OCMH STUDY

SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE U.S. ARMY MILITARY ADVISOR

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Prefatory Note

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SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE

OF THE U.S. ARMY MILITARY ADVISOR

I. The Early Experience

The following survey attempts to trace the development of the role of the American military advisor from its humble beginnings down to the present time. Because of the limitations of time no effort has been made to cover the experience in depth or to include all of the many missions that the United States has despatched abroad since World War II. The survey, therefore, will confine itself to a sampling of the advisory role in several key areas and set forth the major policy and legislative actions that have had an influence upon the role of the advisor.

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The role of the military advisor is an ancient one. Through the centuries the nations of the world with less military sophistication have sought to achieve a degree of parity with their more militarily advanced neighbors. As new weapons and tactics were introduced into the art of war, it became a matter of necessity for the nation that wished to survive to keep abreast of the new developments.

There were several ways in which a country could meet this challenge. It could send spies or observers to watch and make notes and copies of new formations and equipment. It could hire mercenaries or craftsmen that could instruct its own soldiers and citizens in the tactical use of the phalanx, for instance, or the construction and operation of siege weapons

such as the catapult. Or, thirdly, it might prevail upon a friendly nation, with whom it might be allied or otherwise associated, to send military advisors to train the soldiers and civilians in the construction and employment of the new instruments of warfare. We shall concern ourselves primarily with the third method in this survey.

Although the military advisor has a long history, the American experience in the field has been relatively short. During the greater part of its existence the United States Army has been on the receiving end of military assistance. It is only necessary to think back upon Lafayette, Von Steuben, and Kosciusko during the Revolutionary War and then to remember that as late as World War I the British and French sent military missions to the United States to train American personnel in the use of British and French equipment.

The reasons for American dependence upon Europe for military leadership especially in the development of new weapons and equipment were rooted in the small size of the Army and the modest appropriations allocated to the procurement of weapons and equipment during the first 165 years of the republic except for the actual periods of war. It was natural that lacking generous allocations of manpower and funds, the U.S. Army should rely heavily upon Europe for the advances in weapons technology and changes in tactics just as the rest of the world did. Thus, it was only on rare occasions that foreign nations would come to the United States for military advisory aid rather than to one of the European nations.

There were, however, several occasions on which the United States did become involved officially or unofficially in military advisory efforts during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

One of the earliest took place in Egypt shortly after the Civil War. In 1869 Turkey controlled Egypt's foreign relations and France exerted considerable influence in that troubled country. Impressed by the performance of the U.S. Army in the Civil War and the U.S. success in expelling Maximilian and his French troops from Mexico, the Khedive of Egypt contacted Gen. William T. Sherman, Commanding General of the U.S. Army, through an American intermediary for assistance in choosing American officers to serve as military experts attached to the Egyptian service. Eventually fifty officers, including several general officers, who had served in the Union and Confederate Armies went to Egypt during the period between 1869 and 1882. They were assigned to the Egyptian General Staff and some of them commanded Egyptian forces in the field as well. Thus, they performed advisory and command functions, too.

The status of these officers was unique because of the personal interest General Sherman evinced in the matter. Not only did he recommend a number of officers, but he even granted leaves of absence to junior officers so that they might gain experience in Egypt. Although Sherman may have exceeded his authority somewhat, the officers serving in Egypt never were accorded an official U.S. status.* In essence, however, the

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* William B. Heseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, The Blue & Gray on the Nile (Chicago, U. of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 1-22.

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bulk of this group were professionals who became soldiers of fortune because of the high pay and the promise of adventure and excitement.

The last American officer left Egypt in 1882. In the following year the Department of State received a request for military assistance from another corner of the world. The Korean Government wished to offset the mounting Japanese influence in Korea and asked the United States to send military instructors to train the Korean armed forces. For several years thereafter the War Department declined to detail officers for this task. Finally the Korean Government agreed to accept officers not on active duty and the War Department consented to recommend several officers for the assignment. Once again the connection between the mission that was formed and the U.S. Army was a tenuous one. The members of the mission were employed directly by the Korean Government and the War Department provided only their names and a few samples of American equipment to the Koreans.

