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THE FUNCTIONS
OF THE
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
GENERAL STAFF

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The United States, prior to its entry into the present conflict, with its small military establishment, with its isolation and its traditional policy of friendliness to other nations, found itself virtually without those agencies necessary for gathering military information in time of war.

On the other hand it found itself pitted against a nation that had developed the art of gathering military intelligence in all its branches to a degree far surpassing any other similar organization known to history. The capacity for patient, painstaking effort, which the German has developed, had served him well in this task. For two generations, with the determination of making wars for conquest, he had winnowed with minute care every grain of information concerning every possible enemy. The world, during the last four years only, has come to appreciate the extent and the thoroughness of the German organization.

HISTORY.

The General Staff was quick to appreciate the weakness of its position, and the strength of that of its antagonist. It set about the development of the Military Intelligence Division, General Staff. A sketch of the branch, its origin and its evolution since war was declared, may prove illuminating.

In 1885 the Secretary of War called upon his subordinates for certain important information concerning a foreign army. He was told that there existed no office nor officer charged with the collection or supply of military information. To meet the obvious need, he created a Military Information Division in the office of the Adjutant General. Four years later, it became a separate division under the personal supervision of the Adjutant General.

In August, 1903, this division was transferred to the Office of the Chief of Staff, and later became the Second Division of the General Staff. In June, 1908, the Second and Third Divisions were consolidated and the work was thereafter handled by what was known as the Military Information Committee of the Second Section, General Staff. Personnel and appropriations were limited, the powers of the committee were narrow and its accomplishments, though valuable, were necessarily meagre. Such was the situation at the time war was declared.

The entrance into the war with Germany made an immediate extension of intelligence work necessary. On April 28, 1917, the Chief of Staff directed the Chief of War College Division, to organize a Military Intelligence Section, and to report on the requirements of this work. On May 3, 1917, a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, approved by the Secretary of War, authorized the Chief, War College Division, to put a

officer in charge of military secret service work, and to detail to him such other officers and men as might be necessary.

Accordingly, the Director, War College Division, organized the Military Intelligence Section, assigned it a chief and personnel from among the personnel of the War College Division, and delegated to it authority to correspond directly with such departments, agents and individuals as may be found necessary in the performance of the duties with which the section was charged. The Chief, Military Intelligence Section, was directed to begin military secret service work at once. The map room and photograph gallery were placed under his supervision and he was furnished with such clerical force as the limited personnel of the War College Division permitted.

Owing to the limited number of officers on duty in the War College Division and to the fact that few of them had any experience or training in intelligence work, the assignment of personnel at the time consisted but three officers—one major, General Staff, as Chief of Section; one captain, General Staff, and one major, retired.

Upon recommendation of the Chief of Staff, an item of \$1,000,000 for military intelligence was approved by the Secretary of War, and submitted to Congress in the emergency estimates. It was arranged, as in the case of a similar appropriation for the Navy, that expenditures deemed necessary could be made on confidential vouchers approved by the Secretary of War. This provision safeguarded the fund while obviating the necessity for publicity.

The task of the newly organized section was threefold. It was necessary to cope with the manifold domestic problems arising from the fact of our mixed population, to counter the efforts of the enemy to lower the morale of our army, and to furnish the Expeditionary Forces with whatever information was usable in the conduct of its campaigns.

The small force of April, 1917, has increased until now there are over two hundred officers and over seven hundred clerks. The staff is divided between headquarters in Washington and service in the field, with the addition of Intelligence officers stationed in New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, St. Paul, St. Louis and New Orleans, and at each of the points of this country where offices for mail censorship have been established. In addition there are intelligence officers with troops at each camp, post, cantonment, and field. All Military Attachés also are under the jurisdiction of this Division.

On February 7, 1918, the Secretary of War, by memorandum issued through The Adjutant General reorganized the General Staff and with it the Military Intelligence Section. It was placed in the Executive Division of the General Staff, and became the Military Intelligence Branch.

On March 15, 1918, the Military Intelligence Branch was moved from the War College to a new building at Fifteenth and M. Streets, the Translation Section and the Map Section remaining at the War College, where there were better facilities for their work. At the end of June, the offices were again moved; this time to 1330 F. Street.

On June 1, 1918, Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman, General Staff, to that time Chief, was ordered to service overseas, and Lieutenant Colonel Marlborough Church, Field Artillery, was detailed as Chief of the Military Intelligence Branch. In August, 1918, Colonel Church was promoted to be Brigadier General and shortly after the Branch was raised to a separate Division of the General Staff and its Director given the duties of Assistant Chief of Staff.

FUNCTIONS.

