


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PROCEEDINGS  
OF  
ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM OF  
THE FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COURSE  
6-8 DEC 1976



UNITED STATES ARMY INSTITUTE  
FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

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Questions regarding the symposium or the Proceedings should be directed to:

Chief, Program Coordination Division  
Civil Affairs and Security Assistance School  
United States Army Institute for Military Assistance  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

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# US Army Military History Institute



Presented by -

Colonel John W. DePauw

P.S. Fight the good

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"Suffice it to say that the decisions facing all of us will run the gamut from the impact of Middle East oil on energy, to a sound US foreign policy towards Africa, detente with Eastern Europe, Credibility with our Asian allies, to realizing hemispheric fraternity with out Latin American neighbors. It is not coincidental that the geographical breadth and profound substance of such decisions paralled the range of academic pursuit of the Foreign Area Officer.

## OPENING REMARKS

DELIVERED BY

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT C. KINGSTON

COMMANDER, JFK CENTER FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY INSTITUTE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Major General Kingston, and I'm Commander of the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance and Commandant of the United States Army Institute for Military Assistance. I would like to extend to all of you a warm welcome to the Eleventh International Affairs Symposium of the Foreign Area Officer Course. In particular, to those visiting Fort Bragg for the first time, I offer you any assistance that we can provide to make your visit with us as comfortable and enjoyable as possible.

In its fifth year now, the symposium has transcended earlier assemblies which were relatively narrow in scope, and shallow in depth--primarily attractive to those civilians and military who had an enduring interest in security assistance. Today the symposium's focus of attention has been broadened and its range of issues has multiplied to the extent that, as you meet and get to know your fellow participants, you will discover that the institute is hosting a much more representative cross-section of our nation. Sitting among you are academicians, representatives from other service schools, civilian government officials, and members of the private business sector who have joined our students, faculty and staff to examine, analyze and discuss issues of common interest but which have grown more and more uncommon in importance.

As we launch this eleventh symposium it is necessary for you to understand who the students are, since ultimately, it is because of them that we have convened this assemblage today. I bring this to your attention because there is the tendency for an academic gathering such as this to acquire a life of its own, losing sight of its

Fundamental reason for which it was established--to further the Institution's mission of educating these officers as they take on a variety of challenging assignments. We take that mission seriously and ask that you commit yourselves with us to supporting that mission and this symposium. These officers have been carefully selected to be trained for, and eventually serve in, politico-military assignments. By nature of their prior experience, advanced civil schooling, and language abilities, the Foreign Area Officer students have become knowledgeable in area studies and other related fields. In addition, they have anywhere from seven to twenty-five years of military experience and about half of the class have graduate degrees. Their sources of commission cover the entire spectrum: ROTC, the Military Academy, OCS, Direct and National Guard. They speak sixteen foreign languages with several of the class being multi-lingual. Although the class ranges in grade from captain to colonel, all will be "doers;" all at some time in the future will be called upon to input information effecting the national decisionmaking process.

And what problems will these decisions involve, what challenges will they present? They don't need to be catalogued here. Suffice it to say that the decisions facing all of us will run the gamut from the impact of Middle East oil on energy, to a sound US foreign policy towards Africa, Detente with Eastern Europe, credibility with our asian allies, to realizing hemispheric fraternity with our Latin American neighbors. It is not coincidental that the geographical breadth and profound substance of such decisions parallel the range of academic pursuit of the Foreign Area Officer.

I am not before you this morning to presume that a solution will be achieved for the issues addressed by this symposium. In fact the military recognizes as well as any the complex interrelationships characterizing our inter-environment. I do submit however, that the seeds to these solutions quite often are sown in the open forum which promotes a better understanding of the problem. What is endorsed and encouraged, and hopefully, what will emerge on Wednesday is a broader range of responses to the problems to which this symposium attends. I have good reason to expect this, for although the institute's resident expertise is limited in its capacity to intellectually arm the

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Foreign Area Officer to respond to our international challenge, we have the ability to call upon you, our distinguished guest, for your support.

The gentleman to whom I am about to yield the podium reinforces my optimism for a successful symposium. Dr. Ray S. Cline, Executive Director, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University has distinguished himself in a long career in academia as well as service to his country. After graduating from Harvard University in 1941, Dr. Cline served in the Navy and the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. He broadened his service experience with a three year assignment with the Department of the Army. From 1949 until 1951 Dr. Cline had a tour with the Central Intelligence Agency which he served as an attache in London. Following this assignment he returned for another tour with the Central Intelligence Agency, then became Director of the Naval Communications Center in Taiwan. From 1962 until 1966 he was the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency followed by a tour as special advisor, American Embassy, Bonn, Germany. From 1969 until 1973 Dr. Cline was the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State after which he assumed his present position undertaking research and writing on strategic intelligence, on the world balance of power and on US decisionmaking in international affairs.

The center that Dr. Cline directs is dedicated to service as an open forum for clarifying and communicating responsible scholarly viewpoints concerning international challenges confronting the United States. This Institute, and this Symposium are equally dedicated to this purpose. It gives me a great deal of personal satisfaction and honor therefore to have this opportunity to introduce to you such an eminently qualified speaker as Dr. Ray Cline to address "The Role of Intelligence in Foreign Policy." Dr Cline...

# FIRST PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATION

DELIVERED BY

DR. RAY S. CLINE

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC  
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Good morning. I'm delighted to be able to be here at sunny Fort Bragg. It's good to escape from Washington to any climate, and particularly during this transition era between administrations. I can't count how many administrations I've seen changed, but they started with Roosevelt to Truman and they're all painful. One of the experiences I had when I was working for General Eisenhower, before he was President, in the Army tour that General Kingston spoke about, involved writing a history of military planning in World War II and Ike was extremely interested in this. I spent almost four years before I finished a volume and helped launch a 99 volume army history series. But during my tour in the Pentagon, I was indoctrinated occasionally as we all are and I was invited to go to a lecture by a retired calvary officer on the arts of modern warfare and it was not bad, but you had a feeling that the officer concerned didn't quite have his heart in the lessons he was propounding. He had a text he held in front of him and unfortunately you've heard these speeches given where the voice rises at the end of sentences and falls in the middle. He obviously hadn't read it before he gave it to us. But he was slugging through it pretty well until he came to a sentence which said, "It's still very important for the Air Force to give close support to ground troops in battle." He looked up and said, "Jesus Christ, that's something I believe myself."

I like to mention that story because I want to talk to you this morning as an old intelligence officer and not give you any particular canned lecture or indoctrination. I'll try to say a few things I really believe myself about intelligence work, it's a very honorable profession but it's not a very well understood one, and sometimes a malign one. The first thing I'd like to say is that there's nothing mysterious about intelligence, and particularly at the high level

of international foreign affairs and foreign policy. It's obvious that you need to understand everything about the complicated world we live in, so you can make sensible decisions as to how to live with it. We all know that intelligence appreciations are necessary even to decide how to get to work in the morning, and work in intelligence at all levels is just as practical as figuring out your commuter's route before you plunge into the traffic. Unfortunately, the common sense approach to intelligence isn't very common. I'm afraid we've bred a generation of people, particularly in Washington, who have read Ian Fleming until it's addled their minds and they believe it. They think that all intelligence work is cloak and dagger work, that it is mysterious, probably criminal, immoral, and even fattening. Now, I admit in the military attache circuit, it is fattening, but most of those other adjectives don't really apply.

I'd like to say a few words about intelligence as I think it really is, and then give you an opportunity to ask questions about it. The first thing to say about intelligence work is that it involves a network of ideas, a network of information related to constructs of some matrix or framework in which you're trying to sort out the information so you can understand it. Now, I've been asked to speak on intelligence as a contribution to foreign policy, and I think that it is obvious that our foreign policy dealing with some 158 nations, many of whom we can't even find on the map, but which are all promoting their own interests. Most of them are represented in Washington and the United Nations. I have tried to sort out in my own mind, and I wrote a little book last year, called "World Powers Assessment," what it is that intelligence officers need to know about foreign countries in order to determine how important they are, and how much power they seem to have, and how much influence they rate on some kind of common scale. When I started out to write the book I thought it was going to be complicated. It turned out to be almost childishly simple so I'd like to pass along to you the main simple thought in it, because I think it is a guide to what intelligence in the international arena and international decisionmaking is all about. I devised a formula which at first blush is a little intimidating. I put it on the cover of my book so that anybody who is intimidated by formulas would be frightened off immediately, but I explained it on page 11, if I remember right, and I can tell whether anybody's ever read the book, because if they say they don't understand the

formula, that means they didn't get past page 11, because it's so simple that any fifth grader can understand it, otherwise I couldn't have made it up. It says that the power of a nation, as perceived in international affairs, which means as perceived by other intelligence agencies, as well as by national leaders, is a result that equals the sum of three factors: the critical mass of a country, by which I mean the population and the territory controlled, which is an index of the raw materials controlled, the space controlled, plus the ability to mobilize these resources for economic purposes, plus the ability to use the population, the territory, and the economic resources, as mobilized, to maintain armed forces.

