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By ky NARA Date 8-25-8

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S E C R E T

POST-WAR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TRAINING PLAN

(First Draft)

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I. DISCUSSION:

- (1) a. The basis for the Post-War Military Intelligence Training Plan is the PLAN FOR ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM FOR THE POST-WAR ARMY prepared by the A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, for use of the Special Planning Division, WDGS, dated 31 Oct 1944.
- b. The above Plan sets up a structure consisting of three divisions: The Military Intelligence Division; The Military Intelligence Service; and The Military Intelligence Corps, each with its separate responsibilities.
- c. The Military Intelligence Corps is charged with providing highly-trained intelligence and counterintelligence personnel for duty in the Military Intelligence Service and elsewhere throughout the Army where expert intelligence and counterintelligence personnel are needed. It is further charged with the operation, under the Military Intelligence Division, of the Military Intelligence Corps School which, in turn, operates under the direct control of the Chief, Military Intelligence Corps.
- d. ^{proposed} The Post-War Military Intelligence Training Plan deals with the operation of the Military Intelligence Corps School, and with all other phases of training requisite to the fulfillment of the Corps mission.
- (2) a. The recommendations which are made in this Plan are dictated by the fact that our Military Intelligence ^{establishment} ~~Service~~ was not fully prepared for the present war, ~~either in its accumulation of intelligence or in its machinery for producing and disseminating it.~~ It is deemed beyond dispute that these faults, lacks and failures must not occur again. *particularly in the training of combat (tactical) intelligence personnel*
- b. An analysis of the above faults is contained in TAB A of this Memorandum.
- (3) The collection, recording, evaluation, ~~and~~ interpretation and dissemination of military intelligence, together with adequate counterintelligence measures, are command responsibilities. Commanders must be trained in appreciation as well as execution of this responsibility. They must know how to gain maximum results from the intelligence agencies at their disposal, and they must be supplied with highly-trained personnel for all of the requisite agencies.

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- (4) During the post-war period, the securing and training of military intelligence personnel will be a continuing problem because
 - (a) the character of intelligence knowledge requires constant study and application, and
 - (b) because the demands of another war can only be met by a large number of individuals trained in various specialties.

- (5) The responsibility of the Military Intelligence Corps to provide these trained specialists in sufficient numbers can only be discharged by a thoroughly-evaluated, carefully-planned long-range training program based upon the overall organizational plan of the Military Intelligence System, as approved.

II. THE MISSION:

- (1) The Military Intelligence Training Mission is two-fold:

~~ix~~

1. To train Regular Army personnel (commissioned and enlisted) in sufficient numbers to maintain an active regular Military Intelligence Corps *(or a well trained pool of qualified intelligence officers.)*
2. To train Organized Reserve personnel (commissioned and enlisted) in sufficient numbers to maintain an adequate pool of trained intelligence specialists to meet M-Day expansion needs.

- (2) The Military Intelligence Corps is charged with training other than that conducted at the Military Intelligence Corps School.

- a. Training of Corps members in domestic or foreign institutions.
- b. Training of Corps members in schools of major commands.
- c. Training of Corps members in foreign military schools.

- (3) Instruction of Corps personnel, whether conducted in the Military Intelligence Corps School or elsewhere, will consist of all phases of War Department intelligence, combat intelligence and counterintelligence included in the mission of the Military Intelligence Corps. The training will be applied to both regular and reserve elements in order that qualified and effective personnel may be available in both peace and war. In order to insure that the Military Intelligence Corps is responsive to the needs of the Army, its military personnel, both regular and reserve, will receive additional training within the various arms and services.

(4) Emphasis must be placed upon the training of the Reserve component. The pre-war Military Intelligence Reserve was untrained, was treated as an orphan, and permitted to dwindle in scope until it was largely a Public Relations Reserve. Reserve officers of the arms, who will

be command... *... T-11 officers in war, also must be*
given sufficient equipment to equip them for
out the same way comm... responsibilities.