The duties of the Military Intelligence Division consist, in general, in the organization of the intelligence service, positive and negative, including the collection and co-ordination of military information; the supervision of Military Attachés, Department Intelligence Officers, and Intelligence Officers at posts, stations, camps and with commands in the field, in matters relating to military intelligence; the direction of counter-espionage work; the preparation of instruction in military intelligence work for the use of our forces; the consideration of questions of policy promulgated by the General Staff in all matters of military intelligence; the co-operation with intelligence branches of the General Staffs of other countries; the supervision of the training of officers for intelligence duty; the obtaining and issuing of maps; and the disbursement of and accounting for intelligence funds.

One of the important functions of the Director of Military Intelligence is that of co-ordinating the work of this service with other intelligence agencies. Possible duplications of work and investigation by the State Department, Department of Justice, Navy Department, and the War Department, are avoided or adjusted at weekly conferences held at the Department of Justice and attended by representatives of these departments who consider matters of common interest. For a similar reason the Director of Military Intelligence, is a member of the Fire Prevention Committee, the War Industries Board, the National Research Council, and Censorship Board.

For the purpose of securing close co-operation between the Military Intelligence services of the nations associated in the war, the British and French Governments were requested by the United States to send offi-

cers to this country for liaison duty. Because of their knowledge of the details of intelligence work in Europe these officers have been of great assistance in accomplishing this end.

The gathering of Military Intelligence requires investigation in practically every field and every country. Hence it is necessary to organize the Military Intelligence Division in such a way as to cover the whole world. A brief description of the problems, and of the ways in which a few of the sub-sections in this Division are organized in order to solve these problems, may not be out of place here.

It is necessary to remember, in the first place, that this war is not one that is being fought by the military forces alone. There are economic, psychological, social, political and even literary forces engaged, and it is necessary for us in order to defeat the enemy, to understand fully the strength of each. Nor can the investigation stop with the forces of the enemy: it must tend to each country in the world and to every people. The question of winning the war is far too complicated and far too delicate to be answered by a study of only the powers and resources of the nations in arms.

On the other hand it is equally necessary that we throw every possible safeguard about our own preparations for war and discourage enemy agents who may in one way or another attempt to lower our morale, damage our industries, or debauch our soldiers. We must look to the foe within as well as to the foe without.

In brief, it is necessary to know as much about the enemy as possible, and to prevent, if possible, the enemy's knowing anything about us. For this reason the Military Intelligence Division has been divided into two branches; the Positive Branch, which has as its purpose the study of the military, political, economic and social situation abroad, and the Negative Branch, which seeks to uncover and suppress enemy activities at home.

POSITIVE BRANCH.

The scope of the investigations of this Branch includes all nations, but its primary aim is to secure and furnish for the Army prompt and accurate information of every variety about the enemy. It gets what information it can about the enemy's strength; his replacement troops; his new levies; the combat situation at the various fronts. The political situation in enemy countries is also carefully studied, so that an estimate may be made as to the probable military operations by the enemy which depend upon political considerations. In the same way a careful study must be made of the economic situation in enemy countries. We must know what food they have and what raw materials; what transportation and lines of communication; their finances; their supplies and munitions.

The economic investigations are not complete if they include only enemy countries; for it is necessary to know the situation in neutral and allied countries as well, so that there may be perfect reciprocity and mutual advantage. It is highly interesting and important also to know the enemy's state of mind, his attitude toward the war, toward the leaders, toward the army, and what effect recent operations have had upon the national morale. Material of this kind can be, and is, supplied, by the Committee on Public Information, which enables us to institute propaganda by one means or another among enemies and neutrals, sometimes even among allies; for the signs of defeat appear when a country feels that resistance is no longer possible. Then it is that the enemy's morale is broken.

In order to attain the results described above, it is necessary to employ a large number of officers who are experts, who have traveled extensively, and who know where to find the latest information, for this in-

formation changes from day to day. With each change a new channel for information may have to be discovered, a search which will require the patience and skill of one who is intimately acquainted with the country and their inhabitants.

Besides the officers employed in Washington and other cities of the United States, there are military attachés sent to all neutral and allied capitals for the purpose of gathering information on the countries which they are accredited. Supervision of these attachés falls directly upon the Military Intelligence Division. By diplomatic means they secure the information desired, and transmit it to Washington where it is collated, edited and then supplied to the agency that desires it.

Furthermore, it is necessary that our Army be supplied with accurate maps of the fields where they are now operating and of fields where they may have to operate in the future; and these maps must be kept up to date. For this purpose an elaborate map-making and map-filing section has been organized. The collection of maps includes a large amount of source material in the form of blueprints, road sketches and the like. From these, new maps are constantly made. For example: before the American Expeditionary Force was sent to Siberia, it was necessary to find source material for new maps of Siberia, to lithograph these maps and furnish them to the troops. The maps are all furnished with indexes and cards of cross-reference, and may be consulted in the Map Room of the War College by anyone entitled to their use. In connection with the Map Section there are also photographic laboratories for the reproduction of maps, and the means of copying by photostat important letters, documents, cables, etc. The photographic laboratories are equipped with cameras taking prints up to 34 x 34 inches, enlarging cameras and blueprint machines. The laboratory is equipped to supply photographic copies of any map on any desired scale.

