities and people should have come into question. The NSC-68 document prepared by Paul Nitze and his staff in 1950 already raised some of these doubts within the government about extended deterrence and nuclear umbrellas, the same doubts that were to be outlined for the public reader by Kissinger some seven years later.

Even if our cities will be hit, one can keep some reinforcement of nuclear deterrence for Western Europe and South Korea by continuing to discuss escalation dominance and war-fighting as if they were meaningful, pretending to be so locked into "winning" any future war that we would have no compunctions about directing nuclear warheads at such "military targets" as Moscow and other Soviet cities. President Eisenhower and General LeMay remained good at this all through the 1950's. Some analysts would argue that this is what the Soviets are doing to us today, turning the tables on us, now that their nuclear arsenal has surpassed ours in total megatonnage, ignoring the inevitable damage to their cities by pretending to be most concerned about who would "win" any future nuclear war.

The discussion of Eisenhower's style then led us into perhaps the most important part of the attempt to deter by threat of escalation, considerably more important than who actually has more megatonnage, or who has objective "escalation dominance," and here I refer to the manner in which the President and people of the United States put forward their intentions on these matters.

As demonstrated all too well by the press conferences and other public statements of President Eisenhower, it is crucial that the President be a good actor, that he feign a lack of awareness of any "rational" reasons for being reluctant to punish the Soviets for aggression, that he pretend to be fully intent on such retaliatory punishment, just as he would retaliate for any attack on the United States itself. When the arguments of an analyst like Henry Kissinger were ever addressed to Eisenhower at a press conference, he would always garble his response, so that no one could be sure that he had understood the reasoning. Critics passed this off as showing the intellectual limitations of the President. An astute strategic analyst would rather see it as evidence, (inherently imperfect evidence, of course) of what a clever old fox the Republican President was, for any Soviet observer at the press conference would have had to report back to Moscow that the free ride into Frankfurt was by no means yet assured. The American President was either too foolish or too uncomprehending to realize that he would have to withhold SAC during the Soviet armored advance into West Germany.

The Democrats under President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara began their time in office by trying to be more clear and rational, aiming for a conventional defense of Western Europe so that the US would not have to bluff at what was so patently irrational. Faced with European resistance, however, to the increases in economic expenditure and compulsory military service that this would entail, they soon enough came back to playing the extended deterrence game, not playing it as well as Eisenhower because they were too intent on

looking intelligent rather than looking stupid, but still playing it well enough. President John Kennedy visited West Berlin and in a single speech proclaimed "Ich bin ein Berliner," and "we will defend your cities with our cities." The latter could only mean that we would continue to threaten nuclear escalation, for one does not portray deterrence by denial by such phrases (would someone roll Des Moines around so that it blocked the Soviet advance on Frankfurt?)

The sentence identifying Kennedy as a "Berliner" illustrates another dimension of how nuclear deterrence continues to be credibly and plausibly extended, as we identify various countries as the "fifty-first state." Nuclear deterrence works credibly enough, it is widely held for the fifty United States itself, but not for anything else (perhaps it only works for the first forty-eight, plus the fiftieth, Hawaii, skipping over Alaska, as Secretary of Defense Schlesinger apparently proposed to augment the conventional forces of the US Army to shield the Alaska pipeline against hostile attack)

If deterrence can work for the fifty, can it not then be just as plausible to include Canada or Britain or Australia, or Japan or West Germany? When citizens of any of these countries ask us, after a few drinks, whether we would be willing to defend them, be willing to risk nuclear war in their defense, our response is typically that "we think of you Australians (or whatever) as the fifty-first state."

All of such extension of deterrence thus amounts to "jawboning," a maintenance of pretenses on political attitudes, and it all can work; in fact, it is perfectly plausible that it has worked now for a quarter century or more. Reinforcing the jawboning is what gets put down on paper as formal alliances, as NATO and the mutual defense treaties we have signed with Japan and Australia and New Zealand, and with South Korea. Such alliance documents have now come to play a role and function very different from what identical legal documents would have at an earlier time, in the days before nuclear weapons arrived upon the scene.

The alliances of an earlier time, for example between Japan and Britain in 1902, amounted to a mutual reinsurance treaty as each side wanted to be assured of military and political help for the future contingency of a war, and reluctantly agreed to bind itself to give such help to the other for the other's worrisome contingency. Like all normal insurance policies, neither party very much liked having to pay in, while each partner wished to be assured of getting help paid out if the dire need arose.

The alliances that the United States has negotiated since 1949, by contrast, are much more one-sided, with the US contributing continually to the defense of countries like Belgium and Luxembourg, but with Belgium and Luxembourg not really being expected to make a contribution to the defense of the United States. Rather simply amounting to a mutual insurance policy, which is what treaty arrangements like NATO still pretend to be, such agreements have the more real function of tying the hands of the United States in advance and of making our commitment to the defense of Western Europe more

credible. We could not have announced in advance that this was what the real function of a NATO agreement had become, for such candor would have undercut the new function of treaty agreements. Rather we must pretend that these are simply the legal, mutual assistance contracts of old. Since Americans are law-abiding and contract-adhering people, the message to potential aggressors is that one more reason exists why the US, irrationally or otherwise, might plunge into nuclear war in defense of these threatened territories.

Unlike the British 1902 alliance with Japan, when Britain wanted to be sure of Japanese aid but did not particularly want to be committed to give Japan aid (agreeing to do so only because it came out ahead in the swap), the United States in its current alliance with Japan wants to be tied to assisting Japan and to assisting all the countries of NATO and South Korea, etc., because such tied hands help deter Communist attack. We don't just accept the commitments of alliances, but rather seek such commitments.

The ludicrousness of the ostensible mutual defense agreement between the United States and Luxembourg is illustrated by the discussion at a NATO Council meeting in a year when the Soviets had advanced the propaganda ploy of suggesting that NATO and the Warsaw Pact guarantee each other's security, a ploy to which the West at least had to respond. After most of the other NATO Foreign Ministers had gone through the drill of explaining why the Soviet's plan was unworkable, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister took the floor to explain his own nation's response, as follows: "If the Soviet Union wishes to guarantee the safety of Luxembourg, we do not object. But if the Soviet Union expects Luxembourg to guarantee the safety of the Soviet Union, well, gentlemen, I submit that this would be a bit too ambitious."

Yet another approach to insuring the credibility of nuclear escalation would seem a bit bizarre, although it may have been part and parcel of the success of this approach ever since 1957, namely to fail to prepare conventional defenses, thus showing the Soviet Union that we have no other choice but to respond at the nuclear level, or at least holding back any evidence that we are entertaining such serious doubts about nuclear war and its consequences.

All contests about the comparative resolve of the two sides in a crisis will somewhat resemble a game of "chicken." In the classical game of chicken, each side would be trying to show a maximum of determination with a minimum of concern for ways of avoiding a crash. Too much discussion of the alternative of a conventional defense, especially if such discussion only leads to half-hearted efforts without meaningful results, would thus be worse than nothing, as the Russian simply extracted the intelligence that we were beset by deep doubts about the wisdom of a nuclear response.

A different part of the escalation-plausibility strategy might at first seem contradictory with what has just been noted above, actually is not. Namely, to have some American boys deployed near the front lines of a future conflict as a trip-wire moral commitment. When American soldiers are overrun by an aggressor's advance, their parents and the rest of the American public

can be counted upon to become angry enough to wish to respond, and perhaps to respond by an escalation to the use of all the other weapons in the American arsenal.

The American troops deployed forward can never be allowed to admit their role is merely to get in the way, merely to mobilize American outrage, for this would again cast some of such American resolve into doubt. Rather they must go through all the motions of seeming to prepare for combat, with the message to the Soviets being that the rest of the United States would be sucked into the melee merely as part of the normal course of events, just as with the wars of the past when we redeemed the honor of the Maine, or of Pearl Harbor and Bataan.

A perfect miniature illustration of this entire phenomenon comes with the US Army garrison in West Berlin. The garrison is small enough so that it could probably be overwhelmed and disarmed by the East German police force, leave aside the strength of the East German and Soviet armed forces surrounding the enclave. The role of the force is thus obviously to commit American honor to the city and to force any hostile force to rise above a certain threshold of violence in seizing the city. Yet the commander and troops of the West Berlin army garrison will never admit to this simple tripwire role, always training for and asserting a role involving the defense of the city, a "deterrence by denial." The "denial" on which our military forces were so intent would, of course, involve some significant additions of force if this proved necessary, in the end perhaps bringing all our forces into play, greatly adding to the costs for all concerned, amounting perhaps even to a World War III, i.e., "deterrence by punishment."

We will thus never see Army shoulder patches with the Latin for "trip-wire" as the unit motto. The units engaged in this role must pretend to be something else in order to be effective as trip-wires. Just as an actor must always pretend to be the character he is playing (and never admit to being an actor if he is to be a good actor), so it is with the garrisons and forces deployed to Western Europe.

One might welcome it if such forces were defensively proficient enough to throw back any Soviet onslaught without escalation, imposing enough simple battlefield costs on the advancing Soviet tank columns so that the Russians learned a nasty lesson, but so that neither side had to escalate to all-out war. Such a capability might by its prospect deter any aggressions in advance.

While it might be desirable to attain this level of conventional warfare proficiency, however, it would be highly undesirable to stress any reliance on such a capability and then to fall short of it. The proper quantity of forces to be maintained is thus either enough to defend Europe surely without any escalation to nuclear war -- our "defense by denial," or instead a considerably smaller force sufficient to ensure American involvement in any hostilities, but only pretending to be ready to hold the line conventionally in a manner leaving the Soviets convinced that the Americans would have to escalate to nuclear warfare in the end.

Another move to reinforce the nuclear escalation commitment is straightforward enough, to deploy some tactical nuclear weapons around in the path of erstwhile aggressors, weapons which ostensibly are intended to repulse a Soviet advance, just as the troops themselves, but which by their presence make it all the more likely that any war in Europe (or in South Korea) will go nuclear, if only because a weapon in place is a weapon likely to be used. The role of such tactical nuclear weapons has always thus been a double one, either (as officially described) to make escalation to all-out war unnecessary, or (as perhaps more realistically interpreted) to make such escalation very likely and thus deter invasions in the first place.

Henry Kissinger went through an interesting evolution of thinking on tactical nuclear weapons (or theater nuclear weapons) which illustrates all of our logical complications here. In his first major book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, he (as noted) developed the argument in Chapter Five that Western Europe would have to be defended entirely without the threat of escalation since SAC would have to be held in reserve to deter the Soviet intercontinental nuclear forces. In Chapter Six of the same book, he then surprised his readers by advocating theater nuclear forces as a way to do this, arguing that such weapons could be kept limited in their use, that no escalation to general all-out war would have to follow when the nuclear threshold had been crossed. The Kissinger limited-war argument was found persuasive by many other critics of the Eisenhower defense policies in the late 1950's, but his advocacy of nuclear limited war drew much skepticism.

Kissinger came around to join the other critics of Eisenhower in his second book, The Necessity for Choice, published in 1961, conceding that any use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would be hard to limit -- all too likely to produce escalation up to all-out war. Endorsing preparations for a conventional-defense limited war, Kissinger thus got into step with the thinking of President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara, as they for a time tried to turn away from the deterrence approaches of the Eisenhower years.

Kissinger then returned to an endorsement and advocacy of tactical nuclear weapons in his third book, The Troubled Partnership, published in 1965 but for a diametrically opposite reasoning on their proclivity to escalation. He continued to concede that the risks of escalation to all-out war remained high after any use of theater nuclear weapons, but concluded that this risk was desirable, from the viewpoint of the Western Europeans and also of the United States, precisely because it contributed to deterring Soviet aggression in the first place. Having made a reputation for himself by showing the alleged gaps in the reasoning of deterrence-by-punishment as the protection for Western Europe, Kissinger had thus come around 180 degrees to advocating a continuation of this deterrence reinforced by the coupling link of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in place. Having first argued that these weapons would be valuable solely or primarily for their impact on the outcome of the battle, Kissinger would end up instead stressing their impact on the costliness of battle, costliness for the world, and especially costliness for Moscow.