Now those are very conventional factors, but they are the bread and butter factors of intelligence. I've briefed a lot of Presidents, and Secretaries of State, and Secretaries of Defense and when I get to telling old sea stories about it, I'm always surprised myself at the fact that most high level briefings may include a lot of very technical and complicated matter, but the questions usually relate to the simplest things. For instance, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 when I was lucky enough to be involved in carrying data into the excom, the NSC special committee, dealing with the crisis, headed by Jack and Bobby Kennedy. The questions I got usually baffled me because they would be something like, how many people are there in Cuba, anyway, and what kind of armed forces system do they have. You know, you're all full of OB and weapons technical data and they ask you the simplest kind of questions, so if you're really trying to think what a national leader wants in order to make up his mind, you've got to get back to basics, the very simple things about demography, geography, economic structure and structure of the armed forces. I'm especially reminded of an occasion when I briefed a senate committee on the high level photographic reconnaissance capabilities of the intelligence agencies, this was 10, 15 years ago, when there was very little known information about our satellite capability, and I gave what I thought was a pretty professional briefing, but a very distinguished senator at the end of the briefing, said, Dr. Cline, you make it very interesting, but he says there's something I don't understand, so I braced for a scientific question that I couldn't possibly answer, you know. He said, would you just tell me, what the hell makes those things stay up there when you throw them up there? So I went back to high school civics and tried to fashion an answer.

I want to emphasize this simplistic approach to the subject matter of intelligence. However, I didn't stop there with my formula because those are the obvious factors. The only subtlety in developing a formula to describe what you need to know about nations is that I put a multiplier sign next. In other words, the sum of the terms of these, what you might call the concrete, conventional elements of power has to be multiplied by a coefficient, something that modifies the value of the whole equation, and that modifier is the hard part of intelligence. It is made up, as I described it, of two terms. One, what is the strategic purpose of a nation, and second, what is the ability of a nation to produce a coherent national will to carry out the strategy of the nation. So the last two terms in my formula are S. and W--strategy and will. So if you add up a coefficient, based on your calculations, of these rather subtle intellectual, psychological, and political factors, then you modify the rest of the conventional strength, and its obvious, as I say the only arithmetic involved at all in the formula is the multiplication and if you come up with a nation with no strategy and no will, that's zero, and the only thing I know about arithmetic is that if you multiply something by zero, the answer is zero. And, I'm afraid that in 1974 and 1975, we came periously close in this country to having our own coefficient national will and strategic purpose to zero, in fact, I rated it about 7.7, I think, where one is average.

At any rate, the intelligence officer in the national government does get asked the terribly simple question all the time. How far is it from Peking to Shanghai, for instance. I'll give you a true example. I was briefing the National Security Council back in the 50's for Allen Dulles, and one day when he doublecrossed me, we had been talking about the new and rather mysterious electronic activity going on in Russia. And we just had a vague inkling that it was rocket activity, and, of course, it was the preparation for the Sputnik in 57. And, Allen Dulles was not very interested in technology, I think it turned him off because he couldn't talk freely about it the way he did, very glibly, about people in foreign areas, etc. But, as we were heading into the NSC briefing room, he said, you know, I think maybe you were right. We should have included an item on this Sputnik activity. I said, I argued all last night that we ought to put it in, of course, I think that. He said, well, I'll let you explain it. So, after he'd given the regular briefing, he said,

Mr. President, Eisenhower, of course, Dr. Cline has a special point here he wants to make, whereupon he turned me loose in front of a map showing the new economic subdivisions of the Soviet Union, completely out of scale and perspective to anything good for geography, and I pointed to a locality within 500 miles of Moscow, and said, well, Mr. President, there's a range here of some kind where they're shooting rockets. I could find the test range area even on this map that I had and that was the only briefing that President Eisenhower got on Sputnik before it went up a few months later, I might say, and we were very glad we gave it, but the question that Ike asked was, how far is it from the test range to Camp David. Fortunately, I knew that, then he said well supposing they turn the damn thing around, will it reach Pearl Harbor? And, I really didn't know that, I had to take a quick look and make a horseback guess. But that was what he was really interested in: Is the rocket of military application and all he wanted to know was how far is it from one city to another. So, those answers are very important but they always get folded into questions of intention, of national purpose. Were the Russians in fact building international rockets, or were they, as many thought at that time, simply engaging in very advanced earth sciences research. Well, we know the answer to that one now but it wasn't quite that easy in 1957. That is the kind of factor involving strategic purposes, very hard to pin down in advance, which is when intelligence officers are asked about it. The coherence of national will in a foreign country is even more difficult to assess. It changes the feeling of the population in the country, the morale and **efficiency of the leadership**, the stamina of a population to support a given policy--these are factors which the best of scholars and the best of politicians make mistakes on.

I was saying last night, in a conversation we were having about the Vietnam war, that I thought that the tragedy was that President Johnson made a miscalculation, not on anything that he considered to be the business of intelligence, but in his own field of political science, in a practical stance, and that was how long the United States citizenry would support a distant war with a conscript army without mobilizing for a national emergency. I believe that the rather unfortunate combination of the personalities of Bob McNamara and President Johnson resulted in a kind of superficial optimism which kept suggesting that the war would be over at the end of the year,

which led us down the garden path of not preparing psychologically for the strains which everybody in the intelligence community knew were ahead. And, I must say, I take some pride in the relative sophistication of the National Intelligence Estimates written during that period because they all stressed the long range nature of the commitment, the difficulty of nation building in a country which had been fighting for 40 years to escape colonial rule and to work out the split of power afterwards. There was very little uncertainty among people who really studied Vietnam about the magnitude of the task. I think most of them thought the task of helping build a non-communist nation in the southern part of the Vietnam peninsula was worthwhile but that's a debatable proposition. The real point is that to assess the political will of the North Vietnamese, of the South Vietnamese, and in fact for our national leaders to have a shrewd understanding of the national will of this country, those were essential ingredients in calculating the balance of forces, the power relationship, among these nations. And, an essential ingredient in calculating the kind of strategic intelligence advice to pass up the line.

Now this immediately gets us to one of the really tough problems in the subject matter of intelligence. Is the United States and its position in the world a factor which intelligence officers should speak about. The tradition is, no, that's G3 business, not G2 business, but at the national level it seems obvious to me and I think people have mostly come around to this point of view though it was the reverse only a few years ago. Somehow, by assumption, by asides, by direct analysis, by consultation with policy leaders, you have to recognize that the United States is an actor in international Affairs. It is an important influence in international affairs. And, even if you only make an estimate of what the foreign nations think the US action will be, you have to take it into account. Probably, the experiment of Nikita Krushchev in putting intermediate range missiles in Cuba to double his missile strength in 1962 was based on the calculation that the United States had a young and inexperienced leader, Jack Kennedy, whom he had pretty well cowed in his own mind, had talked down, shouted down, at Vienna a few months or so previously. I think the Russians had decided that the United States was not up to a serious strategic challenge. Well, it showed how little Nikita Krushchev knew about the fighting Boston Irish. But, it was a grave

miscalculation on their part and I think that this factor of studying the foreign appreciation of US political and psychological strategic factors is one of the toughest problems in US intelligence. Somehow it has to be dealt with, but it's there.

Now in addition to being a subject index, a network of ideas, intelligence is a process, an intellectual process, a bureaucratic process and you can't separate them. If you're only interested in the ideas of intelligence and you don't worry about the process, you're not a very generally useful intelligence officer, you may be a good specialist. Needless to say the subjects like Soviet policy, Soviet military capabilities, Soviet intervention in other areas is a very voluminous subject which a good intelligence officer could spend his life dealing with. But at the national level of influencing foreign policy, providing the subjective, reliable data based on which foreign policy can be made, you have to take into account a lot of factors and you have to take them into account in process which feeds to the policymakers what they need at the right time, in the right way. In other words, intelligence has to be selected, has to be processed from technical language, photography or signals, or espionage, into general language, then it has to be emphasized, evaluated, analyzed and all those words which we're familiar with to turn it into something meaningful to a generalist in our government at the top of the Defense Department, the State Department of the White House and this I indicated earlier, you can't count on those people knowing the names of all the missiles and the numbers of armed forces in various parts of the world. You have to recapitulate them all the time and you've got to get the language into a process of description and into a format of conveyance of intelligence which will hit the user.

Now the usual thing is to distinguish between current intelligence which is a process of reporting almost like a newspaper, new and meaningful items of data, significant new events which have taken place that ought to effect your appreciation of the world situation. That's pretty obvious. The difficulty with it is that any current intelligence operation, like the morning newspaper, tends to become an addiction with policymakers. You almost have to fight to keep the morning newspaper away from them in order to get them to pay attention to longer range factors which ought to be influencing our policy. You must run a

good intelligence current operation in order to keep your audience, but you also have to include in the process of briefing on current intelligence, the infiltration of ideas based on longer range depth research in military, political, or economic matters relating to the countries you're talking about. You've usually got to infiltrate at the time some current event is forcing attention on this area, this country, or this international relationship and then you have to seize opportunities at certain crucial points and the timing here for the process is very difficult to interrelate a bunch of strategic ideas, some of them old, perhaps a few new, but very fundamental to our own policy to force a rethinking of our posture in a given area or with respect to a given subject matter. This is what I call an estimate. We have a national intelligence estimate system which has had its ups and downs. I'm afraid it's down at the moment, but I hope it's coming up again. I'm hoping that the new administration will have a livelier interest in intelligence than the last six or seven years have suggested, but at any rate, any administration has to be confronted with the national intelligence estimate which puts the strategic problems to our high command in terms of what is happening abroad among foreign nations, particularly among the very large nations, such as the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China and our major allies, Germany, Japan, etc. These estimates have to be crisp, they have to be persuasive.