At any rate the military mission consisted of four men and was headed by a former West Pointer and Civil War veteran, Bvt. Brig. Gen. William McE. Dye. It arrived in Korea in 1887 and immediately ran into trouble. Internal dissension, problems of language and communication with the Korean authorities, and the chaotic political situation in Korea sorely limited the effectiveness of the mission during its nine-year stay. During the last few years the mission apparently restricted its activities to the training of the palace guard. In 1896 the Americans were replaced by a full-scale Russian mission. *

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* See Richard P. Weinert, "The Original KMAG" Ms article to be published shortly in Military Review.

Following the Spanish American War the Army undertook directly for the first time the task of training foreign soldiers. Since the United States had liberated Cuba and set up the new republic, it could not leave the fledgling defenseless. Thus, in the period 1899-1902 the Cuban Rural Guard was organized and the Cuban coast artillery troops were instructed by American officers and men in the care and operation of coast artillery weapons. Later -- in 1906 -- the Americans returned to Cuba after a period of internal unrest to maintain order under the authority of the Platt Amendment. Remaining until 1909 as a stabilizing influence, the Army completely reorganized the Rural Guard. An American officer served as advisor to the commander of the Rural Guard and one U.S. officer was assigned to each of the Guard's three regiments. During these three years the Rural Guard was transformed into a regular army under American direction. *

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* See 1. Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1899-1902, 1906-1909 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1899-1903, 1906-1909). 2. David A. Lockmiller, Magoon in Cuba: A History of the Second Intervention, 1906-1909. (Chapel Hill, U. of North Carolina Press, 1938).

American interest in Cuba and the other nations of the Caribbean increased with the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 and was further sharpened by World War I. The war swiftly changed the United States from a debtor nation to a creditor country and by 1924 it was directing in some measure the financial policies of half of the twenty Latin American states. *

* Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York, F.S. Crafts & Co., 1941) pp. 700, 711-712.

The era of dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean was characterized by armed intervention in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo to maintain law and order, protect American lives and investments, and forestall European intervention.

It is against the background of this intense interest in Latin America that Congress in May 1926 gave President Coolidge the authority to detail, either upon request or at his own discretion, officers and enlisted men to assist the governments of South and Central America and the Caribbean in military and naval matters.*

* 44 Statutes 565 (U.S. Code, Title 10, Sec. 540) 19 May 1926.

But the period of military intervention was almost at an end. In 1929 Herbert Hoover became president and he and his successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, actively pursued the "Good Neighbor" policy. The cornerstone of this policy was respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other Western Hemisphere nations. Thus, the number and size of military advisory missions in Latin America remained small and many Latin American countries did not even have a resident U.S. military attache. As late as 1938 the United States had only two missions in Latin America -- one 4-man mission in Brazil and a one-man mission in Guatemala.*

* Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense in the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960) pp. 172-173.

It was not until after Hitler invaded France in May 1940 that a sense of urgency entered the Latin American picture. In late July President Roosevelt approved a Latin American arms policy that would provide the principal countries sufficient arms to defend themselves against attack until United States forces could respond. Military staff agreements were drawn up in 1940 between the United States and all the Latin American countries except Argentina and all were in effect by early 1941. In these agreements the United States pledged to assist American republics to acquire armaments, to train their personnel, and to provide the assistance of such advisors as might be desired and available. On the eve of U.S. entry into World War II the number of military missions had increased to twelve and thirty-two officers were assigned to them.* The framework for the military advisory

* Ibid., pp. 179-183.

effort in Latin America was therefore established prior to the beginning of hostilities, but the big expansion was not to take place until after December 1941.

One incident of significance to the role of the military advisor occurred in mid-1941. Following an outbreak of fighting between Ecuador

and Peru over an old boundary dispute, the Army sent small observer teams to both countries not only to observe the clashes, but also to persuade the forces to stop fighting. There is reason to believe that their persuasion had some effect, since the action soon subsided and did not break out again during the remainder of the war.*

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* Ibid., p. 191.

Meanwhile, halfway around the world, another American military advisory program had gotten underway. With the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934 providing for Philippine independence after a ten-year period of transition, the new Philippine Government successfully persuaded General Douglas MacArthur in 1935 to become military advisor to the government. Congress amended the act of 1926 to include the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands among the nations eligible to receive assistance in military and naval matters and President Roosevelt approved General MacArthur's assignment.*

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* 1. 49 Statues 218, 14 May 1935. 2. Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, in the U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953) p. 9.