Why would one assume that theater nuclear weapons are so much more likely to come into use, merely because they are deployed into a prospective combat zone, as compared with the missiles and bombers based back in the United States,

or over in Great Britain, or on aboard submarines and other naval vessels off shore? The nuclear warheads in the path of an advancing Soviet tank force are presumably under the lock and key of Permissive Action Links (PAL), designed to make their detonation impossible unless higher authority has ordered their use in combat.

Yet, therein lies the rub for the Soviet briefer trying to seel Andropov on an invasion of Western Europe. If all the American nuclear warheads were based on board submarines off the coast, or at locations in Britain, it would be conceivable that an American President would back away from their use after a Soviet invasion, chickening out exactly as Kissinger and others had argued some twenty-five years ago. If the President's vetoing of the use of such warheads depends rather on the airtight effectiveness for battlefield PAL, how even then, the Soviet briefer will have greater difficulty in being so sure that no American nuclear warheads would come into use that there would be no crossing of the conventional nuclear firebreak, then perhaps leading to an all-out war with Moscow itself being destroyed. It has been the tradition of the field artillery all over the world that they not let their ammunition be captured by the enemy, but rather go down firing it off against the advancing enemy. Could Soviet leaders possible feel assured that none of the nuclear artillery rounds and short-to-medium range missiles in the path of their advance would come into use? The answer is negative and deterrence is once again enhanced.

Perhaps the reality is that such theater weapons are really intended by their officers to blunt a Soviet offensive by simply turning it back. Perhaps PAL devices will work so well that no Captain of Artillery could fire such weapons when a US President did not want him to. But such weapons, as Kissinger belatedly admitted, probably are at least as important for their likely contributions to a chain of events leading up to nuclear attacks on the USSR itself. The winds of Europe blow from West to East, carrying nuclear fallout into the USSR, giving the pilot of a jet fighter-bomber a tail-wind if he decides to hit a target a little further east.

All of this will never be publicly declared in the west, but can't be ignored in the briefings of the east. The most important word in theater nuclear forces might indeed be "theater." In all the ways we have already outlined, alliance defense remains a form of show business.

#### The Role of the Conventional Balance

While one is thus bolstering the deterrent threat of nuclear retaliation, is there nothing we can do in the meantime to try to bolster the threat also of conventional defense, the approach which deters by the prospect of denial, the kind of prospect which already so nicely shields Australia against Soviet invasion? The analysis here would be that many such avenues should be pursued, as long as the pursuit is quiet and subtle, so that it does not cast doubt on, and undermine, our willingness to escalate to nuclear weapons when all else fails. We surely will never wish to abandon the nuclear retaliatory defense of our alliance partners until we first very definitely have another means of protecting them.

In general, therefore, we need to pursue breakthroughs in defensive technology, new anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), some new forms of fixed fortifications (with the West German urban sprawl now supplying a lot of this as a spin-off from the civilian sector), perhaps with a heavier reliance on minefields, (if farmland) were not so expensive in West Germany)

As stated from the outset, the core of our problem, for both the peninsulas about which we are most concerned is these territories' basic geopolitical vulnerability to an adversary's ability to bring forces in rapidly. Much of this vulnerability is embodied in the totals of Soviet tanks and other armored vehicles, and it should be our consistent goal, at negotiations such as MBFR, to get Soviet tank totals substantially reduced.

The centrality of the tank threat is easy to forget in the wake of the public excitement in Western Europe and the United States about the Soviet SS-20 Missile. President Reagan's offer to swap our new ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) and Pershing II deployments for the elimination of the SS-20 was a good propaganda ploy, especially since the Soviets will lose credibility in the European Peace Movements as they reject the swap, but it is not a swap consistent with the interests of the United States and its alliance partners by our analysis here.

Consider the following two hypothetical situations. If the Soviets had no tanks and were equipping themselves with SS-20's, would we have any great reason for concern and any need for GLCM's and Pershing II and tactical nuclear weapons on our side? The answer is basically no, because the threat of nuclear retaliation from the United States would shield West European cities against the nuclear warheads on these newest Soviet missiles. The same SS-20's presently could hit targets in Japan and Ireland and Britain, but do not cause any concern there because Soviet tanks cannot roll into those countries; the SS-20 is threatening in the end only as an accessory to the Soviet tank potential. (The SS-20 is basically a failed Soviet intercontinental-range missile, reminding us that the USSR could always aim more warheads at Western Europe simply by retargeting some of the warheads aimed at the United States.)

Conversely, if the Soviet Union had no SS-20's, and were still so well equipped with tanks, would we have any great reason for concern, and any need for GLCM's, Pershing II and tactical nuclear weapons on our side? Of course we would, for all the reasons we have already discussed; we would still need to couple into the picture the American nuclear retaliation that keeps the Soviets from using their conventional advantage in armored warfare.

If we swap in Europe, we would thus need much more to focus on the swap of tactical nuclear forces for Soviet tanks, ignoring the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons as having only a very indirect relationship to our problems.

### Inherent Tensions

There are some inherent risks in our reliance on nuclear escalation, risks which no one should deny. If deterrence fails in Western Europe, the entire world is plunged into a terrible mess.

But the normal response of West Germans and other West Europeans, not always so fully articulated and not something most of these people want to think about every day, is that this prospective mess is a blessing in disguise, for the USSR would also be in a mess, and then the Russians won't attack in the first place and deterrence won't fail.

A conventional warfare defense against a Soviet advance would surely leave Moscow and Washington in much better shape and would also be less devastating for Western Europe. West Europeans would note, however, that World War II was no picnic, not simply a light-hearted switch of political administrations for Belgium and France and the other NATO partners. If conventional warfare responses made Western Europe a more attractive prize for the Russians, moreover, this would again increase the risks of attack, the risk that deterrence would fail, and the great majority of West Europeans do not look forward to an occupation by the Soviet Army.

Western Europe, to use a crude analogy, is trying to protect itself against rape for its problem is that this peninsula might be very attractive, economically and otherwise, to any Communist leadership trying to increase its power. The threat of destroying one's self, as well as one's imminent attacker, has been a defense against rape in many a gothic novel and might still be an important part of what keeps Western Europe from being invaded.

### Earlier Anxieties About the Same Issues

None of the discussion we have been going through here is particularly new. As noted, some of the debate emerged immediately after the detecting of a Soviet atomic-bomb test in 1949 in the NSC-68 document intended to shape policy choices within the US Government. With the Korean War making the threat of such aggression look all too real only a few months later, the plan for NATO defense at the end of the Truman Administration took the form of the Lisbon Goals, calling for a buildup to some 96 divisions.

Facing the enormous financial and human costs of such a buildup, the Eisenhower Administration shifted instead to the "New Look," and the complicated charade of threatening nuclear realiation in pretending to be preparing for a battlefield repulsing any Soviet advance by the nuclear-equipped "pentomic" divisions of the US Army. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into West Germany resulted in a stir in 1955 with the US "Carte Blanche" exercise, as more than 300 nuclear warheads were detonated inside West Germany on the first day of the war game. The Social Democrats stated their opposition to the beleaguered Adenauer government on this issue, on the premise that West Germany would be devastated in the process of being defended; but within a few years they came around to joining the Christian Democrats in welcoming this linkage, as an economical and effective way of deterring any Soviet advance in West Germany.

Showing their own sensitivity to the nuclear escalation threat, (and perhaps wishing to eliminate the risks of such escalation, to pave their way into Western Europe), the Soviets allowed the Communist Polish regime to propose the so-called Rapacki Plan in 1957, calling for a nuclear-free zone including West Germany and East Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia, a zone within which no nuclear weapons would be deployed.

Secretary McNamara took over the Department of Defense under President John F. Kennedy in 1961, committed apparently to something like a blend of the Lisbon goals and the Rapacki Plan, obviously wishing to have Western Europe secured by one means or the other, but transparently preferring the means of a conventional defense.

While Western European resistance to a conventional defense was dooming this ultimate goal of the McNamara Defense Department, the United States then became engrossed in the defense of Vietnam, where no one believed or argued that a nuclear threat could hold back Communist expansion. Conventional force strength deployed in Western Europe hence did not increase toward the end of the 1960's, but rather was thinned out to meet the demands of Vietnam, and this might (willy-nilly) again have served as evidence to the Politburo that nuclear retaliation would follow after any invasion of Western Europe because the Americans had still failed to prepare for anything else, because (in light of the Vietnam experience) they had soured so much on conventional warfare.

While the Kennedy-McNamara administration had spoken of wanting an ability to fight two and one-half wars, the Nixon administration coming into office in 1969 announced after a time that it was deliberately scaling down this capacity goal to one war, thus very much matching the old Eisenhower line that what was appropriate and sufficient for general war had to be appropriate and sufficient for smaller wars as well.

More recently, we are again going into a new layer of anxiety and excitement about our limited war problem for Europe, as the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile has apparently once again put life into the scenario outlined by Kissinger. It is alleged that we will at last be credible about an escalation to the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe, finally now having to come up with something else, a defense by denial rather than a defense by punishment. Secretary McNamara published an article in the Spring 1982 issue of Foreign Affairs together with McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan and Gerard Smith as co-authors, openly endorsing what many had conjectured he had favored twenty years ago as an abandonment of the reliance on nuclear weapons as reinforcement for the security of the West European peninsula, as we would proclaim a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and presumably pull them back out of harm's way.

#### Current Public Tensions

This reentry of Robert McNamara into a public discussion of defense matters came at a time when considerably more attention was seemingly being accorded such matters in the United States, and in West Germany and throughout Western

Europe (lamentably, there is no way for us to measure parallel popular attitudes in South Korea until we convince the military regime in Seoul that democracy should be appropriately restored) Much of the alleged concern about nuclear threats in West Germany reflects the American plans to deploy new ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II ballistic missiles in response to the increased deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles, a deployment which West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had pointed to with great alarm in a 1977 address to the annual conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

Yet today's West German anxiety about how GLCM could destroy Europe is strikingly analogous to the uproar about Carte Blanche a quarter century ago, for what is bad news at first glance can become good news upon reflection by the curious logic which has dominated nuclear strategy ever since 1945. What makes Western Europe a mess (along with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) makes a Soviet rape attempt on Western Europe far less likely.

I would propose the following general interpretation of public attitudes on all nuclear matters -- the attitudes in the United States (amid periodic gatherings in Central Park), the attitudes in West Germany, the attitudes all around the alliance.

We like the way nuclear weapons have impacted on the world, at least until last night. The total of wars fought since 1945 has been less than almost any reasonable analyst could have predicted in 1944 with the deterring impact of nuclear weaponry (a weapon which is uniquely destructive, and which is uniquely effective in never being used) making all the difference.

But we brood about, and hate, the way nuclear weapons might impact on the world in the future, any time after tomorrow morning, because the worst that could happen, -- if calculations go wrong, if deterrence fails, if the way nuclear weapons have impacted changed, is the destruction of civilization as we know it.

Thus we are against change, against new developments, in this area, and we prefer the status quo on nuclear matters, because any and all new ways of handling these weapons could upset the old way that things worked out. West Germans will be upset by new missile deployments, but would be just as upset by the total withdrawal of American nuclear weapons suggested by the advocates of a conventional defense. Americans get upset about the "war-fighting" talk of the Reagan administration, but get just as upset at the prospect that the Russians might have used the SALT negotiations to bypass us significantly in nuclear weapons strength. A "no-first-use" or "nuclear free zone" arrangement might thus cause as much unhappiness in Europe and as many fears of new trends for the future as are caused by GLCM or Pershing II. And similar unhappiness emerges from the prospect of a proliferation of nuclear weapons to the arsenals of additional countries.