If you start listing the adjectives of what policymakers say they want in an intelligence estimate, it covers the gambet--short but full, crisp but detailed--you know, they want everything, so it's an art form that is extremely difficult but it is the way in which it must be done by intelligence officers, in my view, by a combination of the talents in all agencies, looking at things from a military and economic and a foreign policy point of view, put together their understanding of the challenges of running this country in any given context. The big national estimate from the Soviet Union and what the Soviet Union is doing in other countries, such as Angola, Vietnam, Portugal, where you will. That is the ultimate payoff of the whole intelligence systems in which many of you will be a part. It doesn't matter what part you play, it all fits together in a process which leads from the collector in the field who is getting those images, those electronic signals, those agent reports, or technical data from open analysis, and

pushing it into a machine which assesses, synthesizes, and reduces to meaningful propositions on which policy can be made.

Now there are a couple of other things about intelligence I'd like to say. One is very obvious. It's a network of people, as well as ideas and processes, and the people are extremely important. I think it's wrong to say that if you get a thousand of the highest talented people in the world and put them together, somehow they'll organize themselves into an efficient machine. Seems to me that most of the talented people I know have a genius for disorganizing themselves, but it certainly is true that you can have the most elaborate process and organization in the world and you fill it full of dunderheads and what you get are dunderhead ideas, and like the computers, you know what the scientists say, a computer is very clever but if you put garbage in it, you get garbage out of it. The motto is GIGO--garbage in, garbage out. That's true of the intelligence system, generally, and it will happen if you get people who don't know the difference between garbage and food. So I don't want to dwell on it because I know you're perfectly well aware here of the importance of training, a broad preparation for intelligence mission. After all, to collect one little piece of data on a military weapon or an economic plan for a foreign country, may not seem like a very high mission but it is the bedrock on which those final synthetic national estimates rest. If there are many errors of fact in the input then the conclusions are inevitably all bound to be wrong and I think the honesty, the instinct for objectivity, the fairness and the good intellectual training of people in the intelligence system is of the highest possible significance. Fortunately, I think we have been very lucky in this country in getting able people into our intelligence systems.

Mostly by accident, I came very close to stealing my own thunder here this morning by having a book which I'd just written available in the book stores this week. I understand it's going to be available tomorrow, didn't you say, General Kingston? But, I wrote a book called "Secrets, Spys, and Scholars," trying to relate the different elements of intelligence work as it evolved historically in our country from OSS down to the present time and I'm rash enough to propose some reorganization plans for the future. The point of the book--the reason I call it "Secrets, Spys, and Scholars," is that what you need

need is a mix of talents, you need collectors. In some cases, in the case of CIA, there must be not only technical collectors but espionage agents and above all you need a sense of scholarship, a sense of careful research and objectivity at every level of intelligence work in order to make it all fit together. Scholarship, I stress, must be a goal in the minds of most technically oriented people in the intelligence system, because they are doing the fundamental research which, if it is reliable, if it is clearheaded, and objectively described, will make the input which makes the intelligence, (I use that in the sense of the English language, not the professional sense) makes intelligence possible among the people who have to make hard judgments in intelligence papers. You can be sure that at the national level where foreign policy is involved, no easy questions are asked. If the questions are easy, somebody's picked up the answer easily. What they want to know when the President or Security Council asks a question of the national intelligence staff are the answers to the unknowable questions, essentially, the ones where evidence is scant, where you must extrapolate, where you're going on judgment about a very general mix of factors which are not susceptible to quantitative analysis--where you do have to rely on the wisdom of the people who are handling the evidence. All national estimates should be evidentially based but usually the evidence is unsatisfactory for answering the question, that's why we're all in business is to keep improving that data base, but when you're answering questions like what the USSR will be like in 1980, obviously there's a certain unknown element. So you get asked very hard questions.

Now this brings me to the last point I want to make about intelligence for foreign policymaking, for strategic policymaking, which are the same thing in my view, virtually the same things--closely related. It isn't enough to have a process which deals with an orderly system of ideas and information, passes it up through intelligent people, responsible people who give the objective story in the paper that they write. It is crucial to have that information to package in a way which permits it to be provided at the right time and the right place, virtually to force policymakers to use it. In my more than 30 years of trying to package and process ideas about intelligence situations for national leaders, I would say that 75 percent of the problem is getting national leaders to pay attention when you've got an important intelligence issue. Now this is

not interrogation of our national leadership, sometimes it is but usually not, they're very busy men. Capturing the time of a president of the United States is the hardest thing in the world. He's got to sign autographs, he's got to meet the chambers of commerce in the rose garden and get his picture taken, he's got to meet congressmen, he's got to meet dignitaries, he's got to talk to his own staff, he's got to act as head of a political party--it's an almost killing job that we have arranged for our president and none of them do the job perfectly. To demand their time for intelligence papers is presumptuous unless those papers are perfectly cogent, absolutely reliable and extremely relevant to the issues before the president.

Now the presidents very a little bit. Some of them could have their attention captured a little easier. It was a great pleasure to work for President Eisenhower because he believed in intelligence and he believed in staff work. I used to say that doing an NSC briefing for President Eisenhower was like participating in an orderly football game. There were rules, you knew how long the time frame was and how long you had to make a score, etc., and it was a quite orderly process. Some people said it was more form and order than it was substance, but on the whole I think it was a pretty good policy deliberation system at the National Security Council under President Eisenhower. This process has gone down the rathole, gradually, since then. With increasing difficulty, Jack Kennedy abolished most of the staff structure of the National Security Council because, as Mac Bundy told me, President Kennedy can listen faster than most people can talk, which I think was true, but he didn't like formal briefings and he got impatient with them, so you've got a much more ad hoc operation of the Security Council but it worked and in emergencies I think it worked pretty well. I always said that participating in national policy-making with the Kennedy crowd was like playing fast break basketball. It was quite different. You had to be pretty quick on your feet. You had to race around all the time. A lot of the time you couldn't find out where the ball was, but if you could get your hands on it you could do something with it. Occasionally, some of the staff got so excited they scored in the wrong basket. I won't mention names now, but I'll give you some examples if you ask me the right question. But at any rate it was an exhilarating process designed to produce ulcers at a very early age. Unfortunately, I think we went downhill from there.

President Johnson was a much less sophisticated man about orderly handling of ideas. He was a very intelligent man and very sympathetic in many ways but he essentially has the habits of mind of a long time congressman. He wanted to consult his cronies, he wanted to count the votes, he wanted to know what the public would think. He sort of figured he'd hired all these specialists in the government to tell him what ought to be done and his job was to maneuver it through, but that meant a diminution of the role of advisor and policymaker from the regular establishment, and it ended up really with about four or five people making most of the decisions, in the absence of the rest of the apparatus. The Tuesday luncheons, I think it was Tuesday, on day of the week, he had lunch with Rusk and McNamara and Walt Rostow--later on I think Dick Helms managed to squeeze in there, though it was with difficulty--and they decided things, there's no question about it, but the trouble was sometimes they decided things that they were not fully briefed on. I can't say often decided them wrong, occasionally decided them wrong at least, and the most damaging part was that the essential appreciations which underlay the decisions could not be passed back through the bureaucracy in a meaningful way. I think our whole Vietnam war effort suffered from the fact that the exact premises on which we were working were never clearly articulated as decisions of the National Security Council. It was decided to send so many troops, it was decided to do this, that, and the other thing.

At any rate, in this period the process of decision-making shrank and when I used to be challenged to give a sporting synonym for Johnson, I always said, well, I'd run out of sports. Johnson obviously runs the oldest established floating crap game in Washington, DC. If you can get in there and get your money down you may win, but otherwise you're out of the game. Well, I needn't tell you what happened under President Nixon. The process shriveled into a two man operation with President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger making the decisions in such a way that nobody ever knew which one or both made them, the edicts all issued from Dr. Kissinger, and Dr. Kissinger's policy, which he had expressed firmly before he became assistant to the president, and later Secretary of State, was that in important matters that it is fatal to let the bureaucracy know what it is doing. He made it very clear that he felt important decisions should be made in secrecy at the top of the government and that if the drift of

policymaking was revealed to the regular bureaucracy, you had to anticipate opposition and perhaps, defeat in moving in the direction you wanted, so the main object was to keep this information secret from the people who were charged with advising you on it. This reduces the decision-making process to a dimension which makes intelligence work almost impossible and that's the reason that I decided to leave the government in October, 1973, because I felt that our intelligence work was not very much appreciated on the foreign policy level because it sometimes did not demonstrate total wisdom on the foreign policy and users of intelligence have to decide whether they want the protection of objective analysis and information or whether they want supportive information, supportive rearrangement of events and facts to support decisions already made.