In order that documents in foreign languages, which

come with frequency to the War Department, may be translated, the Military Intelligence Division is compelled to maintain a Translation Section, where books, articles, letters, pamphlets in any foreign language may be immediately translated and forwarded to the office interested. This Section serves not only the Military Intelligence Division but also the entire General Staff.

To show the scope of this work, translations have been made from the following languages: French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Dutch, Norwegian, Icelandic, Swedish, Russian, Greek, Rumanian, Ukrainian, Czechoslovak, Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, Albanian, Bulgarian, Polish, Lithuanian, Lettish, Finnish, Ladino, Hebrew, Yiddish, Turkish, Armenian, Assyrian, Syriac, Arabic, Esperanto, Hindustani, Bengali, Chinese, Japanese, Choctaw and other North American Indian dialects, Samoan and the dialects of the Philippines.

INTELLIGENCE IN THE FIELD.

In order that an army may fight effectively, it is absolutely necessary that it know as much as possible about the enemy in front of him; what brigades, divisions are in his immediate vicinity; what guns he has and their positions; the condition of the posts, the trenches; the number and the position of the railway lines, narrow-gauge lines; where are hidden; how much food supplies the enemy has on hand; what divisions are in reserve; who the commander is; who the subordinate commanders are; who is expecting to attack or to be attacked. All this information, which is called Positive Information in the Field, must be known by an army if the attack it makes is to be successful.

Fundamentally there is nothing new in the principles underlying the duties of the intelligence section of a combat unit engaged in modern warfare. They are the same as in the past, whether performed by cavalry or by infantry patrols, and may be summed up as follows: the acquisition of complete information of enemy strength, movements, morale, dispositions, etc. In the application, however, there is a world of difference between an intelligence organization as it has been provided for each division, on which has been placed the duty of acquiring necessary positive information of the enemy. This organization is drawn from and functions as a combat unit of the Division. Its principal sources of information are (a) Observation, (b) Reconnaissance and controls, (c) Prisoners. Intelligence of the enemy by such means may be termed Combat Intelligence to distinguish it from information of less immediate value

to combat units gained through the employment of either civil or military agents more or less remote from the zone of operations.

Combat intelligence may be stated to be the essential factor of almost equal importance in all tactical operations, whether offensive or defensive, in open or trench warfare. The intelligence service is the eye and the ear of an army; and no army can maintain absolute equality with or superiority over the enemy unless both senses are constantly strained and constantly to be depended upon for complete information of the enemy's aims.

Into the front held by one of our Divisions in Lorraine in June last a "traveling circus" or shock battalion was thrown in an effort to terrorize our "amateur soldiers" and "bag" prisoners in large numbers. Its operations were assisted by gas projector attacks, liquid fire, and the other forms of terrorizing warfare dear to Boche ruthlessness. Late one evening, intelligence men on duty in a front line post, picked up some suspicious phrases by means of a "listening in"

set. On analysis, and in the light of other information gained by patrols and observers, the Regimental Intelligence Officer decided that it meant an attack at midnight and warned not only the commanders of the units in the line of his own regiment, but through Brigade and Division Headquarters the units in line to right and left. Warning orders were immediately issued and as midnight approached every man in the first line on the entire divisional front was on "the alert," ready for any eventuality.

Promptly at twelve midnight a terrific explosion was heard, and the brilliant flash that illumined the enemy front warned that scores of huge shells filled with gas were speeding toward the sub-sector picked for the raid. Instantly every man within range slapped on his gas mask and prepared for the attack, while outposts, discerning the enemy advancing, gave the alarm. Machine gunners, riflemen, and automatic riflemen, many with their weapons already laid in anticipation, immediately

opened fire with terrible effect. In the words of eyewitnesses, the front ranks of the raiding party were literally cut in two; the others broke and fled. Carelessness among our men from gas, though scores of big shells exploded within a comparatively small area and in the midst of hundreds of men, were comparatively few. A great many lives had been saved and a raid stopped with heavy losses to the enemy chiefly the result of one officer's knowing his business.

On the Champagne front prior to the big offensive July 14, 1918, the allied intelligence service conclusively, nearly a fortnight before the attack was launched, that it was in course of preparation. On the afternoon of the 14th reports of scouts and observers all indicated that the "H hour" was rapidly approaching. A raid planned suddenly and as suddenly launched was executed successfully by the French that evening, and an hour before midnight exact information of the enemy's intentions had been secured by the Allied Command. At ten minutes to twelve that night, warning was issued to the battalion in line that the enemy would attack with violent artillery preparation at midnight and attempt to advance at four the next morning. Exactly as announced, the enemy artillery preparation began and at 4 a. m. the enemy infantry attempted advance. Nine picked divisions, exclusive of the divisions previously in line which had been moved back to a reserve position, participated in the battle which ensued, and opposing them were only three French divisions and one American division. Yet five days later when German defeat had been definitely conceded, it was found that they had been unable to penetrate beyond our front line of trenches, which had been quietly abandoned before the attack. Captured enemy documents showed later that the Germans had confidently engaged to be in possession of Chalons-sur-Marne, nearly 20 kilometers to the rear of the allied front, on the second day of the action. With the successful issue of this battle Intelligence unquestionably had much to do.

