PROCEEDINGS
OF
THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM OF
THE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COURSE
9–11 JUNE 1975

UNITED STATES ARMY INSTITUTE
FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

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Questions regarding the symposium or the Proceedings should be directed to:

Chief, Program Coordination Division
Civil Affairs and Security Assistance School
United States Army Institute for Military Assistance
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

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

Major General Michael D. Healy invites the Foreign Area Officer Course students to make the most of this unique opportunity to share their ideas with representatives of the military, academic, corporate, and governmental sectors.

OPENING REMARKS

DELIVERED BY

MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL D. HEALY

COMMANDER, JFK CENTER FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY INSTITUTE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Major General Healy and I am the Commanding General, USAJFKCENMA. On behalf of Lieutenant General Seitz, the Commanding General of Fort Bragg and XVIII Airborne Corps, I would like to extend to all of you a hearty welcome and offer you any and all assistance that we might be able to provide during your brief visit with us here at the home of Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and Civil Affairs elements of the US Army. Most of all I would like to welcome you to what we consider to be one of the Army's finest educational facilities, the Institute for Military Assistance.

The Army makes a clear distinction between education and training. When we train people, we teach them to perform tasks essentially by rote with individual initiative. When we educate people such as the officers of the Foreign Area Officer Course with whom you will be working, we encourage intellectual reconnaissance and flexibility, and provide them with the greatest possible opportunity to examine and analyze the many facets of the subject problems with which they are confronted and must master. The Eighth International Affairs Symposium is designed to be a truly educational experience.

One of the more unique features of our symposia, as evidenced and reinforced by the people assembled here, is the unusual mix of professional from diverse backgrounds. Junior officers, senior officers, representatives of the corporate sector, young researchers beginning their academic careers, and established professors and deans have come together once again from across our Great Republic to share their thoughts on subjects of mutual interest.

I think that it is important that you understand who our students are since it is because of them that we have asked you here today. These are some of the young men who the United States Army has very carefully selected to serve as the action and staff officers in assignments of a political-military nature. In other words, at some time in the near future, these officers will be serving as attaches, security assistance managers, members of joint and allied staffs, and other similar important positions. These are young men who by nature of their previous military experience and exposure and formal academic training have become extremely knowledgeable in area studies and other related fields.

In recognition of the importance of their future tasks and assignments, the classes here are held to a limited size in order to provide each and every student with maximum individual attention. These officers, who, as you see, range in grade from captain to colonel, are going to be the "doers" of the future. The civilian leadership of our country will, in large measure, be looking to them for information upon which to make some of the most important decisions affecting policy at the national level.

The young officers whom I have just briefly profiled for you--and the rest of us--find ourselves meeting at a very difficult time in our nation's history. The sudden and tragic turn of events in Southeast Asia, continuing friction in the Middle East, recent political developments in certain NATO member states, and international and domestic economic turmoil have all combined to produce this very difficult movement in history. Traditionally, in democratic countries, we have turned to the open forum as the place in which the seeds of solutions to these problems are best sown. Frequently this process consists of creating simply a better mutual understanding of the problem itself; never uniform but at least better understood.

In the past these symposia have provided just that type of forum and result by promoting exchanges between the various sectors of our social system that we see represented here today. We sincerely hope that the Eighth International Affairs Symposium will accomplish the same end. And we have good reason to expect that it will, primarily because of the participants plus the fact that we think the agenda for the Eighth Symposium is the best we've developed yet. I'm just finishing my second year here, as Commanding General/Commandant, and I have not seen before, nor do the records of previous symposia indicate, that we have had so many truly distinguished guests. For example, during the first plenary session this morning you will here Professor Hans Morganthau, Professor Inis Claude, and Mr. Sandor Vanocur. And, then this evening you will have the opportunity to hear the youngest--and perhaps most controversial--Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy's history, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. That will truly enliven this session here.

Additional opportunities for intellectual stimulation and profitable debate also certainly exist in the three workshops. The workshop examining the question of who benefits from arms coproduction will be chaired by Professor Robert Pranger of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, while Professor Seale Doss of Ripon College will head the workshop on combatting international terrorism. Finally, Vice Admiral John Marshall Lee will chair the workshop on international peacekeeping operations.

I would be remiss if before closing I did not make one very important comment to you. The time, effort, material, and money spent on the preparation of these young officers are great. The purpose of this expenditure can be summarized in a very few words: The furtherance and successful realization of the goals, objectives and policies of the United States of America.

Since I have been here, and for as long as I am here, these young officers will continuously be reminded of this fact of our professional life. Although they may become emotionally involved and develop great ties and friendships with other countries and their peoples--we have no restrictions on humanness--they are continuously reminded by me that in the final analysis they are instruments for the implementation of the policies of this great land of ours. This does not imply a disregard or disrespect for the policies, considerations, and sovereignity of other nations but is rather an incontrovertible statement of our purpose as soldiers and servants of our Nation. Hopefully, we are and will continue to be successful in that pursuit. For at the risk of sounding trite, you will find that underneath the cover of academic excellence displayed here at the Institute, there is a very basic but very strong force. A simple thing that is, in fact, making our bicentennial celebration possible this coming year, and that is a very deep love of this great and wonderful Republic. It is a patriotism that even when all things appear to be going against us will make it possible for the United States to be successful. I think that the taxpayers of the United States of America have a right to demand that, and to expect nothing less than that from the professional soldiers be he a Foreign Area Officer or an individual rifleman.

The time available for the conduct of this Eighth International Affairs Symposium is very short. So I will excuse myself and leave you to your deliberations. Hopefully my duties will allow me to participate in your further discussions and to hear all of the great people who have joined us here. Again, welcome to Fort Bragg and welcome especially to the United States Army Institute for Military Assistance.

INTRODUCTION OF FIRST PLENARY SESSION SPEAKERS

DELIVERED BY

COLONEL ROBERT A. PREHN

DIRECTOR, CIVIL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE SCHOOL

INTRODUCTION

I trust that your initial workshop sessions from 8:30 to 9:30 were fruitful, and I'm certain that they did lay a very valuable cornerstone and define the parameters of the discussion that will follow later on. The form of the opening plenary session this morning will hopefully lend itself to your questions during the question and answer period that will follow the speakers.

Virtually every student of international relations has been influenced strongly by the significant works of Hans Morgenthau and Inis Claude, and virtually all Americans have watched and listened to the news and commentary of Sandor Vanocur. We are most pleased and fortunate to have these three gentlemen present with us this morning to examine the substance and limits of America's obligations abroad.

We will hear first from Dr. Morgenthau, followed successively by Dr. Claude and Mr. Vanocur. The floor will then be open to questions and discussions. At this time its my pleasure to introduce to you Dr. Hans Morgenthau, Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago.

PROFESSOR HANS J. MORGENTHAU, PRINCIPAL SPEAKER

COL Prehn, ladies and gentlemen. I take the title of my presentation this morning to mean the obligations of the United States in terms of the interests and the policies of United States. The United States has one primary, one fundamental obligation which is an obligation toward itself, that is to say, the preservation of its territories and of its institutions. Every other obligation-legal, moral or political, is bound to be subordinated to this one.

This is not an act of chauvinism, but it is the result of the nature of international society. Individuals living in a national society can afford to subordinate their own survival to collective agencies which will to a very great extent take care of those individuals concerns. On the international scene there are no such agencies. A nation which does not take care of its own survival and that of its own institutions will make an end to its survival and to its institutions. This sounds so elementary

but it is so necessary when one considers the welter of contradictory expressions of opinion. Furthermore, in a society of sovereign states which by definition have no secular superior above them, it is the military power of the individual nation which is essential to the preservation of its territorial and its institutional integrity. This basic rule has survived through all changes of history and has taken on a new meaning in view of the availability of nuclear weapons. From the beginning of history to 1945-nations lived in a military world of scarcity where there were always more potential targets than available weapons. The nuclear powers or the super powers now live in a world of military abundance. Both the United States and the Soviet Union single-handedly can wipe humanity off the face of the earth by way of nuclear weapons. Nuclear power, it has been shown in practice in the first 25 years of the nuclear age, is not like conventional power. As an instrument of national policy, it gives a country the capability to wipe an enemy off the face of the earth. But you cannot do with it what conventional weapons have been used for, and that is to change the mind of the opponent. We could have "won" the Indo-China war by blowing the people of Indo-China to Kingdom Come. That would have been no great military feat; you would have just made an end to the war by getting rid of the people who presented the problem.

Although we did not choose that course, the proliferation of nuclear weapons does pose a threat to the present stability of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

If you imagine for a moment, as you must under present circumstances, that within 10 or 20 years 10 or 20 nations will have nuclear weapons, it would be close to a miracle if one or the other of those nations did not use nuclear weapons with the result that against their will the major nuclear power would be drawn into a conflict. If tomorrow a nuclear explosion occurred on the territory of the United States, we would all know who was responsible for it and the retaliation would be forthcoming. For this one does not need to expect such an explosion to occur tomorrow.

But imagine for a moment that, 10 years hence, the United States has tense relations with three minor nuclear powers and a nuclear explosion occurs on the territory of the United States. Against who are you going to retaliate? Are you going to blow up the whole world in order to make sure that the culprit doesn't escape unpunished? Furthermore, in such a situation the nation actually responsible for the explosion will make every diplomatic effort to make it appear that another nation has been responsible for it in order to deflect retaliation. If you consider all of history and consider the number of fools or rogues or a combination of both who have led nations and if you imagine that a number of these nations have nuclear weapons, it is unrealistic to place one's faith merely in a miracle and to expect that the world will escape unharmed from this kind of terror and unstable situation.

If you can imagine for a moment what it would have been like if Hitler had had nuclear weapons or men like Sukarno or Amin, you have a foretaste of what is likely to be a reality of international relations in one or two decades if the present nuclear competition is not stopped or reversed. So, when one speaks of the preservation of the territorial and institutional integrity of the United States, one must make the avoidance of nuclear war the indispensable precondition for the preservation of that integrity. So, there is today a national interest which transcends the national boundaries and which is therefore different from the traditional national interest. And that is that the avoidance of nuclear war and of the threat to not only this or that nation but humanity itself is the precondition for everything else.

This is but one example of those general and novel problems with which the United States as one nation among other must come to terms. And I underline the word "must"

Professor Hans Morgenthau prepares to respond to a question raised by one of the participants.

It is obvious that the United States at the end of the Second World War has been engaged in a world-wide conflict which operates on two different levels, the traditional power one and the ideological one. The power one is indicated by the contest of power, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers around which two blocks of allies and associates are grouped. This conflict has been defined by some in ideological terms. That is to say, not only do two nations face each other in conflict and competition but also two different philosophies, two different governmental systems, two ways of life, face each other in conflict and competition. And so, one factor or one level has strengthened the other, and as long as the power conflict has been defined in ideological terms, it has not been susceptible to agreed-upon settlements. For when you deal with power politics alone, you can make concessions, you can bargain, you can reach a compromise. When you deal with two contradictory and mutually exclusive political philosophies and ways of life, each of which claims to having the monopoly of virtue, while the other has the monopoly of evil, neither has anything to negotiate about and can only wait for the ultimate victory of good over evil

It is a characteristic of the foreign policy which has been initiated by former President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, that we have ideologically decontaminated the foreign policy of the United States insofar as the major Communist powers are concerned.

If you read, for instance, the annual "State of the World" messages of the President, largely written by the Secretary of State, you'll find hardly a reference to communism. You find rather a matter-of-fact analysis of the power situation that we face with the Soviet Union. In our relations with China and the Soviet Union we have retreated from those ideological commitments; however, we have not retreated from them when it comes to dealing with second or third-rate powers. We have not granted the same kind of immunity from ideological commitments to Greece or Indo-China or Chile that we did to China and the Soviet Union.

So here you have an interesting and difficult to explain schizophrenia in which on the grand, world-wide level we deal with the great Communist powers on a matter-of-fact power-political basis. Yet when it comes to second or third-rate Communist movements or governments, we take a stand which harks back to the classic Cold War times of the 50's and beginning of the 60's.

In this context, let me say a word which has been virtually used, not so much to express thought but to avoid it. And that is the term 'détente.' We have heard a great deal about 'détente' and I personally confess that I am sick and tired of hearing of it, and I have expressed my lack of understanding of this term in print but usually without any visible success.

Détente has of course a positive moral connotation. It is like peace, relaxation of tensions, patriotism, mother-love. You can't be against détente, for you certainly can't be in favor of bigger and better tensions. So, to be against détente puts you in the wrong, and there's no point for you to make any arguments about it. But détente, if you look at it realistically, is a result of certain foreign policies that can be challenged. Détente exists today in Central Europe because West Germany has recognized the territorial divisions in Central Europe, and so the tension which existed between the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and Poland and the Soviet Union on the other because of the unsettled territorial claims of the West have disappeared. The West German government has given up the position which it formulated at the beginning of the Cold War.

But to speak of approaching the Middle East problem in the spirit of détente is simply to talk in abstractions which are essentially meaningless. I remember once, long ago, I suggested to the then Secretary of State that we ought to take the initiative. And he asked me if the President of the United States asked me to take the initiative, what would I have done? I was speechless, and I realized that I had fallen into the trap of abstraction which I thought I had professionally at least avoided. But détente is another one of those traps; détente is another of those abstractions, which have come to be meaningless, and in reality can only be the result of certain policies. So if the United States and the Soviet Union were to see eye to eye, in regard to the problems of the Middle East, we would have détente in the Middle East. But to approach the problem in the spirit of détente may only mean--if it means anything--that we ought not to protect and pursue our policies as forcefully as we would if we were not bound by the concept of détente.

So here we return to the theme of this lecture, the obligations of the United States. We stress the idea that we ought to avoid this kind of abstract thinking, which is rather a substitute for thinking rather than thinking itself. You find a similar example, to anticipate what I will say a little bit later, of this kind of abstract thinking in a recent debate in the Senate on American security and foreign policy. One distinguished senator made the statement that future American policy ought not to be directed toward any particular nation but against hunger. Now I don't hesitate to expose myself to the suspicion that I'm insensitive to other people starving and being hungry. But I ask myself, even if I were personally concerned with the misery in which a great deal of humanity lives, what would I do if I were President or Secretary of State and if it were my purpose to combat hunger throughout the world? Perhaps if I were President, I would ask the National Security Council, where do we start? And somebody would say Bangladesh. And if I saw a competent and frank staff study on the situation in Bangladesh, I would find that the main source of hunger in Bangladesh is not the result of natural

deficiencies, but of political and social deficiencies.