Now, obviously, no group is entirely one way or the other. Every president prefers intelligence reports which support his position, some of them get angrier than others when they get the wrong ones, ones with which they disagree, but I do think that we had, in the hard days of the Vietnam retreat and defeat and the especially hard days of the Water-gate political problems of the Nixon Administration, gone through a period where we had an excellent intelligence machine whirring away with very little erring into the foreign policymaking process. This was a product of the times, of some deficiencies on the part of the intelligence community, I'm sure, but mainly the product of an extraordinary combination of personalities at the White House, Dr. Kissinger and Richard Nixon. We're entering a new era now and I have no idea what it will bring. My own view is that intelligence as in many other matters we have no place to go but up, and I certainly think that we will see in this country a resurgence of public confidence in the government if the new administration makes an effort to consult more widely and bring more people into decisionmaking. I think that as a result the national will of the United States will improve, there'll be a more likely consensus of views behind any given foreign policy or strategic decision. And in those circumstances it will be more vital than it has ever been before for intelligence to make an input in a systematic way with a known process of delivering the goods in the right packages, and a receptivity on the part of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council Director, Assistant to the President, and the President to hard intelligence findings, even if they're hard in the sense of being unpalatable, as they


often are. The old Greek concept of shooting the messenger who brings the bad news is a pretty human characteristic, so you've got to be tough to be an intelligence officer. You've got to be hardened to danger that you'll get your head knocked off, figuratively at any rate, if you bring in the bad news but any intelligence officer whose worth his salt, if he finds the bad news, is going to labor to get it up there where it will permit a note of prudence and readjustment if necessary in our policy-making. That's what it's all about. Thank you, I think I'll stop now and I'll take questions later.

## LUNCHEON PLENARY SESSION

INTRODUCTION BY

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT C. KINGSTON

General Zais, distinguished guest, ladies and gentlemen, I mentioned yesterday in my opening remarks that this Institute seeks every opportunity to hone the edge on our highly qualified students to carry out the foreign area officer specialty's sensitive assignments. As was mentioned, this symposium represents one method in which we sharpen the officer's politico-military awareness. Another avenue open to the Institute is to avail ourselves of the resources of such agencies as the State Department. We are able to accomplish this through the effort and support of the man I am about to introduce, Mr. George Churchill. Mr. Churchill has been affiliated with the Institute since March, 1976, when he became the State Department liaison officer with us. Mr. Churchill studies at Yale University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He served in the field artillery from 1943-1946. He joined the State Department four years later and has served in Germany, Italy, Singapore, Turkey, and Greece, service in Washington included officer in charge of Turkish affairs from 1946-1968 and country director for Greece from 1971-1974. Currently, Mr. Churchill is the Director, International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, a position that makes him uniquely qualified to address "Foreign Policy: The Politico-Military Perspective,"--Mr. Churchill.



FOREIGN POLICY: THE POLITICO-MILITARY  
PERSPECTIVE

DELIVERED BY

MR. GEORGE T. CHURCHILL

As long as the Soviet Union poses a real, immediate, and potentially overwhelming threat, we will continue to have a foreign policy dominated by--indeed almost totally preoccupied with--strategic concerns. I use the word "strategy" here in the sense of the business of the "strategon," the classical military commander. In that sense we have a "strategic" foreign policy. Every other aspect of our dealings with foreign countries--trade, investment, help to developing countries, humanitarian efforts, promotion of our own values--must be examined carefully to see whether it helps or hinders our position vis-a-vis the rival super power. As Secretary Kissinger pointed out, we have two main foreign policy objectives:

"One is to maintain our security and the security of our allies. The second one is to live in a world which is compatible with our values."

"And you cannot" he went on to say, "you cannot implement your values unless you survive."

While the circumstances of today's world oblige us to pursue a "strategic" foreign policy, it is important to keep this state of affairs in perspective.

We should be clear, for example, about the distortion our security preoccupation imposes on our relations with the world. Imagine for a moment that the Soviet Union were to break up overnight into a dozen ethnic states each interested in its own domestic affairs. How would our foreign policy evolve, with the Soviet threat eliminated, and with any direct threat from China still remote? While we would always need an adequate defense posture, our survival would no longer be a dominant issue. We would begin to see how our overriding defense needs had in some cases cloaked profound differences in values and goals and in other cases blinded us to a natural affinity or to a mutuality of interests. We can guess that our interest, for example, in Turkey or Greece would be quite different from what it

is today. Certainly our relations with most European countries would become more contentious as trade and monetary issues took precedence over the unity imposed on us for almost two generations by our common defense needs. We would perhaps look with rather more equanimity on events in remote places like Angola or Ethiopia, if we were no longer constantly obliged to watch for fatal leaks in the dike. Our foreign relations would no doubt remain a complex and sometimes turbulent business, but would perhaps reflect more closely the rich, diverse fabric of our national values and interests than does the sometimes monochromatic foreign policy to which we are now uneasily wedded.

We should also keep in mind that our preoccupation with security is not an inevitable result of our coming-of-age as a nation, but is a response to a very specific world situation--a situation that can, and hopefully will--change over time. There is a fine line we must walk; we must maintain an adequate defense in this nuclear age, and we must at the same time be alert for any changes in the world that would allow us to broaden and diversify the content of our foreign policy. While a premature weakening of our defense posture could be fatal, a failure to perceive and react to change could lock us into an unnecessarily defensive mode which would alienate us from the world and inexorably corrode our own values.

We can expect that we will continue to follow the twin policy of detente and preparedness, these being really two faces of the same coin. Such activities as Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, Strategic Arms Limitations, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe may seem cumbersome, but they do provide an alternative to a more unbridled competition. On the side of preparedness, the deterrence triad figures large, and along with it the development of conventional forces to deter and defend against attack in Europe and to meet likely threats to our security elsewhere. While accepting a "Strategic" foreign policy and the need for preparedness as imperatives, we should also be aware of the dangerous excesses into which such a policy can lead us.

A study of our overseas base requirements in 1968 concluded that a successful defense of the continental United States could be assured by bases in the United States, Canada, and the Caribbean. The same study recognized that

it is nonetheless desirable to maintain a first line of defense at a considerable distance from our shores, through the NATO Alliance. Beyond that, disturbances in such places as Korea and Vietnam have been seen as affecting our security, although at yet another remove from our direct defense requirements. Even further, almost any crisis in the world can be perceived as an event that could--in Secretary Kissinger's words--"in time affect American security even if it didn't do so immediately." Carried to its logical conclusion, this view would extend the American defense perimeter into every nook and cranny not already occupied by a Russian. Our credibility and prestige would thus become dependent on our willingness to go all out to influence events in areas quite remote from our direct interests. As General Weyand commented in a recent article in Armor, "If we fail to respond, we can anticipate a constant slicing away, each slice not significant in itself, until our very existence is threatened."

The image of salami being sliced has always been a compelling one, and if the monetary and political costs of such a defense concept were modest it would be difficult to quarrel with the General. However, budgetary considerations aside, the political cost of influence or intervention increases rapidly as we proceed from contiguous areas toward regions that are remote from our national territory.

Measures seen by one power to be legitimate defensive measures are often interpreted by another power as an aggressive move. The further we go from the central defense of a nation the more likely this difference of perceptions becomes. The British desire in the 1870's to defend India by controlling territory as far as the Black Sea was, not surprisingly, perceived by those in the neighborhood as an aggressive intent. We can wonder--though we have so little insight into Soviet strategic thinking--how the Russians see their ventures in regions at the margins of their direct area of interest. Is Angola, or Somalia, part of an aggressive Soviet design, or do the Russians perceive such efforts as a legitimate attempt to compensate for their own perilously close defense perimeter?

I am not attempting to say where our defense perimeter should lie, but would like to point out that there is a distinction to be made between a reasonable forward defense

Posture, and a posture so forward that it escalates political costs well beyond the benefits we might expect to receive.

In pursuing a "strategic" foreign policy it becomes all too easy to see other countries only in the narrow focus of our own defense requirements. The British, for example, saw Egypt before the Second World War as a vital link in the Empire's defense system, and as little else. Overlooked were Egypt's national aspirations that sometimes ran counter to British needs. Egypt's formal break with Britain in 1951 stemmed to a large extent from this rigidity in British perceptions. For our part, we should acknowledge that Iceland, Greece, and Turkey, for example do not always see their NATO defense role as the central fact of their national life, and we should not be as surprised as we usually are when they forcefully remind us that cod-fish or off-shore oil are more important to them than our bases. A preoccupation with the strategic aspects of our relations with the world must not blind us to psychological and political developments that can, if not properly handled, undermine our global influence as surely as a military defeat.

A central issue of any "strategic" foreign policy must be to achieve a satisfactory match between objectives and capabilities. What military forces and dispositions will be required to support our objectives? And conversely, how will we need to adjust our objectives to take into account the limitations on our military power and political influence? These are questions that can never be fully answered; but the process of addressing them, the pull-and-haul of diverse points of view about them, will determine the directions our foreign policy will take.

In few places is this pull-and-haul of different points of view so clearly seen as in the question of our overseas basing and operating rights. We can all agree on the need for an overseas base structure, which supports our forward defense policy, and allows flexibility in our response to crisis situations. Secretary Kissinger remarked several months ago that: "In a crisis the President must have other choices than capitulation or resort to strategic nuclear weapons." Without our military arrangements overseas, we would be severely limited in these choices.

Today's base system is the product of many decisions made to meet changing conditions, rather than the forward

projection of a master plan. Despite this ad hoc quality, our overseas basing arrangements do serve to keep our options open in most areas of the world where threats to our national security could develop. The forces we maintain in Europe and the bases from which they operate are essential to our first line of defense. Intelligence gathering facilities around the world are also--taken as a whole effort--essential to our defense, although the utility of individual sites might be questioned.