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
- (A) Except as indicated herein, the major commands will be responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence training within their respective jurisdictions. They will operate intelligence and counterintelligence schools or provide intelligence and counterintelligence courses within other schools as required to meet the special needs of the various arms and services. However, intelligence training of MIC personnel (other than unit training after assignment to a major command) will be a responsibility of the Chief, Military Intelligence Corps. In addition the Chief, Military Intelligence Corps will be responsible for training selected individuals from the Army as a whole in any other phase of intelligence or counterintelligence in which centralized War Department instruction is found desirable. (Note: This category may include such subjects as foreign order of battle, organization, uniforms, weapons, equipment and maps the exploitation of documents, aerial photographs, signal intelligence and prisoners of war; and any other subjects in which the Military Intelligence School should be a leading authority. The extent of assignment of MIC personnel to T/O positions in the major commands will influence the number of students and program of instruction under this category.)

III. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CORPS SCHOOL:

- a. A Military Intelligence Corps School should be established in order to fulfill the Military Intelligence Training Mission.
- b. For operating details of the Military Intelligence Corps School see the following Tabs of this Memorandum:
 - (1) MICS Plant -- TAB B
 - (2) MICS suggested T/O -- TAB C
 - (3) Sources of trainees -- TAB D
 - (4) MICS Troop Allotments -- TAB E
 - (5) MICS Curricula -- TAB F
 - (6) Language Training -- TAB G

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That a Military Intelligence Corps School be established.
- b. That the Military Intelligence Corps School be operated by the Chief, Military Intelligence Corps under the Military Intelligence Division.
- c. That the Military Intelligence Training Mission be officially defined as set forth in Section II of this Memorandum.
- d. That the site of the Military Intelligence Corps School be chosen with due respect to the considerations as outlined in TAB B of this Memorandum.
- e. That the allotment of Military Intelligence trainees be approved as set forth in TAB E of this Memorandum.



TAB A -- Post-War Intelligence Training Plan

Our Military Intelligence ~~Service~~ ^{establishment} was not fully prepared for the present war, either in its accumulation of intelligence or its machinery for producing and disseminating it. In the early stages of this war in Europe, United States forces were again, as in the last war, in a large degree dependent upon our allies for intelligence of the enemy; ~~In the Far East intelligence was disastrously lacking. In Latin America, where we should have been vitally concerned our efforts were meager and uncoordinated.~~ ^{and in other areas our position was weak.} The following points are brought out to indicate some of the ways in which we failed.

1. Responsibility of Command: Commanders were largely unappreciative of the need for or the value of intelligence. Too many did not, initially, know how to use intelligence agencies.
2. Implementation of Policies: Lack of equipment, funds, facilities, and command understanding hampered early efforts. In addition, the personnel policy followed has failed to provide either adequate progressive training or sufficient continuity of individuals in intelligence activities to insure qualifications.
Staff Officers:
3. At the start of the war there was a complete lack of properly trained intelligence staff officers, especially on Regimental and Battalion levels. Combat intelligence training had been virtually nil and few if any officers in the Army had had actual or practical experience. G-2's and S-2's were drawn from all branches of the Service and sections had to be built from scratch and learn the hard way ^(frequently handicapped by commanders' lack of interest.)
4. Photo-Interpreters: We had none. All through the African and Sicilian campaigns we were forced to rely upon British PI Teams. It takes time to train these ~~people~~ ^{specialists}, and the need was immediate and urgent. ^{when training}
5. Order-of-Battle Teams: We had no instruction, no teams, ^{apparently} and no consciousness of the need for any - until the need was upon us.
6. Prisoner-of-War Interrogators: ~~The need for interrogators was simply not anticipated;~~ At the start of the war we had none, nor any provision for training them ^{was delayed to the point where it was not possible to send adequate military training to the hastily procured linguists}
7. Prisoners-of-War: ~~Neither did we have a plan for handling and processing prisoners of war. In the early days much valuable intelligence information was lost because of this lack.~~
8. Linguists: No linguists had been trained, in a military sense, nor was the actual pressing need for them foreseen. The sources of such personnel were not known. No provisions had been made either for securing or training them - in any language, not even French. Examples:
 - a. Japanese: Faced by the most urgent need, ^{approximately} a small, catch-as-catch-can Japanese language school was established on the West Coast. The sixty (60) graduates of this school furnished for Attu and other early operations the only Japanese language personnel to meet the many demands and requirements.