In other words, you have a widespread black market, widespread smuggling, you have other inefficiencies in administration and distribution. So what you are saying if you ask the United States to combat hunger in Bangladesh is really to take over the government in Bangladesh or to invite the Chinese to take over because the Chinese have solved the problem of hunger in their own country by methods of government which we are not prepared to imitate or even advocate for others. So here again an obligation is put before the United States which is in its very nature incapable of fulfillment. For even if world-wide famine were to result from nothing but natural deficiency, and not primarily as a result of social arrangements and political measures or the lack of them, the United States is not powerful enough, is not rich enough, to take care of hunger throughout the world. Nor is it powerful and rich and wise and good enough to transform the so-called Third World into something resembling an advanced society or an advanced industrial society after the Western model The idea that the United States has obligations which go beyond what it can achieve by its own resources is, of course, a recipe for frustration and failure. And if we have learned a lesson from Viet Nam, then this is one of them we ought to keep in mind. In Roman Law there is a principle that says in effect that beyond his powers nobody is obligated. And this is true of individuals and of nations as well

I think we are in the aftermath of Viet Nam in danger of embracing well intentioned idealistic obligations which in the nature of things we cannot discharge and if taken up would only lead to frustration, and failure, and recrimination. The United States has still another obligation which is perhaps the most profound and the most subtle of all the obligations it must discharge as a nation. That obligation stems from the desire to exist in organic relationships between the kind of foreign policy the United States pursues and the kind of nation it is, and wants to be. This relationship is more intimate in the case of the United States than in the case of traditional nations states, for traditional nation states such as France or Spain or Great Britain, do not need to raise the question of their identities. They don't need to raise the question of their national purpose because their identity and their purpose are predetermined by history, by dynastic allegiances, by ethnic identities, by religion and so forth. The United States is founded upon nothing but the free will of its citizens whose ancestors once decided to become Americans and who thereby have created subtle ties which in the nature of things cannot be as strong as the ties which binds traditional nation-states together. So while the foreign policy of a nation such as France flows from its historical identity which goes back centuries, the foreign policy of the United States flows from its own self-definition as a nation which is performed by citizens everyday in their public pursuits.

So when we talk about the obligations of the United States, their nature and their limits, we ultimately must come back to the conception which the citizens of the United States have of themselves, and of the mission of their nation among the nations. Here again it is the Viet Nam War which has some advice to give us, for our deep involvement in Viet Nam has been a result exactly of the definition which we have given ourselves and our mission in the world. However mistaken this conception might have been and how unrealistic it was, it was certainly the idea that we were powerful and good enough to bring salvation to the Vietnamese people even if they themselves did not understand what their salvation implied. We have been disabused by the bitter experience in Viet Nam of that self-definition which is a kind of self-deception. So if this is a lesson that we ought to have learned, it follows that in our future forays into the international world, we ought to be very careful not to overestimate our virtue and our power, and perhaps our wisdom. For the damage which Viet Nam has done to us does not lie primarily in the fact that we have failed--as other nations have failed in other circumstances--but that we may draw the wrong lessons from this experience, and that other nations may draw the wrong lessons from that experience. In my own recent experiences abroad I have found very little of that lack of confidence in the United States living up to its commitments. But what I have found is a considerable lack of confidence in the ability of the American government to take care of the business of the nation, and more particularly, to go back to Viet Nam, of the wisdom of our leaders of the past.

So our attention, when you speak of our obligations to ourselves and to the world, ought to be directed not so much to our material power, which is still strong if not overwhelming, but to the quality of our government at home and abroad. And here the quality which our citizens exhibit in taking care of political matters and public matters in general is a determinent factor. So let me say in conclusion, that if one speaks of the obligations of the United States and their nature and their limits, one raises the overall question of what the United States is all about and to what extent its foreign policies reflect what the United States is all about. Thank you very much.

PROFESSOR INIS L. CLAUDE, DISCUSSANT

I hope none of you expect me to spend my time attacking what Professor Morgenthau has said, for as what was properly said at the beginning, he is in a basic sense the father of us all in this profession. I'm his student although I never took a course or a seminar from him, but I'm a student by long distance having read his work. I have sometimes, indeed quite frequently, disagreed with some aspects of it, but I've learned from it, I've been provoked by it, and my thinking along with that of the old generation of American scholars, has been to a very considerable measure formed by, in reaction to, and in sympathy with much of which he has had to say.

I certainly don't find a great deal this morning in the opening address to arouse my ire or my sharp disagreement. I'm impressed by the initial point which I think is fundamental: that in the real world--perhaps not in the ideal world, but the world that we actually have--states have to take care of themselves. If they don't look after their own interests, protect their own survival, nobody will. It doesn't mean they must do it, or can do it, unilaterally, but that they bear the fundamental responsibility of figuring out how to survive in a difficult and dangerous world.

Now, don't think this necessarily means, as it may sometimes have been interpreted, to suggest that there is a clear cut cleavage--dichotomy if I may--between national interests and global concern. It doesn't mean that a state is obliged by its own sense of responsibility to itself and to its own people to operate selfishly and in conflict with the interest of mankind as a whole. There may be something in the proposition that what is good for the world is good for the United States. But, one ought not to base his policy on this abstraction. All abstractions are dangerous, as Professor Morgenthau has repeatedly reminded us. But the point is, of course, that the interest of the United States include having a world that is stable enough and that is characterized sufficiently by the conditions of a decent life for human beings everywhere, so that it becomes a world that we can operate safely, in which we can enjoy living, in which our basic values can be realized. So the concern about the nature of our environment in which we are necessarily encompassed and by which we are fundamentally affected is, I think a fundamental concern, a basic interest of any state that looks at its problems intelligently.

Let me make one reference to what was said about détente. I share Professor Morgenthau's caution about this term and not only because it is a French word. I sometimes wonder whether it doesn't mean the same thing as Cold War.

A euphemism, a nice way of putting it. But I think one can find a great deal in common between what we used to call the Cold War and what we now are inclined to call détente. However, I am not certain that détente is any more lacking in clear meaning than most other abstractions that we are condemned to use. And try as we may, we do not release ourselves from dealing with abstractions. It simply needs, like all other abstractions, careful translation. We need to make sure that we know what we mean when we use it.

The problem of the translation of the term détente does not arise exclusively from the fact that it is one of those attractive French terms--one of our borrowings from another language. I think it is conceivable that detente may be taken to mean--and perhaps this is the way in which it should be used more consistently--to refer to a Cold War situation that is moving more in the direction of peace than in the direction of war. One that is getting better rather than worse. One in which at least the major parties involved in a Cold War situation seem to be activated by some concern to ease tensions rather than to intensify them. It is one kind of cold war rather than another kind of cold war perhaps But I certainly share the views that we should be very cautious in throwing this term around without defining it and oftentimes discovering that we mean quite different things by it.

Let me make a few comments of a more general sort about the problem of national obligation, national commitment, which is the centerpiece of our concern this morning. I am impressed by the fact that there are at least two ways of interpreting the concept of national commitments. I don't suggest that either one of these is correct or incorrect, but it seems to me that we need to be constantly aware of the fact that people mean different things and that indeed different commitments mean different things. Perhaps the most common and standard and traditional way of interpreting the notion of national commitment is to think in terms of a buy and sell arrangement, a quid pro quo arrangement. We get a quo from somebody else and in turn we give a quid. In these terms we are looking at commitment as a price that a state pays for some good that it sets out to get. It is a liability that a state undertakes for the sake of gain and asset. Presumably in a mutual relationship when two states commit themselves in some sense to each other, each one values the commitment of the other and is rather reluctant to give its own commitment but necessarily pays the price of giving in order to get.

Obviously, in the world of statesmanship as well as in the world of commerce people prefer good bargains and the best of all possible worlds. One gets a very big asset of somebody else's commitment to our interests in exchange for the smallest possible quid pro quo, the smallest possible liability of our asset given in return. In short, we pay reluctantly for what we are eager to get. This is, I think, the traditional view of commitment.

We necessarily and rather unhappily undertake a liability because we think it is worth it in order to acquire the asset from the other party. I think there is a significantly different way of interpreting the concept of commitment that has too seldom been articulated and brought to our attention in the recent generation, the last era. One can think of a national commitment--one's own commitment to somebody else, I'm talking about--as an asset rather than a liability. Perhaps the best analogy I can think of is the billboard. One buys billboard space in order to advertise his policy in order to tell the world or to tell the enemies, the antagonists, the rivals, or to tell one's friends and allies what one wants them to hear and wants them to believe about one's own policy and one's own intentions. I think to a very great degree the commitments that the US government has made since the Second World War have been regarded by the government as assets, as billboards erected or rented by us enabling us to say what we think it is desirable that we should say to the rest of the world about our intentions and our policy.

One might think of the typical American post-war commitment as a "No Trespassing" sign, a sign that we put up saying, "We intend to hold this You stay out. You'll get into trouble if you intrude." Or perhaps even better, one of those typical "No Parking, Towing Enforced" signs that one sees here and there. The commitment is not in and of itself, then, something that we want to have, an asset, something that we think is good for us. It is a liability, a price we pay for the act of getting something else. In a great many instances it is valued in itself as a instrument of policy. I think more American commitments since the Second World War have been regarded by the US Government as assets rather than as liabilities. Not as promises to sacrifice our interests in order to do something for somebody else, but as proclamations of our intentions of following a tactic in foreign policy which we think advisable, helpful for stabilization, for educating rivals, for reassuring our friends.

Now if a commitment is regarded as or is intended to be an asset, a foreign policy proclamation board, this does not mean that it is cost-free. Assets cost something, of course. One has to pay rent for billboards, or if one owns it himself, one has to spend money for the maintenance of the billboard. Commitments are always costly. One has to pay for them. But it may be that a given commitment is in itself not a liability which we accept reluctantly, but an asset which we erect as a part of our strategy of performing in international affairs. Now this point of view I think helps to explain what may on the surface seem to be worthless alliances.

The US has engaged in a lot of alliance-making since the Second World War which one can raise an eyebrow about on the ground that the allies are not worth very much to the US. They are not needed very much or they're not potent enough or reliable enough to be very valuable. Does it make you sleep better at night to know that we have an alliance with the Philippines. So the argument goes. Alliances of this sort are frequently one-sided in fact although not in words. We are committed to protect somebody

somebody else although they are not really committed to protect us. They couldn't in a meaningful way be expected to. Well, if you're still back with the traditional view of alliances of quid pro quo's, then you say we've got a bad bargain. We've paid too much for something that isn't worth having. But if you think of alliances as assets, it doesn't necessarily follow that such an alliance makes no sense. It may be a very useful billboard. If in fact the US feels it important to prevent other states from getting the notion that we are not interested, that we don't care what happens there, that we will not resist intrusion, a billboard proclaiming our intentions may be a very useful asset.

Professor Inis L. Claude addresses one of the points raised by Professor Morgenthau.

I would comment in passing that I think a good deal of the discussion and debate and dissention over Vietnam about American involvement there relates to the fact that on the two sides of the question--or within the many sides of the question--some people have been thinking of commitments as liabilities and others as assets. I think you can detect in the debate between US governmental leaders and leading critiques of policy in Vietnam the point that the critics more often than not have tended to think of commitments as liabilities and that the government has tended to think of this particular commitment as an asset to be maintained, something valuable, something that is worth a great deal if we can maintain it.

There is another view of commitments which in some sense overlaps these first two that I have tried to lay out. Commitment is in some sense a "buy now-pay later" arrangement, a matter of signing a promissory note. I must say that I have some tendency to feel that the American people--and not only the men in the street, but the men on Capitol Hill and various other places--for the last generation have displayed the same sort of casualness about signing promissory notes that some people do when they avidly acquire television sets and refrigerators with notes and don't think too much about payday the unpleasant occasion when promissory notes have to be converted to cash. I have the unhappy feeling that a great many American alliances were entered into and supported by many people in very responsible positions because they liked the asset which they thought the commitment represented, but they didn't worry very much about having to pay for it. And when payday came, they found themselves very unhappy with it. I think, for instance, of one passage in the Vietnam hearings where Senator Fulbright had been taxed by someone that he indeed had voted and given apparently enthusiastic support in the mid-50's to the American commitment to Vietnam, and he replied rather sadly by saying: "Yes, it's true. But at the time I didn't think about it very seriously. I thought of it as just some other little old country that we were making a commitment to, and I didn't think it was worth bothering about very much." It was a nice little asset to acquire, but there was not much concern about the day when the promissory note might have to be paid. Alliances and commitments, whether they are buy and sell arrangements or whether they are billboard arrangements, do have costs.

What does a commitment really say or do? One comes back to the fundamental proposition which I think I learned as much from Professor Morgenthau as anybody else, and that is that, in the final analysis, states act in terms of their own interests rather than in terms of pieces of paper which may have been signed in negotiations. One can certainly make a case for the proposition that formal commitments by states are superfluous. A state will behave in accordance with its view of its national interests, whether or not a piece of paper exists. Well, in this sense, there is truth in this; but I think there is a sense in which a commitment says something significant and therefore may be an asset of real importance for a state which is trying to make itself clear, its position clear in the world. A commitment can never be a guarantee of behavior. I don't think that's possible. Circumstances change, points of view change, interpretations of national interests

change. It would be ridiculous to assume that a formal and solemn commitment really guaranteed the behavior of a given state sometime in the future. At best--but this is not very vast--I think the commitment may be a prediction about the probable policy behavior of a state. Having a commitment to act in a certain way puts the burden of proof on the opponents of that policy. It leads in the direction of, it reinforces the tendency to act in the way that has been previously promised. It makes it harder, it makes it less comfortable for a state not to do what it has promised to do. Probably in this limited sense--it is the most realistic point, I think--states do have commitments. We do have obligations that we have proclaimed but not a matter fundamentally of promising to sacrifice our interests or subordinate our interests to those of any one else.

I think the obligations that the U.S. government undertakes, has undertaken, will undertake are fundamentally directed towards attempting to serve our interests in having the world know with some degree of predictability how we are likely to behave, what sort of policy behavior we are inclined to follow. And therefore we hope that this may assist us in avoiding the miseducation of other states and confusion and difficulty and perhaps even war stemming from uncertainty and miscalculation of American intentions. Thank you very much.

MR. SANDOR VANOCUR, DISCUSSANT

I have been educated by Hans Morgenthau; like Professor Claude, I have never disagreed with him. And it is not simply because I have always been in agreement with him. I've just never dared to. If you will forgive me a personal note, my only expertise in this field is that I was educated once removed by Hans Morgenthau personally and by his writings. I have spent most of my life as a political reporter, a domestic political reporter; I dabbled slightly in international politics. And now I am about to start a new life as a television editor and critic for the Washington Post.

I mention this this morning because I want to take up the subject of abstractions and images as they relate to reality. And I would think that one of the things that was disastrous in my career as a television reporter was when I began to think seriously about the consequences of what I was doing, which is always a very unpleasant thing to do when you get into your forties. I now teach a course down at Duke entitled--because one has to have a pompous title at a University-"How the Mass Media Distorts Our Perceptions of Reality." Which means I can teach anything I want to.

Now Professor Morgenthau raised in his remarks being trapped by his own abstraction in talking to a Secretary of State about the President taking an initiative. Mr. Claude has talked about billboards and what we think is advisable to tell the world about our intentions. I would like to juxtapose abstractions and images. I don't think they are the same thing. Abstractions are ways in which we grapple to express in a very broad and general way specifics, but we don't always succeed. In fact, we never succeed. If we did, we wouldn't have to go to abstractions. Images are creations of what we would like people to think are realities.