These instances of combat intelligence and its effectiveness are not rare and isolated instances; they are merely two among many equally distinctive, illustrating the value of such intelligence of the enemy. Numerous instances might be cited, not only of the successful results of the allied intelligence sources as a whole, but of those of our own combat divisions and army corps in recent fighting.

To equip recently formed Divisions with Intelligence organizations so trained as to be able to achieve the same results with precision and skill immediately they enter combat, whether in trench or in open warfare, is the aim of the Divisional system of intelligence instruction and training now in operation.

NEGATIVE INTELLIGENCE.

This phrase, of recent vogue, and of recent importance in America, covers the whole field of activity directed against the enemy's intelligence service. Its magnitude depends upon the enemy's energy and its nature and the nature of his activity.

General Lewal, an eminent authority on secret vice, and one of the unheeded prophets of the disaster that befell France because of her neglect of the spy system, placed counter-espionage among the most important duties of the State:

"We cannot employ too much vigilance and activity to pursue adverse spies. It is useful to know the designs of the enemy, it is still more important to prevent him from knowing ours."

The Intelligence Officers attached to our army abroad, are kept busy by the activities of the spies behind the lines, and by the necessity for concealing from them the plans and movements of our troops. Our troops occupy only a portion of the Allied lines and confront only a portion of the hostile army or its spies. At home, however, there are many alien enemies endeavoring to find out our plans, our movements, all the activities of our army, and thwart them or at least report them for the benefit of their cause. The forms which counter-espionage activity assumes are almost innumerable, and the methods are constantly improvised.

The man or woman of foreign sympathy in the United States, who prevents the enlistment of one soldier, diminishes his loyalty, prevents or delays his arrival in France, hampers the supplies he requires, in any other of a thousand ways cancels that one man's usefulness to this nation, has done as much for the Kaiser as the German soldier who kills an American in battle. Indeed, he has done more, for he has saved that German soldier's time, strength and ammunition for the killing of other American soldiers.

The importance of counter-espionage at home can hardly be questioned, but it is difficult to realize how manifold are the demands upon it. Having met the hostile espionage at one point we must be ready to check it at every other point; must not only prepare for the familiar tactics of the enemy's agents, but must endeavor to foresee and forestall their invention of new attacks. It is not disparaging the problems of our military forces abroad, to emphasize the fact that they are threatened more seriously and more numerous here at home than in France. The activities of the spies in the military zone are circumscribed to a certain extent by conditions, by the network of sentinels, by the restrictions upon movement, and finally by the alertness of the intelligence officers attached to the regiments and divisions.

Military spying, dangerous as it is, cannot, of necessity, employ a very great number of agents, at least in comparison with the domestic supply.

The opportunities for hostile activity in this country are on every hand, and the temptation to take advantage of them is irresistible to the foreign zealot.

As there has never been a country which devoted itself so ruthlessly to espionage as Germany, so there has never been a country which offered so wide and varied a field for it as America. The German attack on the United States began long before this country dreamed of entering the war. Influences were set to work to stifle all legislation looking toward preparedness. Press campaigns of the most elaborate sort were carried on to bias public opinion, to moderate or misdirect the indignation aroused by German methods of conquest, and to persuade the country to inaction.

The immunity of Ambassadorial officers was used as shelter for conspiracies against American life and property, and against the life and property of our neighbor countries.

Efforts to stir up other nations against the United States have been incessant, and are still made. Through neutral channels, often by the most devious courses,

American banking and commerce have been and are still employed to the injury of American interests.

Schemes have been practiced for checking the adoption of the principle of conscription and universal service; later, for preventing its success by corrupting members of exemption boards, or by encouraging assistance to the draft and desertion. Supplementary to this activity is the placing of spies or propagandists among the regiments in camp or proceeding to the battleground.

Every true patriot is a believer in peace, provided it is not purchased at the price of freedom or honor. The word "pacifist" is applied generally to a believer in peace at any cost, an immediate peace, though it may in the end grow intolerable and compel another war. Pacifists have been so played upon by German agents, that they have been more or less unwittingly recruited as active agents of the German cause, and have become a dangerous element of the population, since it is manifest that any activity whatsoever which retards or diminishes the maximum efficiency and enthusiasm of a country in war, is inimical to the success of that country, and gives the enemy aid and comfort.