The best rule to follow, therefore, might be simple enough: we ought to seek to "keep nuclear weapons out of the news," to seek to let as few new nuclear developments as possible emerge for public discussion.

Our problem, of course, is that this is more easily said than done, for the ongoing march of military technology makes it inevitable that some new developments will emerge from time to time in nuclear weaponry and in the related delivery systems, generating the kind of "news" that will drive commentators to reopen all the choices that we are discussing here.

The following conclusions might thus be offered about the problem of defending our more valuable allies on the peninsulas extending from the Eurasian Continent. First, what's old about the problem is probably more important than what is new. Second, people who should know better will keep on reinventing problems as if they were new, problems which have been invented before, and which have been solved before. Third, the irrational and time-worn threat of American nuclear escalation can probably still suffice for a long time into the future to shield Western Europe against Soviet attack. The annual Poliburo briefing on "windows of Western vulnerability" is probably never as gleeful or upbeat an operation as we fear.

The NATO alliance may have to remain an "alliance" in name only. The techniques of defending the Persian Gulf may require a more traditional application of military alliance techniques, or still other political and military techniques, as the local regimes decline to be formally tied to the US by treaty. If the lessons of NATO do not apply to the Persian Gulf and other regions, however, it hardly follows in reverse that lessons from such other regions, e.g., about the incredibility of nuclear escalation, have to apply back to NATO.

WORKSHOP REPORTS

## Workshop #1

### Alliances in the Context of Strategies

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#### Introduction

The purpose of the workshop was to determine the relationship between US foreign policy strategies and participation by the US in security alliances. Workshop discussions focused on examination of alliance participation as a means of achieving foreign policy objectives and were limited to US experience in the post-World War II period. In an effort to determine the probable evolution of US alliance participation, six issues were identified for research and discussion. The issues were chosen as a means of logically developing the workshop topic and included:

1. Concepts and assumptions fundamental to post-war American foreign policy.
2. US national interests and foreign policy objectives.
3. Strategies pursued by the US in support of its foreign policy objectives.
4. The role of alliances in US foreign policy strategies.
5. Foreign reactions to US alliance participation.
6. The efficacy of US alliance participation as a means of achieving US foreign policy objectives.

#### Discussion

Concepts and Assumptions. Workshop discussions began with an attempt to identify as clearly as possible the fundamental concepts and assumptions of US foreign policy in the post-War period. Discussions initially focused on the relative merit of three basic assumptions which appear to have been fairly consistent throughout the post-War period.

a. First assumption: that the United States must permanently reject isolationism and substitute for it responsible activity in the international arena. Emerging from World War II as the strongest economic, political and military power in the world, the US saw no choice but to reverse the isolationist policies which had been the foundation of its foreign policy for the first 175 years of its existence. Following World War II, the first expression of new internationalist or globalist perspective was the Truman doctrine. The period after World War II was marked by a series of US sponsored regional security organizations with the US as the central actor in each. This globalist

philosophy has been expanded and developed under successive American administrations, but in spite of reinterpretations, the American government has not reverted to isolationist policies.

b. Second assumption: that communism constitutes the principal danger to the US and to other nations of the world, and American foreign policy must be directed against this threat. Since the end of World War II, there has been a clear understanding among Americans that communism, in whatever guise it might appear, was an all-encompassing ideology which would subjugate the entire world if left unchecked. These fears were based on a number of perceptions which, in retrospect, may not be valid. These perceptions included the following: that all communism, in whatever manifestation, is expansionist; that communists are crusaders, intent on converting the entire world; and that communism is a monolithic, cohesive force which has bound its adherents into a single united front. The perceptions upon which the second assumption are based appear to be changing, with both near - and long-term consequences for US alliance participation.

c. Third assumption: that because the Soviet Union is the spearhead of the communist challenge, American foreign policy must be dedicated to the containment of Soviet expansionist tendencies and influence. If one assumes that communism is expansionist, then it follows that the Soviet Union, as the largest and most powerful of the communist nations, must be the greatest threat to the United States. Further, the US, as the leader of the free world, must take the lead in curbing Soviet expansionism. This understanding has led to the perpetuation of the East/West power axis or bipolar theory of international relations as the fundamental basis for post-War American foreign policy. The third assumption, articulated in George Kennan's famous "X" article in 1947, has served as the framework for US/Soviet foreign relations throughout the last 35 years and has directly influenced US participation in alliances. Whatever the fate of the second assumption, the perspective underlying the third assumption is likely to continue to dominate the expression of US foreign policy in the future.

US National Interests and Foreign Policy Objectives. Workshop discussions of US national interests focused on attempting to determine core US national interests and foreign policy objectives in an effort to identify the fundamental basis for alliance participation. Five core interests were found to have dominated US foreign policy in the post-War period. These include the following:

a. Preservation of the security of the United States. The priority task of US foreign policy has been to effectively meet any threat to US security posed by the danger of overt military aggression. Without maintaining the nation's security against external threats, the US government is not free to pursue any of the nation's other interests.

b. Preservation of access to energy sources and strategic raw materials. US reliance upon oil imports and imports of some rare materials critical to the defense and economy insures that an important foreign policy objective of the US will be to maintain continued access to both oil and strategic materials.

c. Preservation of world peace. Only in a peaceful world is it possible for the US to devote its full energies to other national interests. Any on-going conflict inherently contains the possibility of spreading to involve additional nations, thereby threatening the stable world environment necessary for the security and prosperity of all nations.

d. Preservation of the competitive position of the United States in international markets. In an increasingly interdependent world, US consumption of foreign-made goods contributes to the economies of many nations. Unfortunately, some of these nations employ tactics that make it difficult, if not impossible, for US manufacturers to compete in their domestic markets. This has had a deleterious effect upon US businesses and is the cause of increasing pressures for protectionist policies.

e. Promotion of long-term core values, generally articulated as the preservation of human rights. An important foreign policy objective for the US has been the evolution of a world order in which threats to its security and, more broadly, to its way of life, are less likely to arise. Future foreign policy objectives are less likely to involve direct intervention in the internal affairs of other nations and more likely to involve efforts to direct the attention of thoughtful citizens of other nations toward an increasing awareness of their responsibilities for eliminating poverty and oppression from their own environments.

US foreign policy strategy. The strategies employed by the United States in pursuing its foreign policy objectives in the post-War period were analyzed in an effort to first, determine how strategies were likely to evolve and second, to provide a framework for a consideration of alliances. US strategies in the post-War period seem to have emphasized the following major elements:

a. Preservation of alliance relationships, especially with NATO member nations. In focusing its attention on stronger alliance relationships, the US has sought a more equitable sharing of the burden of international security with its allies, especially Western Europe and Japan. Although there remain substantial differences between US and allied interests, the US has encouraged its allies to share the defense burden both within and outside of the regions of most immediate concern. Such initiatives have included, for example, US attempts to encourage Western Europe so that some US assets could be used in other regions of vital interest to the West, and US efforts to encourage Japan to strengthen and improve its Self-Defense Force in order to decrease dependence on US security guarantees. Although the power and the threat of the Soviet Union have grown, the US faces allies whose policies are conditioned by domestic constituencies and constraints which encourage policies diverging from those advocated by the US. In the years to come, the Soviet Union can be expected to exploit these differences and to expand its efforts to reinforce any allied divisions as a means of attaining what has been called the "Finlandization" or "Hollandization" (movement toward official neutrality) of Western Europe. Soviet policy will be designed to strengthen those forces opposed to NATO modernization, including the deployment of new-generation long-range theater nuclear weapons, while at the same time increasing its own capabilities.

b. Preservation and strengthening of relations with friendly states, especially in developing countries, East Asia and the Persian Gulf. US policies toward developing nations have been based on a mutual concern for modernization and development in those nations. Western capital, trade and technology are essential to this process. The US recognizes that the essence of development is the creation of additional wealth rather than the selective redistribution of existing wealth from one part of the world to another. Progress, in the American view, depends on both domestic economic policies and on the strength of the world economy. East Asia has seen a change in the security framework of the region over the last ten years with respect to the principal actors, to include the Soviet Union, Japan, China and the US. Regional capabilities are asymmetrical as a result of the vast differences in military and economic strength of its members. Only the US possesses relatively balanced capabilities in both military and economic power. In the past ten years, the US has rapidly expanded trade with China. The security framework that has evolved in East Asia over the last decade has been set within the broader global strategic framework of the growth of Soviet military power, the outward thrust of Soviet policy into the littoral of the Indian Ocean, and the marked deterioration in relations between Moscow and Washington. Strategic relationships between the nations of the Persian Gulf and East Asia and the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean are significant. The region is torn by instability in Iran and the Iran-Iraq war. Suspicious of both major powers and jealous of their prerogatives, the nations of the Gulf are just beginning to sketch the outlines of regional security arrangements in which the US would like to play an important role.

c. Maintenance of coalitions in support of vital interests while undertaking necessary defense modernization programs. US force modernization programs include four aspects. The first is the strengthening of each of the legs of the triad of strategic forces while increasing the survivability of each. The second involves the development of more capable general purpose forces, to include maritime forces, an improved rapid deployment capability, and refurbished reserves. Third is an ongoing analysis of the nature of future conflicts and the creation of adequate doctrine and strategy. The final aspect involves attempts to correct deficiencies in the defense mobilization base, to include the industrial infrastructure and manpower base.

d. Exploitation of existing and emerging Soviet vulnerabilities through political-economic initiatives as well as through military strength. US attempts to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities include efforts to take advantage of Soviet economic failures. The Soviet emphasis on defense spending at the expense of commercial growth has led to a very shallow economic base, incapable of supporting a longer-term arms race. US modernization programs are oriented not only on US military growth but also towards pressuring the Soviets into viable arms control arrangements. The Eastern European debt to the West is a heavy economic burden on the USSR. The US has sought to limit East-West trade as much as possible so that the economic problems of the Eastern Bloc will force a reduction in Soviet military expenditures. The Soviet reliance on military force to hold the Eastern Bloc together is apparent in the Polish crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet inability to trust their allies forces them to garrison their "allies", increasing the burden of military expenditures.

The role of alliances in US foreign policy strategies. Workshop participants considered the post-war roles of alliances in US foreign policy strategies in order to identify how US alliance participation can be expected to evolve in the future. Discussions included consideration of a broad typology of alliances and identified three categories of alliances in which the United States has participated.

a. Alliances to contain communist expansion. The concept of the Truman Doctrine, enunciated on 12 March 1947, while initially focused on economic aid to Greece and Turkey, was soon expanded to include an elaborate system of military alliances. The focus of these alliances was clearly on containment of communism. The United States assumed significant responsibilities for supplying military and economic aid to its allies. These alliances, which included CENTO and SEATO all revolved around NATO. Middle East crises such as the Suez debacle in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967 made CENTO appear either impotent or irrelevant. Likewise, the Vietnam embroglio exposed the weakness of SEATO. NATO seems to be one of the few survivors of the system of post-War alliances, at least for the moment.

b. Bi-lateral alliances to promote regional stability. Reliance on American administered world-wide alliances began to change under the Nixon Doctrine, articulated in 1969. NATO became the first priority, and the central theme of American foreign policy was that America could not and would not conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake by itself to defend the free nations of the world. The US would rather help where help was essential and clearly in the US interest.

c. Regional alliances designed to support US strategic interests in a region. While the main focus of US foreign policy was NATO, other areas of the world were compartmentalized into regional alliances such as those developed with Iran during the Shah's rule, South Korea, and Israel. The fall of the Shah may have helped to heal the trauma of Vietnam with respect to fears of American intervention abroad, but as a consequence, President Carter in 1980 seemed ready to abandon regional alliances as a means of maintaining stability in favor of a Rapid Deployment Force which could provide the means for US unilateral intervention in troubled areas.