Now it is very strange and somewhat difficult for me to be standing in this hall because I haven't been on this post for 14 years. The first and the last time I was here was in September of 1961, when President Kennedy paid a visit here. And you did for him-or people who were here then--did the most glorious dog and pony act I have ever seen on a military post. And he loved it. Now I should have been aware of what was going on when one day prior to that in a little cubicle in the White House, I received a brown manila envelope with a speech by Walt Rostow on guerrila warfare. Now reporters never have time to think. We are kept at a fast trot. I think that this is designed to make us not think. We just "give you the facts, ma'am." And I should have had a bell of alarm ring--what was Walt Rostow doing with guerrilla warfare? I thought he was busy with the takeoff point. I later learned that the takeoff point with Walt was that point at which his own rhetoric made him weightless. If you think I exaggerate, I only invite you to go back and read about the mood of the White House in the early 60's when these learned gentlemen came down from the banks of the Charles River, and they really had guns to play with like toys. It was a very dangerous and heady feeling.

Now, in the area of images and extractions, both employ words. A very strange thing about being a reporter in Washington for 15 years you get, if you are thoughtful, a rather terrifying sense of how words are used without thought. I commend you to the plaque in the hall, "Pay any price and bear any burden to insure the survival of liberty." I'd like to think that when I was standing in the Capitol Rotunda that day in January 1961, that I had the time or the experience to analyze the implications of that speech. Because what that speech meant is that we took on the burden from that day forward of defending liberty, or what passed for liberty, anywhere in the world. Now I don't think any of us at the time who were journalists wrote about it in that sense. We wrote about a new generation, a young, charismatic President, but I don't think that even John Foster Dulles in his most egomaniacal moments ever contemplated taking on a burden like that for the United States. Now what followed, you see, from that is that these men in Washington used words rather carelessly. And it's surprising, or perhaps not surprising, that academicians who one thought would have a sense of how words should be used would use these words so recklessly. If you read George Orwells essay on politics and the English language, or years later, an introduction by Lionel Trilling for reissue of Orwell's Homage to Catalonia, both men talk about the power of words. Later on Orwell in 1984 showed you the diabolical uses to which words could lead men.

The thing that is funny about the people in Washington and hasn't stopped since that time is they use words and they forget that a cumulation of words takes on power and policy. Men act upon these words. When Kennedy told Walter Cronkite and Huntley and Brinkley-I believe on Labor Day in 1963 when the two networks, CBS and NBC, went into a half an hour show-"Yes, he believed in the Domino Theory " Not remembering, as Gene McCarthy observed later, that it had been his experience as a man and boy, that dominoes can fall either way. It seemed innocuous, "Yes, I believe in the Domino Theory." Having said that without examining what the Domino Theory really was beyond just a phrase--and sofar as I know there has never been a student who has done a historical analysis of where the phrase was first used--I think Ike used it but I'm not sure--this country proceeded upon a policy of investing men, lives, national treasure and severe social dislocations here at home on an abstraction. Or if you will in this case, an image of words which had never been seriously examined. Now they used it, and in the context of journalism which is group followship they were picked up. Would this have been so bad in a pre-television age? I think not. But when it's picked up, a phrase like the Domino Theory, and used on television and seen by 60 million people then you have it becoming part of the general mind set of the country. And men who lead us can invest lives, treasure, and risk socioeconomic dislocation because of the Domino Theory.

Now Professor Claude talked about billboards, I don't know of any billboards that try to tell you the truth. They try to sell you something. Should we be in the business of selling a foreign policy that has not been thought out? I don't think, since perhaps the policy planning days of the State Department under George Kennan and maybe Grigouie in the 50's, that there has been a concentrated effort to deal with realities in the State Department or on the National Security Staff as against these abstractions these slogans, these billboard signs that tell the rest of the world what they ought to be on guard against as against what our reality is. We had as recently as 1970, I think, President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger (especially President Nixon) leaking information that he didn't want the rest of the world to know what our policy was because he wanted to keep the rest of the world off guard. I think that's dangerous and risky.



Mr. Sandor Vanocur discusses the differences between imagery and reality.

Now coming closer to home and what this School is all about, when I first started covering Washington, you were the darlings of the Administration, the darlings of the Mass Media. That dog and pony act was a high point of it. And you were set up, as I remember the slogan, "to put out brush fire wars." This is a wonderful slogan: it evokes Smokey the Bear and our national forests. Put out brush fire wars--build a backfire, dynamite here, cut down timber, that's it. And then leave. So they went to Vietnam, and you know who's taken the rap for that. Not the civilians, who had this concept and probably with the aid of the military said "Sure, we can do that." But it's a slogan, and it has lived to haunt you.

I commend to your attention, if you can get it, a speech that was made about two or three weeks ago at a Bicentennial Forum in Boston by Hannah Arent in which she talked about what happens to a nation when it starts to substitute imagery for reality in its foreign policy. We don't know enough yet about the force of imagery in our lives. We live in a world of advertising, public relations, and the formation of imagery. People Magazine tells you they are dealing with important people. People. If they're people, and our names never get in there, then what are the rest of us? This whole question of imagery goes back to the beginning of the public relations industry in this country. Men like Bernaise, Benson and Byrd, Albert Laster, in advertising, Bill Benton, Chester Bowles, which has become a step advanced from selling of goods to the formation, enunciation, and propagandizing of a foreign policy or a domestic policy.

Men do things for images. Have you ever noticed on the television networks that when Henry Kissinger is going on a trip, people will rush out to Andrews Air Force Base, and they will stand there, but he will make no comment. He is filmed; it's on the evening news. He comes back; he is filmed; he will not say anything; he has to go report to the President. Whether anything has been done or not, there is the creation of a sense of momentum. A Secretary of State flying off in the dark of night to do the Lord's work. And it passes for reality.

What I think we have to do, and I'll conclude on this, is to get back to what Hans Morgenthau talked about. A realistic interpretation of what are our obligations to ourselves. I don't think you can do that until you start to strip away this mock reality which the image makers in government try to create for themselves on the pretense that you don't understand the realities. I think the American people once told the realities have a very shrewd sense of what their national interests are and what they are not. However, if they are being blown smoke at all the time, they're not going to know. And until you clear the smoke, which requires that you start to have a little tender, loving care for the English language, and the Mass Media stops acting as a transmission belt with the smoke of their leaders, civilian and military, then the American people are going to be in a quandry. And, ultimately, if I may say to you, you are going to take it in the neck, as I think you are right now. Thank you.

ARMS COPRODUCTION: WHO BENEFITS?

A Summary of Workshop Deliberations

Prepared by

Captain Albert J. Snyder

INTRODUCTION[1]

Arms coproduction, briefly defined as the assembly of a US military item in a friendly nation and/or manufacture in-country of a portion of the components of US military items, is a form of US security assistance. Coproduction is an assistance option which nations will increasingly elect as arms sales become the principal mode of American security assistance.

The primacy of the role of force in international politics makes defense a central national function for all members of the world system. The utility of force compels nation-states to seek the improvement of their defense establishments. Most countries have historically driven to modernize their military capabilities commensurate with the prevailing international level of technological sophistication. Only a handful of powers possess the capability to generate highly sophisticated defense establishments, with the superpowers spearheading this technological imperative. The remaining countries must obtain this sophistication abroad, hence the role of security assistance.

American security assistance is a central element in the network of international defense improvement. US military technology is viewed as second to none. Thus, nations seeking to build first-rate military establishments come to America for military hardware and training. US foreign and defense policy recognize this necessary arms demand by other sovereign nations: American security assistance is a legitimate adjunct of US foreign policy. The attendant dangers in security assistance, i.e., the militarization of US foreign policy, the fostering of arms races, the escalation of violence, etc., are considerations in the decision making process.

Arms sales is the future norm for US security assistance. Indeed, a transition from grant aid to sales as the dominant mode of security assistance has been the sense of Congress since the early 1960's. As sales increase, nations will be able to attach demands to their sales acceptances which were not feasible under grant aid. That is, nations will insert conditions into sales negotiations not previously possible. In the sales arena host country objectives will drive US security assistance more than US defense objectives.

One prominent host country objective is industrialization. A point of departure is self-sufficiency in arms production. Those who do not have the technological expertise are insisting that arms coproduction or offset arrangements be prior conditions in arms sales agreements. To make a sale, American manufacturers must be prepared to grant coproduction and offset agreements. If arms sales are to be successful, the US government must accede to this growing international demand.

WHY COPRODUCTION?

The intense competition in the arms sales business is basic to the increased emphasis placed on coproduction/offset arrangements by purchasing nations. With five or six major weapons-producing nations and the plethora of industrial firms manufacturing military hardware competing for sales revenues, the customer can insist that coproduction and offset agreements be conditions of a purchase. The purchasing nation can thus obtain more for its money than the military item in question; industrialization and reduction of dependency on foreign suppliers are just two benefits to the customer from coproduction.

Since the political elements of the US national security apparatus dominate security assistance decision making, US security assistance is often keyed to non-security objectives. Economic interests are foremost today. As America becomes more dependent on foreign sources of raw materials, especially energy resources, arms sales or grants gain credence as tools for obtaining and maintaining access to these commodities. Coproduction is part of the quo in an arms sale; the sale itself being a quid in a commodity access arrangement.

Attaining US national security objectives has developed into a highly difficult and sophisticated task in an environment of emerging mid-level world economic and military powers. United States foreign policy must operate in a buyer's marker, since economic and political interdependence allows these new centers of power and resource commodities to stipulate many of the conditions for the satisfaction of American policy aims. In this realm, coproduction has become a quid pro quo for base rights sought by the US military. The Philippine demand for M-16 rifle coproduction as a prerequisite for continued American use of Clark AFB and the Subic Bay Naval Base is exemplary.

Briefly then, the impetus behind the proliferation of arms coproduction is the effective demand of the purchasing nation. Should America ignore that demand, the requesting government can turn to another anxious supplier who is quite willing to give the customer a piece of the manufacturing action.

HOST COUNTRY IMPACT

Nationalism and the amenities of industrialization are motive forces behind the growing popularity of coproduction. For developed economies with accomplished arms industries, coproduction and offset arrangements present

opportunities to improve technological standards, maintain or increase their own production (with the attendant balance of payments and employment benefits), or broaden the scope of their arms production capacity. The recent F-16 buy in Europe is illustrative. America was obliged to spend $30 million on Belguim machine guns as a condition for the Consortium purchase of the F-16. That is, selling was a condition of buying. Such skillful bargaining may become prevelant in future years.

Among the developing nations coproducion looms as an alluring vehicle for industrial development. While commentators may criticize the contruction of an arms industry as a first step in industrialization, sovereignty, and a lack of world order make arms production attractive. The intense arms sales competition extant today allows the purchaser to extract industrialization as part of the price of purchase.

But the price of this extraction is high. The recipient nation lacks technology, industrial management, skilled labor, and often the capital to pay for these production necessities. The oil-rich nations can buy coproduction to fill these gaps at a cost well in excess of the price tag of a straight purchase of military equipment. The non-rich must depend on credit to industrialize. Thus, their independence is more limited and susceptible to supplier control.

Though coproduction is expensive, it generates spin-offs which may save the recipient nation some costs over the long term. Much of the technology of arms production or assembly is transferable. Machinery which fabricates weapons often can be easily retooled to produce consumer goods and applicances.

Coproduction also appears to be a way for the host nation to escape some American arms control policies. The more a country can produce itself, the less dependent it is on the whims of US foreign policy and the American Congress. To be totally free, however, the host country cannot rely on America for anything. Spare parts production and raw material fabrication are requisite to complete autonomy. Internal market development is a spin-off under these conditions. Subcontractors are necessary arms production, as are training schools and other trappings of industrial plants. The initiation of arms coproduction founded on a desire for industrial and military sovereignty sets in motion a congeries of developmental imperatives to make the effort worthwhile. These imperatives demand a stable political system capable of enduring the strains of modernization. And, if the industrialization is to be of any scale, money in large amounts must be available. Arms coproduction as a scenario for industrial modernization, will, therefore, be confined to the new rich of the "Third World." The "Fourth World" may suffer the consequences.

One of these consequences for the poorer recipients of coproduction may be general international inflation. An oil-rich nation which is heavily involved in arms purchasing and coproduction may find it necessary to raise

the price of crude oil to finance its ever-spreading industrialization. The resultant increased cost of manufactured goods (to include arms) may deprive the poorer nations of any possibility of development, military, economic, or social.

From the host perspective, there are some dangers in arms coproduction. First, the expense may strain financial resources which, unless one is relatively rich, may serve to increase dependency on foreigners for financial capital. Second, unless the host nation is capable of producing the complete item from raw materials to final assembly, it is vulnerable to supplier control including spare parts embargo. An embargo could abort the industrialization effort, rendering the host investment fruitless. It appears that to be totally sovereign in this regard, a nation must be both rich enough to absorb or substitute for such an embargo and industrialized enough to fabricate complete items.

IMPACT ON US ECONOMY

Military sales is a portion of our national security and foreign economic policies. Arms sales are often criticized exclusively on moral grounds because even the marketing of weapons earns money for America. But arms coproduction has fallen victim to the purely economic arguments that it transfers American jobs overseas, creates competitors, and reduces the markets for her exports. The three agreements are partially true. But placed in the context of "coproduction or no sale," these criticisms become essentially moot.

Obviously, jobs for Americans require successful American business enterprise. Successful enterprise equals profits. Profits derive from sales. Sales require markets. American arms industries originated to satisfy US military demands. When those demands decrease or are fulfilled, the US arms makers must sell elsewhere or become unprofitable enterprises.

The goal of US arms manufacturers is to maintain or increase their profits. To make a profit they must sell the implements of war to customers beyond American borders. When a foreign customer inserts coproduction as an *a priori* condition for sales negotiations, US industry either complies or loses the sale to a French or British firm willing to accept coproduction in the terms of contract. Coproduction, then, is a precondition for sales. And that idea is gaining popularity.

Arms coproduction is a tactic in the strategy of market penetration and maintenance. An American arms producer accepts coordination as a means of increasing his own sales and profits in the short term. Long-term cost-benefit analysis of coproduction is not yet possible due to the recency of the trend toward coproduction arrangements. While American arms makers prefer manufacturing in the US and selling directly to customers, the reduced per-item profits to them under coproduction are preferable to the no sale/no profit condition which results from refusing to meet foreign coproduction demands.[2]

Furthermore, arms coproduction may lay the technical groundwork for later market penetration by American industries not engaged in arms production. The partial production and assembly of American military items may function to pattern foreign industry along the American model, aligning their industrial system with ours, thus facilitating subsequent American business penetration. Just the fact that American machinery is used would seem to enhance this capability.

The evidence to date suggests that coproduction agreements do not entail a net loss of American jobs. While some specific production/assembly line spaces may be transferred abroad, the host country's need for managers, technical training and dispatch of Americans. That is, coproduction arrangements generally bring a net increase in Americans employed. In any case, the loss of a sale because of a refusal to coproduce would create more unemployment than gaining a sale with coproduction. The choice is between no jobs or some. Industry understandably feels that some jobs (coproduction) are better than no jobs (no sale).