MacArthur's mission was to aid in the establishment and development of a system of national defense and he was given wide authority to deal directly with the U.S. Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The Commanding

General of the U.S. Army Philippine Department was informed that his most important peace-time mission was to help General MacArthur, although there was no official connection between the two. With the resources of the Philippine Department at his disposal, MacArthur assembled a small advisory staff of six officers and one civilian and began to carry out his mission.*

* Morton, The Fall of The Philippines, pp. 9-10.

MacArthur proceeded to draw up a plan that was incorporated in the National Defense Act of 1935 and passed by the Philippine National Assembly. The plan called for a regular army of 10,000 men and eventually by 1946 a reserve force of 400,000 that MacArthur felt would be strong enough to defend the homeland against an expeditionary force. Progress, however, was slow. First, camps had to be built, cadres organized, and instructors trained. The Philippine Department furnished Philippine Scouts to serve as instructors and "detailed U.S. Army officers to assist in the inspection, instruction, and administration of the program."*

* Ibid., pp. 10-12.

By the end of 1936 the camps were established and the instructors trained. American instructors provided assistance in infantry, field artillery and coast artillery training. One of the biggest problems was to create a satisfactory officer corps and many of the higher ranking

officers in the new army were drawn from the Philippine Scouts. Junior officers had to be trained in Officer Candidate Schools until a military academy could be set up and begin to produce graduates and an ROTC program could be gotten underway.*

* Ibid., pp. 12-13.

Philippine armed forces trained under American guidance until July 1941 when the deterioration of relations between Japan and the United States led President Roosevelt to bring them into the service of the United States. General MacArthur was recalled to active service at the same time and became Commander of the American and Philippine units in the Far East. With the induction of the Philippine forces into Federal service and the abolition of the two separate military establishments in the Philippines, the military advisory effort came to an end and the problem of training became an internal matter.* The question of military

* Ibid., pp. 14-18.

advisors in the Philippines would not become important until the war was over and Philippine independence won.

Thus, the American experience in the military advisory role prior to World War II was fairly limited, except in the Philippines. The American advisors had performed the conventional advisor functions of advice and instruction, save in the unofficial instance of Egypt, and had

sought to prepare the foreign armed forces for the defense of their countries against external aggression.

II. World War II -- 1941-1945

Many of the important military missions that operated during World War II were established before the war came to the United States. With the passage of the Lend-Lease legislation in March 1941, the United States expanded its military assistance efforts around the world. As the requests for aid poured in from nations already embroiled in the war, the United States felt it necessary to set up missions with a three-fold function. First, they determined the need for lend-lease materials; second, they provided assistance in arranging for the forwarding of the aid agreed upon; and third, they saw to it that the material was properly used after it arrived.*

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* Leighton, Richard M. and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943 in THE U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1955) p. 111.

Five major missions were in operation prior to December 1941 in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, North Africa, Iran, and China. The mission to the U.S.S.R. limited itself strictly to providing aid in forwarding material from the United States to the Soviet Union. In Great Britain a Special Army Observer Group represented the War Department on military matters pertaining to lend-lease, but its function was limited to the provision of technical advice. The North African and Iranian missions were established to facilitate aid to Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. and received identical letters of instructions. They were to set up essential

port, transportation, storage, assembly, maintenance and training facilities to provide advice and assistance in obtaining military defense aid, and to assure that effective use was made of the U.S. material.*

* Ibid., pp. 110-111.

Although the primary function of the American mission to Iran was to speed up the flow of supplies to Russia and the British forces in Iran, the unusual set of circumstances in that country soon led to a gradual expansion of the U.S. commitment. Internal disorder, economic distress, and occupation of the nation by Russia and Great Britain had weakened Iran and bade fair to make it a potential source of trouble later on. After Lend-Lease to Iran was approved in May 1942, the United States entered the picture as a disinterested friend and attempted to bolster Iran's military and economic position.*

* T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia in THE U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952) pp. 161 ff.