Foreign reaction to US alliance participation. In recognition of the responsiveness of US foreign policy to both international and domestic perceptions and pressures, the workshop participants attempted to summarize, on a regional basis, key foreign reaction to US foreign policy initiatives and alliance participation. Discussion was focused on attempting to determine the warp in which foreign reactions had changed in the post-war period and the impact of foreign reaction on future US alliance participation. Principal discussion points for each region included the following:

a. Europe: Europe is the home of the cold war and European events have largely defined that conflict. Before World War II, the global balance of power was virtually a reflection of the European balance of power, with Great Britain acting as the principal mediator of power imbalances. The end of the war and the

subsequent prostration of Europe brought on the emergence of both the US and the Soviet Union as the principal power brokers. Western European nations are seeking to establish their traditional roles and view the US position as a sole mediator to be at an end, as internal European recipes for disengagement become more practicable.

b. Sub-Saharan Africa: With the exception of its human rights initiatives, the United States has left Sub-Saharan Africa largely to its own internal dynamics and to the residual influence of the former colonial powers. It is unclear to what extent the African nations perceive the US position as one of admirable self-restraint, or rather as attempts to shirk its legitimate responsibilities in the region.

c. Middle East: The Middle East is experiencing a long inter-Arab conflict revolving around the issues of Arab solidarity and the conflict with Israel. The nations of the region also appear uncertain about US intent. More moderate nations appear to perceive the US as genuinely interested in a resolution to the chronic problems of the area, while other nations ascribe US regional initiatives to a selfish concern with maintaining a neo-colonial role in order to exploit the region's mineral wealth.

d. Latin America: The perceptions of Latin American nations toward US policy and alliance participation can perhaps be characterized as ascribing to the US the role of a protective imperialist power. The prevailing view is that the US will always attempt to control the political evolution of the nations of the region in order to protect its economic interests. The US is frequently seen as a vacillating and often unreliable ally. US military and economic influence are perceived to be on the wane, largely as a result of inept and insecure leadership. US regional initiatives are seen primarily as self-serving and though the majority of the nations of the region appreciate US power and clearly understand the benefits of a close relationship with the United States, there is a great reluctance to depend upon the US for the protection of each nation's national interests.

e. The USSR: The Soviets perceive US alliances and foreign policies as a tool for aggression against them and as an obstacle to their efforts to expand and protect their empire. Soviet reactions to US strategy and alliances have been to avoid direct confrontation while exploiting other nations' hostility toward the US. Soviet policy has tended to stress long-term efforts to undermine the global strategic position while building a "correlation of forces" favorable to their own foreign policy objectives.

f. Asia and the Pacific: With the end of the Vietnam war and the deemphasis of US interests in Asia and the Pacific, China's perception of threats from the US has declined, with a consequent desire to manipulate US fears of the Soviet Union to its own advantage. China is still sensitive, however, to continuing US commitments to Taiwan, though interested in expanding its commercial and cultural relations with the US. Chinese perceptions of the value of the "US card" in its dealings with the Soviet Union will probably define future US-Chinese relations.

The efficacy of alliance participation. Discussion of workshop issues concluded with an examination of the relative success of various alliances, including NATO, SEATO, OAS and Korean bilateral agreements. Discussion focused on two major topics: first, the criteria by which success or failure of an alliance is measured; and second, the primary factors which seem to influence success or failure.

The criteria for measuring success appears to be obvious; that is, did the alliance achieve the stated objectives? This measure, however, assumes that alliance objectives are both explicitly stated and interpreted the same way by all alliance participants. Further, the expectations of member nations, if not the stated objective of an alliance, may change over time. A successful alliance may indeed be one which contains only broad and vaguely defined objectives which permit flexible redefinition of objectives over time; that is, a successful alliance may well be the most difficult to categorize as successful by reference to stated alliance goals.

Factors influencing alliance success appear to be more easily defined. These seem to include, in addition to the degree of flexibility provided for by alliance objectives and structures, similarities in cultures and political systems, the number of alliance members, the degree of convergence of national interests among alliance members, the importance of political and economic ties outside of the alliance, and the perception of the threat to alliance members.

Findings. The workshop participants attempted to reach conclusions relative to each of the sub-issues identified for discussion. One of the obvious lessons relearned from the effort, with perhaps some applicability to more formal foreign policy deliberation, was the difficulty of achieving a consensus relative to specific issues: in any relatively large group consisting of people with differing perspectives, broad, amorphous statements are likely to result where consensus is demanded.

a. With respect to the concepts and assumptions underlying US foreign policy, the group found:

(1) That the US government has pursued policies since World War II which, taken together, indicate the adoption of a bi-polar concept of the international system. Recent policies and initiatives toward Europe and Third World nations seem to indicate an increasing recognition of the complexity of the modern international system; indeed, US government assumptions about the international system seem to vary with specific policies. The US government seems to recognize the growing economic power of selected states and groups of states which lie either within or outside of traditional power blocs. Still, relative to political-military issues, the US appears to continue to assume a bi-polar world, with the US and its allies at one pole and the USSR and its satellites at the other. Intolerance of permanent "neutral" or "non-aligned" states, typified by the Dulles era of foreign policy, still seems to prevail in relations with Third World nations; indeed the assumption seems to be that one can speak of a "Third World" only because the two primary poles are so clearly defined. Viewed from the perspective of US geo-political interests, the assumption of the validity of a bi-polar world seems valid.

(2) That the principal threat to US interests is perceived by the US government to be the USSR, rather than its fragmented ideology of dubious appeal. However, the workshop acknowledged that the US government clearly perceives that Soviet influence in foreign nations is not permanent, is not necessarily cumulative and should not be confused with control. In general, workshop participants concurred in this view.

(3) That the US government clearly perceives that the US must continue to act as a leader of the free world and that a return to the isolationism of the pre-World War II period is not possible. Even though the US has adopted and accepted a global role, it will encourage greater political, military and economic participation by other nations in the pursuit of common goals and objectives. The workshop concluded that the US government will continue to experience temporary resurgences of isolationism, particularly when significant foreign and domestic groups are perceived to reject the values or strategies adopted by the US. However, after a period of reflection and policy modifications, the US will return to its role of global leadership.

b. Relative to US national interests and foreign policy objectives and their relationship to alliance participation, the workshop found:

(1) That while US interests have been fairly consistent since World War II, the relative priority assigned to, and the willingness of the United States to support each has depended upon both the international and domestic situations of the United States. Apparent conflicts between long-term core values and short-term foreign policy objectives have resulted less from disagreement over values and objectives than from disagreements on the specific means by which values and objectives should be pursued. As an intermediate objective, the United States has consistently pursued the preservation of the international status quo as a means of preserving a peaceful environment within which both nations and individuals can evolve and pursue their legitimate interests.

(2) That US interests were likely to remain unchanged in the future, and that alliance participation by the US is more likely to be affected by changes in strategies for achieving interests than by changes in the nature of the interests themselves.

c. Relative to the strategies employed by the United States in pursuit of foreign policy objectives, the workshop concluded that diplomatic efforts, supported by a strong defense establishment, with a balance of nuclear, conventional and unconventional capabilities, is most likely to result in effective deterrence and preservation of the international status quo. The workshop concluded that strategies of "defense" and "deterrence" were not in reality different strategies, but were rather complementary. Indeed, the workshop found that a strong defense posture was essential to effective deterrence.

d. The workshop concluded that alliance participation supports foreign policy strategies best when such participation includes membership in both relatively complex multi-national arrangements and participation in flexible bi-lateral

arrangements. Alliance participation should be based on a convergence of interests with other states; alliances should address mutual interests across the spectrum of potential conflict, and should include provisions for the employment of a broad range of potential political-military solutions, to include those which are less conventional in nature. Finally, the workshop found an increasing emphasis on flexible relationship with other states, to include increased burden-sharing among alliance participants; the workshop concluded that these relationships were more likely to persist over time.

e. The workshop concluded that foreign nations appear to frequently view US desires for increasing flexibility as vacillation and a lack of commitment to alliance partners. Because US strategic interests are broader than those of most of its allies and because the US must tolerate political and economic independence among its allies, both the US and its allies must maintain a clear understanding of where interests converge. The workshop concluded that for alliances to be an effective part of foreign policy strategies, foreign nations must clearly perceive the tangible benefits of alliance participation, based on an understanding of shared legitimate interests. We found that the US must make a greater effort toward clearly identifying, articulating, packaging and promoting its understanding of shared values and interests.

f. With respect to the efficacy of alliances, the workshop concluded that alliances have been an effective part of US foreign policy strategy in the post-War period and will probably continue to play an important part in the future. Broader-based alliances, embracing a variety of nuclear, conventional and unconventional capabilities and providing for mutual support in a wider variety of political-military situations are likely to contribute more to the achievement of US objectives than more narrow, less flexible arrangements.

## Workshop #2

### The Structure of Alliances

Prepared by:

MAJ William F. Engel

#### INTRODUCTION

After a brief introduction, General Knowlton presented the following comments as prepared by the members of Workshop #2:

Our approach or methodology was to look at and discuss both the objectives and goals of alliances in terms of historical views, problem areas and the realities that have to be dealt with by the US. We accomplished this by looking at three regions of the world: Europe, Latin America and Asia. We then examined the structure of several agreements pertaining to each of these areas, specifically, the NATO, Rio, and SEATO security pacts. In addition, we discussed some of the bilateral agreements the US has concluded in these areas.

Next, we compared and contrasted the structure of these alliances to determine if there were any common strengths or weaknesses contributing to the success or failure of an alliance. We concluded that while SEATO is now dormant and thus considered a failure, we have had successes in Europe and Latin America but for different reasons and in different contexts.

These successes evolved even though there were differences in both the structure of each alliance and in the machinery set up to implement them. We discussed the impact of political considerations, both internal and external, the impact of bilateral versus multilateral agreements, and the question of reciprocity in terms of costs and commitments. Our last consideration dealt with the question of periodic review or revision of alliances.

#### DISCUSSION

Our examination covered three general areas. First, with respect to influencing elements, we discussed the severe impact of the 1973 War Powers Act on alliances. This legislation has significantly affected our allies' perception of our willingness to comply with the requirements clearly established by our alliances.

Next, we examined the impact of technology on alliances. In NATO, with the transition from MC 14/2 to MC 14/3 and the increased emphasis on conventional forces as an alternative to nuclear weapons, member nations did not meet their commitments to increase these forces. General Rogers is now dealing with this by saying that by not giving him a strong conventional force, he has no choice but to use the nuclear alternative. At the annual NATO meeting which ended this week, the US requested that members support this increased emphasis on improved technology in order to lengthen the nuclear fuse and delay any nuclear decision.

We then examined executive agreements as modification tools. What is at issue here is eliminating the requirement to go back to congress to renegotiate a treaty if it can be amended or changed in a simpler fashion such as by protocol or executive agreements.

We also discussed the United Nations which was listed in almost all of our treaties as being the underlying authority and we questioned why this was done. It was concluded that by its charter the UN is the world's peacekeeping authority and the repository for all treaties and it is thus logical for the US to cite the UN in all its treaties.

With respect to success elements in the structure of an alliance, we concluded that of primary significance was the existence of a common "real" threat, or at least the perception of a common "real" threat. This is not only an element of glue that holds alliances together, but it also helps in exposing all members to common intelligence information which helps them understand the threat.

The wording of an alliance agreement is also very important to its eventual success. The broader a document in its provisions, then the more readily it can be adapted to specific situations as they occur or as they may change over the life of the alliance.