Evidence was presented which showed that coproduction may encourage the purchasing nation to make a bigger buy than would have been acceptable under a direct sale. The gross profits and return to American industry and the US Government are greater under coproduction in such cases than would have accrued in a direct sale. A cited example involved the sale of 50 helicopters to a West European customer. Initially the host planned to buy 50 helicopters. Under coproduction the final total was 140, with 40% of total cost spent in the US Research and development recoupment to the US Government was agreed to at $100,000 per helicopter. Not counting the R&D recoupment, this agreement returned the monetary equivalent of 56 helicopters to the industry, more than the straight sale of 50 helicopters initially postulated.

As to the issue of creating competitors by licensing foreign production of US hardware, the following thoughts were rendered. First, the nation demanding coproduction will get it from someone else if America declines the request. France, England or the Soviet Union will then earn the coproduction dollar. An American coproduction arrangement at least earns us that money. Furthermore, few coproduction arrangements transfer over 60% of the production and assembly operations abroad. In the case of developing nations, the transition beyond the assembly stages takes years. When the host country finally is able to completely produce the item (if he is willing to bear the tremendous cost of attaining that capability), the state of the art has left that item well behind. The result, except in low technology materiel, is that the coproducer is manufacturing obsolete equipment at non-competitive, or barely competitive, prices.

The conclusion is that coproduction normally allows America to earn the price of someone else's industrialization. While the competition-creation argument is valid at low and mid techonology levels, credence

decreases in the high technology arena. Certainly, in the inexorable march of technology, what was once high technology becomes commonplace--obsolete.

And coproduction often brings a reverse flow of better ideas back to America which enhances US technological development. Prima facie evidence of this can be found in the US automobile industry whose lethargy has been reversed by the competition from Japan and Europe. Detroit's engineers are beginning to think again.

Competition, it was agreed, is not necessarily hostile to US interests. Again, the transfer of some technology is better than no money and no jobs without such transfer.[3]

As to the criticism that coproduction arrangements are part of an import-substitution scheme on the part of the host country, thereby plugging US export markets, the point was made earlier that the host will attain that objective producing French of British equipment should we refuse coproduction. America can use that money too. Some exports beat no exports.

The principal reason America suffers in the international arms sales marketplace involves that long lead-time attendant in buying American materiel. Our competitors can deliver quicker with better initial credit terms. Coproduction can deflect this US disadvantage. A purchasing nation is more apt to accept a long lead-time if it is being geared up to produce or assemble all or a portion of the item it intends to buy. Even the first-class status of US materiel pales in the face of impatience. Coproduction may encourage the customer to endure rather than switch. In time the American worker will get that dollar.

The general consensus of the workshop as to impact of arms coproduction on the American economy might be paraphrased as follows: if the prevailing environment dictates "coproduction of no sale," coproduction has no short-term disadvantages vis-a-vis direct sales. Long range assessments are not conducive to analysis because of limited experiential data.

Offset agreements were not seen to cost America except in those cases where offsets are required to secure a much more lucrative sale.

IMPACT ON US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Security assistance has been an integral part of American security policy designed to accomplish or facilitate certain defense-related objectives. The emergence of a multitude of nations capable of purchasing sizeable military establishments has once again riveted public and private attention on the direction of US military assistance.

This concern about the long range implications of arms sales as a US Government policy encompasses misgivings as to the American capacity to forecast defense outcomes.[4] The issue is normally phrased as follows: Is there a danger that arms sales, and especially coproduction, may allow the host country to act independently of US security policy? Does the United States lose control of defense outcomes by acceding to foreign demands for the coproduction of American military hardware? Does the technology transferred abroad prejudice future US military freedom of action in areas vital of American security and economic interests? The workshop surfaced the following thoughts relevant to these questions.

On the impact of technology transfers, it was generally agreed that while low technology coproduction allows the host country to act counter to American policy in varying degrees, high technology coproduction arrangements tend to limit the foreigner's freedom of action. When a nation purchases high technology materiel with coproduction rights, it ties itself to the US for spare parts and sophisticated components not only for the military item but also for the coproduction facilities. A US embargo would disrupt more than the military equipment under such circumstances.

Few coproduction agreements call for complete in-country manufacture and assembly. Rather, the retention of the fabrication of major portions of materiel in America is the norm. In the high-technology arena, the foreign industrial base is often incapable of absorbing, much less generating or supporting, sohpisticated component coproduction. By the time it has this capability, the high technology mastered is old technology.

The technology transfers from arms coproduction were thus seen as of more concern to low technology than high technology US capabilities. This could become a serious danger to American security interests only if Congress enforces a strict limit on US military research and development. Then, foreign technology would close the gap of American superiority. Such action would also reduce arms sales. Research and development reduction would then impact directly on the US balance of payments position.

Generally, the Federal Government bureaucracy is conservative on the coproduction issue favoring the US production-direct sale alternative. Each coproduction request is studied as to its cost and benefits to America. Many such requests have been refused. However, it was conceded that US coproduction policy, like all security assistance policy, is in a state of flux. (Indirection might be more descriptive.) The Government has no firm policy on arms sales. Add to that the confusion of coproduction, where we are selling not only a military item but the production of that item, and the possibility of undesirable defense outcomes intensifies.

Basically, the problems of security assistance are increasing under the pressure of burgeoning arms sales and coproduction requests. The Department

of Defense is now requesting for arms sales and coproduction in an attempt to improve policy analysis and procurement planning. Part of this policy analysis improvement effort is designed to allow the Government to identify sound reasons for saying "no" to coproduction and sales requests when necessary. That such searching is contemplated serves as telling evidence that American security assistance policy demands reassessment. Ad hoc decision making, known as case-by-case analysis, reflects the sort of philosophical malaise that may rebound to America's disadvantage.

A stellar issue in security assistance is the problem of the US capacity to control third country transfers. When a nation buys American hardware it agrees to abide by US law prohibiting third country transfers without American approval. But under a sales arrangement such materiel belongs to the purchaser; the US transfers title to the equipment also. While a nation may choose to violate the law, it risks a spare parts embargo or a credit cutoff. That is, America retains a modicum of control over weapons distribution in the direct sale context.

Coproduction exacerbates the control problems. Indeed, the host may seek coproduction as a means of skirting arms control policies. The more spare parts that can be produced in-country, the more independence the host country has. In low and mid-technology items, such production capacity certainly can depress the efficacy of American laws. Furthermore, we find ourselves at the mercy of the nation concerned to inform us of his desire to make such transfers. He need not be so cooperative if he is self-sufficient.

And should we attempt to limit such self-sufficiency in coproduction contracts, the purchaser may choose to take his business elsewhere. Arms control, it seems, is no match for sovereignty and nationalism. If we want the benefits of arms sales, i.e., favorable gold flow, jobs, markets, technological ties, etc., we must risk some loss of control. And if Congress intends to maximize commercial sales (no US Government participation except licensing), the arms control problems make those of foreign military sales relatively tame.

One problem for America's competitive posititon as an arms supplier is the long lead-time of some US equipment caused by a lack of adequate production capability to meet total domestic and foreign demand. In addition, some nations still operate American equipment for which we no longer furnish support or make parts. Here coproduction facilitates American assistance objectives. As an example, Lockheed-Fiat in Italy has been able to replace lost Turkish F-104's that were unavailable elsewhere. The Colt M-16 production line was incapable of filling the Philippine demand because the total capacity of that line was committed to Vietnam. Coproduction was the alternative. Coproduction, therefore, may be a useful method of reducing the pressure on American production lines, reducing lead-time.

Coproduction is an inducement for acceptance of long lead-times that the US may exploit to keep purchasers "buying American" when impatience for delivery makes the short delivery periods of other suppliers attractive. Successful coproduction schemes mean long-term planning benefits for both participating nations which, if adeptly presented, encourage the host government to forego the "quick fix" in favor of a more stable, though slower, military development. The advantageous spin-offs for that nation should be stressed.

SOME COPRODUCTION DANGERS FOR US POLICY

The foremost national security danger from arms coproduction is the danger of its promoting regional arms races with their inherent instability. As the coproduction purchases in the future will be dominated by those able to pay cash, the rich nations in a region will become militarily dominant. Like the parallel situation in the arms sales arena, the rich nations may not always be on our side. The Mid-East situation illustrates this dilemma. America sells the "moderate" Arabs tremendous arsenals, as do the competitors, for political and financial gain. To keep peace, US grants and credits to Israel must increase to offset sales to Israel's enemies. Meanwhile, the Shah of Iran arms himself with the very latest weapons to fulfill objectives which may not be totally in congruence with US objectives for Iran. Coproduction complicates the regional balance here. The long range impact defies analysis.

And what about failure. Buying one's arms industry, lock, stock, and barrel, necessitates a substantial host country investment. Further, as in Saudi Arabia and Iran, a multitude of coproduction projects drastically increase the competition for the small group of skilled indigenous manpower. Under such conditions of oversaturation, the risk of project failure is real. American industry makes extensive in-country industrial surveys which depress the risk of venture failure to a level below that prevailing in America. But the industry representatives were clear in their warning; if the host wants everything now, failure is imminent. If failure occurs, the host government will probably keep it quiet. One doesn't advertise mismanagment. But domestic pressures may force that government to point the finger at the American government. That certainly doesn't satisfy the security assistance aim of fostering better relations. It would be well if the US Government made provisions to remove itself from unwise coproduction negotiations. Industry may follow suit.

AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

During its deliberations, the workshop explored a few interesting proposals regarding arms sales and coproduction.

First, why not consider a more pragmatic sales and coproduction policy by separating the business of arms sales from US national security where America has no preference as to defense outcomes? In other words, must America sell arms based on defense rationale? Why not just market our wares for the cash

gained? In those areas which are no longer militarily important to the United States and where intervention is not contemplated, allow the industry to sell what it can unencumbered by security assistance restrictions. Take arms sales out of security assistance in areas beyond the US defense perimeter, in Southeast Asia for instance. Make it a free market. Emulate the French.

Discussants agreed that such a scheme was worthy of study as to its implications. Certainly the moral issues would be a primary hurdle; arms race issues versus arms control policies would be sacrificed to some degree. But the domestic economic benefits to America (balance of payments under increased oil consumption) might weigh favorably to a pragmatic arms transfer policy in places not important to America.

The greatest obstacle, of course, would be that America encouraged arms races and wars by coldly furnishing the means for antagonists to fight. It was advanced that, though repugnant, the detached "So, let 'em fight" attitude should be studied. Pragmatism may become as attractive in America as it apparently has in France when considering economic stability in an energy short industrial nation. The question is, "Does disengagement allow arms coproduction and sales to be pragmatically profitable without degrading US national security?"

The second area surfaced for further study involved the use of coproduction as a method of fostering regional development and organization. Could coproduction be a tool to strengthen ASEAN economic and military cooperation? The intent is to limit the proliferation of arms industries while aiding the formation of alliances and "common markets."

The workshop agreed that nationalism is the hurdle here and little hope for success was perceived. Indeed, past experience has shown that nations prefer their own arms industry even if it impedes development. And while nations might agree to such a scheme as long as necessary, they would adopt nationalistic attitudes when economic development made that possible.

Indeed, it was ventured that the US State Department fears that such regional arms schemes may drag America into undesirable levels of involvement should hostilities develop.

The third question for consideration is the impact of "bet-on-come" production vis-a-vis arms races. In "bet-on-come" production, a manufacturer produces beyond current demands, betting that demand will develop to absorb the surplus inventories. If arms makers adopt this tactic and build sizeable inventories, their efforts to reduce the surpluses may be fuel for arms races and arms proliferation. While "bet-on-come" is normally applicable to civilian versions of military hardware where approval of sale is assumed, it is nonetheless a tactic which may be in opposition to arms control policies. "Bet-on-come" may manufacture an arms demand where such demand is nonexistent.

The most critical questions arose concerning the possible link between resource commodity prices and arms sales. Focusing on oil and the arming of the Arab moderates, the workshop postulated that the oil exporting nations may raise crude petroleum prices to increase their revenues in order to support their arms purchases, their coproduction, and their industrial development costs. With regard to arms then, it seems feasible that the industrial oil consumers (the American automobile operator) are paying for the Iranian arms buildup, for example. The Shah buys the most expensive military hardware and also spearheads OPEC prices rises. Could it be that he pays for those very expensive F-14's, F-15's, and tanks by raising oil prices to the very people who sell those weapons? Do Americans end up buying Iranian arms? How much of the Shah's desire to raise oil prices in October 1975 is linked to the escalating cost of his arms purchases and coproduction arrangements? Are arms transfers a principal or peripheral factor in the American inflation problem in such circumstances?

The workshop felt that such questions needed answers.

CONCLUSIONS

The following major considerations arose from the topic "Arms Coproduction: Who Benefits?"

1. Arms coproduction is the result of the utility of force and the strident international arms sales competition. Coproduction as an inducement to make a sale is an effective demand placed upon the arms seller by the purchaser in the arms market. The arms supplier either coproduces or loses the sale. Coproduction is a condition for arms sales.

2. Cash purchase of coproduction will assume an ever larger share of the arms sales business.

3. Coproduction brings more economic benefits to America than no sale without coproduction. While US policy prefers direct sales, direct sales are becoming less popular vis-a-vis coproduction.

4. Coproduction enhances a favorable US balance of payments. But the energy situation of America linked to its arms sales may complicate the gold flow. Indeed, America's energy dependency may be funding OPEC armies. Net loss in balance of payments may be hidden behind those $8.2 billion arms sales in 1974.

5. The assertion that coproduction transfers jobs overseas appears unsubstantiated, or at least questionable. Rather, coproduction may add jobs in America. In any case, coproduction causes no net loss of jobs.

6. Arms producers are not classic multinational corporations. They do not manufacture overseas for sale in America. Thus, they don't compete with American labor and products at home.

7. Arms coproduction does not close markets to US exports. Without coproduction there would often be no sale and no export.

8. Arms coproduction is a form of security assistance and produces no more nor less "influence" than other security assistance. It reduces the paternalist perception of a host nation while possibly tying him closer to the US support capacity. Since coproduction requires host country investment; it may increase dependency on America.

9. Coproduction is not the driving force behind arms proliferation. Coproduction is a product of a favorable host country bargaining position. Even if America decided not to sell arms, and thereby not be forced to offer coproduction, the other arms suppliers would meet the host demand. Arms control is thus defeated as a unilateral "no-sale" action by America. Rather, to accomplish arms sales restraint requires concerted supplier decisions not only on arms transfers but also on the consumer versus oil-producer issue. Arms and oil seem tightly linked in the arms control arena. A unilateral "no-sale" position by America would merely lose America some revenue. It would not stop sales.

10. Sales and coproduction, as part of security assistance, suffer from a lack of clear policy direction. Defense outcomes from arms sales/coproduction appear favorable in the short term, unclear and possibly counterproductive in the long haul. If money talks in security assistance, there may be undesirable defense outcomes with respect to regional military imbalances. That is, sacrificing national security objectives to economic and political strategies for security assistance may not aid US security.