Other bases and operating rights, for example in the Philippines or Japan, primarily support US missions in areas other than the host country and it is arrangements of this kind that raise the most interesting questions as to cost and availability in a crisis. The importance and the vulnerability of these arrangements were driven home to us during the 1973 Middle East conflict. We were not allowed to resupply Israel through facilities in Spain or Italy or Greece. If we had not been able to use Lajes in the Azores, we would have had to conduct the entire airlift with C-5As, with much reduced payloads, greatly increasing the number of missions that would have to be flown and sending the cost sky high.

We need a forward defense posture and we need the base structure essential to support it, but there will always be a question as to the optimum extent of these military arrangements overseas. Our military colleagues inevitably--and correctly from the point-of-view of their responsibilities--believe there can hardly be enough of a good thing when it comes to bases, facilities, operating rights, in short all the paraphernalia needed to support a substantial capability to respond to a crisis wherever one might occur. The geographic bureaus in the Department of State--also correctly from their point of view--are quick to perceive the political costs that go along with even our present base structure, let alone any new additions. Somewhere between the two presumably can be found a balance where the political costs are still at least barely tolerable, and our options for response still reasonably open.

Despite numerous attempts to "rationalize" our overseas basing system, to fit it into a conceptual framework, our policy in this important area continues to be formed by the week-to-week hammering out of interagency positions on specific projects. Our forward defense posture in the last decades of this century will follow

from actions we are taking today in pursuing base negotiations with such countries as Turkey, Greece, Portugal and the Philippines, and in making arrangements for intelligence sites, communications facilities, and numerous other operating rights.

In this day-to-day decision-making process, several themes frequently recur.

One is a question: Which should be determined first? Our basing structure or our foreign policy objectives. In the Philippine negotiations some felt that we should first decide what our post-Vietnam objectives in the Western Pacific should be and then tailor our Philippine bases to support them. Others believed that our objectives in that area would depend to a large extent on the base structure we were able to keep in the Philippines. There is a chicken-and-egg quality to this kind of discussion; obviously there can be no definitive answer, but the fact that this theme so often recurs illustrates the almost indefinable relationship between objectives and capabilities.

Cost is another theme that invariably arises in any discussion of overseas facilities. In the good old days, when a Soviet nuclear attack seemed to hang over our heads, many countries were eager for our protection and willing to enter mutually beneficial defense arrangements. In the UK, FRG, Benelux and Korea, and to a lesser extent in Spain and Japan, a significant mutuality of interests still obtains. Elsewhere, in the more prosperous and pluralistic world of the 1970's, our base arrangements are increasingly seen as benefitting the US more than the host country. In many cases our requirements for base usage may run contrary to some of the host country's political interests both domestic and external. Where interests diverge in this fashion, the host country will invariably request that the gap--usually a bottomless pit as viewed from their side--be filled with money.

For many years we avoided making direct payments for base and operating rights in countries with which we had a defense treaty. It seemed inappropriate that we should be charged for bases that were an integral part of the umbrella under which the host country sheltered. We did provide military and economic assistance, not as payment for use of their territory, but to strengthen their role in the defense relationship.

This premise rapidly degenerated into a polite fiction; our assistance became an actual but unacknowledged quid-pro-quo. In the recent negotiations with Greece and Turkey, the mask was torn off altogether, and the connection between assistance and base agreements became explicit.

In fact, the fiction of mutuality in these arrangements with our allies was a dubious benefit, since it tended to conceal the true cost of our base structure. As direct quid-pro-quo arrangements--and in some instances direct rentals--become more prevalent, we will be obliged to weigh the value of each overseas activity more carefully against its monetary cost. The process will be painful, but perhaps salutary in leading us to prune back marginal facilities and concentrate on those of greatest usefulness.

The payment host countries require may be political as well as monetary. It might be appropriate here to say a few words about the nature of political costs. In the military world, one becomes accustomed to counting costs in terms of casualty figures, expenditures of materiel, budget figures, or even time; all things that can be counted or quantified. In foreign affairs, we must take into--account all the foreseeable adverse effects of any action we plan to take. These so-called political costs are seldom quantifiable and--since we deal in futures--often speculative. They are none-the-less real. When we homeported in Greece, for example, we could be quite sure it would be at the cost of alienating segments of the Greek public.

When we ask a country for base rights, the political cost may take the form of actions that country insists that we take. We may be asked to increase the depth of our security commitment--Spain and the Philippines come to mind--although this is a direction United States public opinion and the Congress are unlikely to support. We will frequently be asked to back host country positions on local issues, and insistence that becomes particularly disagreeable when--as in the Iceland-UK or Greece-Turkey disputes--we have friends on both sides of the fence.

Occasionally we can escape both political and monetary quid-pro-quos by developing technological innovations that allow us to reduce our dependency on foreign real estate, but of course only at a high cost in research and development.

A final theme I will mention is the ambiguity that arises when we use war-time assets to meet peacetime needs. For example, we feel it is advisable to deploy units of the Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean to demonstrate our interest in Middle East oil and in keeping the oil-routes open. To support these deployments we need ASW surveillance, communications, and fueling, for which we require various facilities in Diego Garcia, operating rights in Iran, Djibouti, and Masirah and a communications station at Kagnew in Ethiopia. A substantial military network was built up, and an elaborate rationale was developed to explain our activities to the Congress and the public. Having gone this far, we could never dismantle this apparatus without giving the impression of weakening US resolve.

I do not wish to imply that facilities such as Diego Garcia and MIDEASTFORCE are valueless--they do have substantial value. But where we want to exercise influence in peacetime, we should choose among all the options open to us, and should avoid using military assets in situations where we could achieve adequate results by other means. When we make a psychological point through military deployments and basing arrangements we are frequently left in a rigid posture. We made our point by moving into the Indian Ocean, we get little additional advantage from staying there, yet we cannot move out again without appearing to retreat.

While there are institutional differences in point of view on the two banks of the Potomac, there is unanimity on our major national security issues, and a close and cordial, if sometimes heated, collaboration in working out the specifics of our forward defense posture. It is a time--the first time in our history--when diplomats have been obliged to learn about naval communications, aircraft--capabilities, and all the other mysteries of the military world. Our military colleagues are finding that a knowledge of their military specialties is no longer enough, and they must acquire a sophisticated perception of the whole range of our foreign policy issues.

Gentlemen, we are in this thing together. The more we understand each other's point of view, the more fruitful our collaboration will be. In this spirit, I greatly welcome this opportunity to give you a few of my personal views, and I look forward to hearing yours. Thank you.

EUROPE'S SOUTHERN FLANK: A SPECIAL PROBLEM  
OF WORLD SECURITY

A SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP DELIBERATIONS

PREPARED BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAY C. MUMFORD

The southern flank is critical in world politics being not only a collision zone between east and west, but also between north and south. The area extends from the Iberian Peninsula through France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Turkey and includes, as well, Israel and the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa. While not geographically part of the area, the workshop also considered the roles of the US, Western Europe and the USSR.

The analytical approach to the areas was to identify first, largely intractable problems; second, developing



Gen (Ret) Melvin Zais Discusses his perspective on European Security as seen through the eyes of the NATO forces Southern Flank Commander.

trends; and, finally, addressing current and near term prospects. Other recurring considerations included US security interests and Soviet perspectives and possible opportunities. The following workshop views were dominant in the areas indicated:

The Iberian Peninsula. The unifying, possibly intractable problem is one of regionalism in Spain where almost 50 percent of the total population is non-Castilian with ethnic groups showing varying degrees of regional nationalism. Coupled with great economic disparity, this regionalism is likely to cause great difficulty to the Post-Franco leadership. Trends observed include deliberate movement toward increased liberalism and democracy, with improving relations with Western Europe. The short term prognosis is optimistic. Spain is more stable, larger and has a greater GNP than Portugal. It is expected that successful transition to democracy in Spain will be even more likely than it was in Portugal. Developments in Spain will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary due to the nation's conservative biases, small communist force, and likelihood that the military will support the government in slow changes in political and social institutions. The critical role of the US management of its own economy was noted as a prerequisite for European economic hopes. Spain will likely join both NATO and the EEC in the near range.

Italy. The central intractable problems are political instability and the increasing strength of the communist party in a NATO member nation. The view of the workshop is that a nation with a ruling communist party, even if diluted by some dependence on a coalition with the Socialists, would not be compatible with continued NATO membership. The sometimes hard claim that the Soviets oppose communists entering West European governments for fear of endangering detente and of driving the FRG further right, and that a continued NATO European presence is supported as a check on German revisionism is invalid, at least in the long term. The real Soviet position is the erosion of NATO in such a way as to preclude precipitous FRG reaction and the cutting off of Western technology flow into the USSR. Some workshop members saw Eurocommunism as essentially a European problem and felt that Europe will react to block communist predominance in Italy as it did in Portugal.

Yugoslavia. A sharp divergence of opinion was noted on the nature of the basic problem of regionalism in Yugoslavia. Some argued that regional nationalism has been subordinated to an all-Yugoslavia nationalism and that this bodes well for Post-Tito stability and as a block to Soviet intervention. The more well known scenario of ethnic clashes in the Post-Tito period with the Soviet's taking advantage of the chaos to enter the scene at the request of a pro-Moscow faction was also addressed. A synthesis of views was that Moscow will not attempt direct military intervention but will cultivate domestic groups favorable to the USSR by not posing an external threat. However, if Yugoslavia does begin to collapse in ethnic and regional chaos, Moscow could be expected to take advantage of it more directly.