First evidence of the new role came in May 1942 when Maj. Gen. John N. Greely was appointed advisory Intendant General to the Iranian Army. He was to investigate the Iranian Army situation and report back to Washington how the United States could best comply with the wishes

of Iran. In the meantime General Greely was to be guided by the American Ambassador to Iran in economic and political matters. His efforts to secure for Iran a status as an American ally in mid-1942, however, invaded the Ambassador's realm and occasioned his supersession in September by Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley.*

* Ibid., pp. 166-171.

By this time the German drives into the Caucasus and across North Africa had heightened Allied interest in strengthening the Iranian Army to resist a possible German takeover. Iran was receptive to an expanded American mission, but it was itself bound by an Anglo-Iranian-Soviet treaty that restricted Iran's armed forces to internal security missions. Therefore when General Ridley received his appointment, he was cautioned not to commit the United States to any action relating to the use of Iranian Army as a combat force without specific authority from the War Department. He might advise the Iranian Army directly on supply matters and might consult with the Ambassador, but he was not to be under the Ambassador's authority.*

* Ibid.

There was considerable discussion on the size and status of the Ridley mission. Iranian proposals that he be appointed Aide to the Shah or Assistant Minister of War were turned down by Washington. Since Congress had amended the Act of 1926 on 1 October 1942, permitting the President to detail

officers and enlisted men of U.S. armed forces to assist other governments when the President considered it to be in the interest of national defense, the United States decided to maintain the Ridley mission as an American mission and to keep it small. General Ridley had two assistants to aid him during 1942. *

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* 1. Ibid. pp. 171-173. 2. Public Law 722, 1 Oct 42, amending 44 Statute 565, 19 May 26.

In the meantime Col. Norman H. Schwarzkopf had been appointed advisor to the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie and arrived in Iran in August 1942 also with two assistants. He and his staff remained under the Ambassador's direction until the act of 1 October 1942 permitted him to be placed again under the War Department's orders. * Thus, at the end of 1942 there were three

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* Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, pp. 169, 463.

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different Army groups in Iran each with a separate mission. The successor of the original mission to Iran, the Persian Gulf Service Command, which was responsible for the construction, maintenance, supply and administration of all U.S. installations in Iran and for the movement of supplies to the Russians and British, operated under command of the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East. The other two missions to the Iranian Army and the Gendarmerie were responsible directly to the War Department. *

* Ibid., pp. 91, 463.

In November 1943 representatives of the United States and Iran signed contracts setting forth the terms under which the Army and Gendarmerie missions would operate, in the hope that formalization might provide the authority necessary to enforce reforms in Iran. The Gendarmarie mission was limited to eight men but it attained a maximum of twenty-two officers and men later on. Its purpose was to advise and assist the Minister of Interior in the reorganization of the Gendarmarie. Colonel Schwarzkopf had immediate charge of the entire administration and control of the Gendarmerie and the right to recommend to the Minister of the Interior the appointment, promotion, demotion, or dismissal of any employee of the Gendarmerie. He could also transfer and reassign members of the Gendarmerie with the approval of the Minister of the Interior.*

* 1. Ibid., pp. 462-464, fn. p. 474. 2. United Nation Treaty Series (New York, United Nations, 1949), Vol. 31 pp. 458-468.

General Ridley, whose staff reached a maximum of 25 officers and men, was chief of the mission to the Iranian Army. He was appointed military advisor by an Imperial General Order and received access to all records, correspondence, and plans relating to the administration of the Iranian Army. In addition, General Ridley was empowered investigate, summon,

and question any member of the Army and to recommend to the Shah removals, promotions and demotions of Iranian Army officers.*

* Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, p. 464, fn p. 474.

All of the members of both missions served in the Iranian Ministries of War and Interior and outranked all Iranian officers of similar rank. Salaries, in addition to the American salaries, and expenses of the missions were borne by the Iranian Government. Members of the missions had to be approved by Iranian officials, had to swear to safeguard all Iranian classified information, and could have their contracts cancelled by Iran if they interfered in political affairs or violated Iranian laws.*

* Ibid., p. 464.

Thus, a dual allegiance and pay situation resulted. The members of the mission also had the attributes of command as well as of advisory functions.

Despite the broad authority given both chiefs of mission, they were hindered by two factors. In Iran frequent changes in the Ministries of War and Interior disrupted the continuity of operations and budgetary deficiencies further hampered progress. The low priority accorded Iran until 1945 made it extremely difficult for either of the missions to get military equipment, supplies, and especially transport vehicles from the United States. In addition, the Gendarmerie was regarded as a kind of poor relation to the Army and usually came off second best in the struggle for military aid.*

* Ibid., pp. 464-473.