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[1] The introduction summarizes extemporaneous opening remarks by the Workshop Chairman, Dr. Robert Pranger.

[2] Industry representatives explained that profit margins under coproduction are difficult to forecast, though they agreed that they were lower per item than direct sales. A conservative planning approach is used, therefore.

[3] It was noted that real technology transfers take place under the rubric of scientific cooperation in high technology fields including space cooperation with Russia, nuclear collaboration with allies, the sale of nuclear power plants abroad, etc. On the competition argument, the AFL-CIO unionism internationally, it nonetheless deplores coproduction generally. The job issue evinces similar problems for American labor unions.

[4] See Robert J. Pranger and Dale R. Tahtinen. Toward A Realistic Military Assistance Program. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, December 1974.)

COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICALITY

A Summary of Workshop Deliberations

Prepared by

Major Erle W. Thomas, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the opening of the formal discussions the instructors and students of Foreign Area Officer Course 2-75 prepared a list of topics to be discussed with the guest participants. As a result, the discussion was generally divided into five major topics.

PATTERNS OR PRINCIPLES OF TERRORISM

The first topic of discussion was entitled, "What are the general patterns or principles involved in terrorist incidents?" The nature of the terrorist threat was very difficult to define as there was enormous disagreement as to whether or not they are significant in terms of the overall picture of modern society or whether we have exaggerated the importance and the threat associated with such terrorism. In discussing the possibility of exaggeration and distortion, the workshop examined the role of the media, especially the role of television. Included in this examination was the way in which the availability of television makes the isolated incident of terrorism difficult to assess in terms of its significance because television makes possible the transmission of the news of the incident throughout an entire nation within minutes after an incident occurs.

One conclusion concerning the impact of media was that quite clearly the meaning of a terrorist act is dependent upon the availability of the media so that the act can feed upon itself and become magnified in the public eye. Without the availability of a media such as television, the terrorist act would cease to have significance and indeed terrorism itself would not be logically possible. Terrorist activity can be an occurence recognized as a phase in an insurgency movement in terms of the orthodox model of unconventional warfare. Terrorist activity can also be recognized in a domestic sense as a symptom of political unrest. At the same time many incidents also must be recognized as essentially random violence which may have the impact of frightening everyone associated. Nevertheless, these incidents should not be taken seriously in terms of constituting some representative kind of threat or as part of a program of terrorism.

ROLE OF MILITARY

The second topic considered was, "What is the US Military Role, if any, with regard to domestic terrorism?" It was recognized that in terms of tradition and doctrine the US Army has almost no domestic counter-terrorism role. It certainly is not engaged in a law enforcement role and therefore the extent of its involvement in domestic terrorism would be essentially one of cooperation and support of those agencies which have specifically a law enforcement role in the United States. Attention was given to the ways in which police departments across the country are working on the problem of terrorism. New police organizations and tactics are a by-product of some of the incidents which have occurred during the recent years. The workshop discussed at some length the way in which the US Army is indirectly involved in domestic counter-terrorism. The conclusion was that the Army is involved indirectly because the Active Army is charged with a number of responsibilities concerning training and doctrine for the National Guard. The National Guard is on occasion activated as a peacekeeping organization when local police forces turn out to be inadequate.

An incident of this sort, which probably fits into the overall scope of terrorism, was the seizure of a large segment of property in Wisconsin by the Menominee Indians and the containment of that incident by the Wisconsin Army National Guard. That containment was a reflection of the current doctrine in terms of civil disorder. Despite discussions of the recurrence of domestic turbulence with regard to terroristic type activities, there was general recognition within the workshop that indeed the US Army has no significant role to play in the containment, the suppression, or the response to unlawful incidents inside the United States which would be characterized as "terroristic." At the same time, it was recognized that under extreme conditions--conditions approaching the scope of insurgency itself--the Army would be drawn into a domestic role.

EXTERNAL TERRORISM

The third topic considered by the workshop was "What is the US Army's role with regard to external terrorism or terrorism which takes place in other nations?" The workshop experienced some uncertainity as to how to respond to this topic because of the shifting nature of the American overseas commitment. In approaching this topic the workshop was able to review the nature of counter-insurgency doctrine and the way certain kinds of terroristic actions are recognized as being symptoms and parts of the process of insurgency. A considerable amount of discussion was devoted to the role that the advisor would play in assisting the security forces of a host country. It was concluded that in terms of responding to terroristic activities there are no formulas available to the advisor that would be universally applicable. It was generally agreed that there are no formulas

because the situation varies considerably from one nation to another, from one environment to another, from one country to another, and that the most critical consideration available in terms of advisory resources would be good, plain common sense. It would be appropriate for an advisor to spend as much time as possible reading particular case studies, the histories of recent incidents concerning terrorism and the role terrorism plays in terms of political unrest. This should include the case of the Tupamaros in South America or the FLN in Algiers so that one's common sense could be sharpened as much as possible. The general consensus was that the most important tool would be very good judgment on the part of the advisor. In addition, the workshop generally recognized that the advisor would not be working on his own in terms of assisting or responding to the terrorist incidents. He is a part of a "country team" and the Army's role of combatting terrorism in a foreign nation would be essentially as a part of the country team commitment. The workshop generally concluded that while counter-terrorism is most tempting, it is nevertheless essentially counter-productive and not to be encouraged and certainly not to be advised.

INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM

The fourth topic of discussion was, "What are the factors involved in the collection of information and intelligence with regard to terrorist incidents and terrorist threats?" The workshop generally recognized that the restraints placed upon the Army in terms of collection and processing of intelligence in a domestic environment are part of the Armed Forces tradition and not to be tampered with.

THE ARMY OFFICER AS A TARGET

This led the discussion to the fifth and final question, the most practical of the five questions, the one question with which there was very little theoretical disagreement. This question dealt primarily with, "What should the individual US Army officer anticipate with regard to terrorism in a foreign environment?" The workshop agreed that a vast majority of the measures that could be taken by an individual to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack would be passive in nature. The students received instruction on this subject during their regular course of instruction. Mental awareness and preparedness are keys in the prevention of a terrorist attack. Complacency is the greatest threat to adequate precaution.

PEACEKEEPING AND THE UNITED STATES: A SECOND LOOK

A Summary of Workshop Deliberations

Prepared by

Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Clayberg

INTRODUCTION

The original intent of the workshop was to examine the role which US ground units might play in UN-sponsored peacekeeping forces assembled and deployed throughout the world. Discussion was to have addressed, but not be limited to, a scenario or scenarios in which joint US/Soviet participation in peacekeeping might be envisaged as likely; the politico-military implications of such a scenario; and the advantages or disadvantages associated with a "superpower" peacekeeping force. Although encompassing several aspects of the above proposed topic, the actual discussion flowed generally around four basic topics:

a. What is peacekeeping? Does it, or should it, connote current types of consensual or partially consensual operations? Should peace enforcement be included in the overall topic? How about other possible problem areas requiring some sort of international attention, such as law of the sea, outer space, and environmental pollution?

b. What improvements are needed to make the existing peacekeeping system more effective?

c. To what extent, if any, should the superpowers become involved in peacekeeping operations? What role should, say, the United States play in policy formation and implementation in this area?

d. What role, if any, does or should the US military have in peacekeeping?

PROBLEM AREAS

One of the real challenges of the present is the question of stimulating a higher degree of interest on the part of the American public and of the Congress in the whole matter of US involvement in peacekeeping. Thus far it seems as if US Government policy makers fail to take into consideration third party or even UN-sponsored efforts in this field. Yet what can be done to get the news media, the public, or Congress to back international peacekeeping as a viable alternative? Keeping in mind the domination of the UN by the Third World majority, it may well be that this is the only realistic alternative the US--or, perhaps, even the Soviet Union--has in the world organization.

Another, possibly more basic, aspect of this overall problem has to do with definitions. In examining peacekeeping, is it desirable to eliminate the idea of enforcement of selective/collective security? Professor Inis L. Claude, Jr., has written about preventive diplomacy, in which he addresses peace enhancing, i.e., creation of a favorable climate; peacemaking, a sort of non-military, diplomatic process; and peacekeeping, defined generally as already discussed. Accordingly, it would seem that both the keeping and enforcement of peace should be examined. Apparently there has been some discussion in Washington of Article 43--related enforcement procedures as compared with the typical consensual operation. Since it is difficult to draw a clear line between the two, both should be discussed. With respect to the question as to whether peace enforcement includes collective security, it was suggested that it is necessary to differentiate between NATO-style selective security and the UN variant. Under the Charter collective security is supposed to be obligating and to have the support of the permanent members of the Security Council; however, actual implementation of this provision of the Charter has yet to happen. When it comes to setting policy guidelines, establishing controls, and running actual field operations, the recent tendency has been to go the Article 43 or collective security route.

Peace enforcement is a particularly difficult question; take, for example, the Congo operation where some 20,000 troops were involved. Among the problems encountered in this case were rules of engagement, command and control, and logistics. At least one discussant had severe misgivings about the prospect of the US Congress directing American forces to enforce peace in some distant country. Perhaps, however, this likelihood will seem more palatable at some time in the future, say, in twenty years. Nevertheless, the UN is a much more efficient organization than it was back in the chaotic Congo era. Further, it is necessary to distinguish between a peacekeeping operation, which the Congo incident was, and a Chapter 7 enforcement operation.

With respect to the organization of peacekeeping a number of problem areas were brought up as causes behind deficiencies in peacekeeping operations such as logistics and communications. One of these is the lack of clean division of responsibilities among the Secretary General, Security Council, and Military Staff Committee. The man on the ground is constantly hampered by a lack of clear guidance as well as a well-defined organizational structure. The matter of UNEF-II was also brought up and the question raised as to whether the latter should serve as a desirable model for building future such organizations. Is a large UN military staff in New York what is wanted, or will it be likely to interfere with the operational commander on the ground?

Getting back to the definitional problem it was suggested that both peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping had to be looked into as it was difficult to distinguish clearly between the two concepts. With regard to consensuality, the point was raised how complete does it have to be. Does it have to be from both sides on a continual basis? Also, it is important to determine what is being consented to and to what extent. Since the establishment of UNEF-II the necessity for continued support or agreement to foreign

peacekeeping presence has arisen. Is some effort being made to deny to the contestants on the ground the right unilaterally to terminate a peacekeeping effort (as happened in Egypt in 1967), reserving it instead to the Security Council? If you continue an operation without the consent of the parties in confrontation doesn't it then become in effect a peace enforcement operation?

In examining peacekeeping it would seem that such action at most supplements a political agreement on the part of the antagonists to negotiate rather than serves as a means to cause such political negotiations to start. As an example, UNEF-II was created in response to the need of the parties concerned after the military action had progressed to a certain point (i.e., to where Israel was on the verge of defeating Egypt, a circumstance that galvanized the USSR to seek to bring active hostilities to a halt). Thus UNEF-II was sent to assist in making possible a shift in relations between the previously warring sides. In addition, it has served to increase confidence on the part of all concerned that the ceasefire will be adhered to; the same goes for the UN disengagement observer force on the Golan Heights. Merely by being there this small contingent reduces the likelihood of the Syrians renewing hostilities. Therefore, peacekeeping forces can be said to solidify a previously made agreement.

Flowing out of the basic problem of defining the nature and extent of peacekeeping were the other three proposed agenda items. First was what ought to be done to improve the effectiveness of current and future peacekeeping efforts--or is such amelioration really what is wanted? Second was what role, if any, were the great powers, especially the United States, to play in peacekeeping, seen as at least partly a matter of public opinion; and third was what, if anything, in the way of policy recommendations flow out of the previous points?

The matter of the USSR and its role in persuading the US to force a ceasefire agreement on the Arabs and Israelis was brought up and identified as being a part of the overall world environment. Thus UNEF-II could be seen as a sign that détente (whatever that is) is alive and well, although a general agreement among the UN membership was also needed to bring UNEF-II into effective being. It was also noted that Third--and Fourth--World agreement and involvement in peacekeeping were not only implicit but absolutely essential, as peacekeeping was the antithesis of great power domination. As for other powers, it was remarked first, that the great peacekeeping powers have been Canada and the Scandinavian states and second, that it was a fact of life that the allies of both superpowers were clearly less dependable than they were in the past, especially when it comes to rendering consistent support to the initiatives of their patron state. In addition, it was necessary to take into account the views of the "peacekeepees," i.e., those nations willing to accept external power involvement in their internal or regional problems.

The Third World was seen as important not only as recipients but also as participants in peacekeeping operations. This was especially true as a number of middle size powers have become disillusioned at the limited results achieved in terms of the effort expended. A suggestion was made that perhaps more

could be done on a regional level to control conflict through organizations such as the OAU or OAS. The problem here was that it has proven very difficult to get a South American country to participate in a peacekeeping force. In concluding the first hour the question was raised how can one have consensual peacekeeping if no one consents?

DOES UN PEACEKEEPING MATTER?

In opening the second session's discussion the question was raised is UN peacekeeping of sufficient significance to warrant our attention? In Cyprus, for example, the UN force has only halted the flow of events, not led to a solution, leading some force contributors to become more and more disillusioned; however, there is a positive side, too.

Once again the matter of definitions was raised, leading to a description of peacekeeping as a UN-sponsored, politico-military attempt to control conflict by essentially impartial, noncoercive methods, seen as more successful than peace-building. Peacekeeping, like any military operation, was seen as not being an end in itself or being able to achieve results without other types of action being taken in addition. The success or failure of peacekeeping operations should not be gauged as being successful or a failure but rather in terms of the degree to which the political climate has been improved by the interposition of peacekeeping forces. Although ideally peacekeeping should lead to a settlement, often enough it produces the opposite effect, leading some to suggest that perhaps it would be better to let the antagonists to fight it out. In opposition to the latter point, it was noted that "fighting it out" did less than no good in Cyprus.

"SUPERPOWER" INVOLVEMENT

After brief mention of the increasingly suspect nature of the use of military force in general, the discussion turned to the prospects of great power involvement in peacekeeping. Is Dag Hammarskjold's original policy of excluding the superpowers still valid? In response, it was noted that while middle size states like the UK or France could play a role, there would be problems if the US and the USSR became involved. There was fairly extensive disagreement on this point with several discussants suggesting that the time had come for the big powers to play more than a logistical or other support role, although no one seemed to want to face up to the inherent problems. A problem, if it arose, was not seen as coming from the juxtaposition of Russians and Americans but rather from the Security Council and more specifically from the PRC, who might be expected to veto the whole operation.

One special consideration that was brought up was that of cost, Sweden, for one, having expended some $50 million to support various peacekeeping efforts. In this context it was noted that although the UN provides $500 per month per soldier, the actual cost is significantly higher, running around $1200 per man. A possible solution for the cost problem might be for the more affluent powers to help bankroll the smaller ones.