Albania. The problems of generational change, isolation, and need for foreign technology to solve the problems of a depressed economy were reviewed. The beginnings of a thaw toward the West and a weakening of the ties to China (PRC) have been noted.

Turkey/Greece. The intractable problem of historic Greek-Turkish animosity underlies the current critical threat to NATO's southern flank. The Cyprus crises and Turkey invasion of the island has been followed by new points of conflict dealing with overflight and sea passage rights as well as mineral development rights in the Aegean Sea. The clashes and the inability of the United States and NATO to react in a satisfactory manner to either, have resulted in a partial withdrawal of Greece from the alliance and some base rights loss in Turkey, as well as sharp hostility and increased doubt about the value of NATO commitment in both.

The role of US domestic politics on the Southern Flank is most clearly seen in the Turkey/Greece situation as an arms embargo stopped all US arms transfers to Turkey in an unsuccessful effort to force Turkish troop withdrawal from Cyprus.

The trends noted include a Soviet attempt to improve USSR-Turkish relations which has been rather successful since, as one workshop participant noted, "...Turks can't be obstreperous toward the USSR when US support is in question." Some see a waning of basic Turkish anti-Russian attitudes, especially in the younger generations.

The short term prognosis varied from pessimism to guarded optimism. General agreement, however, was noted that the US Congress will play a critical role as it deals with the Turkey and Greece base rights agreements currently under consideration, exacerbating US-Turkish relations if passage is refused. While identifying serious problems yet to be solved, most felt that both Greece and Turkey realize the need to stay in NATO and to secure arms from the United States.

The Middle East. The underlying problem of the Israeli-Arab conflict seems somewhat less intractable currently than anytime in a decade. Recent and ongoing trends, which are generally encouraging, include the following:

.Israel is showing signs of moderation in announcing willingness to talk about territorial concessions for a Palestinian entity.

.Oil is not the same weapon it was in 1973 since the two factors of Arabism (i.e., anti-Israel) and resource transfer interests of OPEC that converged in 1973 are not now convergent. Oil interruption may well occur if a war breaks out, but short of war the oil weapons is less useful due to the dependence of the economies of oil producing nations on world oil commodity price and demand stability. However, another oil embargo might well be catastrophic to NATO solidarity.

.The ambivalence of Soviet policy in the southern flank in the face of uncertain opportunities is exemplified in the Lebanon civil war where Soviet armed "progressive" Syria fielded units which destroyed PLO forces. Syria itself seems to be moderating its positions.

.Egypt has expelled Soviet advisors and moved sharply toward reapproachment with the United States as national focus shifts from anti-Israel maneuvers to domestic modernization.

The Soviet approach to the area is moderated by the following considerations.

.The trends are no better understood by Moscow than by the West.

.The area is typified by a series of instabilities which unfold unevenly.

.Developments do not offer any single, simple opportunity, but are conflicting, containing both gains and losses to the USSR.

The result is a somewhat incoherent, ambivalent and often reactive Soviet policy. (This view was not held by all. Some saw a coherent Soviet approach of a projection of power in increasing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and support of groups, forces and nations with anti-Israel and anti-conservative Arab bias. Influences in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Syria and support for the PLO were noted as suggestive of some coherent "grand design.")

Some evidences of a West European southern flank policy were noted, together with a perceived US concern, if not objection, thereto due to domestic constituency politics. The general view was that Europe should be encouraged to actively participate in solutions to southern flank problems.

THE MILITARY: CHANGE AGENT IN DEVELOPING NATIONS  
A SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP DELIBERATIONS

PREPARED BY  
MAJOR CARROLL M. COOMER

1. INTRODUCTION.

This workshop examined the role of the military in bringing about change in developing nations. Guest participants invited were Professor W. Scott Thompson, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tuft's University, who chaired the workshop; and Professors Donal N. Levine of the University of Chicago and William C. Martin of Georgia State University. These men provided insights in the fields of political science and political sociology. Additional expertise was contributed by Dr. Bynum Weathers, Jr. and Colonel Howard Sanders of the Air War College, LTC Richard Healy, G5, 82d Airborne Division, and Major Dale Ackels of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

In organizing, participants determined to set the following general objectives for the workshop.

- a. To identify the extent, nature, and manner of military participation in change.
- b. To identify the extent to which the military is better or worse than other agencies of change.
- c. To search for generalizations. The difficulty and fact of numerous exceptions in any case was recognized.

Workshop discussions centered more on the role of military governments than on military forces subject to direction by civilian governments. This reflected recognition of the dominant position of military governments and military supported civilian governments.

Additionally, the workshop recognized events subsequent to World War II which tended to support the dominance of military forces in developing nations. The disintegration of colonialism gave rise to a proliferation of new nations with little basis for existence as nation-states. The non-viable entities were adequately held together by the vested

interest of elite groups through the relatively tranquil period from 1955 until 1967. A subsequent increase in disorder producing factors saw the emergence of the military as the only stable power structure with a semblance of national identity which could insure the continued existence of many developing nations. A general breakdown of family, economic, political, and other institutions forced military services to the forefront. Accordingly the numbers of military and militarily supported governments increased rapidly. Throughout the sixties the United States' perception of militaries of developing nations was one of potential professional and incorruptible forces for modernization. Pragmatism has now replaced the earlier romanticism.

## 2. DEGREE OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CHANGE.

The predominance of military governments and the nature of developing countries meant de facto involvement in change. Involvement was seen as a continuum represented at one end by directed change of military governments and at the other by civilian controlled military services. Even in nations where military participation has been characterized by civic action the involvement vis-a-vis more developed nations is much greater.

While no crisis of capitalism was identified, this trend toward military dominated governments and consequently heavy involvement in change was observed. Although the average life of military governments has been only ten years, the precedence of a military coup makes the process relatively easier to repeat. In Latin America a military heritage further facilitates military take over of government. Not only Latin America, but throughout the developing nations institutionalization of military intervention has increased the probability of direct military involvement.

The very nature of the developing countries invites a military role in change. Special attributes such as identity, organization, resources, and will, particularly qualify the military services for a leading role in developing nations.

Defense, security, and preservation of the nation are first priority for any nation. The correlation between stability and development make internal order especially critical for developing nations. Fundamental military roles, such as maintaining civil order, will therefore of necessity overshadow roles

in modernization. In the preservation of the nation-state the military tends to intervene when national ideologies are threatened.

Inflation, which contributes to instability, affects the military earlier than most groups. Not only is the military affected severely by inflation but it alone may possess the political will and power of enforcement necessary to impose taxation and other constraints to control inflation.

### 3. ALTERNATIVES.

The workshop's general concensus was that the world problems, exacerbated in the developing nations, left no alternatives to a high degree of military involvement in change. The military has come to the fore precisely because of a lack of suitable alternatives and there was very little change, especially with military governments, that the military was not involved in. The military was seen as assuming a commanding role in order to save the nation, to save the government, or to save itself.

### 4. KINDS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.

The workshop listed the kinds of change the military services of developing nations are involved in despite the earlier acknowledgement that there is hardly any kind of change in which the military is not actually involved in. The broad categories were limited to social, economic, educational, and political. Most types of change in development were found to fit more than one category. Land reform, for instance, was found to have ramifications under each of the four major categories. Principal social changes were identified as acculturation, nationalism, development of ideology, restructuring of social systems and institutions, changes brought about through propaganda and information programs, and urbanization incidental to recruitment and exposure of personnel to new experiences. In the economic realm, examples of direct management, expropriation, and provision for stability were cited. Changes in the political system were through reformation of powerstructures. The military was found to be involved in aducational programs ranging from literacy training to higher education. Programs were designed for the soldier and the general populace depending upon the degree of military control and the country. The traditional roles of defense, stability, security, order, and civic action were still thought to take priority over other roles in critical situations.

5. CONDITIONS LEADING TO RELINQUISHMENT OF POWER OR LESSENING OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.

The workshop concluded that most coups are for the purpose of correcting a failing of the government or because of a perceived internal or external threat. A military government may therefore stand aside when goals have been achieved or when the threat no longer exists. The effectiveness of military governments was seen as a function of alliances with civil service and other agencies necessary for continuation of essential services. Success may have just the opposite effect so that a military government may be reluctant to gamble with change of governments.

Military government, once in power, find they are no more immune to corruption or power-hunger than the general society from which it was drawn. The good life is a powerful deterrent to relinquishment of power. Military governments which are able to maintain a degree of professionalism find it easier to gracefully return to civilian control.

A few military governments may be unable to relinquish power because of the manner in which they have governed and the consequences of losing power -- they cannot quit because they have too much to answer for. Serious maladministration can generate foreseeable problems with no ready solutions. In such circumstances military governments may reach a point when they are anxious to allow a civilian government to absorb the abuse for the problems thus created.

Despite the spread of military governments there was the perception that they are transitional. Apparently there is an enduring desire for civilian government in developing nations. The military itself seems to recognize that it is not a completely legitimate form of government. In some developing nations there has been a definite reluctance, for various reasons, on the part of the military to take the reins of government despite their ability and evidence of a need for a change.