The function of the military and naval counter-espionage services in these matters is less executive and punitive than informational. The constituted civil authorities have full power to act, but they must be kept informed and provided with evidence. This evidence must be gathered with more or less secrecy from various sources; it must be co-ordinated, corroborated, and referred to the proper destinations.

The province of counter-espionage is therefore terminous with the national field of action. The soldiers in the front line trenches must be guarded against the enemy's spies, not only on the ground, but all the way back to the origin of enemy activity touching upon his welfare.

Officers and men in uniform have been recalled from France or prevented from sailing because of the discovery of their untrustworthiness. The Red Cross

Y. M. C. A., and other services have been utilized by the enemy. The transports and carriers of supplies have been kept under observation and information of them conveyed to the submarine commanders. The wharves and the railroads and warehouses have been the objects of attack, as have the divisional camps, the officers' training camps, and the centers for training in aviation and motor mechanics. In all the bureaus of administration, investigation, invention, and manufacture, the enemy has sought to plant his agents. As there is hardly a field of human endeavor that is not affected by the war, there is hardly a field which the hostility of the enemy has overlooked.

Besides the actual physical menace to the personnel, the equipment, or the efficiency of our national force, there is what might be called the spiritual invasion. Anything that tends to diminish the ardor, the conviction, the optimism of the people at large, is hardly less destructive of effectiveness than an actual defeat on the battleground. The poisonous gas attack is practiced by the Germans, not only against our soldiers, but also against our citizens.

At a time when the whole nation must bend every energy and make every sacrifice, discouraging rumors gain an incalculable power. It is of the greatest importance to the health of our troops that sweaters, socks, wristlets and "helmets" should be knitted for them by the devoted women of the land, and an enormous quantity of these articles provided from the countless hand looms. Suddenly a story appeared somewhere that a woman who had knitted a sweater and sewed into it a bank note for the further comfort of the wearer, found that sweater on the back of a Red Cross agent, or on the counter of a department store. This story re-appeared with inconceivable frequency in the United States. It was almost always told as the experience of a friend of a friend, and had just transpired in each instance. Questionnaires were sent out concerning rumors of this sort, and disclosed that this particular libel was quoted as of personal knowledge in every

community, from the largest cities in the east to the mining towns in the Nevada desert.

Every woman who hears and believes this circumstantial story, is inclined to give up her work. The sum total of such a diminution of output can not be computed. In times of peace such examples of wireless gossip are merely amusing encouragements to satire. In a time of war, they constitute a serious danger.

In many cases it is impossible to trace such stories directly to German sources, but they are no less dangerous for being of American origin. The misbehavior, disloyalty, or indifference of native Americans is as important a material of military intelligence as any other. The activities of many elements in the pacifist movements, the extremists among the socialists and the I. W. W., are as proper subjects for investigation and repression as mutinous soldiers, deserters or traitors in the ranks.

Stories of naval disasters to our fleet, quotations from eye-witnesses, once-removed, of hundreds of wounded sailors seen being smuggled into hospitals, tales of hardships and cruelties and immoralities—these tend, not only to distress the families of our soldiers and sailors, but to diminish enlistment, strengthen the pacifists and the aliens, to encourage resistance to the draft. Statements that Liberty Bonds and Thrift Stamps are worthless and will be repudiated have a direct financial menace.

People and societies of loudly proclaimed sincerity have promulgated the most outrageous slanders proclaiming the immorality of Red Cross nurses and drunkenness and viciousness of our troops abroad at home. Such libels left unpunished, not only reward the noblest patriots with unmerited dishonor, but they discourage sacrifice and instil a paralyzing cynicism.

The running down of such rumors takes time and labor and organization, but it is vital to our efficiency not only to stamp out such libels, but to bring home our population, native and foreign, that they manufacture and disseminate such rumors at their peril.

The German military party once regarded America with a frank contempt, and boasted openly that they were prepared for any national activity. They spoke with confidence of the damage that they would do in the United States.

Great damage has indeed been done in innumerable ways, but the malevolent prophecies have not been realized. This is to be credited in a large measure, to the activities of our counter-espionage, not so much by virtue of any visible and direct action, as by its services in acting as a clearing house for information; a central bureau which gathers from every quarter, all available intelligence, reduces it and forwards it to the point where it can be translated into action. To speak by metaphor, considering the nation as one man, the Intelligence Service, while it has neither authority to command, nor hands to seize with, nor feet to march with, acts as the eyes, the ears,—and the nose!—and as the registering memory.

In computing the earning capacity of a man, the eyes, the ears and memory are usually taken for granted. Their importance is seen when he is deprived of them. His efficiency depends largely on their efficiency, and he may be disabled entirely by their failure. Especially when he is surrounded by enemies, their neglect is nothing short of fatal. The cost of their upkeep is, comparatively, so slight that it ought not to be withheld. Everything that tends to their improvement is a golden investment.