In the NATO case, there was some discussion concerning the fact that the European community itself was a cohesive factor which kept NATO together. It was also pointed out that NATO may be the cohesive factor keeping the European community together since the NATO treaty did in fact precede the formation of the European community as we know it today. We concluded that both are actually mutually supportive and in fact reinforce each other since they both provide a forum in which discussion can take place.

We came to the conclusion that the success of a particular treaty rested on its ability to be adjusted or modified to meet a particular situation. In NATO, for example, when Greece and Turkey decided to join, the protocol accomplishing this also redefined the NATO area since they were not North Atlantic nations and thus would have been considered outside that area of operations. A similar protocol was used in the case of Germany and most recently in the case of Spain since neither was a North Atlantic nation. On the other hand, Algeria was covered under the original treaty because it was a part of France. However, when Algeria became an independent nation, she was excluded from the treaty at the request of France. Here then, are examples of a treaty being fundamentally altered without having to be completely renegotiated.

We also concluded that objectives and the particular situation define the kind of structure used within a treaty organization. When France pulled out of the integrated military portion of NATO but not the entire alliance, an adjustment was made in structure. The North Atlantic council was maintained with a representative from each country, but the defense planning committee under it now includes everyone except France. When Greece partially pulled out, it too was excluded from the defense planning committee. Once again, we see that structure can be successfully modified to accommodate changes in the geopolitical situation without having to renegotiate the basic agreement.

We also recognized the ability of individual membership in an alliance to influence the actions of its members. This is especially true with respect to local disputes: for example, the Codfish War between Iceland and England over fishing areas. The fact that both nations were members of NATO meant that they could discuss the problem within the context of their NATO memberships. This probably kept both sides from escalating the dispute knowing what the impact would be on the alliance. We think membership in NATO also helped to modify the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.

Alliances also have a synergistic effect on member nations. For example, NATO has just adopted a six-year plan for defense improvements which has a much larger scope than any single nation could have attempted over the same period. It is also doubtful that some of the member nations would have even considered doing as much as they are if it were not for their NATO membership.

With respect to weaknesses, we found that all alliances require that an "armed attack" must occur before there can be any unified action. This severely limits military action under a treaty when you consider the more subtle, indirect or ambiguous threats that exist such as subversive actions or border crossing operations. Most treaties do not deal with these problems.

There can also be conflicting goals between members of alliances which cause problems. In the case of NATO there even seems to be a misunderstanding of the area of operations. The treaty does define the area in which an attack would be considered to be an attack upon NATO, and there has been a view held by some of our European neighbors that this is the only area in which NATO forces can operate at any given time. This view is not correct and will be challenged as we start to actively discuss the new airland battle doctrine and the concept of hitting second echelon forces before they enter NATO territory. It must be made clear that although NATO boundaries define the area in which an attack must take place to be considered an attack on NATO, they do not limit the area of operations once the battle begins.

#### FINDINGS

Our conclusions were as follows:

- (1) Alliances should be formulated on a broad basis in order to be flexible and their structure should follow the objectives for which they are formed.
- (2) Alliances should discourage different categories of membership. Here, we are referring to our experiences with France and Greece in NATO. General Haig made it clear that Greece could not follow the lead of France in this regard, and General Rogers has also taken this position. It is clear that this type of multiple status of membership must be avoided in any future alliances.
- (3) Alliances are successful in allowing smaller nations to withstand threats that they might not otherwise be able to withstand alone.
- (4) Alliances should contain provisions for periodic review such as the one contained in the NATO agreement.

(5) Alliances have been adversely affected by the 1973 War Powers Act because our allies question how we will respond to threats and carry out our obligations as defined in specific treaties.

(6) A common threat or the perception of a common threat is of primary importance to any alliance.

### Workshop #3

## The Influence of Domestic Factors on Alliances and on the Treaty-Making Process

Prepared by:

MAJ William L. Koob, III  
and  
CPT Ronald R. Duquette

### Introduction

The topic addressed by Workshop #3 was the influence of domestic factors on alliances and on the treaty-making process. The workshop's discussions centered around three major subtopics: the relevance of contemporary peace movements to alliance policies and provisions; the influence of religions and/or ethnic groups upon alliance provisions; and the role of congress, being a body representative of public opinion, in the formulation and abrogation of treaties. An additional unplanned subtopic surfaced during the workshop's deliberations which is worthy of mention; that of the media as a factor in the molding of public opinion.

In order to facilitate the coherent treatment of these topics and the formulation of meaningful conclusions, the workshop confined its discussions to specific domestic phenomena and/or groups. The peace movements considered were those taking place in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Great Britain, The Netherlands, Italy, Japan and the United States. Religious/ethnic groups considered were the Israeli and Greek lobbies and the Catholic Church. The workshop posed specific questions, the responses to which would hopefully lead the group to valid findings. Also, the workshop members' preliminary research efforts prior to the symposium were conducted in consideration of these questions. They are as follows:

#### Peace Movements

- How will the various peace movements affect alliance politics within their respective countries?
- Around what issues do the various national peace movements seem to rally?
- To what extent do outside influences affect and control the various peace movements?
- Do peace movements have the potential to endure?

#### Ethnic/Religious Groups

- Are religious and ethnic groups which engage in lobbying overstepping perceived bounds of acceptable activity? How does American society set those bounds? Do they change?

- To what extent does the effectiveness of such lobbies depend upon favorable predispositions in the government and the public?
- Are the Roman Catholic Bishops being unrealistic in divorcing the contents of their controversial pastoral letter from the practical implications it suggests?

#### Congressional Role

- What, if any, should be the role of Congress in the formulation or abrogation of treaties?

#### Discussion

##### 1. Peace Movements

In discussing the influence of peace movements upon alliance politics within their respective countries, it was first deemed necessary to examine the differing perspectives among the various nations regarding the current condition of East-West relations. These perspectives can perhaps be best understood in terms of the "triangular diplomacy concept; with the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union occupying respective corners of the triangle. Although the United States and Western Europe are, in the minds of many, lumped together under the rubric of "The West," our European Allies cannot sensibly pursue the same foreign policy path as does the United States with regard to the Soviet Union, located as they are on the same side of the Atlantic as is the USSR. Such close proximity to a potential superpower adversary necessitates some effort towards accommodation, as has perhaps been evidenced by the phenomena of "Finlandization" and "Ostpolitik," not to mention the pipeline issue and other European trade agreements with the East. Thus, when the demise of Detente finally became evident in the wake of events in Poland and Afghanistan, and the Reagan Administration's new "tough talk," backed up by new rearmament initiatives, gave notice to the world that the United States did not intend to pursue reconciliation with the Soviets, the reaction of Western Europe was one of concern -- even dismay. Even though our European allies had also been concerned when the opposite extreme prevailed in the early seventies, with post Vietnam America and the Soviet Union basking together in the cozy glow of new-found detente, the resumption of something akin to cold war between the superpowers has evidently engendered a Western European self-image of a pawn caught helplessly in the middle of a superpower confrontation. Thus, when the December 1979 NATO decision to station 572 nuclear-tipped Medium-Range Missiles (MRM's) on European soil was followed by the current administration's statements regarding the notion of fighting and winning a "limited" nuclear war in Europe, many of the people of Western Europe became alarmed, and one of the tangible products of this alarm has been the so-called "peace movement" in Europe. Another result has been the growing doubtfulness in the eyes of many Europeans as to the consistency and sincerity of US foreign policy, and especially the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. The preceding scene having been set, the various questions relating to the contemporary peace movements could be more meaningfully addressed.

When treating the question of the effect of the various peace movements on alliance politics, it was acknowledged from the start that the diversity of the various movements from country to country and of the innumerable subelements comprising each of the national movements, as well as the general disorganization which characterizes them, did not permit the formulation of broad, umbrella-like conclusions concerning the "peace movement" as a coherent whole. Spotty and incomplete US media coverage of the Western European movements, covering little more than a few of the more massive demonstrations, has tended to foster distorted images as to the scope, designs and degree of unity of the movements in the minds of most Americans. This factor, as well as the workshop's research and discussion, suggested that it would be more realistic to consider each national movement as a separate and unique case.

In the United States, the intensity and burgeoning popular appeal of the American Nuclear Freeze movement, coupled with concern as to the potential political viability of its sister European movements, has apparently caused the Reagan Administration to backpedal somewhat from its initial vague, but disturbing rhetoric about fighting and winning a limited nuclear war in Europe. The Administration is now talking and doing more about disarmament accords (i.e., the President's "zero option" proposal, initiation of START), although still maintaining an essentially "tough" line.

In Europe, where the salient issue is Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF), a progressive decline in the relative degrees of influence and political viability of the various national movements was noted as the focus moved from northern to Southern Europe. Although the extreme compositional diversity of the various European movements (alluded to earlier) defied precise organizational breakdown, it was established that three primary sorts of groups were to be found within most: various religious groups, the far left wings of existing political establishments (i.e., the more liberal factions of the various national social democratic parties) and "Alternativist" interest groups advocating single issues or environmental causes. The type of individuals most likely to participate in European as well as American peace movements were described as members of the so-called "post materialist" generation, who are generally characterized as being young (18 to 35), well-educated and fairly prosperous persons who reject the values of individual material security in favor of more publicly-oriented quality-of-life issues. Further, the typical post-materialist desires to exert political influence to the end of putting his values to work, but often demonstrates a predilection for unconventional political activity (i.e., demonstrations, civil disobedience) as a means of achieving his goals. Many original members of this "post-materialist" generation, which first established itself as a force to be reckoned with during the heyday of anti Vietnam activity, are again at work in the various peace movements.

Of all the European Peace movements, that of the Netherlands has achieved perhaps the most significant degree of political influence upon its government's alliance policies. Following the election in May 1981 of an anti-nuclear majority to the national parliament, the Netherlands Government indefinitely "postponed" its final decision as to whether or not they will permit MRM's to be stationed in their country. In effect, the government is buying itself some political time in the face of strong and comparatively well-organized TNF opposition from anti-nuclear forces.

The Federal Republic of Germany, which, among the NATO nations, is scheduled to receive the largest number of MRM's as a result of the December 1979 decision, has more at stake in the TNF controversy than her neighbors. After all, West Germany will be the most likely first battlefield in the event of any future Soviet invasion of Western Europe; and, owing to the density of nuclear weapons already stationed there, the FRG stands to suffer the greatest potential nuclear devastation. Thus we find in the FRG the most massive, most active and perhaps the best-organized of the Western European peace movements. The German movement has been embraced and tirelessly supported by a legitimate political party - the "Greens" - which shows the potential for gaining seats in the national legislature in upcoming elections. The primary tangible effect of the FRG's Peace movement thus far has been the role it has played in factionalizing and weakening the nation's Social Democratic Party in such a way as to contribute to the recent collapse of the coalition government led by Helmut Schmidt. Of all the European movements, that of the FRG bears the closest watching in the immediate future as implementation of the 1979 MRM stationing decision draws near.

In Great Britain, strong anti-nuclear demonstrations protesting the positioning of MRM's and the continued location in Britain of US Trident submarine "homeports" had become an embarrassment to the Thatcher Government by late 1981. The ambiguous situation exists there, however, whereby the British movement is decrying the presence of US bases while generally acquiescing to their own government's acquisition of Tridents from the US. The vehemence of the British movement has been diminished somewhat, however, by the public's overall enthusiasm concerning the successful Falklands campaign.

The Italian protest movement has been sharp, but short. Italy, despite initial second thoughts about its entry into the NATO "nuclear front line" for the first time, is the NATO nation which remains apparently more willing than any other to permit stationing of US missiles on its territory.

In Japan, the broadest and strongest overall anti-nuclear consensus of any country was perceived. The legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No distinct anti-nuclear movement has manifested itself in Japan, however, as the US sees no cogent reason as yet to challenge that consensus by advocating the stationing of nuclear weapons there.