As for actual big power involvement in peacekeeping, the volatility of the Middle East as well as the ongoing competition for influence among the superpowers in the region make the prospects for their employment there somewhat problematic. Nevertheless, great power presence, if it could be managed, could increase the deterrent effect, first, because, once having had to commit their own troops to a peacekeeping operation, the superpower would be likely also to communicate to the antagonists their disinclination to put up with untoward behavior. However, active superpower presence in peacekeeping would in effect put them in the position of guaranteeing that there would be no resurgence of conflict; is such a role really in the best interest of either the US or the Soviet Union? In the other hand, joint presence might possibly reduce the likelihood of one being played off against the other by the parties in confrontation. One could almost argue that there would have been no October 1973 war if the two superpowers were not already involved in supporting Israel and its Arab opponents.

Nevertheless, although the overall politics of the Middle East are complicated and despite superpower competition in the area, it is possible to envisage joint support for various peace proposals at some time in the future. This would, of course, be much easier in a region like Africa for instance. One headache that has not been taken into consideration is what might be the effect if major power forces committed to a UN peacekeeping force became casualties in an armed clash or through local terrorist action. One heartening sign of less doctrinaire attitudes on the part of the superpowers is the fact that the Soviets actually let their UNTSO members function by themselves mixed in with various foreigners without continuous KGB supervision. Judging by available data it appears as if the Soviet and American observers have been working together quite satisfactorily, to include assessment of the overall situation. One reason for such success as UNTSO has achieved thus far has been the strong desire on the part of both superpowers to damp down armed conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors; in the Soviet case this was due, of course, to the increasingly difficult position the Egyptians found themselves in during the last stages of the war.

With respect to mechanics one suggestion made was for the establishment of well-defined peacekeeping zones where a higher level of coercion by the peacekeeping force could be authorized. It was noted, too, that the UN could be useful in activities such as peacekeeping only where there is a reasonable coincidence of interest on the part of the superpowers backed up by an adequate consensus of other UN members such as, for instance, the PRC. In response to a question about possible disagreement as to roles between the Secretary General and the Security Council over current peacekeeping activities in the Middle East, it was noted that the lack of sharp conflict on the matter has been due to the level of operation; observers are simply less controversial than peacekeeping forces. In addition, there has apparently been some softening of the positions of both superpowers on the supervision issue, in

that both concurred that the peacekeeping operation would be conducted under the control of the Secretary General acting under the authority of the Security Council. Although this represents a concession on the part of the US, in effect it has worked out that the Secretary General has the same degree of supervisory power as before. In a jocular mood it was suggested that Chapter 7 type peace enforcement was unlikely except if the UFO danger became great enough.

Returning to the subject of peacekeeping costs, it was noted that successful early maneuvering such as force movement under Article 43 might prove sufficient without further action being necessary. On the other hand, peace enforcement against, say, another Indo-Pakistani squabble might prove to be a problem. Still, an enforcement operation does not of necessity have to be a large scale operation. Also, it was pointed out that cost evaluation has to be made in terms of available alternatives. Should the latter include the risk of open confrontation between smaller nuclear powers or other highly dangerous situation, even a large-scale peace enforcement operation might seem to be a cheap enough price.

In this regard, one hazard that world peacekeeping efforts repeatedly encounter is that of continued governmental support, seen as necessary to insure the continued effectiveness of any operation of this type. A case in point was West Irian, where Indonesian lack of cooperation with Pakistani elements sent in on a peacekeeping mission was finally overcome by implied threats of Soviet and US reinforcement.

POSSIBLE FUTURE OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

In looking over the world for likely areas for future UN peacekeeping efforts a number of possibilities were suggested, to include Angola, Mozambique, South Korea, South Africa, and Namibia. It was mentioned that it might be likely for, say, Nigerian troops to be sent to Angola, an example of Africans taking action to settle problems on a regional basis. It was felt that political consensus between the superpowers was unlikely to hold up under a Chapter 7 situation where a reasonable amount of coercion was necessary. Further blurring of the distinction between this type of action and more conventional peacekeeping might lead to use of the same UN rules for both types of operation. In response to a question as to whether the Charter didn't prohibit member nations from intervening in the internal affairs of another member, it noted that although such intervention was not very likely it was necessary to think about contingencies. It was mentioned that there was a considerable amount of great power competition for influence in the Third and Fourth World, for instance, in Africa.

Among a group of possible areas mentioned where international action seemed needed were terrorism, law of the sea, hijacking, and environmental pollution; with respect to these the question was raised as to whether enforcement agreements might be envisaged through the use of some sort of UN

peacekeeping force analogous to the US Coast Guard. Also, it seems that a number of studies have been conducted of the use of the sea and sea beds. Other areas brought up included outer space, the International Atomic Energy Agency, Antarctica, and international fishing rights.

IMPROVING EXISTING MECHANISMS

During the following hour the discussion moved on to the problem of the management of peacekeeping operations, to include such matters as command and control, training and readiness, preparatory measures, and staffing.

The first problem addressed was that of the basic US-Soviet disagreement as to the manner in which peacekeeping forces were to be directed, with the Soviets holding that full control should remain in the hands of the Security Council (thereby ensuring that the Soviets could exercise their veto power over everyday operations) while the US position has been to give maximum discretion to the Security General. It was noted in passing that up to the 1973 Middle East War the Soviet Union had not been a supporter either of UN peacekeeping in general or of measures designed to improve the effectiveness thereof. In response the question was raised as to how doctrinaire the Soviets have shown themselves to be with UNEF-II.

Historically, the original intent at San Francisco had been to shape the Charter to deal with a Hitler-type situation, with the Military Staff Committee serving as a sort of combined chiefs-of-staff with broad authority being given to the commander on the ground. In actual practice, however, it did not turn out that way at all. The extreme US position is not politically realistic while the extreme Soviet position is not mechanically workable. In the end, both have found that the Secretary General has to be given much of the job. Part of the US-Soviet problem on this issue originated within the UN Secretariat where action had been taken to exclude the Soviets from effective participation. Almost as an irony of history, it was noted that although the personality and ideological convictions of the incumbent Secretary General were important, the fact of the matter was that both the US and the Soviet Union were now in minority positions in the UN, with the result that both may well feel the necessity to be able to limit the executive discretion of the Secretariat. In trying to resolve this issue, it was suggested that perhaps a middle ground could still be found. Even while recognizing that the Secretary General has to work out peacekeeping force mandates, it might prove feasible to work out a minimum number of controls acceptable to the USSR, such as force size and national representation. In return, perhaps the Soviet Union could be persuaded to allow the UN force to act under the Secretary General within such agreed-upon guidelines. Thus, although the Secretary General retained the necessary authority, he still would have to be subject to Security Council approval. It was agreed, however,

that it would be going too far to force choice of the field commander onto the Secretary General; the latter should have his own man. It was pointed out that UNEF-II seemed to be working out well enough, despite the fact that no military advisors had been present at the negotiations and that the agreement had been loosely written.

SWEDEN'S MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

In response to a special request, one of the participants, Colonel Stig Waldenstrom of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN, presented a briefing on Swedish involvement in peacekeeping and on the Nordic Stand-by Forces. This has been included in the following paragraphs.

I feel very honoured to have been invited to this seminar as guest participant.

I have been asked to inform you about the "Nordic Stand-by Forces." I will, however, as an introduction make a statement about Sweden's UN policy and Sweden's military contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Sweden's cooperation in the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations is an essential part of its general United Nations policy. Contributions in personnel illustrate this attitude. More than 35,000 Swedes have served in forces and observer contingents over the years. Right now over 1,000 Swedes serve with UNEF, UNDOF, UNTSO and UNFICYP.

We also have a delegation in Korea as part of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). (The Commission, however, is not one of the United Nations' commitments).

Until 1968 Sweden's--as other Nordic countries--participation with UN peacekeeping operations was organized on an ad hoc basis.

Ever since that year the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) have had stand-by forces earmarked for UN service but organized and trained on a national basis. These forces are intended to be employed either on their own or alternatively partly or wholly within the set-up of Nordic Stand-by Forces, serving with a UN peacekeeping force.

After a request by the UN each country decides whether units of its forces are to be placed to the disposal of the UN.

SOME COMMON PRINCIPLES

The organization, equipment and training of the various units are carried out entirely according to national regulations. It has, however, been possible to apply some coordinating measures with respect to special units. (e.g., Military Police).

Personnel are mainly recruited on a voluntary basis. Selected personnel are committed to be in readiness for one or two years in order to be able to be available for UN service at very short notice.

All personnel undergo UN training for periods of from two to four weeks depending on personnel categories.

Certain central training course for Nordic officers and NCO's are organized on a yearly basis.

A joint manual--Nordic Stand-by Forces in United Nations Service--has been provided to the United Nations. In this book are given details about the organization of units, problems which might arise in an initial stage of a UN operation, etc.

The total strength of the Nordic Stand-by Forces is approximately 5,000.

In order to deal with military UN matters the Nordic countries have set up national military UN branches. The general organization of the Chains-of-Command in Sweden is shown in this.

A number of other countries have also established similar forces.

A few details about the Swedish force (about the same in the other Nordic countries):

Sweden's emergency force is comprised of 1,600 men. It consists of:

-two infantry battalions

-one technical contingent

-staff officers and observers

The battalions' organization, equipment, etc., makes them capable of serving in UN peacekeeping operations within different climatic regions. The battalions are equipped with small arms, 7.62mm light machine guns and 84mm antitank rifles. A few cross country staff and special vehicles are included. In case the UN cannot supply the battalion with extra vehicles, Sweden can furnish them.

The battalions are responsible for their own support and maintenance services and bring with them adequate supplies scheduled to last one to four weeks depending on the nature of the commodity.

The technical contingent is principally intended for catastrophe aid. It has squads for housebuilding, construction of roads and bridges, electricity,

telephone and telegraph work, etc. During 1970-71 part of the contingent (technical team) served for six months in Peru, where it assisted in reconstruction work after the earthquake disaster.

The recruitment of Swedish personnel is done entirely on a voluntary basis. UN service is popular. There are nearly 3,000 applications for positions in each battalion.

This means that great demands can be made on the personnel selected. One condition that must be fulfilled if one is accepted is to complete compulsory military basic training. A special law forbids employers from dismissing anyone who serves with the UN emergency forces.

As most applicants are already trained for some civil trade or profession, it follows that yearly selection boards have an unusually high percentage of craftsmen and qualified technical personnel to chose from. As a result of this an added capability of "self-help" has been observed within limits.

In principle, service abroad is not extended for an additional period. On the other hand, he who has been in his home country for a year or so can apply for further service. UN service must not and can never become a profession. Creating of "UN legionnaires" must be avoided.

The period of training for officers, non-commissioned officers and privates in the battalion is three and two weeks respectively. In addition to the special training, there are briefings about the UN, the political situation, the Geneva and the Hague Conventions, behavior towards the local population and questions about hygiene.

As mentioned before, all personnel undergo UN training and certain central training for officers and NCO's. A Nordic UN training college for higher civilian and military employees has been arranged. The purpose of this training college is to instruct potential candidates for higher posts within a UN force, and for national positions with different administrations which in the home country deal with questions regarding UN peacekeeping activities. The first training college took place in Oslo in 1971, and the second in Stockholm in 1974. We hope that the next one will take place in 1976.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Army, General Almgren, who has just been on a visit here in USA, told me to tell you that we should be very happy to see an officer from the USA as a participant in one of our training courses.

After UN training, the employee is discharged but still remains under contract and liable to be called up with five days notice for service abroad of not more than seven months (for observers not more than twelve months).

According to existing plans, an advance party should be ready to leave for the area of duty within three days after the Government has informed the UN that the request for units of the emergency force has been approved. The corresponding time for the main body is nine days.

It was proved that existing plans could be carried out in connection with the setting up of the United Nations Emergency Force in October 1973.

The air transport of the force and its equipment can only, to a certain extent, be handled by Swedish military aircraft (C-130).

The cost of Swedish UN undertakings up to now amounts to 130 million dollars. Of this, the UN has refunded about 85 million dollars. So until now it has cost us nearly 50 million dollars. Salaries are the main item of expenditure. For example, a private gets a monthly pay of about 700 dollars, which is the equivalent to the average pay of an industrial worker. In addition there is a daily allowance of 6-7 dollars.

For Swedish defense forces, participation in UN peacekeeping activities has advantages. The quality of the personnel, equipment, and organization can be tested under active service conditions. UN training in Sweden and duty abroad give personnel an educational standard above and beyond compulsory training.

In addition there are increased international contacts. UN service also contributes to the development of the individual and his ability to judge the problems of other countries.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I want to state that the Swedish Government believes that through its peacekeeping operations the United Nations can play a significant and unique role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

I think that Mr. Ralph Bunche was quite right when he said "If the UN had been as successful in peacemaking as in peacekeeping the world would have been rather different."

In response to a query the briefer agreed that volunteer availability was dependent on the condition of the overall job market. It was also noted that despite the official policy of opposing repeated tours of duty in a peacekeeping force, certain personnel, mostly specialists, were permitted to extend. The other Nordic countries reportedly follow this same general rotation policy, the consensus being that a half year or so was long enough to be away from home. As for doctors, they pose a special problem, with few apparently staying abroad longer than a couple of months.

IMPROVING UN CAPABILITIES

The next question discussed was what, if anything, was to be done in UN headquarters, especially in the Secretariat, Military Staff Committee, and

field service support organization with respect to improving UN capabilities to deal effectively with peacekeeping? To start with, it was noted that in planning an operation the UN has always had to start from zero. Inevitably this means long delays before either a force headquarters or a logistical organization can be set up. There is apparently no agreement as to how to bring peacekeeping expertise into the Secretariat or how to arrange the replacement of those who leave, probably the result of Dag Hammarskjold's penchant for improvisation. Apparently it was a bit hair raising getting the Congo operation, for example, into proper gear. One reason put forward for this lack of advance planning was the political set-up in the UNO.

With regard to field service organization and preparations (i.e., logistics and other forms of operational support), the UN apparently now has a global communications system. Further, it has an old warehouse with some used equipment near Pisa, Italy. In this respect, it was noted that trying to improve the situation by getting the Security Council involved in procurement would only gum things up even worse.

As for the UN Secretariat, it simply is not staffed to do any type of advance planning; the operational staff is two to three people while the logistical staff is not much larger. The Military Staff Committee is in even worse shape, being practically nonexistent, although at first it was a large organization. If it were considered desirable to make the Committee functional, it would have to be equipped with a small staff of officers. In addition, if it could be accepted as an advisory group, such an enlarged committee could play a role in advance planning and operations in the peacekeeping field.

Even though political realities precluded advance planning in the Secretariat, training of its staff members in the administration of peacekeeping not only could be but actually has been accomplished, one recent case being a simulation exercise conducted under the auspices of the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). Considered very useful, it was recommended that other, similar exercises be conducted on a more nuts and bolts level. A question was posed as to whether any Soviet observer had visited peacekeeping training in Scandinavia, especially as a number of states to include the US had been so invited.