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91's was begun, the personnel was selected

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from our own staff had been rejected to permit of more uniformity in the selection of personnel to be put into the intelligence establishment.

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... not foreseen for
... ignored
... because
... demand
... became

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- b. Arabic: ~~no one ever~~ ... ~~ought of needing~~ ~~an~~ Arabic-speaking personnel until the African campaign was ~~under way~~, *imminent*
- c. Russian: The future need for Russian-speaking personnel was ~~foreseen only by the Training Branch, MFD, which procured some of its own, keeping them under control until the need broke.~~ When the demand came it was so great it could hardly be met. The Training Branch ultimately succeeded in creating an agency for training military Russian linguists. This ~~fore~~ ~~sight has been richly repaid,~~ *but* action was not taken soon enough.
- d. General: There was a lack of anticipation of impending needs for interpreters, translators, interrogators, broadcasters, liaison personnel, etc. in all languages, including the lesser tongues such as Hungarian, White Russian, Latvian for which though the demand may be small, the need may be as great as for Russian or Chinese. To repeat, the sources of such personnel were neither determined nor controlled, nor were training facilities established, ~~or even initiated.~~

- 9. Intelligence Training: Existing training, such as it was, was totally inadequate. Various needed schools were ~~not planned or set up.~~ *inadequately* Curricula was not thought out in advance. Full use of combat-trained instructors was slow in developing. *obtained, and when combat-trained instructors were not available, we*
- 10. Psychological Warfare: The great and many ramifications of this type of warfare were not foreseen. This useful activity grew from scratch and from necessity. *qualified instructors were not*
- 11. Signal Security: Early violations were serious. This aspect of intelligence training had been gravely overlooked.
- 12. General Security: ~~No adequate provisions were in existence for such vital general security measures as air warning service, industrial protection etc.~~ *Inadequate*
- 13. Public Relations: Many problems in public relations which could have been anticipated through careful, thorough planning, were not. One outstanding fault was that men placed overnight in PRO spots knew nothing of the Army. *Even M1- Reserve officers were untrained.*
- 14. Counter-intelligence: The ^{combat} counter-intelligence mission had not been specifically defined, with the result that many CIC teams found themselves working, through no fault of their own, at cross purposes. Methods of CIC operation in the field differed widely.
- 15. Military Government: Need for security in connection with MG and CAD activities, together with many other aspects of administering captured or occupied countries, was not provisioned. This personnel, also, needed a sounder grounding in the military.
- 16. Maps: There was a crying need for adequate maps and in sufficient quantities. For the Attu campaign the available maps were largely white space and such contouring as was on them was highly inaccurate. In Tunisia divisions were forced to operate from 1:200,000 maps *--- and no aerial photos.*

many

TAB G - LANGUAGE TRAINING

1. Military Intelligence language requirements are these:

- a. To provide adequate Regular Army linguists (commissioned and enlisted) to meet peace-time intelligence and liaison needs.
- b. To provide an adequate pool of trained linguists to meet the demands of M-Day expansion.
- c. To insure an adequate pool of officers and enlisted men (Regular and Reserve) trained in every language which may conceivably be useful to the national interest.

2. a. Languages may be divided into two groups:

Group "A": Essential tongues.

Group "B": Subsidiary tongues.

b. Group "A" includes:

- (1) French
- (2) German
- (3) Russian
- (4) Spanish
- (5) Portuguese
- (6) Chinese
- (7) Japanese

c. Group "B" includes:

- (1) Annamese
- (2) Arabic
- (3) Balkan tongues
- (4) Baltic tongues
- (5) Hindu
- (6) Hungarian
- (7) Czech
- (8) Italian
- (9) Polish
- (10) Scandinavian tongues
- (11) Siamese
- (12) Turkish
- (13) Miscellaneous tongues.

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3. Training:

- a. Language training would necessarily have to be "farmed out", as at present, to various suitable universities and colleges.
- ~~b. Specific recommendations will be submitted upon approval of overall intelligence training plan.~~

to some means must be established for encouraging the study of ~~certain~~ certain languages, so that we will not be dependent upon refugees or immigrants, and for maintaining the fluency of language graduates.