The workshop's discussions concerning the issues around which the various national peace movements rally have already been partially reviewed above. In Europe, it is simply the TNF issue and the prospects for nuclear holocaust which it implies. Hiroshima in the town square now seems awfully close all of a sudden for many Europeans since the NATO stationing decision. In the United States, a broader spectrum of issues is brought to bear, to include nuclear proliferation, America's apparent re-tooling for a new arms race and the overall fear of the effects of nuclear war. Of particular interest during this aspect of the workshop's discussions was the recognition of a recent tendency for politics to become a never-ending series of so-called "zero-sum propositions," in which there are simply two stands on the issue at hand: one is either for it or against it, with no room for compromise. Thus virtually any controversial issue can be

tossed into the political arena these days, where it will be surrounded by zealous, hard-core advocates who have difficulty in viewing the world in ways other than as they relate to their pet issue. The activities of such hard-core groups then tend to polarize public opinion concerning the issue at hand, resulting in situations which are not usually politically productive. This tendency can be seen at work in such recent instances as California's "Proposition 13," the Abortion and School Prayer issues and the various peace-movements. This tendency may help to explain why so many of the peace movements, both foreign and domestic, cannot seem to get their acts together organizationally; witness the case of the Bonn, FRG protest rally coinciding with President Reagan's visit in June 1982 at which over 800 separate interest groups and organizations were represented. The movements often seem to be able to rally such diverse and numerous groups for large-scale protests, but are evidently unable to reconcile their differences or compromise their specific goals or views long enough to achieve political credibility.

During the workshop's deliberations concerning the extent to which the various peace movements may be affected or controlled by outside influence, it was decided at the outset that use of the term "control" was inappropriate, as no single element or interest group has yet established a clear position of dominance or leadership within any of the significant national peace movements. The main outside influence discussed was, of course, the Soviet Union, working through the various national communist parties and front organizations. It was acknowledged that the Soviets obviously have an interest in the success of the peace movement, which in effect seeks to reduce the nuclear threat - unilaterally if necessary - to the Soviet Union. It was shown that there are numerous documented instances of communist participation in various activities of peace movements; the Soviets have admitted - even boasted - of such involvement in much of their propaganda which is designed to lend credibility to their self-portrayal as a "seeker of peace." There are even a few documented instances in which individuals or organizations with Soviet or communist connections had been involved in major leadership roles or had attempted to assume control of anti-nuclear meetings and activities. It was concluded, however, that such communist influences, although they may well have helped to aim the thrust of the movement in an anti-missile or anti-American direction, have for the most part not played a dominant role in any of the major peace movements. They have been, for the most part, no more than "fellow travellers." Those few documented instances in which Soviet-linked individuals or organizations have blatantly attempted to gain control of peace groups or co-opt public anti-nuclear sentiment to support Soviet designs have proven self-defeating, as they have usually been recognized for what they were; moreover, they usually resulted in such polarization within the target groups that the effectiveness of the organization was greatly diminished. A sobering thought was considered - namely that the Soviets, recognizing that the peace movement's designs are often unintentionally coincident with their own, will be content to simply sit back and let the peace movements do their work for them. The workshop therefore advocates continuing study and fostering of public awareness concerning all divergent inputs - including Soviet ones - into the dynamics of contemporary peace politics, as well as realization as to who will benefit from the various outputs. Only then can intelligent and informed conclusions and decisions be arrived at.

Discussion as to the various peace movements' potential to endure concluded basically that, as long as the frosty nature of current East-West relations continues and the above-detailed issues remain at center stage in the political arena, the peace movements are likely to remain forces to be reckoned with. Over the long term, however, various happenings could adversely affect the movements' staying power. For example, such events as the resumption of arms control talks, the "zero option" proposal and the Polish crisis have already had something of a damping effect upon the various movements. It should be pointed out as well that most of the peace movements which the workshop examined remain outside the normal political processes of the various democratic nations in which they appear. Historically, the democratic institutions of these countries have been quite flexible, and have often succeeded in co-opting potentially explosive issues. This may well be the case, for example, in the FRG, where the Social Democratic Party - now that it is no longer a part of the ruling coalition - may be moving to the left to co-opt the Greens on the peace issue. Soviet actions during the future course of the ongoing START talks may well also influence the longevity and degree of political influence of the peace movements. A particular danger is seen in the cases of such nations as the Netherlands and now Denmark, whose governments have delayed their ultimate decisions as to whether they will accept US missiles. By periodically making or even hinting at possible small concessions in the START talks, the Soviets could "string along" such nations, inducing them to delay their deployment decisions indefinitely. In other nations as well, the life of peace movements could be prolonged or even revitalized if the Soviets toss occasional "candy bar-concessions" across the negotiating table in Geneva at opportune moments. The year 1983 is seen as a crucial one with regard to the Euromissile/peace movement issues. Elements of the various movements - notably the Greens - have promised to spare no effort in their unstinting opposition to the scheduled deployment of Euromissiles beginning late in the year. As the deployment dates draw nigh, the world may well see far more intense and radical activity on the part of peace movements - especially the European ones - than ever before. In any case, the situation, as the year progresses, should be subjected to continuous and close scrutiny.

## 2. Religious and ethnic groups.

The impact of religious and ethnic groupings on the domestic arena provides an insight on the effects of domestic considerations on alliances and their strategies. Examination of three specific such groupings, the Israeli lobby, the Greek-American lobby, and the American Catholic bishops through their pastoral letter, permitted a detailed examination of the effect, constraints, successes and failures such aggregations have on the domestic factors of alliance and treaty strategy.

The Israeli lobby provides an interesting example of the lobby that has set the limits of the bounds of acceptable behavior of itself, rather than waiting for some long-forming consensus among the American body-politic, especially in the form of public opinion. There was a distinct understanding that the Israeli lobby had used the media resources available to it to mold public opinion, and thus establish the acceptable bounds of allowable pressures. Though it would be too extreme to suggest that the United States' rapid recognition of the State of Israel in 1948 was the consequence of Israeli pressure groups, it was understood to be accurate to suggest the Israeli lobby's unique successes in

identifying the pressure points in the organizations necessary to maintain the "engine of momentum" for support of Israel. Because lobbies are considered an appropriate and legal form of expression of interests in this nation, it is also understood that their contentions have at least the right of hearing in the forum of ideas. The Israeli lobby has successfully played on this notion of the fairness of public expression, and has also succeeded in determining the extent of pressuring that the American public will permit. It has enjoyed this success for several reasons. The pro-Arab or pro-Palestinian elements in this country have not understood or have chosen not to understand how the United States' political processes function. The image has been successfully projected of Israel as the "valiant underdog," surrounded by more numerous enemies, both militarily and demographically. Finally, the "Western-ness" of Israel in comparison to preconceptions of Arabs as somehow different, exotic, "oriental", even inferior have made our sympathies for Israel easier to activate. By the same token, the effectiveness of the Israeli lobby's picture of an Israel desperately defending itself against Arab hordes is in jeopardy as a consequence both of the Lebanese massacres and the growing understanding on the part of pro-Arab lobbying groups of how to activate public and private opinion favorably to Arab interests. Nonetheless, the favorable predisposition of American public opinion toward Israel which the lobby has succeeded in creating and reinforcing since WW II will ultimately be difficult to overcome.

One other factor which has been instrumental in the success of the Israeli lobby is the very strong sense of Jewish nationhood, and of a separate sense of identity that the Diaspora, the Jewish faith, and (most recently) the Holocaust have engendered. This, perhaps more than any other single factor, is at the root of the strength of the Israeli lobby and its persistence and success.

The case of the Greek-Americans and their lobby is considerably different from that of the Israelis. In the first place, its most notable efforts were limited to a very short period (1974-78), unlike the longer-running efforts of the Israeli lobby. Again, unlike the Israeli lobby, the Greek-American lobby was centered on a negative issue, denying arms to the Turkish government as a consequence of Turkey's actions in Cyprus. Finally, the Greek-Americans "came together" for the specific purpose of defeating, year after year, several administrations' efforts to renew arms sales to Turkey. It was, in the parlance, a "single-issue" lobby; and the proof of the ephemeral nature of its existence is shown in the practically total disappearance of the lobby as an active participant once Congress resumed arms sales to Turkey.

In some senses, the Greek-American lobby was an example of how not to be effective on an issue. The eventual overriding of its desires in 1978 was a consequence both of perceived American interests being better served by selling arms to Turkey, and as a backlash to the shrillness of the Greek-American lobby's views as expressed to Congress, as well as the fragility of the coalition that had gathered on the issue. On the other hand, the Greek-American lobby did serve several useful purposes, not least of which was to concentrate attention on the reasoning behind support for Greece and/or Turkey.

much in the line of a long tradition that has been reactivated by the formulations of the Second Vatican Council. We have seen these concerns expressed elsewhere in the questions of birth control, abortion, "liberation theology," and so on; and the moral and social implications of these concerns are not likely to be lightly dismissed, neither by those to whom these concerns are directly expressed, nor by those who are otherwise concerned with such issues.

### 3. Media Influence

At this point, the workshop found it necessary to address the question of the media as a factor in the molding of public opinion - the question having arisen repeatedly during earlier discussions. It was agreed that political perceptions are strongly influenced by what we read or see in the media. From there, it was concluded - after examining media impact upon previously discussed matters - that although the media can obviously influence public opinion, it will (by itself) only rarely cause basic existing policies to change; and the altered predisposition preceding any such change will come about very slowly. The degree to which the media can influence policy seems to be inversely proportional to the strength of political parties and the mainstream political system in any given country. The weaker the parties and/or system, the weaker their ability to direct the issues, and the stronger the effect of the media.

### 4. Roles of Congress

In trying to decide where Congress should fit in to the process of formulating and abrogating treaties and into the overall alliance process, the workshop found no reason to call for a change in what exists today. The House of Representatives influences alliance policy by appropriating - or refusing to appropriate - the monies necessary to implement treaties. Thus if the House sees fit to block funding, the treaty or alliance provision concerned will not be implemented. The Senate, as provided in the Constitution, advises and consents with regard to treaties presented to it by the Executive Branch. It is inescapable, however, from analyses of what has happened in the past, that the Senate should - or must - be consulted from the very conception of the idea of a new alliance or treaty rather than being presented with a finished product as a fait accompli. History has shown that there have rarely been problems when the Senate has been regularly consulted from the outset of treaty formulation processes; otherwise, the Senate has tended to feel "pushed around" by the administration, causing difficulties.

The perceived problem of "loss of bipartisanship" in foreign policy procedures in the Senate - having been bemoaned as of late - was also discussed as an adjunct to the basic question of congressional roles. Since the Vietnam era, we can see that there has been an erosion of what previous administrations came to expect as not quite carte blanche, but certainly a great deal of sympathy toward and support of the executive branch as the primary definer of national interest. If such rubber stamping is what ideal bipartisanship is supposed to be, the workshop's contention is that the United States can do without it. The contribution of the Senate is reasoned, informed debate and deliberation on the merits of any given alliance or treaty as it pertains to the true interests of the nation. Public opinion is a valid expression of these interests, and to ignore the Senate, or to stifle debate therein is a basic disservice to the American People.

## Workshop #4

### Current Alternatives to the Alliance System

Prepared by

CPT Art Robinson

#### Introduction

This workshop examined the following issue: What current alternatives to the alliance theme exist for the United States? In order to make this topic more manageable, only military alliances were discussed. The workshop was organized for a roundtable discussion that allowed for an open forum which was monitored by the symposium leader. Initial research was conducted by small teams within the workshop in order to lay the foundation for discussion of what types of alternatives were available. This research was supplemented by three guests who addressed the symposium and presented their views and opinions on the topics under consideration. The specific discussion topics included:

- a. Have the attitudes of governments changed with respect to the positive contribution of alliances?
- b. Examine the impact of US credibility in the international arena, Soviet "friendship" treaties, and the creation of neutral zones on US foreign policy.
- c. Examine the role of the UN peacekeeping operations, the non-aligned movement, and the Guam doctrine on current attitudes towards alliances.