Military governments formed around a charismatic leader find it difficult to disengage and revert to a lower level of involvement. Nevertheless, military governments do turn over with something approaching regularity. At least part of the time the power is only seized by another group within the military.

## 6. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES.

Competition between the United States, Russia, China, and other nations was considered by the workshop as constituting considerable influence on the role of militaries in developing nations. Additional external influence was also being exerted by the business world, especially multinational corporations.

The Russians were seen as projecting their influence to an increasing degree throughout the developing nations. They have established several hard bases in third world countries and made quantitative and qualitative changes in their programs in the last two years. They are now developing an infrastructure whereas formerly advances were principally with targets of opportunity. The Russians have also made use of surrogate power; e.g., Cuban forces. The workshop noted instances in which Russians have lost influence after the initial appeal by the attitude of Russian advisors and poor supply and maintenance records of equipment.

The Chinese were identified as striving to gain a reputation among developing nations through programs designed to maximize influence at minimal cost.

The United States' influence was seen as possibly waning for the military and Department of State. This conclusion was reached because of the reduction of MILGP and MAAG strength and because of the difficulty the state department has in communicating with military governments. Reduced contact for both may be in the offering because of Congressional concerns for human rights. Contact with only democracies would severely reduce contacts since democracies will be a definite minority. Not all authoritative regimes are repressive of human rights so contact may be broken or reduced with only the worst offenders. The workshop identified this list of factors bearing on US recognition and interaction with new governments:

- (a) Ideological bent
- (b) survivability
- (c) economic importance
- (d) the impact on the area
- (e) strategic location

- (f) the needs of that country
- (g) what that country wants from the US
- (h) the perception of US support in the international community

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

General conclusions resulting from workshop deliberations were:

- (a) There was an escalation of disorder producing factors in developing nations not the least of which were the financial burdens of recent years which must be dealt with.
- (b) The tendency toward instability will continue until there is another period of consolidation such as occurred just prior to this century.
- (c) The military services may be the only stable power structure in many developing nations.
- (d) Military regimes tend to become corrupt once in power, but are no better or worse than their societies. They generally reflect the norms and values of society unless they are revolutionary.
- (e) Changes brought about by the military may be good or bad. The tremendous changes brought about by some military regimes have been regressive and disorganizational.
- (f) Military forces in developing nations fit three models: the corporate, revolutionary, or developing nations was not seen as equating precisely to the professionalism of the military of more developed countries.
- (g) Contrary to current reduction in US MILGPS/MAAGS, an increased role would seem logical in keeping open communication between the US and the military governments of developing nations. The US military presence in developing nations are agents of change.
- (h) Humanitarian considerations enforced by the US Congress may reduce interaction between the US and military governments of developing nations.
- (i) Defense, security, and stability are necessary for a viable country. The military services possess the means of

achieving these overriding prerequisites which will have priority over nation building efforts.

(j) The business community will become increasingly important in the maintenance of US influence, markets, and lines of communication with military governments of developing nations.

FOOD AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL  
A SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP DELIBERATIONS

PREPARED BY  
CAPTAIN MICHAEL K. A. LEGG

INTRODUCTION

The United States will face difficult choices in the future about the allocation of food resources among rich nations, poor nations, and the United States itself. The intent of this workshop was to investigate the role of food in international relations and the part it plays in US foreign policy. It was apparent that domestic farm policies and the demands of the US farm community had to be discussed to properly understand US attitudes at the international level. Additionally, the economic factor of price fluctuation, in conjunction with supply and demand, is a key determinant in current international food transactions. Specifically, the problems associated with commercial food sales and the meaning of US food aid were discussed as ingredients in over-all US food programs. Specific case studies were identified with attention centering on implications and future factors concerning grain sales to the Soviet Union in the 1970's. The impact of US influence on the world food situation, to include associated US requirements for market development, was analyzed in the context of effects on US foreign policy.

DOMESTIC FARM POLICY

The domestic farm situation has a significant bearing on the international trade market. Because the US farmer can produce above consumption rates, the requirement for secure, stable markets for excess produce is basic. A very high demand was created in the early 1970's due to adverse global weather conditions. At that time, US reserves were high and it was decided to sell large food quantities from these substantial reserves to demanding countries. Obviously the fluctuation of price is a result of free market adjustments of supply and demand. The desire of the US farmer is to create pure demand stability at a high price level through export sales. In a time of surplus reserves, prices will tend to be lower. However, US reserves are now accumulating and are being stored privately by businessmen and farmers who are waiting for poor weather or increased demand to bring higher prices. The conclusion is that international trade of farm

production is greatly influenced by the US farmer and his desire to maintain high, stable prices. Still, it appears the best way to achieve this objective is to regulate supply without government market intervention or price controls. There is a direct relationship between US domestic and international farm programs: domestic production drives our international food programs.

#### WORLD FOOD ALLOCATION

Several incidents took place in the early 1970's to open the international market, eliminate excessive government controls, and make US products more competitive. In addition, a global economic boom, followed by the OPEC oil price increase, provided many countries with significant international purchasing power. Combining these ingredients with weather, the most influential factor in food production, made an interesting plot for the future. After experiencing a disastrous growing season in 1972 because of poor weather, Soviet grain purchases practically emptied US grain reserves. (And the US government sold most storage facilities.) To further illustrate this halcyon period, US grain trade sprang from \$0.6 billion in 1970 to \$12 billion in 1975, and overall agriculture exports increased from \$6 billion to \$22 billion during the same period. Currently, as demand has slackened, US surplus stocks are rising. However, private business controls them, not the federal government. This increased surplus tends to depress farm produce prices, a result unpopular with the US farmer. The possibility of government intervention to stabilize prices arises. Generally speaking, it is accepted that the market price is the fairest solution, although it can pinch the US farmer considerably.

At present, many countries, including the Soviet Union and several East European countries, are relying on US food supplies. To alleviate the uncertainty of variables on sales to the Soviet Union, a ten-year bilateral agreement has been reached. US bargainers learned from the mistakes of 1972, when the Soviet Union proved to be a crafty international buyer. Minimum volume limits were established as well as restrictions to prevent resale to other countries. But bilateral agreements may detract from free market activity by restricting production and export-import trade within the small circle of "have" nations during less productive years, which leaves the "developing" countries out in the cold.

## US FOOD AID

Currently, US food aid programs amount to \$1.4 billion. On the surface this appears to be an insignificant amount, but one should realize that some food deficient countries are quite poor and \$1 million is real aid. Public Law 480 is the controller of our national policy in this regard. Generally, there are four purposes for food aid: development of markets; dispersal of surplus food; humanitarian considerations; and influence-building in the foreign policy arena. As with many programs affecting foreign policy, Congress has become deeply involved in food allocation and this will likely continue in the new legislation required when Public Law 480 expires in March 1977. In reaction to activity in the late 1960's and early 1970's, when two-thirds of US food aid went to Vietnam and Cambodia, Congress decreed, probably overreacting, that 75 percent of food aid must go to countries with a per capita income of \$300 or less. This illustrates one area where legislative constraints are adversely affecting food allocation. The US has more food than these poor countries can use. Still, the allocation of food resources and related subjects are receiving a large amount of publicity and media attention, a situation tailored for exploitation by ambitious politicians.

## CURRENT FOOD POLICY

The formulation of food policy is a complex process owing to the Washington bureaucratic maze and the recent interest of several powerful groups. One must realize that US participation in the international trade area affects foreign policy, balance of payment, employment, and other areas of interest to specific government and private organizations. Just within the government, representatives from the White House, Department of State, Department of Agriculture, the Treasury Department, and the Commerce Department are involved in the machinations of food policy through committees and task groups.

The impact of recent interest in food policy is illustrated by the lines of responsibility in the Congress. There are two agriculture committees in the Congress. The interest of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee reflects the emphasis food policy is receiving and demonstrates the confusion in Congressional lines of distinction. The industrious efforts of lobbying groups cannot be omitted as they influence all branches of the government and try to educate the bureaucracy toward the reality

of the farmer's dependence on international markets. Again, one must realize the insecure feeling permeating this issue, namely the effect to the US farmer from low prices and rising stocks. The parochial interests of allocators in the food policy formulation process produces confusion in a very complex situation with few concrete results.

At this point, one should question the need for an all-inclusive national food policy. Should decisions on issues be reached as issues arise? Or should a concrete policy be set? What should its focus be? Activity at the national level has focused on a food policy to promote development in "developing" countries as well as contingencies to handle another oil price increase which will adversely affect agriculture production as it did a few years ago. Can food policy effectively promote balanced development? Does food aid detract from agricultural development? Does a US food aid policy, designed to help poor countries feed themselves when oil price increases make that difficult, merely encourage further oil price rises by taking the pressure off OPEC? Would the US food consumer willingly bear the costs of increased US food aid and US food production to help Fourth Worlders who cannot seem to halt their population explosion or say a nice word about America? If not, then Americans face a tough moral decision: to starve fellow human beings in order to keep domestic food prices reasonable.