The more successful the Military Intelligence Service is, in its offices of vigilance and record, the less attention will be drawn to it. The ambitious enemy finding himself under constant observation, his movements recorded, and his associates also watched, abstains from evil deeds, professes his peaceful intentions and relapses into a quiet helplessness which is the ideal condition for such of the country's enemies as cannot be converted into good citizens.

As the best watchman is the one whose streets get least often into the newspapers, so the best Intelligence

service is the one of which the least is heard or seen. This silent efficiency, however, cannot be attained without a considerable outlay. It involves a far-reaching nervous system of complex ramifications, everywhere in touch with the outer environment, and the inner mechanism of the state. Much of its work is most difficult and must be done in secrecy and preserved in secrecy and many of its expenditures of time and money must be without visible result. These must be charged off to profit and loss, and the only test of its value is the subtraction of what it has cost, from a fair estimate of what it would have cost the country to do without it. It may be called "spy insurance."

It may not be uninteresting to give with a little more detail some of the measures that are taken by this Division to protect this country and our army from the baleful influence of the German spy system. It is a well known fact that unceasing efforts are made to corrupt our army. Enemy agents have been found at every camp, with the boast that they would put an agent in every regiment, whose duty it would be to lower the morale of the American troops and make them less responsive on the field of battle. In consequence, it has been necessary to safeguard the welfare of our soldiers, not only to protect their health and their moral well-being, but to protect them from the insidious propaganda of the German agents. Every camp, every post, every aviation field has had to be watched for it must be remembered that it is not the first aim of these agents to destroy property or to send information back to Germany, but to do the much more serious damage of creating dissension, dissatisfaction, and rebellion among our troops. The fact that up to the present, there have been no outbreaks, that there have been no cases of mutiny, nor of sedition, nor even of openly expressed dissatisfaction, proves how successful our efforts have been in guarding our soldiers against the enemy.

To illustrate the minuteness with which the German system of espionage within our army is organized,

is interesting to recall an order that was not long ago issued by the Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Forces. In effect it was a command to kill on the spot any officer or man who advised surrender during an engagement. This order was not directed against poltroons in our own army, for we do not expect to have our soldiers advising or recommending weakness in the presence of the enemy, and there have been no authenticated cases of this disgrace, but against enemy agents. For it is known that German officers or German spies dressed in American uniforms, have during the thick of battle made their way into the American lines, and at critical moments urged the soldiers to throw down their arms and surrender or retire.

It is vital also that the industries of this country be protected, our factories, our shipyards, our storehouses, elevators, railroads, canals, docks, for destruction of property at this time means loss of energy and the weakening of our offensive. In consequence a constant supervision has to be exercised over our civil population. It is not enough to station a guard at a warehouse, who will arrest the enemy who has thrown the bomb; it is better to catch the enemy before he has manufactured the bomb. Indeed, it is necessary to make it impossible for a man to escape detection if he contemplates a Hunnish career.

There are a number of civilian organizations and government agencies who are appointed to do this work of detecting enemy activities. The Military Intelligence Division co-operates with these to the utmost, furnishes them information upon which they act and receives their suggestions. Such agencies include Naval Intelligence, the agents of the Treasury Department and of the Department of Justice, the American Protective League, the War Trade Board and the Alien Property Custodian. Indeed, there is scarcely an agency in the country, whatever its purpose, that, in one way or another, does not come into close relationship with the Military Intelligence Division.

MILITARY MORALE.

The Military Morale Section was formed in this Division to develop and maintain the morale of the American army. In no previous war has the importance of paying careful attention to the fighting spirit of an army been so generally recognized. Lest we credit this generation with this discovery, however, we might recall that Napoleon once said: "In warfare, morale is to material three is to one."

By the destruction of her enemies' morale, Germany has conquered more territory than by force of arms, both Italy and Russia bear witness. The splendid recovery made by Italy was accomplished by reviving the spirit of her troops. A section of her General Staff was charged with this work and there are now five morale officers attached to each Italian division.

We must admit that Germany has maintained the spirit of her armies to a wonderful degree in the face of a world arrayed against her, by characteristic thorough organization, and by careful instruction of special officers under her General Staff.

The Military Morale Section of this Division, in a few months since it was organized, has studied the work done in foreign armies and in our own, with the object of correlating and directing all efforts that seemed to be in the right direction. It is felt that substantial progress has been made and is being made.

A broad program has been laid out, covering educational work with soldiers and officers, so that both may know why they are fighting and better appreciate the vital importance of morale and know how to develop it. Close co-operation has been established with soldier publications such as "Trench and Camp" and "Gods Willing and the Devil Take the Hindmost."