Once the above topics had been raised and discussed by the group a matrix was drawn up in order to ascertain the relative merits of each alternative that was proposed.

#### Discussion

Nearly three decades ago, the US began a period in its foreign policy whereby it actively sought to enter into a number of alliances to extend its own influence in the world and limit that of its chief competitor, the Soviet Union. However, the alliances entered into then may not necessarily serve, in today's world, the functions for which they were intended. This raises the prospect of seeking alternatives to the alliance system. Such alternatives may be difficult to identify since any form of relationship between two or more countries may be looked upon as an alliance. Therefore, in order to establish a base from which to begin a discussion of alliance alternatives, it would be helpful to first recognize, within the context of this symposium, what is meant by the term "alliance." For the purpose of this workshop, an alliance was defined as all inter-governmental arrangements, bilateral or multilateral, that enhance the military viability of its participants. As such, these arrangements should either add to a nation's security or at least not weaken or hurt it.

With this in mind, the workshop then accepted that nations enter into alliances with any of four basic objectives in mind. They are:

- a. To increase national power or gain some specific objective.
- b. To deter an adversary.
- c. To restrain a rambunctious associate member of the alliance from rash acts.
- d. To avoid a possible "worst case" outcome in any future conflict, such as having to carry on a fight alone and without allies.

With alliances now defined and the objectives listed, this workshop concluded that any alternative proposed would in itself not be a radical departure from what this group has already defined as an alliance. Indeed, rather than attempting to propose alternatives to alliances, the main thrust of discussion revolved around alternatives to the way alliances are viewed, constructed, and implemented. This methodology allowed workshop members to include all types of international security arrangements for discussion thus preventing the discard of past unsuccessful ventures since it may have been their implementation which fostered failure, or alleged failure, rather than the concept itself being faulty.

#### I. Factors Steering US Foreign Policy

In order to proceed with the discussion of alternatives, the workshop drew up a list of assumptions to be taken into account concerning US foreign policy. These assumptions included the following points: that any alternative proposed should work to further US national security interests; that the US seeks world peace and an avoidance of nuclear war; that the US position of power in the world would be maintained; that the US encourages world economic development; and that the US seeks arms reductions, a reduction of world tensions, a fostering of human rights, democracy, and free trade.

These assumptions needed to be considered in order to properly address the issue of why countries enter into alliances at all. There is, after all, something to be said for any system which concentrates power in the hands of one individual or organization or at least a very limited number of individuals or organizations. However, in a world which seems to be growing more interdependent with time, such unilateral concentrations of power appear harder to achieve. The issue of trade alone illustrates that countries are beginning to rely more and more on each other; this in turn creates relationships which tend to be more alliance oriented rather than any other form of international relationship. The days of the colonial empires, in which a state would invade, capture, and subjugate its neighbors, are fading. Today's world seems to attempt to satisfy its desires through diplomatic or political channels rather than military action. This same thought may readily be applied to those forces driving US foreign policy.

## II. Alliance Systems and Alternatives

There are a number of alliance types in which the US has been involved over the past several decades. They run the gamut from militarily oriented NATO-style systems to world government oriented UN-style systems. A case could be made for any system's success or failure depending on one's viewpoint and/or expectations. This in particular made it exceedingly difficult for workshop members to critically evaluate any one system. For example can the NATO alliance be said to have failed simply because member countries didn't provide the US the backing it sought for its operations in Southeast Asia, i.e. Vietnam? After all, the USSR has not launched an invasion against Western Europe and wasn't that the purpose for NATO's existence in the first place?

The workshop concluded that in instances where a particular US alliance appeared to fail, it was due to the US overcommitting itself thus surrendering a large degree of flexibility in terms of being able to manage resources, overlooking commitments which led to selective support of governments which had no claim to legitimacy, or because the terms of the alliance had the US tying itself to weaker powers who provided little to US security posture.

Following this, the workshop developed a matrix of "alternatives" to the alliance system and attempted to ascertain the effectiveness of each alternative listed. The matrix was broken into two major groupings. One group consisted of alternatives viewed as not holding much promise for the future and included world federalism, neo-isolationism, a greater UN role, and an expanded non-aligned movement. The other group consisted of alternatives which did appear to hold promise and included regional alignments, regimes, treaties or arrangements furthering economic and political integration, arms control in the broadest sense, dependence linkage, discrete military assistance, proxies, consolidation of power by principal countries, bilateral/multilateral arrangements, and finally an agreement with the US and the USSR against the rest of the world.

None of the alternatives proposed as having some chance for success in the future satisfied all conditions established by the workshop. Instead, the conclusion arrived at was that for the US to seek a successful alternative to the present alliance system, it would have to enter into a combination of alternative types in order to satisfy varying conditions found around the world.

### Findings

The workshop concluded by positing five basic points. The first was that the world has undergone some drastic changes in its political structure and the present alliance system demands rethinking. Secondly, the rethinking requires an innovative approach by region and must take into consideration the current world environment in relation to arrangements made for the region. Third, change should not be initiated for change's sake since there is some good to be had from the tenets which established the present system of alliances. Fourth, planners must recognize that a dichotomy exists between the industrial world and developing countries. And lastly, there is no single answer to the question originally proposed and a grouping of alternative types must therefore be considered in order to meet US policy objectives in the world.

## Workshop #5

### "What is the Future of Alliances?"

Prepared by

CPT Thomas Cannon

#### Introduction

For the FAOC 2-82 Symposium, Group 5 considered the question, "What is the Future of Alliances?" The students were aided by Dr. Henry Albinski, Penn State University; Dr. Eugene Wittkopf, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; and Dr. William Vocke, Juniata College, Pennsylvania.

In studying this question, five more questions were raised. They were, in order discussed: "Do alliances have a significant military utility?", "Should the 'World Policeman' image be subject to revision?", "Should alliances be limited to nuclear assistance?", "Can regional organizations ultimately substitute for American involvement?", and "Can one envision a universal system that can obviate the need for alliances?" The consensus to each question is discussed in turn.

#### Discussion

The first question is, "Do alliances have significant military utility?" The group's decision was that treaties and executive agreements have a military utility when they express a common concern regarding a perceived danger and a commitment to face that danger militarily, if necessary. Alliances have a further military utility in that they represent a collective commitment and deterrent against an adversary. These alliances thus become latent war communities. Alliances are an avenue to raise military preparedness as in the case of NATO or to limit military preparedness as in the case of Japan. Their orientation and utility, in either case, is a military one.

The final military utility of alliances, no matter their original intent, rests in whether the commitment is honored or perceived that it will be by a potential adversary. Honoring the commitment is based not so much on the agreement itself, but rather, whether honoring the original intent of the agreement remains in the national interest.

In many Third World areas such as the Middle East and South Asia, the lack of a shared perception with the United States of the nature of the threat significantly and ultimately impairs the military utility of prospective alliances. The main military utility of such cases rests in the perception of the US commitment by the USSR. Such alliances are apt to perform more of a political than a military function.

As a final point, while the world becomes more interdependent and the interests of the US remain global in nature, the military utility of alliances for the US must be viewed in terms of global considerations and not simply in terms of regional interactions.

The second question considered was, "Should the 'World Policeman' image be subject to revision?" The consensus was that Vietnam had already revised the image. Implicit in the policeman allusion is that he is part of a system of justice that dispenses judicial decisions based on a value system apart from the policeman's value system. At present, this overall system does not exist, and the perception is left that only American values, standards, and interests are being policed.

The intellectual structure of American international involvement is characterized by two conflicting schools of thought. These schools seek influence over the overall strategic direction of American actions abroad. The first, called Cooperative Internationalism, is characterized by a North-South orientation, emphasizing global problems, a strong support for detente, and the idea that international communism is not ultimately a threat to the United States. The second school is called Militant Internationalism, and is characterized by the primacy of the East-West conflict, the perceived threat of global Communism to US interests, opposition to detente, and support for the use of troops in resolving international conflicts. The differences between these two schools have remained deep and constant since the end of WW II, both within the general populace and the national decision makers. Debates within the Washington, DC arena reflect this division. These differences have also contributed to the present day situation in which there is little if any domestic support for the traditional 'policeman' role.

Also impacting on the traditional "policeman" stance is that the US has recognized that its resources are finite and that global interests could easily diffuse our efforts. This leaves the US with unpalatable choice of either leaving some tasks inadequately done or done by others, even when important US interests are at stake. This has increased the need for alliances apart from the "policeman" role and our need to "fine-tune" our worldwide role. The Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) was given as one example of an area dealing with subjects of vital interest to the US, but also one in which our purposes would be better served by working through others, in this case, the Australians. The increasing role of the Australians with ASEAN, beyond the traditional confines of the ANZUS (Australian, New Zealand, United States) treaty illustrates a situation in which US interests are being served, yet with the US playing as interested observers, rather than central authorities. The advantage of this arrangement lies in the economy of force afforded to the US and the increased sensitivity to regional powers.

Given the present domestic situation toward the "policeman" role and the existence of other means of furthering US interests, it would take a major shock, either domestic or international, to reorient domestic thinking concerning American's perceived military role in world affairs. Until such a shock occurs, the use of surrogates with parallel interests will be in partial agreement with the US. Because the US is a world power with global interests, she will often

find herself in a position where she cannot support the regional interests of our surrogates. The Falkland Islands dispute between two US allies, Argentina and England, was just such a situation. In that war, the US had to choose sides, not due to incompetence or flawed policy, but because of unfortunate circumstances. The danger of a surrogate turning on the US is always present, as in the case of Iran. The fundamental lesson of Iran is that no matter how much money and support is provided, nothing can insure the continuing, unwavering support of a client nation.

The final influence on our own perceptions of our role in international politics lies with the Soviet Union. If the USSR is viewed as an aggressive, expansionist power with an overall master plan for world domination, then aggressive pursuit of containment and counterblocking are called for. If the USSR is viewed as merely another great power acting in its own interests without any manifestly visible strategic plan, then detente and a lower level of US countermeasures are appropriate. A middle position that is growing out of these two concepts is "Neo-containment," in which the great powers are prevented from gaining too many "easy" victories. This concept would accentuate the self-destructive tendencies already present within the USSR's foreign policy. The examples of Egypt, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia were presented as examples of either obvious Soviet failure or burdensome Pyrrhic "victories."

In sum, the role of "policeman" should be discarded and a more neutral role of "referee" should be assumed. This "referee" would leave regional disputes to local solution while preventing Soviet interference.

The third question considered was, "Should alliances be limited to nuclear assistance?" This question created some confusion at first as to what was actually being asked. First, it was decided that the question did not mean actual nuclear aid to allies, but the maintenance of American nuclear umbrella and how that impacts on alliances between the US and other nations.

The desire of the US and USSR to limit the spread of nuclear weapons technology has left many other countries nervous and restive. The continuing arms race between the superpowers has fueled the desires of many regional powers to go nuclear, both from a regional security standpoint and for international prestige.

This spread of technology has raised questions concerning the American umbrella. More and more countries are still desiring nuclear protection, but they do not want any devices on their soil, for they see them as ensuring nuclear targeting of their country. The paradox of nuclear weapons is that they are useful only in the last resort and are not an effective deterrent to regional aggression by countries possessing nuclear patrons. This last point is particularly important because the credibility of nuclear power is supported by conventional forces in a wide variety of conflict situations while conventional forces are supported by nuclear weapons only in the most extreme situations. The final paradox is that while conventional forces will not prevent a nuclear attack, their existence and use are necessary to give decision makers an option between impotence and annihilation. Nuclear weapons are not just another more efficient form of munitions; they are a factor far removed from conventional arms. Their use crosses a psychological line that so far no nation has wished to risk, for the consequences could consume both.

specific areas is attractive, but has thus far proven unable to overcome nationalist differences.