Getting back to action needed to improve current procedures, several suggestions were put forth such as preparing an operational staff that could be assembled and dispatched on short notice, providing UN peacekeeping forces with a sophisticated reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and giving such forces the capability of gathering overt intelligence. In particular it was suggested that some sort of satellite communications capability might prove to be of considerable utility, such as providing a means for instant TV transmissions showing actual conditions to the Security

Council. Provided this were feasible, it was felt that procedures should be agreed upon for dealing with such information at UN headquarters. As all of this was going to entail a certain amount of money, it was agreed that to be manageable there would have to be an immense change in financing philosophy among the UN members, especially within the US Congress. Any further increases in UN peacekeeping staff manning--even as few as the six proposed--were thought to be likely to run afoul of the USSR, which traditionally feels threatened by any action that might be seen to impinge on Soviet sovereignty.

In summing up the discussion about UN needs at this stage it was agreed that although action needed to be taken to expand the existing staff, develop a more substantial training program, and obtain additional equipment and supplies, no action seemed to be possible unless and until the member states began to take a greater interest in peacekeeping operations as a desirable element in their foreign policy.

AN ASSESSMENT

At this stage the workshop turned to a general assessment of the current state of affairs. In addition to the efforts of the Working Groups of the Committee of 33, a number of member states have also prepared studies on peacekeeping operations that are both useful and practical. Nevertheless, there have been a series of disheartening setbacks, to include the Congo, Korea, and Vietnam. However, other factors have also contributed to the decline of interest in peacekeeping. One of these has been a change in the political climate. With the growth of détente there has been a lot more confidence in the ability of the superpowers to keep out of trouble, thereby lessening the need for others to help them stay out of each other's hair.

The US, too, through its participation in UNTSO has been able to build up for the first time a body of experienced peacekeepers. Since the word has been getting around that such an assignement has been career-enhancing there has been a substantial increase in the number of volunteers. Such a level, or even a higher one, of American involvement in peacekeeping may become the wave of the future should circumstances conspire to repeat the experiences of the 1973 war by throwing the two superpowers together out of a mutually perceived fear that some third power might start a nuclear war that might drag us both in. Nevertheless, however desirable, the world will not accept anything it sees as superpower collusion except under a world umbrella of some type.

As for the Military Staff Committee, the question was raised whether or not some sort of link could be established with the Nordic Stand-by Force. Could this arrangement not somehow involve the permanent members of the Security Council? As mentioned earlier, the key to activating the MSC is to assign some officers to an international staff subordinate to it, to be tasked with communications, supply, equipment, and other aspects of basic advance planning. There would be no need to limit membership to just the five big powers.

IMPROVING EXISTING MECHANISMS (con't)

In continuing earlier deliberations on the central UN structure the conversation turned again to the Military Staff Committee. Historically, this organization had been established as one of the early actions of the Security Council and was tasked to deal with Chapter 7 provisions of the Charter. Unfortunately, due to massive differences of opinion between the two superpowers, no substantive action could be agreed upon. In fact, the final Committee report was split, reflecting again these deep-seated differences. Nevertheless, it was suggested that perhaps the world situation had changed sufficiently to make successful operationalization of the MSC more possible. Perhaps the middle size powers could play some sort of role in enabling the UN to become more effective in peacekeeping.

Originally, the command structure for peacekeeping was planned to look as follows:



At first the Secretary General was seen as purely an administrative position, as in the League of Nations. But the above concept quickly fell apart, leading to the following arrangement becoming necessary:



There simply is a need for some kind of political coordinator between the Security Council and the UN force on the ground, a role for which the MSC as presently constituted is just not fitted. Even if revived, strategic direction of this type will have to be omitted from MSC functions. But, cannot a distinction be made between planning and strategic direction? Is it really necessary to reinvent the wheel each time peacekeeping action

becomes necessary? Couldn't a revived MSC handle at least the planning, training and doctrine development? In view of the small size of most peacekeeping operations (battalion strength) wouldn't it be possible to work out an arrangement whereby the Security Council could authorize the Secretary General or the MSC to plan for such a level of operation?

In response it was remarked that the Committee of 33 had been working on just this matter for some eight years without notable success, even on observer groups.



Really doesn't quite exist

The basic duties of the MSC include providing technical advice to the Security Council. If so ordered, it could also render needed staff assistance to the Secretary General. The Security Council has been hoping to set up a sort of advisory subcommittee under Article 29, to be tasked with maintaining close liaison with the Secretary General during a peacekeeping operation. This group could achieve more smoooth, efficient operation of peacekeeping while maintaining needed Security Council supervision. Recently a simulation exercise was held to test this concept, specially needed inasmuch as such an option had never been actually employed. As a substitute a sort of in-between organization made up of representatives of contributing countries has been formed, with the task of working out details of peacekeeping implementation with the Secretary General, once the Security Council or General Assembly had directed UN action. One problem that came up was that if you try to set up an advisory body to deal with a UN action of some type, where and how are you going to get a mandate for it (i.e., responsibilities, functions, limitations, etc)? The Security Council will have to work out such details. In the simulation exercise, an effort was made to handle a problem through such a body, but the matter ended up being passed on to the Security Council. On the basis of this test, it seemed that this extra organization was a waste of time.

The Committee of 33 and its Working Groups are trying to work on this overall problem. Generally speaking, a Security Council peacekeeping directive is usually in the form of a very broad mandate for the Secretary General. Private discussions by individual members insure that the latters' desires are met in course of implementation. This is how small details as to who can participate in an operation have to be worked out. The Secretary General's office has developed a lot of experience in handling such cases.

One reason why the military side of the situation is not pushed is because the major powers are not interested. The middle size powers providing the UN troops have tried to get this situation improved; unfortunately they keep running into a brick wall. In the US there are numerous layers of bureaucracy that oppose any increased military role in peacekeeping beyond the mere rendering of advice. Furthermore, the Pentagon itself has shown little or no interest in improving the situation. Perhaps the time has come for a change in American policy towards the support of UN peacekeeping planning. The Soviets, for one, have supported the idea of a Military Staff Committee but little has been done beyond that. Since our concern is for better preparation training and readiness, initiation of operations, and continued support of operations in being, a larger and more professionally capable MSC would seem to be in order.

TRAINING PROGRAMS

At this stage the discussion turned to existing training programs for military personnel. One such school, run by the Nordic countries, has had several Western officers attend but thus far no particular success with the Warsaw Pact. Another organization is the International Peace Academy in New York. Founded by experienced peacekeeping participants and headed by MG Rikhye, this organization is an institution without walls calling together military, diplomats, and some scholars. It has gotten important support from the Austrian government. Twice a summer they run two-week courses with representatives of some 60 nations, to include 4-5 Poles, 1 Rumanian, 1 Czech and a considerable number of Yugoslavs. Only rarely have the Soviets participated, and then as observers, although they have kept pretty close touch with developments at the school. The IPA is not affiliated officially with either a national government or with the UNO, being run primarily with foundation money.

NEGATIVE ATTITUDES

It was remarked that to the degree that peacekeeping is effective it makes the status quo stick. Consequently, one should expect to see a negative attitude towards such activity on the part of radical groups and small powers favoring substantial change. With reference to an earlier suggestion that some sort of action in the way of improving both operational control and planning for peacekeeping operations be taken, a question was posed as to whether this was to be only on an individual, ad hoc basis or was not some sort of institutionalized improvement in the UN's peacekeeping operational capabilities a possibility.

In response it was noted that there were numerous proposals for just this. However, it would take both negotiations and the expenditure of money. Two means mentioned were the use of an advisory committee as well as an MSC international staff under Article 29. Referring back to the simulation exercise run at the UN, it was remarked that setting up such a committee was agreed upon as a good idea but no one specified that it had to be an Article 29 body. In fact, some interested middle size powers who regularly commit forces to peacekeeping suggested that it might be better to get together outside the UN, but this has not led to any formal organization.

ADVANCE PLANNING

With regard to advance planning it was mentioned that all-purpose contingency planning was not feasible beyond trying to work out the nuts and bolts of communications, logistical support, and the like. The question was then raised why not work out plans for specific larger regions such as Africa since it should not be too difficult to forecast where trouble spots were likely to be and how certain actions were going to have to be carried out. This proposal was seen as something the MSC could work on, collection of technical data and advance organization to mold a multinational mix of participants into a viable force being considered very helpful. Once again the matter of financing came up, this time with respect to advance planning itself. One experienced discussant warned again that nothing like this could be done until a situation actually requiring peacekeeping action came up.

Again the matter of the UN peacekeeping force commander was broached, this time in the context of advance selection. In response the discussants were reminded that the Secretary General has fought to keep the right to pick his own commander. The current system, according to which the Secretary General maintains an unwritten running list of preferences, has not proven to be a bad one, with the possible exception of the Congo situation. One likely means whereby the Secretary General might find new names for his list was through maintaining contact with extent training schools such as the Nordic peacekeeping academy. One discussant brought up the subject of UNITAR again, mentioning that the Soviets as well as other members of the board of governors have frowned on the institute staff working on peacekeeping-related projects; thus UNITAR sponsorship of the simulation exercise already described was considered quite unusual. Still, it might, under the right circumstances, prove to be a useful vehicle for working on improving advance planning.

By way of ending this discussion session it might be well to see what actual progress has been made by the UN bureaucracy towards working out an agreed-upon position. Here a quote from a working document of the Working Group of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations might give us a feel:

Article 5

> The Security Council may delegate responsibilities to, or seek advice and assistance from, the Military Staff Committee established in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Committee may invite any Members of the United Nations, in particular any non-permanent members of the Security Council or any States providing contingents or facilities [and the Secretary General or his authorized representative] to associate themselves with it, when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation in its work.

Unfortunately, the above fails to indicate either whether the MSC has actually become functional, without which event the article remains meaningless, or, if not, the degree, source, and urgency of member nation support for the revivification of the Committee. Note, too, that although it is preferred that the big powers avoid involvement in Committee activities, this is effectively negated should any such power contribute troops or facilities. Finally, there seems to be an assumption on the part of the drafters of this working paper of a consensus as to the responsibilities of the Committee as well as the desirability of its efficient functioning.

PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD

The next theme discussed pertained to practical problems of UN peacekeeping out in the field. To start with, if different member states had forces already earmarked for the purpose, the situation would be markedly better, but even so there is the problem of setting up an effective multinational force headquarters. Logistics, too, is a headache, as is the lack of advanced preparations. In the Sinai, for example, it took a lot of time to sort out all the wrinkles in getting logistical support in gear.

Peacekeeping units in Cyprus rotate by battalion, with some equipment being left behind by the departing unit for use by its successor, a policy followed by Sweden as well as several other force contributors. Ideally, the logistical "can of worms" resulting from such a broad mix of peoples and equipment could be lessened somewhat if items such as vehicular transportation could be unified.

There are a variety of disciplinary and morale problems arising out of a multinational peacekeeping force. One of these has to do with the wide difference in military pay scales. Here an effort has been made to increase standardization, through a centralized system funded through assessment of membership. This is, of course, complicated by the refusal of states such as Albania, Libya, and Syria to pay their share. The UN General Assembly agreed to a monthly pay of $500 per man, with additional pay for certain specialties. Reportedly even UK officers on Cyprus have had difficulties over the pay differential problem. As for discipline, the only recourse a UN commander has is

to send an offender home. There are arrangements somewhat like the US Status of Forces Agreements for UN forces as a whole covering, among other things, disciplinary matters. Generally speaking, however, offenses have to be handled by national authorities. One discussant suggested that under combat conditions misbehavior of a UN force member might prove awkward. In the event of injury or death of a UN force member, a special UN insurance policy provides compensation to the victim or his survivors. With regard to disciplinary problems, it was noted that in the Congo some UN troops committed serious crimes, a situation aggravated by the refusal of the national contingent commander to take any action. Such problems are apparently solvable, if at all, at Security Council level.

Although specific efficiency reports as such are apparently not prepared on UN force officers, the more effective ones quickly become known within the UN bureaucracy.

One interesting aspect of UN peacekeeping is the economic effect the presence of such troops has on the local economy. One result noted was the increase in foreign tourism, particularly from nations supplying the peacekeeping force, in the contested area.

A US ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING

At this stage the discussion turned to the US role in peacekeeping. Although great power involvement in logistical support or as observers appeared to pose no problem, the question was raised about the political ramifications of more substantive participation, particularly in areas where impartiality would be difficult if not impossible to assure. Nevertheless, the far greater military capacity of a superpower did seem to offer certain advantages, such as provision of sophisticated equipment like helicopters.

The question was also raised as to whether such involvement would be in the US interest. Are units like the 82nd Airborne Division readily retrainable for such a role? One discussant expressed doubts as to the ability of ordinary infantry troops to relate to people in remote areas. As an example of limitations to their flexibility, riot control training was attempted and then dropped. It appeared that preparing combat soldiers for peacekeeping would require a reversal of training philosophy--from destroying to preserving life. Further, there was the problem of coping with troop boredom.

This led to a variety of points, such as the suggestion to use Special Forces units, Military Police, the new Ranger battalions, reserve Civil Affairs units, or units specially organized for the purpose--although in the latter case, tailoring was seen as a more effective approach than creation of special purpose units. One prerequisite mentioned as of particular value was language capability, the means of communicating with the peoples being pacified.

On the other hand, other discussants felt that a UN peacekeeping mission assignment was merely another test of leadership and that Americans were potentially as adaptable as other nationalities. Instead, it was more a matter of training. Although the Swedes, for example, found a two-week course for enlisted personnel and four weeks for officers to be sufficient, it was felt that US troops would need a longer time. One possible place to look for ideas was Canada, which regularly has about a third of her forces trained for peacekeeping activity, especially as they have been frequently called upon to handle the more highly technical tasks such as communications and logistics. With respect to use of reserve units, a key disadvantage was their relatively slow reaction time.

Getting back to superpower involvement in general, it was suggested that their role should be to encourage other nations to participate, if only to keep the superpowers out; however, it was noted that this did not work in October 1973. Not only did the US find itself unable to depend on other powers to take action, but its reaction was anything but to keep the peace. Only if matters were worked out in advance--and then adhered to at least in spirit--might this be less of a problem. Even though the European powers were reportedly ready to assist with peacekeeping operations, this was seen as not politically advisable. As for Latin America, her level of participation in UN peacekeeping had thus far been less than desirable. It was the general consensus that the Hammarskjold rule was a good one, that great power impartiality was probably not feasible.

At this point the discussion became rather wide-ranging. A question was posed regarding the type of training programs needed both for quick-reaction and for relief organizations. It was pointed out that the scope of planning areas needing attention might necessitate policy adjustments at Pentagon level. Peacekeeping by regional organizations under Chapter 8 was also brought up for discussion. Such organizations were seen to possess key advantages, yet the OAS, for one, had apparently been unable to agree on any type of advance preparations. One example mentioned was US logistical support rendered to units involved in helping to settle the Central American "Soccer War." Additionally, there are reportedly precedents for the use of US security assistance resources to aid peacekeeping forces; in this respect, a proposal was made for the US to "bankroll" through security assistance channels the organization, equipping, training, and other necessary support for peacekeeping forces. One discussant emphasized this latter possibility as being particularly important. Going back to the problem of training US military personnel for peacekeeping operations, it was pointed out that proper recruitment and training of Americans for such duties was absolutely essential, in view of the seeming incompatibility between the US political, social and economic system and peacekeeping. Volunteers were seen as necessary, with some parallels being seen with the Peace Corps. As for the Congo situation, it was noted that there was no difficulty whatsoever in obtaining volunteers for the US joint task force.