The French Army supplies its soldiers with Raemaekers' and other cartoons. Similarly this section has planned

and has in preparation a complete poster service for company bulletin boards, which will show pictures and cartoons tending to inspire soldiers. A series of advertisements on military subjects, to be distributed by the Committee on Public Information, is in process, similar to "Spies and Lies," which was prepared in this office. Copies tending to upbuild the confidence of the soldier and the public in the American gas mask, the military rifle, the machine gun, etc., will be covered, with the approval of the proper authorities. A recent activity of this Section has been the campaign to reduce the number of "Absent Without Leave" cases at the Port of Embarkation, Hoboken, by means of a campaign of educational publicity, both within the camp and in the surrounding community.

Upon recommendation of this Section a morale officer has been authorized at each camp to act as the camp commander's representative in dealing with and coordinating the numerous non-military activities within the camp. At four camps officers of the rank of major are carrying on this work and the organization of the field personnel at other camps is proceeding as rapidly as possible.

Study has been made of some special problems. Particular emphasis may be put upon the work with soldiers of foreign extraction, many of whom cannot speak English, and who were accumulating at camps because they could not understand orders sufficiently to be adequately trained. A sub-section was formed to handle this problem, which was assuming alarming proportions, mutiny actually being threatened. A plan was devised of putting such men under officers of their race and speech. In a few weeks these men, who had been held on kitchen detail and menial labor, because they could not understand orders, were among the best in camp. They were reviewed at one camp by the commander three weeks after morale officers began work, and when asked how many wanted to go to France to fight against Germany, ninety-five per cent. stepped forward. The same work has been put into effect at three other camps, and this office has

organized and is developing a group of specially trained officers of the required nationalities to institute similar work wherever necessary. Thus thousands of men have been changed from incipient anarchists, ready for a revolt, into splendid soldiers, loyal and eager to fight for this—their country.

Work with men as they arrive from draft boards is receiving special consideration, and has been made the subject of extensive experiment at one camp. The commander of this camp places so great a value on this work that he has stated that it saves one month's training. What these efforts mean in winning the war may be guessed.

Especially fitted officers also have been detailed to study problems connected with negro soldiers and to find means of maintaining their morale. Plans are also studied and developed for the stimulation of camp spirit, by means of songs, slogans, organization names and other means of promoting enthusiasm, pride of organization and loyalty.

In addition to directing the efforts of these special groups, this section devotes attention to finding means of reducing the causes which depress morale. Many conditions, both local and general, have been allowed to develop in a way that had a distinctly negative influence, and it is the function of this office to remove them.

PORT CONTROL AND GRAFT.

It is necessary also for the Military Intelligence Division to keep its eyes open to discover if possible, enemy agents who attempt to enter this country to ply their nefarious trade, or to leave this country to be busy elsewhere. For this reason some investigation must be made at the ports of persons who attempt to enter or to leave the United States.

Perhaps one of the most spectacular of the functions of the Military Intelligence Division is the investigation of improper practices in army contracts and army expenditures. To accomplish this, it has been necessary to create a separate section under a competent officer to investigate all cases of alleged graft. Offices have been opened in a good many of the cities of this country where Ordnance, Quartermaster and other supplies are handled, and the accounts of the officers and contractors concerned carefully scrutinized. Since inaugurating this work, there have been reported to this office over 100 arrests, which the Military Intelligence Division either handled itself or in which it assisted other federal agencies. In addition to cases which result in actual prosecution by the Department of Justice, there are a great many cases handled of irregularities not of a criminal nature; these are called to the attention of the chief of the Department in which they occur, so that he may find corrective measures.

CENSORSHIP.

Finally, to this Division also come such portions of the problem of censorship as the President has delegated to the War Department. In this country, with its tradition of the freedom of the press, it is necessary that practically all censorship be voluntary. It has been indeed one of the most gratifying experiences to note with what hearty co-operation the newspapers have entered into the game of suppressing all information which might directly or indirectly be of aid to the enemy. In addition to this, books, pamphlets, magazine articles are carefully scrutinized in order to detect their possible influence upon the spirit of this country. It is not the object of this censorship to determine what the people shall and what they shall not read. The government has no such paternal ambitions. Its object is to frustrate enemy propaganda which is directly leveled at our free institutions.

In addition to censoring magazines and the like, the Director of Military Intelligence is the War Department representative on the Postal Censorship Board, whose function is to prevent a free correspondence between enemy agents and their organizations. Photographs taken of our troops in action or in training are censored, so that such as are issued during the war may not reveal matters which should not be revealed to the enemy. A great part of our training is of a highly technical and secret nature. Many of the formations used in battle should be as carefully guarded from the enemy as the plays a football team practices before it goes into a game with its rival. It would be the highest folly to permit these to be photographed and revealed to the enemy, and thus to jeopardize the chance of victory. In brief, censorship has as its object frustration of the enemy, with the least possible embarrassment to its friends.

COST.