This tendency to accentuate nationalist differences has seen individual nation-states still flout international consensus under the rubric of "sovereignty." This concept, born in the 17th century when the impact of rulers outside their kingdoms was quite limited, still holds sway in the 20th century when technology permits rulers today to strike lands far removed from their home territories.

One means suggested by which nations may be shaken from this attitude would be a regional nuclear conflict which does not threaten the principal developed centers of the world. The ensuing holocaust would paint in the starkest possible terms the dangers of willful behavior by individual nations in today's increasingly interdependent world.

Other techniques that could be as effective without the same drastic consequences include various forms of economic pressure. The example of OPEC is particularly relevant. Indeed, the essence of the North-South conflict lies in the willingness of economically deprived nations to wring concessions from the US and Western Europe. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not be too harassed by these countries, since their record on economic aid is very poor and they don't have that much to give out anyway. The "Law of the Sea" conference and treaty is the most recent of the efforts by the South nations to wrest from the North a larger share of the world's wealth.

These economic conditions have led to greater pressures on the alliance system. Alliances in the future may not be anachronistic as unviable. On both sides of the East-West division, both the US and USSR find themselves receding in ability to control their clients or to control events in regions of importance to them.

Their ability to control events will decrease, but there will be no overarching political organization that will obviate the need for alliances.

### Findings

The group developed three overall conclusions. The first is that the degree of world-wide interdependence is still quite fragile. The recent General Agreements on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) talks revealed that when economic difficulties arise for any nation or group of nations, international cooperation is often the first victim.

The second conclusion is that speculation about the future of alliances or anything else within the US government often has very little to do with current plans. The focus of the government is overwhelmingly on the short term, generally due to budgetary imperatives or domestic political tactics. This condition compels a tactical, rather than strategic approach, with concurrent harm to long-term planning.

The final conclusion is that without a particular vision, the US is in trouble, for its actions will continue to be reactive, its policies subject to constant revision, and its practitioners constantly changing, and foreign powers continually confused over the direction and scope of American foreign policy. One valuable tool for the US would be to adopt a 15-20 year vision of what the US wants in the long-term in foreign policy. Its advantages would be to allow a base for coherent planning, a consistency of stated interests, and a relative freeing of foreign policy from the season's partisan political machinations.

CLOSING REMARKS

TWENTY-THIRD INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM

Ladies and gentlemen, It has been a distinct pleasure to have had each of you as participants at the Institute for Military Assistance Twenty-Third International Affairs Symposium. Having listened to the reports of your workshops, I believe your efforts have been very productive. Your analyses were well-planned and thorough. Your conclusions and recommendations are logically based and pragmatic. We hope that the report of the proceedings of this symposium will be a valuable tool to those people whose thoughts contribute to the national decision-making process concerning foreign policy. We will make copies of the proceedings available to such people and to each of you.

Proceedings from past symposia have been sent to the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, Chairmen of Senate and House Armed Services and Foreign Relations/Foreign Affairs Committees, as well as to numerous agencies within the government.

This Symposium has been an appropriate culmination for the course of studies pursued by our Foreign Area Officer students. It has required the students to use and broaden their knowledge of area-related issues, and it has tied together the principles of interdisciplinary analysis taught in the course. The record of the Symposium's proceedings will certainly portray the benefits gained from the group's discussions, their collective thoughts, recommendations and conclusions concerning some of the most complex issues facing our world today. I extend to each of you my sincere appreciation for your contributions and extend our special thanks to our distinguished guest participants. This concludes the Twenty-Third International Affairs Symposium.

APPENDIX A

BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM  
OF THE  
FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COURSE  
UNITED STATES ARMY INSTITUTE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

The School of International Studies at the United States Army Institute for Military Assistance hosts an International Affairs Symposium twice each year. Such Symposia are conducted as the culminating exercises of the Institute's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Course. The FAO Course is designed to provide the US Army Foreign Area Officers with the necessary skills to analyze military problems as they are affected by political, economic and sociological events in various geographical regions of the world.

During the last eight weeks of the FAO Course prior to convening all Symposium participants, Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Course students conduct extensive preparatory research in workshops. These workshops are formed to study sub-topics of the Symposium theme which students select from issues in current international affairs. As a result of individual research and seminar discussions of their findings, FAO students prepare fact papers which are provided to all workshop participants as a basis or start point for Symposium workshop sessions.

The actual Symposium, a three-day event, is convened during the week prior to graduation of FAO Course students. A distinguished person from either the US or a foreign government, academia, or private enterprise is invited to present the Keynote Address to the opening plenary session of Symposium participants. Also, the Institute invites representatives of the public and private sectors intimately familiar with topic issues to participate in workshops with FAO students.

For two days, FAO students and guest participants meet in workshop sessions to discuss issues pertinent to their topic, to form conclusions and to develop recommendations for policies and/or actions concerning the issues. On the third day, Symposium participants convene over lunch in a final plenary session to hear brief oral reports from representatives of each workshop. Finally, a record of proceedings for the Symposium is compiled, published and distributed to participants and interested agencies.

APPENDIX B

AGENDA

23d INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM

1 December 1982

|           |   |
|-----------|---|
| 1400-1515 | Registration of Guest Participants                        |
| 1515-1530 | OPEN  |
| 1530-1630 | Symposium Opening Session and Keynote Address             |
| 1645-1800 | Informal Social Hour (Sink Room, Ft Bragg Officers' Club) |

2 December 1982

|           |                     |
|-----------|---------------------|
| 0800-1130 | Symposium Workshops |
| 1130-1300 | Lunch               |
| 1300-1630 | Symposium Workshops |

3 December 1982

|           |   |
|-----------|---|
| 0800-1130 | Symposium Workshops - Report Preparation                |
| 1130-1145 | OPEN  |
| 1145-1215 | Sherry Bar - Ft Bragg Officers' Club (Hodge Room)       |
| 1215-1300 | Lunch - Ft Bragg Officers' Club                         |
| 1300-1430 | Workshop Final Report Presentations and Closing Remarks |

APPENDIX C

ROSTER OF PARTICIPANTS  
IN THE  
23d INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM

Key-Note Speaker

Professor George H. Quester  
Chairman, Dept Gov't & Politics  
University of Maryland

Workshop No. 1

Guest Participants

Professor James Roherty  
Professor of Gov't and Int'l Studies  
University of South Carolina

Dr. John Weinstein  
Strategic Research Analyst  
US Army War College

Mr. Yolav Ben-Horin  
Research Analyst  
Political Science Dept.  
Rand Corporation

Faculty

LTC Rudolph A. Pitcher  
Instructor Security Assistance Operations

Dr. Robert G. Wirsing  
Visiting Professor

CPT(P) Edward M. Tice  
Instructor of Economics

Class Members

LTC Stefanovic  
MAJ Anders (Recorder)  
CPT Archie  
CPT Bantsolas  
CPT Carter  
CPT Clark  
CPT Digiaccio  
Mrs. Zekas  
1LT Kop (RC/FAO)

MAJ Call (Leader)  
MAJ Colon  
CPT Knight  
CPT Lewis  
CPT Medaris  
CPT Sherman (Recorder)  
CPT Vester  
MAJ Camina (RC/FAO)

Workshop No. 2

Guest Participants

General William A. Knowlton (Ret)  
International Consultant

Professor Gary Frank  
Adjunct Professor of Int'l Studies  
Center for Advanced International  
Studies, University of Miami

Ms Marjorie Niehaus  
Library of Congress  
Congressional Research Service  
Foreign Affairs National Defense Div

Faculty

LTC Dallas Cox  
Dir, European Seminar

Dr. Hans H. Indorf  
Visiting Professor

CPT(P) Wilbur R. Snyder  
Instructor European Seminar

Class Members

COL Donlon  
LTC Williamson  
MAJ Engel (Recorder)  
CPT Buzzell  
CPT Cassem  
CPT Foltz  
CPT McGuire (Recorder)  
LTC Duffy (RC/FAO)  
LTC Frame (RC/FAO)  
LTC Moor (RC/FAO)  
CPT Korge (RC/FAO)

LTC(P) Fry  
MAJ Bowie  
MAJ Mason (Leader)  
CPT Torres  
CPT Webb  
CPT Wilson  
COL Honore (RC/FAO)  
LTC Pearse (RC/FAO)  
LTC Staniforth (RC/FAO)  
MAJ Madej (RC/FAO)

Workshop No. 3

Guest Participants

Professor William C. Cromwell  
Professor of Int'l Relations  
School of Int'l Service  
The American University

Dr. Dean A. Minix  
Department of Government  
Campbell University

Faculty

LTC Luis C. Barcena  
Dir, Latin American Seminar

Dr. John F. Sweets  
Visiting Professor

CPT Daniel W. Pike

Class Members

MAJ Crighton  
MAJ Horton  
MAJ Walpole  
CPT Bates  
CPT Duquette (Recorder)  
CPT Furloni  
CPT Reichmuth  
CPT Via (Recorder)  
MAJ Fox (RC/FAO)  
MAJ Serrano (RC/FAO)  
CPT Doyle (RC/FAO)

MAJ Koob (Leader)  
MAJ Luchak  
CPT Bass  
CPT Case  
CPT Erickson  
CPT Gonzalez  
CPT Shelton  
LTC Ugate (RC/FAO)  
MAJ Phillips (RC/FAO)  
CPT Cullen (RC/FAO)

Workshop No. 4

Guest Participants

Ms Linda P. Brady  
International Program Analyst  
Office of the Assistant Secretary  
of Defense

Dr. Charles W. Kegley  
Chairman and Professor  
Department of Gov't and Int'l Studies  
University of South Carolina

Dr. Alan N. Sabrosky  
Professorial Lecturer in Gov't  
Department of Gov't  
Georgetown Univ

Faculty

LTC Michael B. Patterson  
Dir, Middle East Seminar

Dr. George Gawrych  
Visiting Professor

MAJ Frederick T. Sherrer

Class Members

MAJ Carswell  
MAJ Govoni  
CPT Alvarez  
CPT Bognsky  
CPT Coven (Leader)  
CPT Denys  
COL Stahl (RC/FAO)  
MAJ Neuscheler (RC/FAO)  
CPT Towne (RC/FAO)

MAJ Maynard  
MAJ Potts  
CPT Peppers  
CPT Robinson (Recorder)  
CPT Smith  
CPT Wheat  
LTC McDonald (RC/RAFO)  
CPT O'Donnell (RC/FAO)

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Workshop No. 5



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Guest Participants

Professor Herny Albinski  
Professor of Political Science and  
Dir of Australian Studies  
Department of Political Science  
Penn State University

Dr. Eugene R. Wittkopf  
Professor of Political Science  
Department of Political Science  
University of North Carolina

Dr. William Vocke  
Department of Political Science  
Juniata College

Faculty

MAJ David B. Wolf  
Dir African Seminar

Dr. Stephen R. Bowers  
Visiting Professor

CHAP (CPT) Harry Matelski  
Instructor Comparative Religions

CPT Karl E. Prinslow

Class Members

MAJ Biser  
MAJ Comer (Leader)  
CPT Babb  
CPT Bergman  
CPT Cannon (Recorder)  
CPT Corocan  
CPT Cunningham  
CPT Furlo  
CPT Rodman (RC/FAO)

MAJ Lemaster  
MAJ Valette  
CPT Jublou  
CPT Palmer  
CPT Quintero  
CPT Tharpe  
CPT White  
CPT Zekas

25 JUL 1983

LM