#### SPECIFIC TOPICS OF DISCUSSION

1. Refusal to sell wheat to the Soviet Union is a cold war action which would increase our surplus and hurt the US farmer. Other grain producing countries could fill the request, since the US has no monopoly. The US can not influence Soviet internal policies by withholding grain. Still, food shortages have been identified in many East European countries and the possibility of influencing public sentiment and acquiring hard currency from Soviet satellite countries is a worthy proposal.
2. Another possibility is to identify the countries causing instability on the international grain market and to charge them for storage of products they purchase, which is a key problem with grain sales. In pursuance of this idea, one must clearly realize the diverse and complex nature of this activity and those who will gain and lose.

3. Long term agreements, like the ten year pact with the Soviet Union, may be a trend. Several other countries, Israel, Japan and West Germany to name a few, have requested such pacts. Proponents see these as contributing to market stability. However, such agreements would commit significant crop production and lessen US flexibility in international affairs.

4. Trade barriers and import quotas ultimately involve domestic policy and are vital concerns to the US farmer and labor organizations. They can also have a dramatic impact on US relations with other countries and go a long way in developing attitudes in other countries relative to American rhetoric vis-a-vis American actions.

5. The humanitarian concern to feed the world was also discussed. It appears that the US may not have the resources to feed the world in the future. To do so, accepting that we could, might be prohibitively costly to US consumers who would bear the costs of aid, loans, and increased production. Alternatively, should we not try to feed the Earth, what selection process is to be used to determine what countries will be assisted either by food aid, food sales or developmental assistance?

6. Finally and probably most important, what form of development should be pursued? Are we encouraging agricultural goals to achieve self-sufficiency, or are we encouraging capital investment in industry to develop goods that the country can export? Will we, the US, accept those foreign exports into our domestic market so that poor nations can earn needed foreign exchange? Will we accept the possible dislocation in our low and mid technology industries that such access might create?

#### CONCLUSIONS

The discussions of this workshop focused on food as a foreign policy tool. There were few definite conclusions, which reflects the diverse views on the subject. Generally, the following assessments were reached:

1. Food can be used as a foreign policy tool. Because of our tremendous influence as a key supplier, the United States can influence food allocation. However, risks have to be accepted since we have no monopoly and there are many

variables influencing food production. Further, are we ready to decide who receives food and who will not? Pro-found moral decisions lay ahead.

2. The second conclusion concerns the preservation of the free market as the primary determinant of food allocation within the bounds of general policies and goals. The government should not become a major food exporter. Rather, international private cooperation and competition is the most suitable of market regulations.

3. Food aid policy is a development and distribution problem. Government influence can be used to direct and guide this development so long as the recipient nation cooperates. Food aid is a good bargaining carrot but a less compelling stick at the present time.

THE ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM  
OF THE  
FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COURSE  
UNITED STATES ARMY INSTITUTE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SCHEDULED ACTIVITY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Monday 6 Dec 76	Participants arrive. Instructional departments conduct preparatory workshop sessions. Early arrivals are invited to join student work groups.	Rooms 305, 407, 619 Bryant Hall
Tuesday 7 Dec 76		
0800-0815	Registration	Lobby, JFK Hall
0815-0830	Opening Remarks: Major General Robert C. Kingston, Commandant, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance	Auditorium, JFK Hall
0830-1000	First Plenary Session Title: "The Role of Intelligence in Foreign Policy"  Speaker: Dr. Ray S. Cline Executive Director Center for International and Strategic Studies Georgetown University	Auditorium, JFK Hall
1000-1030	Informal Coffee Call	Atrium, JFK Hall
1030-1200	First Workshop Session: Opening Comments by Guest Participants. Internal structuring of workshops finalized.	

Tuesday  
7 Dec 76 Cont

	Workshop #1 - "Europe's Southern Flank: A Special Problem of World Security"	Room 305 Bryant Hall
	Chairman: General Melvin Zais (Ret)	
	Workshop #2 - "The Military: Change Agent in Developing Countries"	Room 407 Bryant Hall
	Chairman: Mr. W. Scott Thompson Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy	
	Workshop #3 - "Food as a Foreign Policy Tool"	Room 619 Bryant Hall
	Chairman: Dr. Arthur B. Mackie U.S. Depart of Agricul- ture	
1200-1330	Dutch Treat Luncheon	Various
1330-1700	Second Workshop Session	Rooms 305, 407, 619, Bryant Hall
1700-1830	Open Time	
1830-2000	Cocktail Party Hosted by MG	Sink Room, FBOOM
Wednesday 8 Dec 76		
0815-1100	Third Workshop Session	Rooms 305, 407, 619 Bryant Hall
1100-1130	En route to FBOOM	Hodge Room
1130-1200	Light Refreshments	Hodge Room

Wednesday  
8 Dec 76 Cont

1200-1400	Luncheon Plenary Session: Title: "Foreign Policy: The Politico-Military Perspeticve"	Hodge Room
	Speaker: Mr. George T. Chruchill Director Office of International Security Operations Department of State	
1400-1430	En route to JFK Center	
1430-1600	Workshop Reports: Chairmen pre- sent oral synopses of workshop efforts	Auditorium, JFK Hall
1600-1610	Closing Remarks: Major General Robert C. Kingston, Commandant, U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance	Auditorium, JFK Hall

WORKSHOP NO 1

TOPIC: Europe's Souther Flank: A Special Problem of World Security

SCOPE: An analysis of the political, historical, economic, strategic, and cultural factors involving Europe's southern flank and how these factors impact on world security is to be the central thrust of this workshop. The Mediterranean today is the focal point of serious conflict. Although a quick glance at a map might give the impression of a certain geographical unity, the Mediterranean situation involves Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and even the vital interests of major non-Mediterranean powers. Recent developments in the region which could serve as a vehicle for workshop discussion include:

- a. Political upheaval and change in Mediterranean Europe.
- b. Superpower competition in the Mediterranean.
- c. The Arab-Israeli dispute.
- d. Aegean rivalries and the Cyprus dispute.
- e. Soviet intentions towards Yugoslavia.
- f. NATO's future in Mediterranean Europe.

PARTICIPANTS: Chairman, General Melvin Zais (Ret)

Senior Participants:

Professor William T. Salisbury  
Univeristy of South Carolina

Professor Robert Legvold  
Tufts University

Student Participants:

COL Collins	CPT Harbison
MAJ Ashworth	CPT Meyerson
MAJ Butler	CPT Rzonca
MAJ Ganderson	CPT Skender
MAJ Hanson	CPT Stewart
MAJ Reiman	CPT Weanson
CPT Gibb	CPT Thompson
	CPT Yacovou

WORKSHOP NO 2

TOPIC: The Military: Change Agent in Developing Nations

SCOPE: This topic is designed to examine the military as an effective force for the modernization of a developing country. It focuses on the impact of the military as one of the most modern institutions within a developing nation because of its advanced technology and educated elite. Additionally, this topic evaluates the role of the U.S. military assistance programs in the light of military regimes in developing countries.

PARTICIPANTS: Chairman, Professor W. Scott Thompson  
Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy

Senior Participants:

Professor Donald N. Levine  
University of Chicago

Professor William Martin  
Georgia State University

Student Participants:

LTC Gonsalves	CPT Harding
LTC Smith	CPT Hoberle
MAJ Brunner	CPT Leiteau
MAJ McLaughlin	CPT Merkerson
MAJ Myrick	CPT Salmon
MAJ Pruitt	CPT Stickler
MAJ Wiggins	CPT Walko
CPT DiMeo	CPT Young
CPT Francisco	

WORKSHOP NO 3

TOPIC: Food as a Foreign Policy Tool

SCOPE: It is envisioned that the discussion will center on the feasibility and morality of using food as a major tool in U.S. foreign policy. The United States will face increasingly difficult choices in the future about how to allocate food resources among affluent and poor nations. The integration of this allocation into U.S. foreign policy and the role of food in international relations will be addressed. The types of assistance and assistance programs in which the U.S. could participate will also be discussed.

PARTICIPANTS: Chairman, Dr. Arthur b. Mackie  
U.S. Department of Agriculture

Senior Participants:

Mr. Thomas A. Hammer  
American Farm Bureau  
Mr. Richard M. Ogden  
U.S. Department of State

Student Participants:

COL Beaumont	CPT Geishert
MAJ Beckett	CPT Gibson
MAJ Coniglio	CPT Hethcote
MAJ Greene	CPT Hirning
MAJ Scribner	CPT Klubek
MAJ Ullmann	CPT Steel
CPT Brown	CPT Varhola
CPT Cucullu	CPT Werling
CPT Freeman	

LIST OF OBSERVERS

Colonel Jerry S. Edwards	Office of the Chief of Staff, TRADOC Fort Monroe, VA 23651
Lieutenant Colonel Karl May	OSD, ISA, DCSOPS Washington, DC 20301
Mr. James W. Hartley	Registrar Office of Training Central Intel- ligence Agency, Wash- ington, DC 20505
Mr. Anthony W. Murdoch	Army Material Systems Analysis Agency
Dr. Bynum E. Weathers, Jr.	3825th ASG/EDAP/DR, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 36116
Captain Lennart G. Holmberg, USN	National War College Fort McNair Washington, DC 20315
Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Healy, Jr.	G-5 Section, 82d Abn Div Fort Bragg, NC 28307
Major A. D. Ackels	SRD-ITAD Rm B5E32 FANX III Ft. Mead, 20755
Colonel Howard K. Sanders	Air War College/EDRN Maxwell AFB, AL 36112
Dr. Charles S. Hall	Army War College Carlisle Barrack 17013