The political and fiscal situation in Iran and the difficulties in securing supplies and equipment from the United States did not completely impede improvement in both the Gendarmerie and the Army. The Schwarzkopf mission established training schools for noncommissioned officers and drivers, improved the communications net, created a esprit de corps, strengthened discipline, and instituted more efficient procedures in administration. General Ridley was able to reorganize the supply and auxiliary branches of the Army by setting up a depot system of supply with centralized responsibility for procurement, distribution and troop payment. Improved control of the Army's health through inoculations and anti-malaria measures was also introduced.*

* Ibid.

All in all, the progress of the two missions during the war was significant in spite of the many obstacles that they encountered on both the Iranian and American sides. The Army and Gendarmerie were improved considerably but still much remained to be done. The end of the war and the ensuing dispute between Russia and the Anglo-American partners over Iran's status would focus world attention on that touchy political situation and force the United States to reassess its military and economic aid programs to Iran.

Before leaving Iran, there is one development that deserves mention because of its relationship to what was later to become known as civic action. In late 1943 the President, at the urging of the State Department, authorized the Persian Gulf Command, successor to the Persian Gulf Service Command, to furnish equipment and men to aid Iran in transporting food and fuel products for civilian use. As a follow-up to this, the War Department in February 1944 amended the Letter of Instructions to the Persian Gulf Command (PGC) granting it discretionary authority to render similar aid for short periods when the State Department requested it and provided it did not interfere with the primary mission of the command. However, the War Department soon sent along a word of caution to the PGC, "We do not want American soldiers to undertake any work that can be done by Iranian civilians or soldiers. Assignment of American troops to execute any requests would be the best way of meeting the situation, but this method would not be in conformance with the principle of aiding the Iranians to aid themselves, and would deter the development of Iranian abilities."*

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* Ibid., pp. 456-459.

The effort to strengthen Iran's self-reliance and to improve the public image of the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie in the process was a forerunner of civic action programs carried out later on in other countries with similar goals.

From Iran to China is a long leap into a quite different situation. The Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek had been fighting the

Japanese sporadically since 1931 and attempting to crush the Communist movement in China since the 1920's. Serious fighting with the Japanese broke out in 1937, however, and by 1940 Japanese forces had sealed off the Chinese coast and seized Indo-China shutting off supplies by that route. Only the tortuous Burma Road remained open in late 1940 when President Roosevelt approved sending military aid to China.*

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* Romanus, Charles F. and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China in THE U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II Series (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953) pp. 5-11.

Although the Chinese forces had been trained previously by German, Italian, and Russian missions, and the Chinese combat forces were much improved in comparison to their former status, they still lacked a competent supply organization and the technical knowledge required to operate modern equipment. It was estimated that only about half of the supplies that left south Burma ever arrived at Chungking.* Therefore,

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* Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, p. 108.

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when American military aid to China began to arrive in 1941, a U.S. military mission, headed by Brig. Gen. John Magruder, was sent to China to insure that the supplies reached their destination and were properly used.*

* Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 27-30.

General Magruder and some members of his mission arrived in China in October with orders to "advise and assist the Chinese Government in all phases of procurement, transport, and maintenance of materials equipment and munitions. . ." The mission was also to help train Chinese personnel in the use and maintenance of the supplies and equipment and to explore ways and means of improving the line of communication.*

* Ibid.

The American Military Mission or AMMISCA as it was called had two functional subgroups -- one operated along the line of communication from Burma to China and the other in Washington to handle liaison with the agencies providing supplies and equipment to China. AMMISCA officers had five major fields of interest in China: communications, aviation, military supply, arsenals, and military training. They were warned not to enter into any commitments with the British, Chinese, or other U.S. agencies without securing approval through diplomatic channels. Also included in their instructions was a word of caution that they should not expect the Chinese characteristics to change, but that the mission could be effective if it could put its advice and aid in forms that were practicable.*

* Ibid., p. 32.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, aid to China assumed a new urgency and importance. The Army sent Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell to China in March 1942 to take command under Chiang Kai-shek of all U.S. military forces in that area and such Chinese forces as might be assigned to him. In addition, he was to supervise and control all U.S. defense-aid affairs; to represent the United States on any international war council in China; to act as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo; and to improve, maintain, and control the Burma Road in China. Stilwell's mission was to "increase the effectiveness of United States assistance to the Chinese Government for the prosecution of the war and to assist in improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army."*

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* Ibid., pp. 73-74.