A SURVEY OF DISCUSSANT VIEWS ON THE WHOLE PROBLEM

The following is a list of the problems relating to the topic identified by the various discussants in turn as being of special significance.

a. There is too much conjecture in addressing peacekeeping. How do you get a nation to yield sovereignty by letting in an outside force?

b. The US recognizes that peacekeeping is one option in international affairs and uses it effectively. There is a very definite role for peacekeeping in US foreign policy.

c. A study needs to be made of the implications of Articles 45-50 of the UN Charter with a view to determining what action, if any, the US should take to prepare for a peacekeeping role. Although these articles provide a basis for such types of operations, their wording is subject to a variety of interpretations.

d. There is the problem of consent and its meaning with respect to size and organization of peacekeeping forces. Consent has been weakened as a principle. The US position has been to support peacekeeping operations only where and when consensual. As for termination of an operation, total consent is not needed.

e. A study should be made of possible security assistance to support building a peacekeeping capability in third countries.

f. Use of US forces as well as those of the USSR in peacekeeping was seen as possible, although it should be avoided where feasible.

g. What would be the role of public diplomacy (i.e., the USIA) in a peacekeeping operation? Information on public opinion in key countries might prove critical to any decision to employ US forces. Information--as distinguished from propaganda--could help to explain the purpose of US involvement in a particular operation and to ensure that incidents could be explained to key audiences. US involvement in peacekeeping may well prove to be inevitable.

h. The US Army does not appear at present to be organized, equipped or prepared to involve itself in peacekeeping. It can perform this mission but it will take special training.

i. The US needs to develop a body of peacekeeping doctrine so that in the event US forces must be committed, they can be better able to do the job. Judging by the organizational problems experienced by the US in Vietnam, it was evident that the NATO-style division did not fit the mission.

j. There is a need to prepare stand-by forces for peacekeeping.

k. Contingency planning at UN headquarters is vital. Some mechanism has to be agreed upon to do this. Article 52 provisions for use of regional organizations ought to receive more attention.

l. Consideration should be given to the use of the Military Staff Committee and contingency staff under Article 29, as it is already in the UN Charter. Preparation for peacekeeping operations has to be done or we shall have to reinvent the wheel each time. If peacekeeping is considered to be in itself desirable, something concrete ought to be done about it.

m. There is a need for a specific training program for US units given a peacekeeping contingency mission. Perhaps this could be an additional task for USAIMA.

n. There is a need to identify the type of units to be committed to peacekeeping operations. There are advantages to setting up a specific unit for peacekeeping.

o. There is a requirement to consider the implications of long-term US commitment to peacekeeping, especially in terms of national resolve. Both Congress and the people would be likely to support a peacekeeping unit once national support had coalesced behind the idea, to include the necessary funding.

p. Generally speaking, forces committed to peacekeeping will not be made available to NATO at the same time, whether quick reaction or otherwise. An example of this is Denmark.

q. It may not be feasible to decide in advance the exact nature of a unit to be deployed in a peacekeeping role. It will be necessary to take into account other elements being committed to the UN force as well as the political climate at the time.

r. The important thing is to get quick reaction forces on the spot; you can polish force composition and training as the situation develops.

s. In planning for peacekeeping, it is necessary to define both mission, and role, especially if superpower forces are to be used. It is necessary to sort out the roles of the Military Staff Committee, Secretary General, Security Council, and General Assembly both in advance planning and in subsequent operations. The use of regional forces is a possibility as is security assistance support to third countries' peacekeeping organizations. Financing (by assessment or through voluntary donations) is also an important aspect of the problem; not only did it nearly kill the Congo operation but has had ramifications elsewhere.

t. There is a need to widen the number of countries involved in peacekeeping; further, there appears to be a need for a more precise definition of the term. One definition presented was the following: Peacekeeping is a

politico-military, non-combat operation involving forces committed in the field and whereby peaceful solutions to local or international problems might be achieved. It is not peace enforcement nor is it collective security. One of the criteria for deployment of such forces is the consent of all antagonists. There is a need for the UN to adopt a resolution calling for all members to contribute actively to peacekeeping. If all member states in the UN are considered equal, then all are equally responsible for aiding in peacekeeping. The Military Staff Committee is not doing what it could. There is a need for a General Assembly resolution tasking all members to formally commit a peacekeeping unit. The first thing needed on the ground is an assessment team, to be immediately deployed on UN order. The mission of this team would be to evaluate the situation and recommend necessary action. Such a team should be on permanent stand-by for UN use, on a rotational basis among the member states.

This latter proposal led to some discussion, with there being disagreement as to the relative merits of participation by all members. Article 32 was identified as capable of interpretation so as to allow for such assessment teams. It was also noted that little luck had been experienced in getting member states to earmark units.

u. Use of the US military in peacekeeping has many objectives. Peacekeeping is a tool that must be used with flexibility.

v. As to the definition of peacekeeping, it becomes hard to nail down, being a dynamic affair and subject to expansion in ways we cannot foresee. Further, it may simply atrophy from disuse.

THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM
OF THE
FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COURSE
UNITED STATES ARMY INSTITUTE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

DATE	SCHEDULED ACTIVITY	LOCATION
Monday 9 June 1975	Participants arrive. FAO Course students meet in workshop groups for preliminary organization. Early arrivals are invited to join student workgroups.	Rooms 304, 305, 619 Bryant Hall
Tuesday 10 June 1975		
0745-0800	Registration	Lobby, JFK Hall
0800-0830	Opening Remarks: Major General Michael D. Healy, Commandant, US Army Institute for Military Assistance	Auditorium, JFK Hall
0830-0930	First Workshop Session: Opening Comments made by guest participants, as appropriate. Internal structuring of workshop finalized.	Rooms 304, 305, 619 Bryant Hall
0930-1000	Informal Coffee Call	Atrium, JFK Hall
1000-1230	First Plenary Session. Title: "America's Obligations: Substance and Limits." General Scope: A Senior Observer's view of current US foreign policy obligations and of the politico-military implications of those obligations for the remainder of this decade. Principal Speaker: Professor Hans J. Morgenthau Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Modern History University of Chicago and University Professor New School for Social Research New York, New York	Auditorium, JFK Hall

As of 2 June 1975

Tuesday
10 June 1975

	Discussants: Professor Inis L. Claude, Jr. Edward R. Stettinius Jr. Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia Mr. Sandor Vanocur Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs Duke University Durham, North Carolina	
1230-1400	Dutch Treat Luncheons	Various
1400-1700	Second Workshop Session	Rooms 304, 305, 619 Bryant Hall
1700-1900	Open Time	
1900-2000	Cocktail Reception	Sink Room, Fort Bragg Officers' Open Mess
2000-2115	Buffet Dinner	Hodge Room, Fort Bragg Officers' Open Mess
2115-2200	Evening Plenary Session. Title: "The Shifting Military Balance and Its Implications for Foreign Policy." General Scope: A Senior Observer's view of the changing nature of US military presence abroad and of the military community in the accomplishment of US foreign policy goals and objectives. Principal Speaker: Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt., Jr., USN (Ret) Formerly Chief of Naval Operations Washington, D.C.	Hodge Room, Fort Bragg Officers' Open Mess

Wednesday
11 June 1975

0830-1000	Third Workshop Session	Rooms 304, 305, 619 Bryant Hall
1000-1015	Break	

Wednesday
11 June 1975

1015-1145	Fourth Workshop Session	Rooms 304, 305, 619 Bryant Hall
1145-1315	Luncheon	Various
1315-1430	Fifth (final) Workshop Session	Rooms 304, 305, 619 Bryant Hall
1430-1445	Break	
1445-1615	Workshop Reports: Oral synopses of workshop efforts are reported out by Workshop Chairpersons.	Auditorium
1615-1645	Closing Remarks: Major General Michael D. Healy, Commandant, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance	Auditorium
1645	Informal Conferences, Dinner and Departures	Various

WORKSHOP #1

ARMS COPRODUCTION: WHO BENEFITS?

GENERAL SCOPE:

An examination of military arms coproduction. Discussion will include, but is not limited to, the implications of coproduction and offset agreements as a quid pro quo for arms sales; assessment of the economic, political, and military costs and benefits in the short- and long-term to US national security, US economy, US industry, and coproducing countries; any moral implications of promoting arms coproduction throughout the world; the possibility of US controlling the transfer of weapons and technology through licensing; and the possible loss of US jobs to foreign manufacture.

Workshop Chairman:

Dr. Robert J. Pranger
Director, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
1150 17th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

Guest Participants:

Mr. John B. G. Fiedler
Vice President, Marketing
Firearms Division
Colt Industries
150 Huyschope Avenue
Hartford, Connecticut 06102

Mr. Barton F. Walker, Jr.
Corporate Director, International Programs
Northorp Corporation
Suite 1208
1701 North Ft Myer Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Student Participants:

LTC Stephen H. Schor
LTC Ronald E. Button
MAJ Bartolo Diaz
CPT James S. Derry
CPT Charles P. McCarthy
CPT Stephen R. Norton

Faculty Participants:

LTC Thomas W. Hanson, Instructor, Department of Security Assistance

CPT Robert F. Manning, Instructor, Department of Security Assistance

CPT Albert J. Snyder, Instructor, Department of Security Assistance

WORKSHOP #2

COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICALITY

GENERAL SCOPE:

An examination of terrorism as a political phenomenon and a practical problem in personnel and installation security. Discussion will focus on the nature and historical origins of transnational terrorism, the efficacy of terrorism as a political tool, the countermeasures that can be taken at the national, local, and installation levels, and the manner of existing intra- and international cooperation in this area. Recognizing that the international community is seeking a "model" for the development of counter-terror organizations, policies, and tactics, various approaches to the problem of combatting international terrorism are reviewed.

Workshop Chairman: Professor Seale Doss
Ripon College
Ripon, Wisconsin

Guest Participants:

LT Patrick McKinley
Platoon Leader
Special Weapons Assault Team
Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles, California 90030

Mr. Seymour D. Vestermark, Jr.
Consultant
Research Division
International Association of Chiefs of Police
Gaithersburg, Maryland

Student Participants:

LTC Joe M. Brown
LTC George D. Livingston
MAJ Paul H. Dill
MAJ John H. Thomson
CPT Glenn A. Lazarus
CPT Jimmie L. Myers
CPT Thomas F. Sander

Faculty Participants:

LTC John J. Monville,
Instructor, Department of Civil-Military Operations

MAJ Erle W. Thomas
Instructor, Department of Civil-Military Operations

CPT Daniel E. Wilson
Instructor, Department of Civil-Military Operations

WORKSHOP #3

PEACEKEEPING AND THE UNITED STATES: A SECOND LOOK

GENERAL SCOPE:

An examination of the role which US ground units may play in UN-sponsored peacekeeping forces assembled and deployed throughout the world. Discussion will include, but is not limited to, a joint US-USSR peacekeeping scenario, the political and military implications of such a scenario, and the advantages or disadvantages associated with a "super-power" peacekeeping force.

Workshop Chairman: Vice Admiral John M. Lee., Jr., USN(Ret)
5108 Brittany Drive South
St. Petersburg, Florida 33715

Guest Participants:

COL Stig Waldenstrom
Counselor & Military Advisor
Permanent Mission of Sweden to the UN
New York, New York

COL Thomas L. Fisher, II(Ret)
34 Voses Lane
Milton, Massachusetts 22187

Professor Daniel S. Cheever, Jr.
Graduate School of Public & International Affairs, Bruce Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

Student Participants:

COL John H. Hodes
MAJ Stephen M. Perry
CPT Kim J. Henningsen
CPT William A. Kunzman
CPT Terry D. Johnson
CPT Francis J. Sisti

Faculty Participants:

COL Craig G. Coverdale,
Director, Department of Environmental Analysis and Regional Studies

LTC Richard P. Clayberg
Instructor, Department of Environmental Analysis and Regional Studies

MAJ Landy T. Nelson
Instructor, Department of Environmental Analysis and Regional Studies

ROSTER OF OBSERVER-PARTICIPANTS

Major General James A. Grimsley
Director, Security Assistance
Plans, Policy and Program
Formulation, OASD/ISA
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dean Jackson A. Rigney
Director, Office of Inter-
national Programs
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, North Carolina 27607

Mr. Paul D. Mason
Chief, Investigations Division
USIA, Washington, D.C. 20547

Mr. Thomas R. Lally
Regional Administrative
Specialist, USIA
Washington, D.C. 20547

Mr. Lawrence Crum
USA Materiel Systems Analysis
Activity, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland 21005

Major Edmund F. Lee
USA Forces Command
Intelligence Center
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

1LT Arthur G. Peterson
USA Forces Command
Intelligence Center
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

Professor D. E. Weatherbee
Professor of Political Science
US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

Mr. W. B. Hankee
NATO Study Group
US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

Mr. Robert R. Corey
Sikorsky Aircraft Division
United Technology
Washington, D.C.

COL Arthur E. Dewey
Chief, Politico-Military
Division, Strategy and
Security Assistance
Directorate, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans
Washington, D.C. 20310

Mr. Robert D. Barber
Assistant Director (Security)
USIA, Washington, D.C. 20547

Mr. Robert E. DeLadurantaye
Assistant Chief, Domestic
Activities, USIA
Washington, D.C. 20547

LTC Jerome Trehy
Chief, Landing Forces Opera-
tions Division, US Marine
Corps Command and Staff
College, Quantico, Virginia 22

LTC Albert DeProspero
USA Materiel Systems Analysis
Activity, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland 21005

Major Robert A. Hasty
USA Forces Command Intelligence
Center, Fort Bragg, NC 28307

Major James C. Ritchey
USA Forces Command Intelligence
Center, Fort Bragg, NC 28307

Dr. Richard G. Brown
Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: DI-4, Washington, D.C. 20

COL D. O. Clark
Director, African Studies
US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

LTC Andrew K. Kuschner
Security Assistance Committee
Department of Strategy, USA
Command & General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COURSE 2-75



FRONT ROW: CPT Francis J. Sisti; LTC George D. Livingston; COL John T. Hodes; MG Michael D. Healy, Commandant, USAIMA; COL Robert A. Prehn, Director, CASAS; LTC Stephen H. Schor; SECOND ROW: CPT James S. Derry; LTC Ronald E. Button, Jr.; MAJ Stephen M. Perry; CPT Thomas F. Sander; LTC Joe M. Brown; CPT William A. Kunzman; THIRD ROW: MAJ John H. Thomson; CPT Kim J. Henningsen; CPT Charles P. McCarthy; MAJ Paul H. Dill; CPT Stephen R. Morton; MAJ Bartolo Diaz; FOURTH ROW: CPT Glenn A. Lazarus; MAJ Thomas W. Elrod; CPT Jimmie L. Myers; CPT Terry D. Johnson; MAJ Ralph C. Gauer, PC, FAOC.