It would be interesting, if it were possible, to compare funds spent by the Government of the United States for military intelligence with those spent by Germany. Unfortunately, the most careful investigation shows that there are no available data regarding the budget and organization of the German military intelligence system. The proverbial German thoroughness has in this case, as in some others, been clearly illustrated. In general, however, we know that the German Government has a very well-established system of military and naval intelligence. It has spent time, money and care in producing accurate staff maps of foreign countries and has at its disposal a vast amount of secret descriptive and statistical material of countries and particularly of those countries with which Germany is now at war. Paid agents have been planted in all important countries with the plan of securing useful information and of being generally of service in case of war. Even a useful commercial house like Baedeker has been employed by the German Government for the collection of secret information for purely military purposes. Military and naval attachés have not only been picked men, but have been plentifully supplied with secret service funds. Even fraternal organizations and business houses have been heavily subsidized.

During the present war the economic and psychological factors of intelligence service have been greatly expanded and their activities have become tremendously spectacular. The following outline will show the more striking fields of German intelligence work:

In Germany.

1. Subsidized Press.

Many daily papers are published in elaborate foreign editions with illustrated supplements and text in a number of languages, including Turkish, and distributed as widely as possible.

A special paper entitled "*The Continental Times*" is distributed, particularly among prisoners of war, with doctored war articles representing German victories and fearfully costly allied defeats.

The "*Gazette des Ardennes*" is distributed in Belgium and occupied portions of France. By various means efforts are made to get it into the French trenches.

2. Specially trained officers are kept constantly at work in Germany to give lectures to the troops on subjects tending to strengthen their war spirit.

In Belligerent Countries.

France has been selected as the chief ground for the spread of German propaganda.

1. Attempts have been made to subsidize the press.
2. Funds have been furnished to the Defeatists, Pacifists and Boloists. It is estimated that from ten to twenty-five million dollars are spent yearly in France, in Great Britain and Ireland. German activities associated with the name of Roger Casement indicate very definitely that efforts are constantly being made by Germany to brew trouble, particularly in Ireland.

In the United States.

There are no available statistics as to the actual sums of money spent by German agents before the United States entered the war. The Department of Justice, however, states that Captains Boy-Ed and von Papen and Dr. Albert spent large amounts, probably not less than five million dollars. German activities in neutral countries may be tabulated somewhat as follows:

1. Subsidizing newspapers. Many newspapers in Spain are German owned.
2. Newspaper advertising.

3. Distribution of millions of leaflets, pamphlets and photographs.
4. Moving pictures.
5. Acquiring interests in financial, educational and industrial enterprises, particularly in Spain and Switzerland.
6. Dissemination of propaganda by means of actors, orchestras and expositions.
7. Sending prominent Germans to make official and non-official visits of ceremony, like the visit of Dr. Dernberg to the United States before we entered the war.
8. Urging neutral army officers to visit the German front.
9. Inviting neutral lecturers and professors to visit Germany.
10. Whispering and bribing.
11. Agents of various kinds. There are nearly ten thousand in Spain under the direction of Prince Ratibor.
12. Spreading propaganda by means of wireless.

It is known, for instance, that \$480,000 are spent annually in Denmark alone; \$600,000 in Sweden; nearly \$300,000 in Norway; \$600,000 in the Netherlands; \$1,400,000 in Switzerland for artistic and literary propaganda alone; and \$350,000 in Spain.

Beside these extravagances—and they represent only a small fraction, doubtless, of the whole sum spent by Germany for propaganda and intelligence work—the money spent by the United States cuts but a sorry figure.

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion, it may not be amiss to call attention to the enthusiastic co-operation which this Division has consistently received from the various other intelligence agencies, civilian and non-civilian. Indeed it is hardly too much to state that its success has in a very large measure been due to the loyal assistance which it has received at all times from the various co-operating agencies whose functions are similar to its own.

The co-operation of the members of Congress also must especially be noted. It has been one of the most gratifying signs of the spirit of the country and of the men who have been selected to guide its destiny, that there has been close and cordial support of the agencies designed by the War Department to bring this war to a successful termination.

Congress has been liberal with its appropriations and the responsibility that rests on the War Department in expending this money wisely, has not been a light one. In an organization like the Military Intelligence Division, it is not always possible, without revealing information which would be of value to the enemy, to publish the precise manner in which the funds appropriated have been spent, but everyone may be assured that the utmost precaution is taken to insure the greatest economy that is consistent with the successful prosecution of the war.

Members of Congress have frequently visited the office of the Director and often have given valuable advice. The worth of an organization is to be measured solely by what it has accomplished. When the final summary of this war is written, the part played in it by the Military Intelligence Division will, it is hoped, not be a small one; but the full credit will have to be shared, not only by the officers who have devoted their efforts to the task of discovering and frustrating enemy activities, but also by the friends who have so heartily co-operated to make victory doubly sure.

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