The multiplicity of roles assigned Stilwell placed him in an awkward position from the beginning. As Chief of Staff to Chiang, he was under the Generalissimo's command. Yet as supervisor of lend-lease aid and as military representative of the President, he was responsible to Washington. Later on, when he was also made Deputy Commander of the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) he assumed a further responsibility to the British Commander of SEAC. The split/Chinese, Americans, and British loyalties were reconcilable only as long as the agreed on common goals and on ways and means to achieve these goals. Unfortunately, disagreements were frequent and Stilwell was usually the focal point of pressures from two or even three sides.*

* Ibid., p. 87. See also Romanus, Charles F. and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems in U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1956) pp. 160 ff.

Nevertheless, Stilwell made a valiant effort to carry out his difficult mission. He gave the members of his mission assignments based on a corps headquarters organization. Shortly after he reached the China area, he was appointed commander of the Chinese forces in Burma. The Chinese 5th and 6th Armies were fighting a losing battle with the Japanese in early 1942 and being forced to withdraw northward. Stilwell used a personal staff and liaison system to help him exercise command over the Chinese forces. His staff and selected senior Chinese officers prepared plans, staff studies, and orders for his approval. Orders were then sent to the Chinese General Staff Mission to Burma, which translated and put them into the accepted format and then transmitted them to the Chinese Army commanders. American liaison officers with the Chinese armies reported to Stilwell on the execution of the orders in the field. In Burma in 1942 Stilwell placed the main burden of command upon the Chinese commanders, since they were experienced leaders and their units were picked troops. *

* Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 105.

The defeat in Burma was followed by withdrawal into India where Stilwell succeeded in establishing a training center at Ramgarh for

two Chinese divisions. His main concept was that the Chinese soldier was equal to any if properly taught. Basing his training program on the U.S. Mobilization Training Program, Stilwell had the Chinese soldiers trained to use rifles, machine guns, morters, hand grenades and light anti-tank guns under any conditions. A course in jungle warfare was included and the U.S. artillery section at the training center taught the Chinese to use pack artillery and assault guns especially under jungle conditions In the process sanitation and personal hygiene measures were also introduced and enforced. As was so often the case, one of the greatest obstacles was the language barrier and great ingenuity was required to explain the mechanical terms and concepts to the Chinese.*

* Ibid., pp. 214-220.

When the individual training ended, the Chinese commanders carried out their own unit training, guided by directives issued by the training center. The latter provided facilities, training aids, ammunition, and instructors as required. The Chinese commanders carried out the training schedules; the Americans provided aid and guidance; and the British and Indians furnished food, clothing, pay, shelter, and the greater part of the supplies. As in Iran, the basic principle was to help the Chinese to help themselves.*

* Ibid., p. 220.

When the effort to retake Burma began in the fall of 1943, Stilwell used the Chinese forces trained at Ramgarh. Employing an expanded version of his 1942 system of maintaining control over the Chinese units, he organized an American liaison net that extended down to the battalion level. He assigned a small staff of advisors commanded by a colonel and containing supply, signal, medical, motor, and veterinary officers, to each division. At the regimental and battalion levels there was an American field grade officer and usually a senior captain respectively. All of the advisors at each level had attached radio teams to maintain contact with higher headquarters and the division team kept in touch with the Chinese General Staff headquarters in India.*

* Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 33.

The liaison personnel, however, had no powers of command; they could only persuade and advise. Since the Chinese officers usually were veterans of the first Burma campaign and senior to the advisor, problems of experience, face, and rank often put the American advisors at a disadvantage. Despite these handicaps the Americans and Chinese worked fairly well together during the second Burma effort.*

* Ibid., pp. 33-34.

The American success in training and employing the Chinese divisions in India-Burma was not matched by developments in China itself. Internal conflicts between Chaing and the Communists, corruption and inefficiency in